



ANALYSIS OF PARTY LEADER SURVIVAL IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES (1995-2014)

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Abstract: This paper analyzes the survival of party leaders in the Chamber of Deputies (CD). We seek to answer the question: what variables impact the survival of a party leader? We analyzed the leaders of the main political parties in the CD to test some hypotheses raised by the literature on the survival of political leaders. The dependent variable is the number of days each of these leaders remained at the head of their party, and the independent variables are ideology, experience and political credibility of the deputy, the period in which he/she assumed the role, size of the party, and belonging to the coalition of the Federal Government. Based on survival analysis models, the results indicate that the deputy who takes office at the beginning of the Legislature and has expertise increases the survival time while being in a left-wing party has the opposite effect.

Keywords: Party leadership; Leadership; Chamber of Deputies; Survival analysis; Party ideology.

1 Introduction

The position of party leader in the Chamber of Deputies (CD) is one of the most relevant for the internal functioning of that House of Laws. This is because the leader is invested in a series of regimental prerogatives that give him/her power of agenda, incentives, and control over the bench (MIRANDA, 2010). According to the Internal Rules of the CD, the leader has the power to appoint members to the Standing Commissions, votes for the entire bench in symbolic votes, requests urgency in specific votes, and constitutes the College of Leaders, a body that defines the agenda of the CD with the president of the House. The party leader also functions as “the bridge that connects individual parliamentarians to the Executive” (PEREIRA; MUELLER, 2003, our translation). It is customary for them to be heard when distributing Federal Government posts and forming the governing coalition.

In theoretical and methodological terms, party leaders have emphasized their role, especially in studies concerning the partisan approach to the functioning of the CD (PERES and CARVALHO, 2012). These studies mark an empirical contrast to the works that view the CD as the realm of the individual parliamentarian – distributive approach (MAINWARING, 1999;

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AMES, 2003). In the distributive perspective, exogenous variables such as the Brazilian electoral system (proportional and open list), constituted incentives for the individualistic performance of parliamentarians. The latter would be more concerned with amending the Federal Budget according to their electoral interests and would have little incentive to act collectively.

The researchers of the partisan approach, in turn, indicate that, unlike the reign of the individual parliamentarian, the National Congress and specifically the CD, has its work rationally oriented from "key figures of the legislative process": the members of the Board of Directors (especially the House president) and party leaders, chosen by the benches and with the power of interference over them (MORAIS et al., 2018). It would be rational for parliamentarians to work together with the leader to access important resources, both internal (referrals to the thematic commissions) and external (better relationship with the Executive).

However, in addition to the functions of the leaders and their powers, there are still few empirical efforts to observe the profile of party leaders, particularly how long these actors remain in charge of their cohorts. In the last decade, works such as those of Silva Jr et al. (2013), Simoni Jr et al. (2016), and Morais et al. (2018), sought to test hypotheses concerning the political attributes necessary to occupy the leadership position. Silva Jr et al. (2013) concluded that such characteristics as credibility and expertise are extremely important for the choice of the leader. Credibility is conceptualized as the degree of commitment of the parliamentarian to his/her party, and expertise is the degree of knowledge of the parliamentarian on the functioning of the CD. Those chosen to hold the position of leader tend to be parliamentarians differentiated from their colleagues in terms of credibility. They are deputies with a long history of service and loyalty to the organization.

Simoni Jr et al. (2016) qualify the hypotheses of Rodrigues (2006) by stating that, even if access to CD has diversified over time in social terms (occupational, educational, and gender profile), the parliamentary elite (leaders, chairs of thematic committees, and members of the board of directors) constitutes a subgroup within the political field. The attributes of members of the elite ("high clergy") are different from the "intermediate" parliamentarians. Recruitment to the positions of power and command would still be a more closed path.

Morais et al. (2018) indicate that the different political attributes of leaders, more or less credibility and expertise, would be decisive to maintain parliamentary discipline. Their empirical findings indicate that more experienced and more committed party leaders tend to ensure a higher level of discipline from their cohorts in important votes.

