



ATIVIDADE PARLAMENTAR NO SUBSISTEMA DO BOLSA FAMÍLIA: GRUPOS ORGANIZADOS E A ESTRUTURA DAS RELAÇÕES DE INTERESSE

PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITY IN THE *BOLSA FAMILIA*'S SUB-SYSTEM: ORGANIZED GROUPS AND THE STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RELATIONS

ACTIVIDAD PARLAMENTARIA EN EL SUBSISTEMA DEL *BOLSA FAMILIA*: GRUPOS ORGANIZADOS Y LA ESTRUCTURA DE LAS RELACIONES DE INTERÉS

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Resumo: Respondendo à sub-representação de investigações relativas à política que influencia as estruturas de governança do Bolsa Família, tais como a política parlamentar e as relações de interesse, este trabalho identifica padrões de organização coletiva entre os membros deste subsistema, bem como alguns dos interesses organizados que influenciam o desenho do programa. Com base na análise dos discursos parlamentares nas 55^a (2015-2018) e 56^a (2018-2020) legislaturas federais brasileiras, esta pesquisa explora este sistema a partir de duas importantes matrizes teóricas, o neoinstitucionalismo e a perspectiva pluralista. Usando a metodologia do Narrative Policy Framework, foi possível observar que alguns fatores internos e externos potencialmente influem sobre o comportamento parlamentar nessa arena, e que muito da atividade dos grupos e deputados neste domínio de política pública pode ser explicado pelas premissas teóricas adotadas, como o policy feedback e as coalizões ideacionais.

Palavras-chave: Programa Bolsa Família; Poder Legislativo; Interesses organizados; Neoinstitucionalismo; Modelo de Coalizões de Defesa.

Abstract: Responding to the underrepresentation of researches concerning the politics that influence the *Bolsa Família*'s governance structures, such as the parliamentary politics and the interest groups, this paper identifies the patterns of collective organization among the members of this subsystem, as well as some of the organized interests that influence the design of the program. Based on the analysis of parliamentary speeches in the 55th (2015-2018) and 56th (2018-2020) Brazilian federal legislatures, this research explores this environment from two important theoretical backgrounds, the neoinstitutionalist and the pluralist perspectives. Using a Narrative Policy Framework methodology, it was possible to observe that some external and internal factors potentially influence the parliamentary behavior in this policy arena, and that much of the activity of groups and deputies regarding this policy can be explained by the theoretical prescriptions adopted, such as policy feedback and ideational coalitions.

Keywords: Bolsa Família Program; Legislative Branch; Organized Interests; Neoinstitutionalism; Advocacy Coalitions Framework.

Resumen: Respondiendo a la escasa representación de las investigaciones relativas a las políticas que influyen en las estructuras de gobernanza del Bolsa Família, como la política parlamentaria y los grupos de interés, este trabajo identifica los patrones de organización colectiva entre los miembros de este subsistema, así como algunos de los intereses organizados que influyen en el diseño del programa. A partir del análisis de los discursos parlamentarios de las 55^a (2015-2018) y 56^a (2018-2020) legislaturas

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federales brasileñas, esta investigación explora este entorno desde dos importantes antecedentes teóricos, la perspectiva neoinstitucionalista y la pluralista. Utilizando una metodología del Narrative Policy Framework, fue posible observar que algunos factores externos e internos influyen potencialmente en el comportamiento parlamentario en este ámbito político, y que gran parte de la actividad de los grupos y diputados en relación con esta política puede ser explicada por las prescripciones teóricas adoptadas, como la retroalimentación política y las coaliciones ideacionales.

Palabras clave: Programa Bolsa Família; Poder Legislativo; Intereses organizados; Neoinstitucionalismo; Enfoque de las Coaliciones Defensoras.

1 Introduction

The growing maturity of the conditional cash transfer programs (CCTP) in Latin America seems to be one of the factors that attract the attention from the literature on decision-making processes to the study of patterns of political coordination among actors in these subsystems. Likewise, the increasing expansion of the Advocacy Coalitions Framework (ACF) as an efficient, testable, and predictive model of political behavior made these works mainly devoted to mapping interest coalitions, belief systems, and evaluating theoretical assumptions of the ACF from a comparative perspective (LOMELÍ, 2019; TOMAZINI, 2016).

Despite these advances, researches that employ different theoretical approaches to analyze the limits and potential gains that contrasting models can have in explaining the collective behavior of parliamentarians, interest groups, individuals and civil society organizations in the politics of cash transfer programs are still extremely rare. Therefore, this work aims to contribute with a characterization of the patterns of collective organization in the *Bolsa Família* subsystem, starting from a visible manifestation of organized interests: the parliamentary activity.

For that, we have adopted two main objectives: (1) identify some of the individuals and interest groups that are potential influencers of this public policy during the period and (2) describe the parliamentary behavior associated with the program and infer, from this, about the possible formats of collective organization within the subsystem universe. The fundamental questions guiding this work are: (1) what are the individuals and interest groups cited in parliamentary discourses regarding the *Programa Bolsa Família* (PBF) and (2) what are the collective policy coordination patterns that parliamentary discursive articulation can indicate?

Attempting to answer these two questions and to contribute to the testing of some theoretical hypotheses of the field, two models of distinct ontological headquarters were mobilized to prescribe how collective behaviors may take place in this sphere of public policy. The policy feedback approach (PIERSON, 1993), in the neoinstitutionalist tradition, and the Advocacy Coalitions Framework (SABATIER; WEIBLE, 2007), in the pluralist field, points to different pictures of the means of the political resources and different structures of policy coordination. As will be further explored in the theoretical section, the former approach emphasizes positive feedbacks and lock-in effects as possible guides for collective organization.

In contrast, the ACF explores policy beliefs and ideational issues as the main factors that promote organization among individuals.

The empirical application of these concepts has led this research to test two possible alternative hypotheses about the issue. The first approach views the *Bolsa Família* policy as an institution in itself, which conditions the collective perception and commitment within its arena and, given the path dependence constraints (SKOCPOL, 1995; PIERSON, 1993), dictates a convergent action of political groups in favor of institutional continuity of the program. The second one prescribes that the organization of interests in the subsystem is based on ideological and ideational cleavages, in which the players hold distinct policy beliefs about what the purpose and format of the PBF should be, leading to the organization of rival coalitions.

