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Revista E-Legis

Dossiê Sistema Polí­tico Brasileiro - CEFOR / IMPA / EPRG-UnB

V. 15 N. 37 Jan./Abr. 2022

DESIGUALDADE SOCIAL E FINANCIAMENTO DE CAMPANHAS NOS MUNICÍPIOS BRASILEIROS

DOI
https://doi.org/10.51206/elegis.v15i37.740
Enviado
junho 25, 2021
Publicado
2022-03-14

Resumo

A literatura recente de economia política sugere que alta desigualdade de renda faz com que diferentes classes sociais aumentem suas contribuições para campanhas eleitorais. Este estudo examina o impacto da desigualdade nos custos das eleições municipais no Brasil. Modelos econométricos de efeitos fixos estimados com dados de painel para as eleições municipais brasileiras de 2004 a 2016 confirmam que municípios mais desiguais tendem a apresentar eleições mais caras tanto para campanhas de prefeitos quanto para de vereadores.

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