In the light of neoinstitutionalist theory, this text discusses how changing procedural rules endogenous to the legislative process, such as the institution of Resolution no. 21/2021 of the Chamber of Deputies, inserted in a context of remote parliament, can act directly on the exercise of parliamentary activity, mitigate the power of obstruction of political minorities and the quality of representation. From the quantitative research, it was intended to make a comparison of the approval rate of propositions authored by the Executive Branch (provisional measures) by the Chamber of Deputies in the 56th Legislature to argue that the institution of this Resolution, by abolishing several mechanisms of parliamentary obstructionist action it concentrated, even more, agenda power in the hands of party leaders and the Presidency of the Legislative House, thus favoring the legislative agenda of the Executive Branch after its approval. Finally, a debate is outlined around what is raised by the literature on political representation
and accountability to reflect what impacts the changes promoted may inflict on the quality of representation, on the principles of the proportional system and the deepening of so-called crisis of democracy.