These two hypotheses were evaluated based on the concepts proposed by the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) and the methodology already applied by McBeth, Shanahan and Jones (2005). Like the authors, this work mobilized characteristic elements of the NPF to perform a qualitative content analysis on parliamentary speeches concerning the PBF and statistical measurement of the findings. For the qualitative analysis, the focus was on identifying indicators and narrative elements of how parliamentarians interpret (i) the "context" (setting) of the *Bolsa Família* implementation (the political problems to be treated); (ii) indicators of how the "villains" (political rivals) were described and their role in the problems; and (iii) the which solutions and policy alternatives were proposed ("moral of the story/solutions"). All of these concepts are keys, according to the NPF, to understanding political positions, political participation and collective engagement. Then, scores were assigned to each speech on each indicator, and finally, statistical significance tests were performed.

This methodology was applied to analyze the speech of the deputies of the 55th federal legislature (2015-2018). In a random sample, were chosen 24% (40 speeches) of a set of 168 speeches in plenary were found using the keywords "*Bolsa Família*" during the period between 2015 and 2018. The emphasis on the 55th legislature in the Lower House is because this is the most recent legislature ever concluded and also for having played a leading role in the 2016 presidential impeachment, which allows us to analyze actions before and after a notable replacement of a ruling coalition.

In addition to these, important parliamentary events that had issues related to *Bolsa Família* on their agenda were selected for analysis: three ordinary meetings of the Social Security and Family Commission (*Comissão de Seguridade Social e Família*) (CSSF) - on 02/12/2015, 04/10/2017 and 19/10/2017 -, with the Ministers of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (*Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome*) (MDS), Tereza Campello and Osmar Terra; and three parliamentary seminars (13/08/2015, 20/11/2017, in Salvador, and 20/11/2017, in Porto Alegre), to discuss the ten years and the moment situation of the Unified Social Assistance System (*Sistema Único de Assistência Social*) (SUAS) (2017). In

the extra Plenary events, 38 parliamentary speeches were analyzed. In the 55th legislature, 78 speeches were analyzed².

To achieve the first objective, in addition to the speeches of the 55th legislature, interest groups were also tracked in documents of the 56th legislature: two public hearings, regarding the opinion on the bill proposal 6072/19, which aims to reformulate the financial benefits of the PBF (03/03/2020), and on the proposal to change the format of the *CADÚnico*, the unified registry of social programs of the Federal Government (14/05/2021). We have also analyzed the documents of the launching of the Mixed Parliamentary Front in Defense of Basic Income (21/07/2020). Totaling the two legislatures, more than 150 political actors were found in this subsystem, among parliamentarians, social movements, influencers and organized interest groups.

2 Two hypothesis to analyze the collective engagement

2.1 Policy Feedback Approach, a neoinstitutionalist hypothesis

The policy feedback approach carries the genetics of historical institutionalism. It analyzes interest groups, political elites, and patterns of political participation from the lens of the relationship between individuals and institutions. With the argument that institutions have a remarkable capacity to determine individual behavior, the policy feedback approach advances from the understanding of formal institutions (legal orders) to the interpretation that public policies are institutions par excellence and, therefore, a source of incentives and collective constraints (PIERSON, 1993; PIERSON, 2006).

As such, public policies own a status that gives them a series of attributions that establishes the scopes of action and limits the strategic possibilities of parliamentarians and interest groups. The main one is undoubtedly the principle of institutional self-reinforcement. Much of the literature emphasizes that, once established, public policy design creates a series of constraints and incentives that lead people and the subsystem to an “institutional lock-in” (or lock-in effects) (PIERSON, 1993; SKOCPOL, 1995), where the costs of change are considerably higher than the costs to maintain the path. This is the central assumption of the path dependence theory, emphasized by historical institutionalism.

During the implementation process, policies create and crystallize interest networks, which relate to their own operational and bureaucratic capacities and to the implementation capacities of other public policies. Operating in an “institutional complementarity”, the policies create interdependent networks among themselves and structure a set of justifications for the maintenance and legitimation of their practices (INGRAM, SCHNEIDER; DELEON, 2007).

This structure forces the dynamics of the composition of interest groups, social

² The speeches can be found at the official speeches and debates page of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies website (<https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/discursos-e-notas-taquigraficas>)

movements, and political entrepreneurs, who adjust their behavior to the environment proposed by the institution and feedback their own practices and motivations (INGRAM; SCHNEIDER; DELEON, 2007; PIERSON, 1993). Admittedly, this structure does not mean a pacification of the political arena, nor provide an environment free from conflictual relations (LOWI, 1964)³.

To understand the phenomenon of self-maintenance or path dependence on previous institutional prerogatives, resources and incentives are key elements. In the case of interest groups, spoils, privileged access, means of financing, organizational shortcuts, privileged means of information, specialization, and visibility are some of the elements that enable these political actors to develop strategies and interests in continuing and intensifying the already established institutional design of public policy⁴ (PIERSON, 1993). In this context, the public policy creates institutionalized relationships and rules of inclusion and exclusion of players, or "selective incentives" that foster the engagement of groups that are related in some way to that institutional design (INGRAM; SCHNEIDER; DELEON, 2007; SKOCPOL, 1995).

Together, these constraints create specific ways of collective definition of the problems, alter the preferences and create specific niches of political entrepreneurship, that can overcome problems of collective action inside the groups and in the relation between groups and the representative environment (PIERSON, 1993). In the relations between groups and parliamentarians, the consolidation of a public policy can foster special points of access to the decision-making structure by allowing some groups and hindering the access by others, which strengthens the pre-existing institutional structure. Skocpol (1995, p. 54) shows that:

the overall structure of political institutions provides access and leverage to some groups and alliances, thus encouraging and rewarding their efforts to shape government policies, while simultaneously denying access and leverage to other groups and alliances operating in the same national polity.

This component can impact the groups' access to forums and deliberative meetings, and greatly impact the ideological and programmatic distribution in these environments. As Skocpol (1995) also shows, feedback effects determine fundamentally the social environment of groups and parliamentarians through two main mechanisms: transforming administrative possibilities and affecting social identities. According to the author, policies can affect the objectives, mobilization capacities and the constitution of the identities of these groups, determining the tone of the subsystem.


To parliamentarians, the structure of public policy exerts institutional force mainly through the administrative arrangements previously implemented. For Pierson (1993), the installed state capacities, the outcomes of public policies and bureaucracies already in operation

³ Although representative of this research agenda, Lowi's (1964) arenas model will not be mobilized in this paper.

⁴ Again, it is important to reinforce that institutional lock-in is not synonymous with political consensus, but with path dependence. There may be multiple (including conflicting) political relations given by the institution.

influence the calculations of the politicians. Similarly, Skocpol (1995) sees that negative feedbacks can retrench programs, while positive feedbacks can influence their continuation and deepening (or success)⁵. The “success” of public policies occurs when “it enhances the kinds of state capacities that can promote its future development, and especially if it stimulates groups and political alliances to defend the policy's continuation and expansion” (SKOCPOL, 1995, p. 59). This theoretical element will be important for the following empirical analysis. We will return to it.