In short, these studies aimed to qualify the debate regarding party leaders in terms of selection and performance processes. However, gaps remain. In this work, we seek to address the political survival of party leaders in the CD and answer the question: What are the variables that impact the survival time of party leaders? Thus, we extract variables from a literature little

explored in Brazil that tries to measure the length of stay of party leaders in parliamentary democracies to seek an approximation with the Brazilian case. These variables concern the coalition government, bench size, credibility, expertise of the deputy, time when he/she assumed the leadership, and ideology. Therefore, we believe to contribute to the very broad debate of the research agenda on CD.

In empirical terms, we analyzed the figure of the leaders of all political parties who had the right to hold this post from 1995⁴, inauguration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) for his first term (49th Legislature), until 2014 (54th Legislature), last year of the first Dilma Rousseff government. We justify the time cut because it is a period of relative political stability in Brazil (ABRANCHES, 2018). The names of the parliamentarians who held the position were requested through the Transparency Law (Law 12,527/11) and provided by the Chamber of Deputies, through the General Secretariat of the Bureau. The profile of the political careers of these individuals was collected in the Brazilian Biographical Historical Dictionary (DHBB) and on the CD website.

The work is divided into four sections. The first presents the theoretical debate. Next, we present the research design. The third part is devoted to data analysis. Finally, the conclusion discloses some of the findings.

2 Theoretical Debate

In parliamentary regimes, the position of party leader gives its occupant the possibility to become head of Government, if his/her party reaches⁵ parliamentary majority. In terms of party organization, as Andrews and Jackman (2008) indicated, the leader is confused with the party itself, being blamed for defeats and celebrated when there are election victories. The leadership change becomes a moment of a possible change to the party. Departures of prominent leaders such as Margaret Thatcher, in the English Conservative Party, or Helmut Kohl, in the German Christian democracy become a time of programmatic and organizational changes. Additionally, the “personalization of politics”, according to Bennett (2012), has analyzed party leadership profiles and styles increasingly relevant.

In this sense, many researchers have focused on the (1) selection processes and (2) replacement and survival of party leaders. Our focus lies on this second point. Bynander and Hart (2007) point out that studies on the survival periods of party leadership are still peripheral, both in the field of legislative studies and in the study of leadership itself. Theoretically, it is essential to observe the length of stay of leaders at the head of their parties to verify the degree of "rotation" of political elites and the levels of accountability (horizontal and vertical) of the

⁴ DEM/PFL, PCdoB, PDT, PMDB, PP, PRB, PR/PL, PSB, PSDB, PSC, PV, PT, PTB, and PPS.

⁵ In Parliamentarism, it is possible for a party to indicate the leader even if he/she does not have the highest overall number of votes. In cases where coalition is required, for example.

established leaderships. For Horiuchi et al. (2013, p. 357), a leader who remains for many years ahead of his/her party can indicate two movements:

On the one hand, it may be taken to be a key indicator of the level of authority and the level of support that leaders (whether in government or not) enjoy among their principal party constituents – those who have the power to remove them. On the other hand, very long-serving leaders may stifle innovation within parties and governments and generate internal conflicts and stalemates without any particular faction having quite enough power to replace them (HORIUCHI et al, 2013, p.357).

In other words, on the one hand, he/she indicates a high degree of discipline of its cohorts - caused by political efficiency, good electoral performance, and/or patronage; on the other hand, he/she also indicates party oligarchization (MICHELS, [1911] 1982). This finding would result in an indicator of democratic deficit within the organization, which could also impact the political system.

