



## COALIZÕES DE GOVERNO EM DISTINTOS SISTEMAS POLÍTICOS E A ESTRUTURA DO PODER EXECUTIVO: ESTUDO DE CASO EXPLORATÓRIO E COMPARATIVO

### GOVERNMENT COALITIONS IN DISTINCT POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH STRUCTURE: AN EXPLORATORY CASE OF COMPARATIVE STUDY

### COALICIONES DE GOBIERNO EN DIFERENTES SISTEMAS POLITICOS Y LA ESTRUCTURA DEL PODER EJECUTIVO: STUDIO DE CASO EXPLORATÓRIO Y COMPARATIVO.

Sheila Cristina Tolentino Barbosa<sup>1</sup>

**Resumo:** As coalizões de governo são comumente examinadas em relação aos seus efeitos sobre os governos. Principalmente no processo de formação do governo, governabilidade dos governos minoritários e estabilidade do governo, embora também seja provável que tenha efeitos significativos sobre a estrutura e os resultados do poder executivo, conforme sugerido pelas discussões sobre as políticas das organizações governamentais. Este artigo, em um estudo de caso de estudo exploratório comparativo, discute e aponta como a trajetória dos governos coligados está relacionada à trajetória da estrutura do Poder Executivo, principalmente no seu incremento, independente de qual seja o Sistema político.

**Palavras-chave:** Coalizões de Governo; Poder Executivo; Estrutura.

**Abstract:** The government coalitions are commonly examined regarding their effects on governments. Mostly on government formation process, governability of minority governments and government stability. Nevertheless, it also is likely to have significant effects on the structure and results of the executive branch, as is suggested by discussions of the politics of government organizations. In an exploratory comparative case of study, this article discusses and points out how the trajectory of governments coalitions is related to the trajectory of the executive branch structure, primarily in its increase, regardless of which the political system is.

**Keywords:** Government Coalitions; Executive Branch; Structure.

**Resumen:** Las coaliciones gubernamentales se examinan comúnmente por sus efectos sobre los gobiernos. Principalmente en el proceso de formación de gobiernos, gobernanza de gobiernos minoritarios y estabilidad gubernamental, aunque también es probable que tenga efectos significativos en la estructura y resultados del Poder Ejecutivo, como lo sugieren las discusiones sobre las políticas de los organismos gubernamentales. Este artículo, en un estudio de caso exploratorio comparativo, discute y señala cómo la trayectoria de los gobiernos asociados se relaciona con la trayectoria de la estructura del Poder Ejecutivo, principalmente en su incremento, independientemente de cuál sea el sistema político.

**Palabras Clave:** Coaliciones Gubernamentales; Poder Ejecutivo; Estructura.

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<sup>1</sup> Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA), Member of the Department of Public Policy Studies - University of Brasilia (UnB), Phd on Public Administration - University of Brasilia (UnB)  
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## 1 Introduction

The government coalitions are commonly examined regarding their effects on governs. Mostly, these effects are on government formation process, governability of minority governments, and government stability (CHEIBUB; LIMONGI, 2011). Nevertheless, it is also likely to have significant effects on the structure and results of the executive branch, as suggested by discussions of the politics of government organizations, as seen in Ryu et al. (2019). These effects are not often investigated. In fact, apart from the significant administrative reforms, changes in the structure of governments seem to go by almost without being noticed by the society at large, regardless of which political system.

Distinct political systems are supposed to present different outcomes on a political scenario of power distribution; however, government coalitions share the same motivation and concern, which are respectively control of government power and government stability, being built by bargains of cabinet positions.

This investigation aims to describe possible correlations between government coalitions and changes in the executive branch structure in two different political systems. For that purpose, this paper will, by an exploratory case of comparative study, describe and analyze the cases of Brazil and New Zealand governments from around 1988. This effort's main contribution derives from the challenge of building a framework in the boundaries between two fields of knowledge, such as political science and public administration, since other studies on these specific correlations were not found during this research. Some related studies about public administration reforms were valuable, however.