Thus, in the policy centered model, public policies can reassert their own and other policies' structures by the means pointed out in the diagram:



Source: Skocpol (1995, p.58).

2.2 The Advocacy Coalitions Framework (ACF), a pluralistic diagnosis

Because changes in public policy are a result of patterns of collective coordination, the ACF has also much to say about the cooperation of groups and politicians in the decision-making forums. The novelty is that the collective engagement does not depend, exclusively, on institutional constraints - as in the previous model. Indeed, the ACF admits the importance of institutions forming interests and coalitions, but it is ideational cleavages and advocacy coalitions that are the explanatory force for the policy coordination processes (JENKINS-SMITH, NOHRSTEDT, et al., 2018).

At this point, it can be seen that the causal direction in the relationship between public policies and group behavior is reversed when compared to the neoinstitutionalist model. In the ACF, the main form of political articulation is the advocacy coalition, which has the shared beliefs systems as the main element that binds individuals together (SABATIER; WEIBLE, 2007). Through three levels of beliefs, they articulate themselves in broad and plural coalitions of professional politicians, individuals and interest groups, associations, epistemic communities, journalists, among others (SABATIER; WEIBLE, 2007).

⁵ It is worth emphasizing that “positive feedbacks” doesn’t necessarily mean continuity or stability of the public policy. It is more accurate to understand that positive feedback mechanisms lead to a continuity in the “already established direction”. In our context, “positive feedback” applies to the mechanism of deepening or reinforcement of the PBF, which doesn’t mean that these mechanisms cannot describe, in other researches, a situation of maintaining a path of instability or change.

The three levels of beliefs postulated by the ACF make individuals interact from deep normative to instrumental public policy mechanisms. The first level, *deep core beliefs*, comprises philosophical conceptions about human nature and ontological values. The second one, the *policy core beliefs*, is given by the orientations concerning policy preferences, self-identification with social groups, and possible treatments of social problems. Finally, there are the *secondary aspects*, which are ideas that determine punctual and instrumental aspects of public policy capabilities (SABATIER; WEIBLE, 2007; VICENTE, 2015; JENKINS-SMITH, NOHRSTEDT, et al., 2018). Jenkins-Smith et al (2018) argue that is the policy core the set of beliefs that mostly unifies a coalition, or a collectivity that shares certain assumptions of public policy designs. This is even one of the factors that can overcome the costs of collective action, according to the ACF. This is also why Jenkins-Smith et al. (2018, p. 145) say that “the ACF assumes that public policies and programs are the translations of policy-oriented beliefs and can be conceptualized and measured hierarchically, like beliefs systems”.

Thus, coalitions seek to materialize a roll of theories at their multiple levels, influencing the behavior of institutions and state capacities through coordinated actions and joint strategies, which are based on shared beliefs (SCHLAGER, 1995; WEIBLE, 2018). Therefore, the ideational aspect, which concerns the left-right, liberalism and social democracy cleavages, among other ideational elements receive importance in this perspective even though they are not the only ones, they can be potential conditions for collective action (WEIBLE, 2018).

In the exercise of interest-driven political action, the operation of groups and coalitions towards the public policy is not detached from the context in which they are situated. Contextual factors such as the political environment, the intensity of conflict, the institutional disputes, and the perceived threat imposed by opponents can especially determine opinions on public policy (JENKINS-SMITH; NOHRSTEDT, 2018). It will be especially interesting to observe this condition in discourses about the PBF during Dilma Rouseff's impeachment.

In the ACF, four factors can contribute to major or minor changes in public policies: internal and external shocks, policy learning, and negotiated agreements (SABATIER; WEIBLE, 2007; VICENTE, 2015). To our objectives of understanding the formation of coalitions and collective action in the PBF, two conditions of policy change are important to us: policy learning and negotiated agreements. Policy learning refers to the phenomenon of actors and coalitions incorporating new cognitive assumptions resulting from new information or new experiences, which can lead to the revision of public policy objectives and instruments (SABATIER; WEIBLE, 2007). One of the ways in which learning can take place is through the incorporation of new ideas from one coalition by another. The so-called cross-coalition learning is a phenomenon in which coalition A learns from coalition B about new significations or about the importance of new public policy elements and concepts (JENKINS-SMITH, NOHRSTEDT, 2018).

About this, ACF suggests some hypotheses that may be valid to analyze the problem further. One of them is that learning between different belief systems is more likely to happen when there is a forum that carries enough prestige to make actors from different coalitions participate or when this forum is dominated by professional rules (VICENTE, 2015). The second is that problems with quantitative and abundant data that are collectively accepted are more likely to induce learning than imperfect, subjective, or unsolidified data problems (JENKINS-SMITH, NOHRSTEDT, 2018).

Negotiated agreements, as elements of change, are possible outputs of when coalitions find themselves in a “devil shift” situation, or conflicting stability, that forces them to negotiate agreements that allow the central topic of public policy to move forward and, therefore, to be changed. Negotiated agreements can be seen as a breakthrough against a long-standing status quo, or a sub-optimal, but a necessary agreement between coalitions and belief systems, that leads to a significant change in the structure of public policy (JENKINS-SMITH; NOHRSTEDT, 2018; SABATIER; WEIBLE, 2007).

These categories of behavior and institutional change will be mobilized for statistical treatment and empirical analysis in order to provide us with the theoretical background to analyze how the collective organization takes place in the *Bolsa Família* subsystem. About the collective organization, the ACF states that it is valid to think of a subsystem as having two or more coalitions, and that the distribution of power and resources among them can be balanced or with a strong predominance of a dominant coalition. When there is a predominance, the subsystem is dominated by an “hegemonic coalition” that has greater resources of information, coordination, access, and funding, and “minority coalitions” that have fewer means of representing and influencing public policy in forums and debates (SABATIER; WEIBLE, 2007).

3 Operationalizing two decision approaches in public policy from the Narrative Policy Framework

Using the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) as an epistemological and methodological tool, we depart from the premise that it is possible to capture interactions, interests, beliefs, and political organization through the discourse analysis of political actors. For NPF, political actors understand the world from narratives, which are “a story with a temporal sequence of events unfolding in a plot that is populated by dramatic moments, symbols, and archetypal characters that culminate in a moral to the story” (JONES; MCBETH, 2010, p. 329).

Therefore, narratives are both a pattern of cognition, a method in which individuals interpret reality, and a pattern of communication, a way in which they argue, act politically and operate their interests (JONES; MCBETH, 2010). Thus, the facts and events of the political system, as well as rivals and political goals can be transformed into a narrative arc. The

narratives can both socially construct reality and can be a methodological instrument for researchers to make diagnoses regarding public policy problems, political behavior, among others (SHANAHAN; JONES, 2018).