The work of Bynander and Hart (2007) initiates a series of studies that attempt to fill the gap in the literature concerning the survival of party leaders. In empirical terms, the authors work with data from the two main parties of four parliamentary democracies: the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Their findings indicate that most of the leaders analyzed remained in office for more than 48 months (an election cycle) and that leadership exchanges tend to occur when parties are in opposition (69.2%). Finally, the participation of the members in the selection processes was minimal, especially in the choice of the moment of the change. Even though selection rules may become more inclusive over time, the moment of change tends to be controlled by a narrow political group: party parliamentarians.

The authors' discussion was important to begin a research agenda but advanced little in terms of formulating empirical indicators for the comparative study of the processes of party leader replacement. Following this perspective, Andrews and Jackman (2008) propose a causal inferences model to change party leaders. For the authors, the party's electoral performance would be decisive for the survival of the party leader. From the premise that political parties have to achieve office as their main objective, Andrews and Jackman (2008, p. 674) point out that the loss of power is the most likely cause for changing the partisan "guard"⁶. The theoretical model followed is dependent on the idea of economic democracy (DOWNS, 1999). According to this perspective, parties are seen as companies searching for votes and positions. In this regard, the authors believe there are no ideological differences. Losing elections is the main factor for a change in leadership. Leaders who keep their parties competitive and manage to stay in government tend to stay ahead of these organizations longer.

⁶“(…) the removal of leaders of parliamentary [is] a strategic response to poor electoral performance”. (ANDREWS and JACKMAN, 2008, p.674)

Later works sought alternative explanations to understand the survival time of the leaders. Horiuch et al. (2013), for example, explore the hypothesis that a leader's survival time is directly related to the survival time of his/her predecessor. That is, the authors considered that successors of leaders with (1) long service time at the head of the party and (2) who have become heads of government have a shorter life than successors of more ephemeral leaders. The authors analyzed 448 party leaders, from 69 parties, in 23 parliamentary democracies. The results partially confirm their hypotheses. First, the survival time of the predecessor has a significant statistical effect on the survival time of the succeeding leader only if the former remained in office for, on average, 14.7 years. In methodological terms, the authors divide their sample into three categories: predecessor leaders with a short leadership period (1.7 years, on average), predecessor leaders with an intermediate leadership period (5.4 years, on average), and predecessor leaders with a long leadership period (14.7 years, on average). The second hypothesis is confirmed without adjustments: leaders who succeed former heads of government tend to survive much less.

Another explanation is proposed by Ennsner-Jedenastik and Müller (2015). The authors work with data on the survival of leaders in Austria, from 1945 to 2011, and indicate that internal party democracy has a significant effect on the survival time of leaders. More restrictive leadership selection rules, measured by the size of the electorate (*selectorate*), which can elect or remove a leader within the party, and intraparty coalitions, measured by the total support for the leader at the party convention, would be the variables with the greatest impact on survival. The results of the tests conducted by the authors confirm their hypotheses: the larger the potential electorate, the shorter the survival time, and the higher the intraparty support at the time of the convention, the longer the survival time.

Finally, Van Dyjk (2013) systematizes the main hypotheses of this literature to test the survival time of Dutch party leaders. The author tests, in all, 11 hypotheses raised by the literature and finds significant results in six of them: party performance: if the party wins more seats with the leader in charge, the latter tends to stay for more time in office; time: leaders who take office after predecessors with extensive experience tend to stay less time, and beginning the legislature in charge of the party with more articulation time before the election elevates the political survival of the leadership; men tend to stay more in office than women; and leaders of small parties tend to survive more than leaders in big parties.

Chart 1 – Literature on leadership in parliamentary regimes

Author(s)	Year	Cases	Y	X
Bynander and Hart	2007	65	Change in leadership	
Andrews and Jackman	2008	124	Length of stay in leadership (in months)	Election Results
Horiuch et al	2013	448	Length of stay in leadership (in years)	Length of stay of the previous leader
Ennsner-Jedenastik and Müller	2015	229	Length of stay in leadership (in months)	Organization and internal democracy
Van Dyjk	2013	188	Length of stay in leadership (in months)	Election results, personal characteristics, length of stay of the predecessor, party organization, ideology, and size of the party.