As Borges and Barbosa (2019) pointed out for Brazil's case over recent years, there is a strong correlation between the increase in the number of parties in government coalitions and significant expansions on the executive branch structure. Beyond that, the practice of sharing office positions and ministerial posts in exchange for support for the government of the moment has even visible patterns of party control over government sectors (SILVA; BARBOSA, 2019).

Previous research points out findings related to the incentives of politicians to seek ministerial posts outside of the main parties under coalitions of minority governments (SHUGART; TAN, 2016). This situation could lead the political system to more fragmentation regarding the number of political parties, an increase in coalitions size, and finally, more fragmentation of the executive branch structure and action.

This research derives from a broader research agenda about Brazil, and the choice of New Zealand as a control case took into consideration that New Zealand has some useful features. The most important common feature for the two countries is that they were under formal directives to reduce the government machinery at the selected period. Therefore both of them were not supposed to show

increases in their structures as they indeed have shown

To explore possible correlations as previously mentioned, first, it will be examined relevant features of both political systems, their processes of government formation, and appointments for cabinet positions, as the government structure is an expression of the set of positions. Secondly, it is discussed data about the respective executive branch structures for the period under investigation. Finally, this discussion is followed by an analysis of possible existing correlations between increasing coalitions of government and the path of changes in the structure of the executive branch under its specific rules of appointment.

## **2 Politics and Government organization**

The relation between politics and the government organization is a matter of dependence in which political systems depend on administrative institutions' effectiveness to achieve their particular effectiveness. In fact, "design and control of bureaucratic structures is a central concern of any polity" (MARCH; OLSON, 1983, p.281). Conversely, the government organization is represented by its structure shaped by the set of positions hierarchy, which means it is also a matter of positions appointments available for the polity arena to manage governments' stability e governability.

The staffing of the state apparatus, especially of the executive branch, has both a technical and a political character. In the first case, it is a matter of satisfying a capacity need; in the second case, it is in order to maintain governability within the political system through the distribution of power among the top positions of the government's hierarchy. As it is suggested by White and Dunleavy (2010, p.7), in their study about organizational changes in the UK Public Administration and other countries, "Reconfigurations always provide the opportunity to reorder the Cabinet, reward allies and signal new priorities to the electorate." Similarly, Davis *et al.* (1990) understand that the changes observed in offices between 1950 and 1997 in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom (countries whose political system is parliamentary) reflect political and administrative calculations. Although the correlation between the number of parties and changes in the ministries is weak for the Canadian and British cabinets, all the countries under analysis have a strong correlation between elections, new prime ministers, and ministerial changes.

In order to comprehend better how the political system is related to the government structure (meaning the executive Branch), first, we will take a look at how the political systems under analysis establish their respective government coalitions.

### **2.1 Coalitions of government under different Political systems**

The differences among executive-legislative relations in parliamentarians and presidential political systems were highlighted by Cheibub and Limongi (2011). Their work discusses for both

political systems the possibilities of: a) a single-party majority (when only one party has the majority of seats in parliament or congress), b) minority governments (when the government is formed by one or more parties that unitedly controls less the 50% of legislative seats) and finally, c) what they remark as the “truly interesting political phenomenon”: the coalitions governments. These authors also stress that when a lack of presidential dominance over the legislative process exists, both systems’ conditions under which a collation emerges are the same. This Situation has become common in fragmented political systems featured by more parties with legislative seats.

To further discuss the features of some coalitions, it is necessary to distinguish between government coalitions (multiple parties in the portfolio) and legislative coalitions. However, they might coincide; it is important to stress that eventually there will be minority governments or cabinets which “are cabinets that meet all of the foregoing requirements except the majority clause” STROM (1990, p.6). In other words, the government has collective control of less the one-half of all seats of legislative. Nonetheless, they might be supported by a broader legislative coalition. “They are, in this sense, supported minority governments that will be at least as effective legislatively as coalition governments.” (CHEIBUB; LIMONGI, 2010, p.45).

According to Strom (1990), a legislative coalition in parliamentary systems means that parties outside cabinet portfolios may support the government in confidence. Thus, “parties not represented in the cabinet may even receive some office payoffs, for example, in the form of subcabinet officers, legislative chairmanships, or other appointments in the public sector.” (STROM, 1990, p.5). This type of arrangement seeks to sustain a legislative majority to pass legislative e budgetary bills from the government.