In the structuralist perspective of NPF, narratives can be organized into form and content. Form refers to the structuring of the narrative, or the narrative elements mobilized as components of a story. The first of these components is the "context," which can be seen as the environment in which public policies are situated, such as the problematics given by political relations in other areas, the economic and social conditions of the moment, and the institutional and legal prescriptions in which the policy issue takes place. The "characters" concern the interpretative designs that political actors may assume: allies may become "heroes," rivals may be described as "villains," and policy beneficiaries can be seen as "victims" or other categories (MCBETH; SHANAHAN; JONES, 2005). Finally, the "moral of the story" carries the actor's intentionality. The moral of the story can be seen as the "solution" advocated by an actor to the issue faced (JONES; MCBETH, 2010). It is the communication of the alternatives advocated as technically or morally superior (SHANAHAN; JONES, 2018).

The second core of the NPF, the content, can mention the belief system or the content that individuals want to enable through the narrative. Embedded within the elements of the narrative structure, the content analysis can present ideological cleavages or partisan relationships between actors and political groups (JONES; MCBETH, 2010). For what this research proposes, the relationship between narrative elements and what they may express in terms of content plays a central role in identifying patterns of organization in groups or coalitions.

Hereafter, it is revealed how NPF elements can articulate and form encodings that lighten the path to identifying collective relations in the *Bolsa Família* subsystem. Applying these elements focusing on groups and coalitions, we have formulated statistical equations that consider elements of the "narrative arc", which identifies the prevalence of arguments of neoinstitutionalism or pluralism.

3.1 Equation 1: the "context", an institutional or ideational problem?

The immersion of public policy in an environment dictated by institutional, ideational, or even cultural problems can determine the structures of collective participation and associational patterns. The associations between individuals, depending on the context, may occur based on intense conflict, or non-conflictive; on technical or emotional bases (JONES and MCBETH, 2010). This conception is useful to point out the main cleavages that surround the PBF subsystem. We assume that the existing bases of association in the *Bolsa Família* subsystem can be analyzed by looking at the "main problem" given by the context (SHANAHAN; JONES, 2018). Therefore, this is the first indicator regarding collective

organization in this subsystem. From the question "which contextual problems have predominance in the parliamentary discourse?" the collective organization can follow two distinct parameters:

In the eyes of the ACF, two main points would define a contextual problem for political actors: (1) controversies between groups take place fundamentally at the level of policy core and deep core beliefs, and (2) coalitions articulate themselves in a myriad of subsystems and play in one arena by observing events and determinants in others (SABATIER; WEIBLE, 2007). This suggests that deputies would view *Bolsa Família's* problems from a broader contextual environment, in which rivalries in other political arenas and locus significantly influence positions on the PBF.


For neoinstitutionalism, individuals who are part of each subsystem have actions shaped primarily by the determinants of that public policy, and therefore tend to see as a "contextual problem" those situations in which specific rules and norms of that program are challenged (e.g., functional disruption of the program or the alteration the guidelines for beneficiaries access, for example). Given the path dependence principle, a relevant contextual problem, in this view (SKOCPOL, 1995) is the conservation of the institutional structure and the "problem" tend to be more restricted to the PBF.

On this basis, the first test codifies whether the elementary problems of the subsystem context are predominantly given by cleavages of ideational/ideological order (pluralistic hypothesis), that extrapolates the PBF domain or predominantly institutional-driven and restricted to the effects of the institution (of the PBF) on individuals. For this, it was used the same methodology as McBeth, Shanahan, and Jones (2005) and the metric was structured from qualitative content analysis of Narrative Elements (NE) that have the "institutional problematic" as a theme minus the Narrative Elements that have an "ideational problematic" as a central element. The difference was standardized (divided) by the sum of Narrative Elements that refer to the context/problem in question (MCBETH; SHANAHAN; JONES, 2005). Next, there is the following "context" equation:

$$\frac{\text{NE (institutional/restricted context)} - \text{NE (ideological/broad context)}}{\text{Total NE on the context/problem}}$$

The "Context Score" from -1.00 to +1.00 was assigned to each parliamentary speech, where -1.00 means the "maximum of the ideological pattern of cognition" (ACF hypothesis) (a narrative arc in which the parliamentarian's argumentation focuses on ideological cleavages) and +1.00 means the "maximum of the institution-driven pattern of cognition" (neoinstitutionalist hypothesis) (an argumentation that focuses on issues related to the maintenance of the PBF institutions). Averaging the scores of each discourse generates an index

that can be allocated within the scale:



3.2 Equation 2: the troublemakers (villains)

How are the villains characterized? What is the major attribute of the villains that must be fought? Identifying the view of the subsystem's set of parliamentarians regarding the villains can lighten important aspects about the points of conflict that the *Bolsa Família* subsystem presents. For the purposes of this research, the most important thing is to evaluate how the villains are seen. If our goal is to analyze the subsystem from a pluralist and neoinstitutionalist views, the most logical here is to comprehend what argumentation supports the deputies' view regarding the "villains". So, the ACF hypothesis would point out that what characterizes villains is the ideational/belief contrast of the villain relative to the enunciator of the narrative. In simultaneous reasoning, one might consider that the neoinstitutionalist approach would highlight that the enunciator would judge a villain based on the "institutionally deviant" behavior of the other⁶. This equation can be seen, somehow, as analogous to equation 1.

Thus, one can construct a metric that sees speeches with ideologically content criticism as indicative of multiple, broad coalitions based on shared beliefs. On the other hand, speeches with institutional content critiques (e.g., attacks on the villain as the one responsible for retrenching the program, critiques on the villain as responsible for the program's technical failures etc) as indicative of the power of institutions constraints on political action.


The same concept was applied as in the previous equation, where NE stands for "narrative elements" to obtain the "Villains" score:

$$\frac{\text{NE (institutionally deviant villains)} - \text{NE(ideological villains)}}{\text{Total NE on villains}}$$

Also, in this formula, negative scores indicate the prominence of narrative lines that emphasize ideational/ideological aspects of the villains and, therefore, cleavages and coalitions based on beliefs (*deep core beliefs* and *policy core beliefs*). The positive scores emphasize preservationist and institutional-based arguments (in which the villain is not characterized by his ideological choice, but by his conflicts with PBF institutions), which indicates a strong attachment of the enunciator to the *Bolsa Família Program*. The calculation of the mean of the

⁶ In this sense, from a neoinstitutionalist perspective, an "institutionally deviant" behavior would be the non-compromise of the others in following the institutional prescriptions of action (prescript by the public policy) or to challenge institutionally constituted norms and values (in the scope of the *Bolsa Família Program*).

distribution of observations generates the "villains" score that can be allocated within the scale:



3.3 Equation 3: The moral of the story

As we have seen, in public policy, the moral of the story is the bureaucratic solutions, moral or normative actions that actors judge that is needed, or the proposed changes in public policy. It is composed of policy solutions (what to do) and effective action (how to do) (JONES and MCBETH, 2010). For this research, the moral of the story and the solution presented by each deputy to the identified problem can also be an indicator of the pattern of collective organization in the subsystem.

