LEGISLATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY: SHOULD BRAZIL BREAK UP ITS BIG ELECTORAL DISTRICTS?

Resumen

This paper proposes that Brazil could improve the political accountability by breaking up many of the statewide districts it uses to elect its deputies into smaller districts, each electing fewer deputies. The central argument is that districts that elect low-to-moderate numbers of legislators make it possible to optimize the well-known trade-off between inclusive representation and accountable government. I suggest there are three broad goals that we should seek in legislative representation; representativeness, collective accountability, and Individual accountability. I acknowledge that there are inevitable trade-offs among these goals, but I suggest that the trade-offs are not linear, and that electoral rules can be designed to maximize the quality of representation. I suggest that the most straightforward way to achieve such gains is by maintaining proportional representation systems of elections, but by limiting district magnitude (the number of representatives elected per district) to moderate levels, in the range from 4 to 8. Elections; Election Rules; Electoral Systems; Electoral Reform; Accountability; Representation.