This possibility means that an extensive chain of positions in the wider public sector at arm’s length of government may be used as a resource in the bargaining process to obtain legislative support.

As regards presidential systems, the same lack of dominance over the legislative process can be found in presidential systems, with the same implications. Thus, as it occurs on parliamentary systems, they also tend to form a coalition with a minimal membership considering that, in both systems, the bargaining process requires giving up some amount of power to obtain legislative support.

Since no single party has managed to hold the majority of legislative seats, creating a minimum winning cabinet becomes the primary goal. This type of cabinet is defined as “a cabinet that contains sufficient parties to ensure a parliamentary majority, but that contains no party unnecessary to majority status.” (DODD, 1976, p. 17) so that the major party in the coalition can hold by itself as much power as possible.

As Humphreys (2008, p.380) has claimed, predicted outcomes of a coalition formation process depend “not simply on the bargaining protocol but, more substantively, on details of the space of

admissible contracts—that is, on the types of commitments that can be made.” Thus, some other constraints may influence coalitions formation processes, and the limits of the bargaining process take into consideration the risks of losing the support of their constituencies by making commitments that could compromise it. Nevertheless, it is essential to emphasize that the representative function depends on the success of the office-seeking process. Therefore, the policy-seeking motivation behind a bargaining process does “not denies it may be necessary to get into power in order to enact policy.” For this reason, “A policy-seeking politician trying to get into power in order to implement certain ideals may even behave as if he or she is pure office seeker” (LAVÉR, 1996, p.19). This behavior seems to be the core of the bargaining process that defines how government coalitions are formed.

## **2.2 Public Administration structures: The executive Branch**

It is challenging to compare public administration structures in different countries, as it has so many particularities and different types of organizations. A comprehensive typification should first consider what a state sector organization is. For that matter, is following provided some definitions of the state sector and its types of organizations in New Zealand and Brazil in order to establish comparable data.

According to Ringer (1991), In the New Zealand case, “the state sector is an umbrella term used to describe organizations in which the government has a direct financial interest, and which are responsible for putting its policies into effect.” Including Ministries, Government departments, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations or sometimes referred to as quasi-autonomous national government organizations (Quangos).<sup>2</sup> This terminology was commonly used during the first generation of administrative reforms, during what was then called The New public Management movement (LÆGREID, 2017). As it was explained by Scott (2001, p. 269), nowadays, the public organizations in the wider state sector (excluding Ministries and departments - the core government structure, departmental agencies, and SOEs) are known as Crown entities (at arm’s length)<sup>3</sup>.

In Brazil, the state sector follows a similar notion of core government and arm’s length organizations. Furthermore, the Federal state sector in Brazil comprises organizations funded totally or partially by the public budget and are responsible for putting policies into effect, as previously mentioned. Unlike the New Zealand Case in which the distinction is made by exclusion, a decree from 1967 still is in force and declares the definitions about the public sector of Brazil.

The Decree number 200/1967 says that at core government, referred to as “the direct

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<sup>2</sup> Quangos was another umbrella term for the wide variety of statutory agencies set up by government outside the traditional departmental structure (Ringer, 1991).

<sup>3</sup> Notice that this definition is made by exclusion, which means there are not constitutional variables to the define subcategories, but only subdivisions based on its functions in the government's portfolio. That is, it comprises a variety of organizations that conducts a broad spectrum of activities.

Administration” are the ministries (by analogy, also the special secretaries with ministerial status)<sup>4</sup> and also that the “indirect administration” that comprises the arm length’s organizations, for instance, agencies and SOEs. Therefore the direct administration is a parallel of the public service and the indirect administration a parallel of the crown entities and the other organizations of the wider public sector outside de core government.

The indirect administration is composed of statutory organizations at arm’s length of government. As a peculiar federal system, Brazil’s public sector is quite complex. Even municipalities have a certain amount of political and administrative autonomy. It follows that the same types of organizations are also valid for regional or local governments that have their separate administrative structure and autonomy.