To instrumentalize this aspect, the attention was on the narrative's elements that refer to the institutional design of the program, its status. When issues concerning the design of the PBF are under debate, the identification of a certain consensus among parliamentarians regarding the status quo of the program, in which actors reaffirm with institutional arguments its prevalence, can be a strong indicator that there is a distribution of interests dictated by the institutional constraints of the PBF. This perspective is representative of the neoinstitutionalist hypothesis, and, again, we assume this based on the theoretical premises of lock-in effects and path dependence.


On the other hand, in the ACF argument, changes in public policies are the result of learning, shocks (external and internal), and negotiated agreements. Identifying narrative elements that support institutional change solutions and refer to any of these four mechanisms may indicate the existence of interest coalitions that have patterns of association as pointed out by the Advocacy Coalitions Framework (JENKINS-SMITH; NOHRSTEDT, 2018). However, external and internal shocks can be an explanatory source of institutional change for both ACF and historical institutionalism (MARCH; OLSEN, 2006). Because of this, we will focus on the narrative elements that support solutions and that refer to negotiated arrangements or learning.

Bellow, there is the equation for the score "moral of the story/solutions":

$$\frac{NE(\text{status quo} + \text{institutional restrictions}) - NE(\text{change} + \text{learning or ideological factors})}{\text{Total NE on solutions for the PBF}}$$

The results obtained from the "solution" score assign scores from -1.00 to +1.00 to each

parliamentary manifestation, where -1.00 means that all solutions proposed by the deputy in question are the result of learning or negotiations and it advocates for institutional changes (that all narrative elements identified advocate changes in the structure of the PBF, either by learning or by political negotiation with other actors); and +1.00 means that all proposed solutions either defend the status quo of the program or further expansion of the PBF, in a line of argument that could be seen as consistent with the policy feedback approach. The mean of the distribution of observations generates the "solution" score that can be allocated within the scale:



Before proceeding to the analysis of the results, some comments are necessary. First, it is not said in this paper that neoinstitutionalism (policy feedback approach) is synonymous with stability, nor that ACF is synonymous with continuous change. Both theories have answers for the phenomenon of change, as well as for those of stability. What is done here is only to encode narrative segments that can be related to each theoretical explanation, and to test hypotheses. Second, the indexing done by this work (in a gradation) is a simplification of the theoretical assumptions, to operationalize them. Collective relations are a much more complex phenomenon involving factors explainable by both theories. What we call, for example, the "maximum institutional-driven cognition pattern" is only an ideal type, and clearly there is no such thing as an exclusively institutional-driven behavior. We have here only artifices that help us understand the phenomenon of collective association. Finally, it is not said that ACF is the exact opposite of neoinstitutionalism or vice-versa. Given their theoretical natures, even if we wanted to, such dualistic thinking would be inconceivable and inappropriate. For the limits within which this work proposes to operate, we believe it is not problematic to relate, contrast, and explore the potential of each perspective.

4 Interpreting the results: Bolsa Família, groups and coordinative patterns in an underexplored subsystem

4.1 Interest groups, individuals and collective organizations in the *Bolsa Família's* subsystem

The mapping of interest groups and individuals in the PBF subsystem, only in the speeches of the 55th and 56th legislatures, have revealed an extraordinary number and variety of actors who potentially influence this program. As the dynamics of interests are "present in every parliamentary or governmental decision" (MANCUSO and GOZETTO, 2018, p. 17), this may reveal the complexity of an underexplored subsystem and show the potential that research in this field. Altogether, 71 groups were identified, with the most diverse degrees of formalization, and individuals with different levels of autonomy or group association (all the identified groups and individuals are listed in Appendix I).

To observe them, it is necessary to make use of Mancuso and Gozetto's (2018) view that lobby⁷ actors can be of the most varied kinds. They can be individuals or groups. Among individuals, it seems to us that voluntary lobbyists play a predominant role in the PBF, that is, those who work in defense of the interests of some group or division, but who do not have responsibilities and counterparts like a "formal lobbyist" (MANCUSO and GOZETTO, 2018). Among them, the ones who stand out are mainly members of epistemic communities and research centers and activists for the expansion and improvement of the program. The general position of this first group of actors has been to strengthen the national income guarantee system and to defend a technical approach to the PBF, in advocating, with parliamentarians, the importance of applying scientific evidence to think about aspects such as targeting, conditionalities, exit doors, results, and economic balances. The actions of these groups/individuals have taken place mainly through technical presentations at public hearings of the CSSF (Social Security and Family Committee).

When related to the groups, Mancuso and Gozetto (2018) show that they can also be state actors⁷, administrative or bureaucratic groups, situated in the three levels of the Brazilian State: municipalities, states and the Union. This definition opens up the possibility of identifying national and state collegiate and councils of social assistance managers as potential interest groups, with special centrality of the National Collegiate of Municipal Social Assistance Managers (CONGEMAS) and the National Forum of State Secretaries of Social Assistance (FONSEAS). Several times, the importance of CONGEMAS as an "institution to be listened to" was identified. It is remarkable the performance of groups representing the interests of the counties. Besides CONGEMAS, the National Front of Mayors, the Intermunicipal Management

⁷ Lobbying, in the definition of these authors, is the concept that is given for when "social agents take the initiative to contact members of the public power capable of making decisions, in order to present their interests and pleas to them" (MANCUSO and GOZETTO, 2018, p. 20). We understand that this definition may be adequate to conceptualize what we call here "interest groups".

Council of *Bolsa Família*, and the State Unions of Municipalities were active groups in the parliamentary events.

We attribute the relative importance of municipal interest groups to the design itself of the PBF, articulated upon strategies of decentralization (IGD-M) and empowerment of local administrations in the management of the program. This mechanism can be seen as an effect of the institution of the PBF granting differentiated incentives and access and to these representative groups (policy feedback approach). Similarly, because, since its early implementation, *Bolsa Família* is articulated in the principle of intersectionality with the capacities of the Social Assistance System (SUAS) (using the apparatus of CRAS and CREAS and the professionals of the SUAS apparatus), the groups that advocate for social assistance in the country have been encouraged to have remarkable participation in the politics of the PBF – a phenomenon explainable by the rules of inclusion given by the public policy (PIERSON, 2006; PIERSON, 1993).