Source: The author, 2021.

This study of the literature on the survival of party leaders aimed to situate the discussion and contextualize the variables used in this work. In presidential government systems, the party leader can be conceptualized differently. In general, the president can be identified as the national president of the party or its presidential candidate. In the case of the United States, elected presidents usually become the largest party leaders, while in Congress, parliamentarians are divided between leaders of the opposition and the government. In Brazil, these positions can be overlapped: the party's national president is also the presidential candidate, usually in pre-election periods⁷, depending on the organization and strategy of each party.

However, we address a smaller dimension of the meaning of leader. We consider only the scope of the CD and those parliamentarians who are chosen to command the bench in the daily life of the House under article 9 of the Internal Rules. The occupants of this position end up also having a relevant position in the organizational life of the party given that they are

⁷ The case of PSDB is symptomatic of this strategy. At least in the last two presidential elections (2014 and 2018), the command of the alliance was with the future presidential candidate: Aécio Neves and, then, Geraldo Alckmin.

raised to the National Executives (NEs) as born members (RIBEIRO, 2014)⁸. Although the bench chooses the leader, the parties tend to adopt legal criteria in their statutes, where the NE "protect" the choices to a certain degree. In the next session, we present information on data collection and hypothesis measurement.

3 Method

Seeking to answer the initial questions, we worked with the data of all parties that could have leaders during the analyzed period. The rules of the CD establish the guidelines on what functions are performed by leaders and which political parties can possess the figure of the leader. The criterion expressed in the norm is that only those who have a bench greater than one-hundredth of the members of the House can have access to the position (CD, article 9, paragraph 4, 2017). Except for the prohibition of belonging to the Board of Directors and the need to inform about the leader's election in each Legislature, the Regulation does not stipulate any other prerequisites for members to occupy the position.

We observed information on i) formal rules; ii) career profile of parliamentarians who held the leadership position; and iii) the length of stay at the front of the bench (in days). Regarding the first point, the statutes of the subtitles and the Internal Rules of the CD were consulted. The socio-political profile of the legislators was built from sources such as the DHBB and the CD's website. Survival time was calculated from the number of days within a legislature⁹ in which the parliamentarian chosen as leader remained in office. The CD made these data available through the Law of Transparency.

We worked with the number of nominations to the leadership position: 158 in the five legislatures analyzed¹⁰. In all, 120 individuals held the positions. We analyzed the leaders appointed by the parties in each of the Legislatures. In other words, if the same parliamentarian was chosen to lead the party in three different legislatures, he/she was accounted for three times. This is the case of Valdemar Costa Neto, leader of the PL. The data were systematized in the R and SPSS software, where we also performed descriptive statistics and survival analysis for hypothesis testing.

The number of days in front of the party bench constitutes our dependent variable (Y)¹¹. We seek to test the effect of a series of independent variables (X) listed by the literature on the survival of party leaders, as systematized by Van Dyjk (2013), with a view to an adaptation necessary for the test in the case of presidentialism¹². We explain them in Chart 2.

⁸ The statutes of all parties analyzed in this work provide for the figure of a born member of the National Executive. These are the party leaders in the Senate and CD.

⁹ A Legislature has a period of 1,461 days.

¹⁰ The database and script of the analyzes is available in: <https://osf.io/rv24z/>.

¹¹ We disregarded the cases of leaders who remained less than a month (30 days).

¹² By way of example: the party leader in the CD is not the national "commander" of the party during the election

Chart 2 – Analysis model

Dimension	Variable	Nature	Collection
Performance	Coalition	Dichotomy	Inácio and Rezende (2015); Cortez (2018)
Time	Beginning of the Legislature	Dichotomy	CD
Party organization	Bench size	Continuous	CD and TSE
	Left-wing	Dichotomy	Krause et al (2017)
Personal characteristics	Expertise - number of mandates	Continuous	DHBB
	Credibility - membership time	Continuous	DHBB

Source: The author, 2021.