Some studies indicate that the public sector structure in general, also in Brazil and New Zealand cases has become more fragmented after the NPM reforms (POLLITT; BOUCKAERT, 2011; JENSEN *et al.*, 2014; BARBOSA; POMPEU, 2017; BARBOSA, 2019; LOFGREN *et al.*, 2018) For both cases, the subtypes and trajectory of organizations at arm’s length or the indirect administration are presented on graphics at the next section., These subtypes of organizations have variations of autonomy and independence, as well as of their purpose. As a source of political power, certain positions on these organizations might be an object of the bargaining process to form government coalitions.

The political aspect of the structural face of government has been suggested by studies about its reorganizations (MARCH; OLSON, 1983; RYU *et.al.*, 2019; BARBOSA; BORGES; SILVA, 2020). Rather than a technical issue to address complex social challenges, as it could be reasonably supposed by taking into account that it is a matter of organizing government’s action, it seems to be more about political arrangements. Some evidence of it was provided by Ryu et al. (2019), as transcribed below.

“The intensity of government reorganizations varied more widely between countries than over time. Given the relatively similar levels of socioeconomic development in OECD countries, this pattern strongly suggests that government reorganizations may be more the result of political factors than a technical response to environmental changes shared by most OECD countries.” (RYU et al., 2019, p. 3)

Although governments, in general, share the same primary concerns, for instance, conducting public policies to provide services to their society related to health, education, welfare, infrastructure, and safety, the governments’ structural differentiation between countries, even when in similar socioeconomic contexts, might be related to institutional conditioning grounds. For that reason, an overview of institutions that settle intersections of politics and government structure of both countries

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<sup>4</sup> It is important to notice that at the brazilian system, the concept of department is used to name subdivisions inside of any organization either in the core government or the arms length.

will be provided in the following sections following the methodology.

### **3 Methodology**

To understand transformations in the organization of the public sector, at a Federal/national level, and its political determinants, this analysis was carried out by qualitative and quantitative research and comparative analysis of multiple cases (Brazil and New Zealand cases). The fact that they have different political systems was intended to make it possible to analyze if coalitions or the political systems were a differential aspect.

The comparative analysis of the public administration organization in countries with different political systems can be helpful to identify differential elements regarding the influence of each political system on the shape of government, all this by an exam and comparison of similarities and differences in their characteristics and its results. Firstly, both political systems' features are described, including their respective number of parties in recent years, either in parliament or coalitions by each government. Secondly, it is presented a detailed description of the trajectory of state sector organizations for both countries. Subsequently, an analysis was performed to compare the trajectories of both coalitions and the respective government structure by using the statistical test of *Spearman* correlation.

First, the data analysis has made comparisons among government mandates of each country in order to describe a trajectory for each one so that both trajectories could be compared among themselves. It is important to stress that the countries under analysis have distinct mandates periods: three years for New Zealand and four years for Brazil. Thus, the comparison was not about time but the features of each government mandate.

The data collection was focused on initial cabinet formations at each government to trace the impact of the transition from one government to another over the government's administrative structure in each country. In this case, each minister's length of time has not been considered, but their staffing process at each government transition, as this would be the moment of significant changes in the coalitions and potentially with more significant repercussions on ministerial changes (Ryu et al., 2019., p.7).

Information on ministerial composition and ministers' party affiliation was collected from official sources such as governmental entities responsible for election matters and databases of previously published research mentioned in this article's references. Also, an analysis of content was conducted to describe previous studies and normative documents that define how to create and staff the states sector organizations on Federal Level.

The measure of which and how many parties take part in a government coalition was based on the party affiliation of ministers and, in Brazil's case, other heads of organizational units with a ministry status. It should be noted that, in any case, there are possible limitations of this measure.

However, it is understood as feasible and valid for the research objectives, as already discussed above.

In Brazil's analysis case, the temporal cut-off is right after the recent re-democratization in 1985 until 2016. A parallel period beginning in 1987 until the last election in 2017 was selected for the New Zealand case. The most important aspect about these selections of time is that similarly, these periods of time were also parallel regarding recent public management reforms that were supposed to shape the public administration under the same directives of reduction of structure and effectiveness.

The variables analyzed were the number of parties with seats in parliament, the coalitions size, the number and types of ministries, departments, and other organizations in the state sector, and the appointment process for cabinet, ministries, and superior departments or government enterprises.

