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Revista E-Legis

Dossiê Sistema Polí­tico Brasileiro - CEFOR / IMPA / EPRG-UnB

V. 15 N. 37 Jan./Abr. 2022

MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL: AN ESTIMATOR OF THE POPULARITY FUNCTION FOR BRAZIL

DOI
https://doi.org/10.51206/elegis.v15i37.718
Submitted
June 14, 2021
Published
2022-03-14

Abstract

This work intended to investigate how economic variables can affect citizens' perceptions of a chief of state's performance. The chosen approach assumed the form of an econometric model designed to serve as a popularity function for Brazil covering the period extending from 1995 to 2019. The results of this empirical analysis substantiate that people's approval of a government are sensitive to variations of the unemployment and inflation rates. This work provided contribution to the literature by virtue of comprising the longest period ever analysed in works of this kind for Brazil. Moreover, it was also the first time that the impeachment of ex-president Dilma Rousseff was included in an estimation of a popularity function for Brazil. The results obtained revealed that the event exerted a significant impact on Dilma's rate of approval among Brazilian citizens.

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