The same reasoning can be applied to "corporatist organizations", in other words, the trade union organizations that actively influence the subsystem (MANCUSO; GOZETTO, 2018). In the PBF subsystem, social worker groups have notable participation, from local unions to national federations and peak associations. Some examples are the Union of Social Workers of Rio de Janeiro, the National Federation of Social Workers and the National Confederation of Social Security Workers. Evidently, the position of these groups is almost unanimous in defense of the strengthening of the management capabilities of the PBF and SUAS.

As Pierson (1993) would point out, public policies also influence the participation of public opinion. Corroborating the author, we identified several civil society groups that, in autonomous organizations, advocate for improving and even extending the *Bolsa Família* model (some towards the Basic Income proposal). Among them, we could identify the *Central Única de Favelas* (CUFA), the *Frente Brasil Popular* and the Users' Forums in Defense of the SUAS. Among the social movements, it is notable the prominence of groups that reaffirm the design of the PBF and propose its expansion. At the same time it is notable the absence of groups that propose a "liberalizing" reform in these programs, such as the adoption of more conditionalities or incentives to the exit of beneficiaries. This issue could be seen by our theories in two ways: the lock-in effect in operation, given the "institutionally positive returns" of the program (INGRAM; SCHNEIDER; DELEON, 2007) or as evidence of a strong majority coalition (SABATIER; WEIBLE, 2007). Anyway, it seems to us that *Bolsa Família* Program has strong support among the Brazilian popular social movements and experts and specialized agencies.

Finally, it is important to emphasize the role of two other actors: companies and international organizations (IOs). The participation of these two actors reveals, firstly, the participation of market interests in the area of social assistance. Although this social domain

seems to be the responsibility of the family, civil society and the State, as pointed out by the LOAS/93, we have found some narrative elements that seem to point to meetings between the Executive Branch and members of technology companies such as Google and Facebook regarding the management of *CADÚnico* and the conditionalities⁸. The IOs are sometimes cited as producers of reports and works that emphasize the importance of conditionalities and the cost-effectiveness of the programs. The actions of these two actors would be best explained by ACF, since companies can be potential political actors and international organizations can be representatives of a neoliberal belief system, led by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (PEET, 2009).

In accordance with many studies, the ideational cleavages among interest groups and non-state actors (specially IOs) seem to be relevant. While some of the social assistance professionals and organized social movements advocate for the importance of the benefits in granting economic and civil rights, the international Bretton Woods organizations adopt a technocratic position about the PBF, which could be seen as liberalizing position. In their opinion, expressed on the thematic reports, the principal advantage of adopting cash transfer programs as a strategy for development is that it promotes poverty alleviation with low public costs. We see that this ideational difference among political players in cash transfer programs subsystems is one of the most important and neglected factors in this field of studies.

4.2 Results and interpretations of the patterns of coordinative action, parliamentary activity and interest representation

Based on our the theoretical premises and the chosen methodology, what will be presented is an analysis of parliamentary discourses and how their political meaning can be explored by the ACF and the policy feedback approach, in what concerns the interest representation. What we first present, as one of the most significant results of this research, is that the pattern of argumentation - which, as we see, reflects interest's representation dynamics - is significantly different between the two investigated areas (Plenary and the Committee).

In all indicators, discussions in the committee were significantly more guided by institutional narrative elements than discussions in Plenary. Related to the "context" indicator, the positive score in the Committee (mean = 0.63) and the significant p-value (p-value= 0.000005; $\alpha= 0.05$), suggests that actors clearly identify the contextual problem in this arena from institutional constraints. In the case of committees, it was rejected the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference between contextual views driven by ideologies or institutional constraints and we infer that institutions (the PBF policy institutions) play a major

⁸ About this, former Minister Tereza Campello notified the CSSF on 05/14/2021: "[...] the second suggestion is to request information, the minutes of meetings, of negotiations, if any, contracts in progress, what has already been offered to these large companies - Google, Facebook, TikTok [ByteDance] and others - that, from what we have information, have been meeting with the Ministry" (CAMPELLO, 2021).

role in determining the behavior of parliamentarians. This result is clearly explainable by neoinstitutionalism. As the analyzed committee was the Social Security and Family Committee, social practices are crystallized by the rules, norms and practices operated in this environment, which are dictated by the history of social assistance policies and by the history and practices that surround the National Social Security Policy and the national governance of income guarantee.

The same cannot be said for the Plenary score. The mean score of 0.08 and the non-significant p-value of 0.52 ($\alpha= 0.05$) show that the parliamentary "context diagnosis" in Plenary is as much determined by institutional constraints as by ideological belief systems. It is noted that this result can clearly be determined by the political environment before and after the impeachment that occurred in 2016. It is easy to remember that the impeachment environment was characterized by partisan dichotomies and extreme polarization, which we believe has transformed the plenary arena into a hostile environment to specialized and policy-focused discussions. At the same time that we can see the CSSF as a specialized forum insulating the PBF from impeachment discussions and preserving the policy-centered behavior, the Plenary of the House of Representatives offered an intersection point between different issue arenas and political arguments. This situation prompted a scenario of a far different collective engagement in the plenary when compared to the Committee.

This outcome points to explanations from ACF and neoinstitutionalism. Institutional complementarity would explain that in this situation, the cognitive patterns were affected by events in other institutional arenas, according to neoinstitutionalism. Consequently, it can be assumed that when one of the arenas suffered major disturbs, the entire system of interest representation responded accordingly. By the ACF, at such a critical moment, where the "intensity of conflict" and the "perceived threat posed by opponents" are latent, the actors' entire interpretation of the context is shaken, belief systems are re-signified, and new issues can rise to the top of the interest's agenda.

Table 1 – General results for equation 01 - "Context", in the 55th Legislature

Equation 1	Frequency	Mean	Std. Dev.	n	Test statistic	df	p-value
Speeches in Plenary							
from -1 to -0,5	12						
from -0,49 to -0,1	5						
0	3						
from 0,1 to 0,49	5						
from 0,5 to 1	14	0,08	0,81	39	0,64	38	0,43

Speeches in Committees								
from -1 to -0,5	6							
from -0,49 to -0,1	0							
0	2							
from 0,1 to 0,49	1							
from 0,5 to 1	29	0,63	0,72	38	5,33	37	0,000	

Source: author's own elaboration (2021)

The analysis of the "villains" indicator also points to curious pathways. While 26 narrative elements concerning villains were identified in Plenary, this indicator was so rare in the committees (n= 7), that it is not reasonable to construct statistics about them in the CSSF. Since this equation is very closely related to the context equation, the most attacked villains in the plenary were the "ideological" villains, but this result is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.1; $\alpha= 0.05$). This indicates a first conclusion, this time concerning the methodology of the NPF: it was found notably difficulty in operationalizing the category "villains" in the conduction of discourse analysis, especially in environments endowed with much specificity and technical objectivity.