## **4 Findings**

### **4.1 Distinct political systems and their government coalitions**

New Zealand's Parliamentarism has some distinctive features (see a summary of it in table 1), making it further valuable for the intended comparison, taking into account similarities and differences that make it possible to draw some conclusions by contrast. For instance, its representatives are chosen by a mixed-member proportional system of election (MMP) after a referendum from 1993 that replaced the previous first-past-the-post (FPP) system.

As no party has so far won an overall parliamentary majority after the MMP election system, inter-party negotiations have been necessary to the government formation process in New Zealand. Nevertheless, these negotiations have many features in common with the practice in other multi-party systems (BOSTON, 2011). Thus, parties will probably cooperate, which means that a coalition of government will be made by parties sharing Cabinet positions or forming a minority government. *In this situation*, a party might agree to support the government even without taking part in Cabinet (PALMER; PALMER, 2004, p. 14; MULGAN, 2004).

Another interesting feature of Zealand parliamentarism is that although it follows the Westminster tradition of parliamentarism, it has one house of representatives in a unitary system of government with three different branches of power. Nevertheless, according to Malone (2015), its separation of powers is not so clear as the cabinet (the executive branch) is exclusively comprised of members of parliament (legislative branch) featuring an overlap between them (PALMER; PALMER, 2004).

Under other conditions, Brazil has a quite complex political system. The presence of government coalitions in Brazil's presidential system was earlier discussed by Abranches (1988). It has a bicameral parliament, one house for people representatives (the chamber) and another for states representatives (the Senate – meant to carry on regional representation). Both houses are composed of proportional representation with an open list.

In Brazil's case, there is no doubt about the separation of powers. Nevertheless, similar to




what occurs in New Zealand, another entirely different political system, to acquire the majority to approve any bills in Congress, the party that wins the presidency commonly needs to build up minimum winning coalitions by bargaining ministries positions with parties (BORGES; BARBOSA, 2019). In this sense, the process of building a government coalition is related to the structure of the executive branch (the machinery of government) and, therefore, on how it works to implement policies and deliver public services.

Under the single-member plurality (SMP) electoral system in New Zealand, the average number of parties with seats in an election was three, excluding the 1993 election when four parties won seats in the last SMP election. This exception occurred at the same time the referendum for the MMP election was approved (SHUGART; TAN, 2016). After the MMP system of election initiated at the 1996 election, the New Zealand Political System had shown a tendency for increasing fragmentation until 2008 when the number of parties in parliament came down, and after that, in 2014 once again (see Graphic 1).

In the New Zealand political system, this fragmentation can be seen by looking at the number of parties in the government coalitions that have shown an increase right after de the change in the New Zealand election system. Furthermore, the number of parties in government coalitions surpassed the numbers of effective parties<sup>5</sup> in parliament in 2008, 2011 e 2014 (See Graphic 1). This fragmentation is possibly related to the new scenario of minority governments integrated by parties with small numbers of seats in parliament, meaning that the coalition requires a large number of parties in order to have the vote of confidence to hold the government.

**Graphic 1**– New Zealand’s Political System



Data sources: New Zealand Election Results, 2019 and New Zealand Parliament, 2019

<sup>5</sup> (For more details about the concept of effective parties see Laakso, 1979 p.4)


Comparatively, Brazil has an even more fragmented political system (see graphic 2). The total of parties in Congress is significantly higher than in New Zealand. It could be up to 3.75 times the most significant number found in the New Zealand case.

The same pattern of fragmentation in the political system and government can also be seen in Brazil's case, as the effective number of parties in congress and the number of parties in coalitions were still increasing. Nevertheless, the fragmentation process came down in New Zealand's political system, stabilizing around three parties since the 2005 election (see Graphics 1 and 2).

Although the number of parties with seats in Brazil's congress is expressively more significant than in New Zealand's Parliament, the average number of parties in government coalitions tends to show less discrepancy between both countries. It has varied from 4 (NZ) to 10 parties (BR) in their maximum point (see Graphics 1 and 2). These maximum points can indicate that plurality and diversity might have a functional boundary after some point, but it requires more time to be tested.

The political system in Brazil has a specific feature that can be distinguished from the NZ political system. In Brazil's case, as a single majority elects the president, his party is always in the coalition; for that reason, it can not be a typical minority winning coalition as one of the parties in the coalition has been chosen by the majority process. Nevertheless, it might be very plausible to have a coalition comprised of parties under minority in congress, especially in the face of the fact that Brazil's political system has achieved high levels of fragmentation and plurality by having up to 30 parties with seats in congress in 2014 (graphic 2).

**Graphic 2 – Brazil's Political System**



Data Sources: BORGES; BARBOSA, 2019 and Câmara Legislativa, 2019.

Notes: \* New government after Impeachment of the previous president

\*\* At government beginning

About the number of parties in coalitions, while in New Zealand, it can be typically from three up to five. For Brazil, it has been up to 10 parties in negotiations. Besides that, according to Boston (2011), the negotiations to form a government coalition have been conducted separately by small groups. Usually, matters of principle and policy are discussed before addressing the distribution of cabinet portfolios and other government positions. However, In Brazil’s case, the discussions considering policy matters for this distribution are not so visible to society at large.

In fact, in Brazil’s political system, the president’s party has the prerogative to lead negotiations and choose its allies among those in a spectrum of similar policy preferences, considering that ministers from different parties will be required to conduct the public policies. According to Cheibub and Limongi (2011, p.44), it has been done typically considering the amount of support that the president’s party can obtain at the legislative.

**Table 1 – Countries Features**

<b>Features \ Countries</b>	<b>New Zealand</b>	<b>Brazil</b>
<b>Political System</b>	Parliamentarism	Presidentialism
<b>System of election</b>	mixed-member proportional MMP	Proportional /open list
<b>Fragmentation in the political System</b>	Increased until 2014 -up to 8 parties in parliament	Increased – up to 30 at the congress
<b>Coalition size</b>	up to 5 parties	up to 10 parties
<b>Government coalition definition</b>	Parties in cabinet positions and even minister positions outside cabinet	Parties in cabinet positions

Data source: Documental research, 2019.

#### **4.2 Government coalitions, political appointments, and government structures**

After describing the process of cabinet appointments by discussing coalitions formation, this analysis proceeds to the description of top officials’ appointment process on the next level on the government hierarchy. At this level, it is possible to identify some critical features that have implications on how the executive branch is shaped and, consequently, how it works concerning public policies to deliver goods and services to society.

After 1984, during a period of reforms in public administration, under the New Public Management paradigm, In New Zealand, the heads of departments had their discretionary power significantly increased, and a warning of the risk of politicized service was made (States Services Commission, 2013, p. 23). Following this scenario, the State sector Act 1988 brought some changes to top officials’ appointment process.

Unlike most countries with Westminster-style governments in which senior appointments are handled by ministers or commonly the prime minister, in New Zealand’s case, the appointment of most top officials has an interesting feature. Instead of being characterized as a political choice, it

seems to be meant as a technical choice, as it is the responsibility of a specific department made by the state services commissioner.

This process of appointment starts by looking for a suitable candidate and then propose that person to ministers. After that, the cabinet (technically the executive council) must consider the proposal and has the power to disagree. Although it is possible, veto situations are not so common. If the cabinet does not exercise this veto, the commissioner is authorized to appoint and employ the chief executive (SCOTT, 2001, p. 269). In this Parliamentary monarchy, the formal power of appointment remains with the governor-general who conventionally follows the prime minister's advice, so it effectively means the prime minister has the power of appointment of top officials.

Although this unique appointment system might have achieved its purpose in avoiding political interference, this achievement seems to be restricted to the public service (equivalent to Direct Administration in Brazil's case). For the wider state sector, which includes the statutory crown entities (equivalent to the Indirect Administration in Brazil), the method of appointment is different, considering that it is the responsible ministers who have the power to appoint members of each board. Furthermore, they can determine the remuneration of some of its members according to the Crown Entity Act of 2004.

As it appears to be, the responsible ministers are entitled to some extension of power over the executive branch, by some extent of political appointment, as it is required by the same law that the appointees must do achieve specific criteria. It means that, however, currently, governments are working with the department's chief executives that previous governments have appointed; each government also "has been able to exercise its own political patronage in the appointment of the board members of crown entities." (GREGORY, 2004, p. 145).