Table 2 – General results for equation 02 - "Villains", in the 55th Legislature

Equation 2	Frequency	Mean	Std. Dev.	n				
					Test statistic	df	p-value	
Speeches in Plenary								
from -1 to -0,5	14							
from -0,49 to -0,1	3							
0	1							
from 0,1 to 0,49	1							
from 0,5 to 1	7	-0,29	0,88	26	-1,69	25	0,10	
Speeches in Committees								
from -1 to -0,5	1							
from -0,49 to -0,1	0							
0	2							
from 0,1 to 0,49	0							
from 0,5 to 1	4	~~	~~	7	~~	~~	~~	

Source: author's own elaboration (2021)

In the plenary speeches, "Michel Temer" and the "Michel Temer's government" were

the most attacked villains, both from ideological and institutional arguments. It can be noticed that Michel Temer may have been the villain most attacked because of the possible dominance of the left-wing coalition in the *Bolsa Família*⁹ subsystem. For this group, which is believed to be ideologically in the majority in the subsystem, Michel Temer is both an institutional villain (responsible for “destabilization” and “retrenchment” in the PBF) and an ideological villain (e.g., aligned with financial groups and an “enemy of popular struggles”). In this way, it is difficult to identify any organizational pattern according to the “villains” indicator, which leads us not to think about the limits not of our theory, but the limits of the methodology inspired by the NPF.

The exact opposite happens for the “moral of the story” indicator, in which we find clear evidence of patterns of behavior endowed by an agreement about *Bolsa Família*. In the vast majority of the speeches, the narrative elements that emphasize the position favoring the status quo of the program were much more frequent than the position advocating for changes in the bureaucratic structure of the program. On this indicator, both Plenary speeches (mean = 0.41; p-value = 0.01; $\alpha = 0.05$), and committee speeches (mean = 0.49; p-value = 0.0004; $\alpha = 0.05$) showed statistically significant positive scores that there is a strong tendency for groups to activate preferences based on path dependence. In Plenary speeches, it was found 22 “moral of the story” narrative elements that advocate for the enhancement of the program given its positive track record (positive feedback) versus 8 narrative elements that indicate the “solution” as a change in the ideational design of the program (negotiated agreements) or as a need for adaptations in implementation mechanisms (possible learning experiences). In the committees, this proportion was even wider, 24 to 6.

Table 3 – General results for equation 03 - “Moral of the story”, in the 55th Legislature

Equation 3	Frequency	Mean	Std. Dev.	n	Test statistic	df	p-value
Speeches in Plenary							
from -1 to -0,5	8						
from -0,49 to -0,1	1						
0	2						
from 0,1 to 0,49	0						
from 0,5 to 1	22	0,41	0,87	33	2,72	32	0,01
Speeches in Committees							
from -1 to -0,5	6						

⁹ We infer a dominance of the left-wing coalition on the PBF given the numbers of speeches made by the left-wing Worker’s Party (PT) in comparison to other political parties on this subject. In the 55th legislature, the parties that made the majority of the speeches about the PBF were: the Worker’s Party (PT) (72); the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) (19); the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) (14); and the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB) (11).

from -0,49 to -0,1	1							
0	5							
from 0,1 to 0,49	1							
from 0,5 to 1	24	0,49	0,76	37	3,91	36	0,000	

Source: author's own elaboration (2021).

This indicator reveals, therefore, that two explanations are possible: the first one is that there is probably a hard institutional lock-in situation, that induces the actors to preserve the structure of the program, with few opposing interests, or that there are two advocacy coalitions in the PBF subsystem, with different ideational paradigms, but holding extremely asymmetric resources. These differentiated resources, according to ACF, are the means of the collective organization (with the left-wing coalition being the one that gave the most speeches in the Plenary, addressing the PBF), of support (mobilizable troops) (as the previous analysis showed, that most social groups are in favor of the PBF) and of access (placing these groups in the decision-making forums and situations) (SABATIER; WEIBLE, 2007). For neoinstitutionalism, these resources have the institutions as their source, encouraging some alliances, hindering others, allowing some groups to access and denying participation to others (SKOCPOL, 1995).

The ACF still has good explanations for the phenomenon of convergence observed over the "solutions" in the CSSF: knowing that this is an extremely professionalized and prestigious forum, the learning and incorporation of paradigms among coalitions (cross-coalition learning) became much less expensive and therefore more likely to have happened. Also, the supply of positive and consolidated socioeconomic data about the PBF is extensive in this type of forum. Based on this, we can even suppose that a possible opposing coalition may have revised its goals and instruments and learned from new information and experiences in that environment (SABATIER; WEIBLE, 2007).

The time when the speeches mostly proposed institutional change was during Temer's government. Initiatives such as those of former minister Osmar Terra and congressman Ricardo Barros (PP-PR) on reforms to the PBF premises became more common from 2016. It seems that, in the period, there was an ideational shift from the PBF as a "right" to the PBF as a "mean of social ascension". This phenomenon can be seen by the ACF as an attempted shift in the policy core attributes of the public policy, due to the shift in the governing coalition (after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, the Worker's Party (PT) coalition that created the PBF was abruptly substituted by a neoliberal coalition, which has its first chance to influence the program since its launching) (JENKINS-SMITH; NOHRSTEDT; 2018).

Finally, the generally good acceptance of the PBF's current design by actors and groups in its subsystem seems to indicate a relative "success"- in Skokpol's (1995) definition of success- of the public policy as an institution. Since, in Skokpol's (1995) view, a public policy is successful when it can guarantee its future development and when it stimulates groups and

political alliances to defend its continuation and expansion, we can conclude with our analysis that *Bolsa Família* is a successful public policy. Both the groups analyzed and the parliamentary speeches mostly reverberate positively about the program's system, and sometimes even seek its deepening.

About the "moral of the story" indicator, it seems to us that its operationalization is quite feasible for future research. This indicator proved to be easily manageable and identifiable in the narratives, especially when encoded from the concept of "proposed solution". It presented, as we expected, substantial, statistically significant, and reproducible results.

5 Conclusion

At the end of this paper, we believe we have achieved the two proposed objectives. The first, to map groups and individuals potentially influencers of the PBF and the second, to identify and analyze (based on two different approaches) the patterns of legislative narratives to make inferences about the behaviors inside of the subsystem. From these two endeavors, arise conclusions for this research and the field of public policy and legislative behavior.