In the same direction, reinforcing the perception of the influence of the political system over the public administration, in a study about the crown entities independence and autonomy, Lofgren et al. (2018) stated that "the traditional Westminster convention of constitutional boundaries between politics and administration is not that clear-cut in practice." This study has shown that autonomy is granted since the minister trusts the chief executive; this requirement makes the appointment process central in shaping and operating the executive branch.


In the Brazilian coalition presidentialism case, political appointments are all over the top and medium positions at the executive branch hierarchy. According to BORGES and BARBOSA (2019), the increase of parties in government coalitions is correlated to a rise in government organizational structure, as parties in government coalitions require the allocation of government portfolios.

### 4.3 The Executive Branch structure in comparison

To provide an overview of the executive branch structures in both countries, graphics 3 to 7 show details of organization's type by each government. To better comprehend each trajectory's implications, it is essential to highlight that both countries were under directives to downsize the governmental structure during the analysis period.

As discussed in section 2 and for comparative purposes, the Public Service in New Zealand and the Direct administration in Brazil are considered similar. Both of them shape the central government structure. Its trajectories can be seen in graphics 3 and 6, respectively. Both show some degree of increase and fragmentation, although this is more accentuated in Brazil's case.

**Graphic 3 – Number of organizations at the Public Service**




Data Source: Public Service Commission, 2019 and documental research, 2019.

From graphics 4 and 5, it is possible to observe the trajectories of the crown entities and other organizations still in the public sector. This classification of types of organizations was given by the state's services commission official documents. They are similar to what is called indirect administration in Brazil, and its trajectory is described by graphic 7.


Comparatively, those trajectories show that the structure at arm's length of the central government in New Zealand has a more significant increase over the years. It is essential to stress that, in comparison to the public service, the arm's length structure can be more affected by political appointments

**Graphic 4 – Number of Crown Entities**



Data Source: Public Service Commission, 2019 and documental research, 2019.

**Graphic 5 – Number of Other organizations in the public sector – New Zealand**




Data Source: Public Service Commission, 2019 and documental research, 2019.

Although recognizing that the current State Sector act has been positive in increasing the efficiency and responsiveness of individual departments, the State Services Commission indicates that some of its issues are related to the fragmentation of a previously unified Public Service as it can be observed from the data above.

The Brazil Bureaucracy is either occupied by selections and objective exams or discretionary appointments (LOPEZ, 2015, p. 11). According to the Federal Constitution of 1988, all discretionary appointments for the executive branch positions are a prerogative of the president as chief of the executive branch. Therefore, the party of the president has a valuable resource in the bargaining process. Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that the government of the day is free to make appointments based on technical criteria instead of political ones, even for ministers' positions, which is not the case in New Zealand, as described before.

**Graphic 6** – Number of organizations at Brazil's Direct Administration by governments (Similar to the concept of Public Services in New Zealand)




Source: Ipea database, 2017 and BARBOSA; POMPEU, 2017.

From graphic 6, it is possible to see a continuous growth line in the direct administration from 1996 until 2014 and a downward movement from 2012 to 2018 (From Dilma I to Temer's government). Moreover, this decrease follows a decrease in the number of parties in the government coalition (see Graphic 2). Besides that, as pointed by Barbosa and Pompeu (2017), this reduction was made by merging two or more ministries or departments and mainly preserving its original structures and hierarchical positions under the resultant ministry. This type of reduction suggests that the decrease focused more on reducing the number of ministers than the government machinery itself.

This Downward movement on the direct administration also indicates that the changes are not directly related to an increase in population, considering the continuous growth of the Brazilian population in this same period.

**Graphic 7** – Number of organizations at Brazil’s Indirect Administration (Organizations at arm’s length - Similar to The concept of Crown entities in New Zealand)



Source: Ipea database, 2019.

By comparison from a qualitative point of view, the common point between New Zealand and Brazil’s case is that political appointment still is an open possibility for the arm’s length entities. Meanwhile, for the core public service, both countries are different. The executive branch in Brazil is subject to political appointment on its top hierarchical levels. At the same time, New Zealand public service is apparently out of influence by political appointments.

In addition to this observation, the quantitative data demonstrate that the structures subject to the political appointment have shown a considerably increased fragmentation in both cases. In contrast, the New Zealand public service (direct administration), which is supposedly free of political appointment, presents a tendency for stability in its size. This stability also signalizes and reinforces that government apparatus size is not directly related to population size, taking into account that the New Zealand population has been increased in the same period.

These findings corroborate the ones showed by Borges and Barbosa (2019), which presents a strong correlation between increases in government coalitions sizes and more fragmentation of the public sector. Furthermore, by contrast, these finds make clear that the correlation between the increase of fragmentation on coalitions and the increase of structures in the public sector is more substantial in the presence of opportunities for political appointments.



**Table 2** – Correlations between the number of political parties in the coalition and number of organizations

<b>NZ</b>	<b>Number of Parties in coalition (<math>r_s</math>)</b>		<b>BRAZIL</b>	<b>Number of Parties in coalition (<math>r_s</math>)</b>	
Public Services Organizations	0.835	0,01	Direct Administration	0,815	0,01
Crown Entities and other organizations (at arm's Length)	0.886	0,01	Organizations at the Indirect Administration (at arm's length)	0.738	0,05
Total of Organizations (including Public Services and Crow entities)	0.901	0,01	Total of organizations (including Direct and Indirect Administration)	0,863	0,01

Source: Elaborated by the author, 2019.

According to table 2, all correlation tests have shown it is possible to reject the null hypothesis in all cases. All of them have  $r$  of spearman above 0.6 and Significance beneath 0.5. These findings suggest that the more fragmented the government coalitions become; likewise, the structure of the public administration increases, becoming more fragmented to make room for necessary appointments. It reinforces the statements of March and Olsen (1983) about parties seeking access, representation, control, and policy benefits. However, this does not necessarily mean that it is all about pursuing the public interest. It means there is a positive correlation between the number of parties in coalitions and the number of organizations.

Additionally, the contrast between the public sector and crown entities shows that the strongest correlation is related to the number of political parties in the coalition and the number of crown entities in New Zealand's case. One possible reason for that is that only the crown entities could be subject to political appointments. As it was previously explained, the States Services act from 1988 determines that all ministers must be members of the parliament. Right below them, at the public service, all Chiefs Executives must be selected by the states services commission and work under a temporary contract. Consequently, political parties have less incentive to seek control over the public services than the crown entities and their resources.

Conversely, in Brazil's case, the correlations show that the strongest correlation is related to the number of political parties in the coalition and the number of organizations at the direct administration. It suggests that the political system tends to expand the structure of the executive branch, where it can better obtain more political control over the public administration, considering that both the direct and indirect administration are subject to political appointments.

These findings strongly reinforce the idea that the structure of public administration is more likely to be a matter of influences of the political system seeking more control over the public administration than a technical response to environmental changes, as Ryu et al. (2019) has also claimed.

## Conclusion Remarks

The Analysis shows that despite times of economic crises, the state sector at the national level in both countries has increased following the increase of political parties in government coalitions.

Even in different political systems and social-economic contexts, government coalitions seem to affect the executive branch structure in the same way. From the data cases, increases in fragmentation of coalitions are followed by an increase in the number of public sector organizations, which means increasingly fragmented government machinery. Moreover, during a fiscal crisis, which reasonably would suggest a trajectory of decrease in the public sector structure and action, contradictorily, this same behavior was also observed.

In regard to the way that governments organize their functions and actions, apparently, the increases in governmental structures are towards those parts of government where the political appointments are available and where the coalition can hold more power over organizations, which means at the whole executive Branch in Brazil's case, and The Crown entities at New Zealand's Case.

Although one can claim that after the New Public Management reforms the public sector became more fragmented, it is essential to highlight that this fragmentation mostly happened where the political appointments stay as an option, as the public services in New Zealand have remained stable. This observation leads us to some important reflections about to which extent the political system, in other words, the parties, are shaping the organizational trajectories of the public sector. Furthermore, to which extent the shape and capacity of public services are at service of parties' interests and needs. Those are questions to be examined by further studies.

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