First, it is concluded that the PBF is an extremely underexplored subsystem, regarding its interests' groups. This work has shown that it is possible to identify them from parliamentary narratives and that, based on the identity of these groups, it is possible to identify interesting fundamentals of the subsystem. One of them refers to the dominant vision of the program. It seems to us that the PBF has exceptional internal support, given by a set of associations, confederations, unions, researchers, social movements and individuals who advocate within the system for the maintenance and expansion of the program.

This diagnosis of the identity of the groups is closely related to our second set of conclusions. Altogether, the three equations indicate that the policy feedback approach explanations of path dependence and positive feedbacks in the context of the *Bolsa Família* seem to have good explicative power to this case. Since we do not have sufficient means to test the limits of the theories, the ACF model also presents a plausible alternative explanation by pointing to the possible existence of a coalition (or a set of allied coalitions) that dominates the resources of the subsystem and is hegemonic in implementing its interests. It seems unlikely to us, however, that there are multiple coalitions with very different views on the matter. If we look through the prism of the ACF, we can conclude that there is a coalition that is ideationally dominant and can be seen as the defender of the PBF as a necessary part of an income guarantee system. Even during Temer's government, when a new governing coalition has proposed changes and reforms, this broad support structure of the PBF continued to bring its demands and positions into the subsystem. Remarkably, it brings together actors from diverse social segments and party spectrums. This allows us to establish a close dialogue with Tomazini (2016), on "ambiguous consensus" in the PBF and with Lomelí (2019).

Perhaps one of the most important contributions of this work is to point to the fact that coalitions behave remarkably differently depending on the arena in which discourses and narratives are delivered. It was noted that when speeches are delivered in the specialized committees (CSSF), the mobilization of partisan arguments or those involving ideological cleavages originating from other contexts drops significantly. We attribute this to institutions as an ordering and constraining factor of behavior (as pointed out by neoinstitutionalism). It seems to us that the CSSF has a more complex institutional apparatus than the Plenary and it involves, besides rules, prescriptions of acceptable norms and values that may have been built during the history of the forum. We believe in having advanced in Pierson's (1993) discussion, showing how institutions can influence behavior.

The contributions of this research have also shown important pathways for future work. One of them is to consider institutional complementarity as an explanatory condition for the behavior of groups in public policies and in the PBF, specifically. This can be done through the approach of legal institutions or thinking integrated subsystems. For this to happen, the PBF can be analyzed in insertion with other health, education or other social assistance policies. We also suggest applying this research format to longer periods, as the ACF suggests, and conducting temporal studies that analyze the evolution of coalitions, institutions and interest groups in the *Bolsa Família*.

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Appendix I – Potential influencers in the *Bolsa Família*'s Subsystem*

Organized groups: civil society	
Fórum Estadual em Defesa do Sistema Único de Assistência Social - SUAS	Fórum Nacional de Usuários do SUAS
Frente Brasil Popular	Uniafro Brasil
Frente Gaúcha em Defesa do Sistema Único de Assistência Social - SUAS.	CUFA
Frente Povo sem Medo	Movimento Mobiliza Brasil
Movimento Nacional de População de Rua	Site Fronteiras do Pensamento
Rede Brasileira de Renda Básica	UBM - União Brasileira de Mulheres
Organized groups: corporatist associations	
CNTSS - Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Seguridade Social	Sindicato dos Assistentes Sociais do Distrito Federal
Conselho Estadual de Assistência Social da Bahia - CEAS	Sindicato dos Assistentes Sociais do Rio de Janeiro
Conselho Federal de Fisioterapia e Terapia Ocupacional	Sindicato dos Assistentes Sociais do Amazonas
Conselho Federal de Serviço Social	Sindicato dos Assistentes Sociais do Ceará
CTB - Central dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras do Brasil	Organização das Cooperativas do Brasil
CUT - Central Única dos Trabalhadores	Federação Nacional dos Assistentes Sociais - FENAS
Organized groups: non-corporatist associations	
Associação dos Trabalhadores em Educação do Município de Porto Alegre - ATEMPA	Fórum Nacional dos Trabalhadores do SUAS
Fórum Estadual dos Trabalhadores e Trabalhadoras do SUAS - Bahia.	
Organized groups: state groups	Individuals
Colegiado Estadual de Gestores Municipais de Assistência Social do Estado da Bahia - COEGEMAS-BA.	Aziz Abu Sarah - professor
Colegiado Estadual de Gestores Municipais de Assistência Social do Estado do Pará - COEGEMAS-PA.	Bárbara Trindade - Representative of SUAS Users.
Colegiado Nacional de Gestores Municipais de Assistência Social - CONGEMAS	Bira Marques - City councilor of Niterói-RJ
Conselho Intermunicipal de Gestão do Bolsa Família;	Eduardo Suplicy - City councilor of Sao Paulo
Conselho Municipal de Assistência Social de Porto Alegre.	Fernanda Pereira - Social Assistance Secretary of Petrópolis
Conselho Nacional de Assistência Social - CNAS	Florian Pesaro - Social scientist
Controladoria-Geral da União	José Roberto Afonso - Instituto Brasileiro de Direito Público
Defensoria Pública da União no Rio Grande do Sul	Julieta Palmeira - Secretary of Policies for Women of the Government of Bahia.
Defensoria Pública da União	Mara Moraes - Militant for SUAS
Fórum Nacional de Secretários Estaduais de Assistência Social - FONSEAS	Marcelo Neri – Director of Getúlio Vargas Foundation (FGV)
Frente Nacional de Prefeitos	Maria Helena Lavinias de Moraes - Professor, UFRJ
Tribunal de Contas da União	Mônica de Bolle - Economist, Johns Hopkins University
União dos Municípios da Bahia - UPB.	Pedro Ferreira de Souza - writer
News media companies	Sergei Soares - Former President of the Institute for Applied Economic Research - IPEA
Folha de S.Paulo	Sofia Ulisses - Social Assistance Secretary of Campina Grande
O Globo	Tereza Campello - Center for Epidemiological Research in Nutrition and Public Health (USP)
Rede Globo de Televisão	Think tanks and research institutes

International Organizations and States	Perseu Abramo Foundation (Workers Party)
World Bank	IPEA
IMF	Technology companies
Chinese Research and Development Foundation - China State Council	ByteDance
UN	Facebook
Oxfam Brasil	Google
UNICEF	Microsoft

Source: author's own elaboration (2021).

Note: * Due to the specificities of the names, we preferred to maintain their designations Portuguese.

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