In terms of performance, we considered that the leaders who led their parties during the period in which they were in the governing coalition managed to stay longer in office. This hypothesis assumes that the leaders of coalition parties tend to have more access to the Executive (MELO, 2010) and, therefore, greater bargaining power in matters important to parliamentarians, such as positions in the Government and the release of parliamentary amendments. One cycle: more access, more power, and more time in front of the bench. The identification of which parties were part of the federal government coalitions at each time was taken from the works of Inácio and Rezende (2015) and Cortez (2018).

By hypothesis, we point out that the party leaders who take charge of the bench at the beginning of the Legislature stay longer in office than the leaders who take over later, during the mandate. It is believable to think that those parliamentarians who manage the party's nomination after the elections have more predicates to remain in the leadership, also because the time until the elections is longer, which in parliamentary countries is called a *grace period* (VAN DYJK, 2013). Immediately post-election period, with greater stability for the leadership.

The size of the bench and the voters of the leader have a negative effect on the length of stay: the larger the bench, the shorter the survival time. Ennsner-Jedenastik and Müller (2015) pointed out that more “closed” circles of selection tend to favor longer survivals. In terms of party organization, we also indicate that parties that establish some form of “guardianship” of choice of the leader (interference of the National Executive) in their statutes tend to have leaders who survive less time.

We tested the effect of party ideology on leadership survival time. From the


campaign. He/she can hardly be held responsible, individually, as a promoter of successes or failures in the performance of the party.

classification proposed in Krause et al. (2017), we arranged the parties in the ideological spectrum as follows: Left-wing: PPS, PCdoB, PT, PV, PDT, and PSB. Center: PSDB and PMDB. Right-wing: PRB, DEM, PR/PL, PP, PSC, and PTB. We considered that the left-wing parties - through their extra-parliamentary bodies - have greater control over their benches than the center and right-wing parties (DUVERGER, 1980). The former, in Brazil, have more vertical recruitment mechanisms of their elites (MARENCO; SERNA, 2007) and a greater number of bureaucrats in their National Executives (RIBEIRO, 2014; SCHAEFER, 2018). Internal procedures are more institutionalized and even temporally defined mandates of leaders appear in some of the statutes of these alliances and greater involvement of the National Executive in the leadership choice. By hypothesis, we considered that the survival time of their leaders is shorter in these parties.

We also measured two other variables of the personal characteristics dimension: credibility and expertise. At this point, we follow the methodological trail of Silva et al. (2013) and Morais et al. (2018). The concept of credibility serves to measure the degree of commitment of the parliamentarian to the party organization, while the idea of expertise serves to measure the degree of knowledge of the parliamentarian in relation to the functioning of the Legislature and his/her more general political experience in terms of career. We used the number of parliamentary mandates in the CD and the time of affiliation to the party as proxies to identify expertise and credibility, respectively. By hypothesis, we considered that more experienced and committed parliamentarians tend to stay longer ahead of their cohorts. In other words, within a subgroup quite differentiated from the intermediate parliamentarian in terms of political attributes (the party leaders), those with larger capitals would tend to survive further ahead of the bench. In the next session, we address the result analysis.

4 Results and Discussion

First, we expose descriptive statistics on the survival time of party leaders in Brazil (Figure 1). Leaders in the period analyzed survived on average 541 days in office (just under half of a term), with the median value of 369 days and a standard deviation of 365.54.



Source: The author, 2021.

In terms of credibility and expertise, it is possible to see that the subgroup of party leaders had on average two terms in the CD and a period of 13 years of affiliation to their respective party. These data corroborate the findings of Silva Jr et al. (2013), who measured the same statistics for the 51st Legislature. The size of the bench ranged from a minimum of seven parliamentarians to 107. Ninety-two (58.2%) of the leaders were at the front of their benches when the alliances were in the governing coalition. Fifty-eight (36.7%) of parliamentarians took office at the beginning of the Legislature, while 87 (55.1%) of leaders were affiliated with left-wing parties.

Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Days in leadership	541.30	369.50	365.544	39	1,460
Government Coalition	.5823	1.0000	.49475	0.00	1.00
Beginning of the Legislature	.3671	0.0000	.48354	0.00	1.00
Elected Bench	41.67	34.00	27.578	7	107

Left-wing¹³	.5506	1.0000	.49901	0.00	1.00
Number of mandates in the CD	2.0886	2.0000	1.69066	0.00	7.00
Party membership time	13.8418	13.0000	8.29974	0.00	33.00

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the General Secretariat of the Bureau (CD), 2021.

When comparing the legislatures, according to Table 2, we can see that the stability of the leaders was slightly higher during the second term of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and in the second term of Lula, compared to their first terms. This consists of a trace of the stabilization of the pattern of government coalitions, the presidential agenda and, especially, the parties themselves (ABRANCHES, 2018). The 52nd Legislature had the shortest average leader survival time. It was marked by allegations of corruption that hit party leaders. Roberto Jefferson (PTB), for example, had his political rights revoked by colleagues, and Valdemar Costa Neto (PL), resigned as federal deputy, both involved in the case of the so-called “Mensalão”.

Table 2 – Average leadership survival time per Legislature (in days)

Number of the Legislature	Mean	N	Standard Deviation	Median	Minimum	Maximum
50th	573.08	26	354.731	379.00	189	1,458
51st	738.16	19	508.582	372.00	317	1,460
52nd	443.64	36	212.015	365.00	58	1,204
53rd	578.19	31	384.202	378.00	147	1,460
54th	493.65	46	362.908	365.50	39	1,460
Total	541.32	158	365.576	369.50	39	1,460

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the General Secretariat of the Bureau (CD), 2021.

Note: F value (Anova test): 2.428. Significance: 0.050.

¹³ Another aspect that should be highlighted, even if it does not enter directly into the model, is the distribution of leadership positions according to gender. Political representation does not constitute a reliable mirror of society (NORRIS, 2013). The general distribution of the population in terms of race/ethnicity, gender, and income is not represented in Parliament. As the prestige of the office grows, as indicated by Simoni Jr et al. (2016), the profile of the parliamentarian tends to be more homogeneous. Men, white, rich, and over 50 years of age tend to dominate, for example, the positions of the high clergy of the CD. Our population data corroborate this thesis: of the 120 individuals chosen leaders by their parties, only nine were women. In other words, in addition to the low overall representativeness in the CD (only 13% of the composition of the plenary was female after the 2014 elections), the number of women in the leadership of the parties is even more disproportionate. In terms of the number of days: the leader women stay, on average, just over 300 days ahead of their benches, while the men stay 550 days. The party women leaders were also all from left-wing parties (which made it impossible to include this variable in the model): Manuela D’Ávila, Jô Moraes, Luciana Santos, Vanessa Grazziotin, and Jandira Feghali, from PCdoB, Luiza Erundina, Sandra Rosado, and Ana Arraes, from PSB, and Sandra Starling, from PT.

When comparing the parties, in Table 3, different patterns in the survival averages of party leaders emerge. In the cases of PCdoB, PDT, PT, PSB, PRB, and PSDB, the means and medians were lower than the total cases, which indicates greater turnover. Low standard deviation values indicate that the PCdoB and PT cases are of more systematic post rotation. That is, mandates seem to be defined without oscillations. The case of the PSB is extreme since, while one of its leaders (Ribamar Alves) stayed 39 days in office during the 54th Legislature, Alexandre Cardoso remained for almost an entire Legislature (1260 days, during the 50th Legislature). This data indicates that leaders who remained in office for almost the entire Legislature occurred in large part of the alliances. There were no leaders with more than a thousand days in front of the bench only in the case of PCdoB, PRB, PSDB, and PT.

Table 3 — Survival time per party (in days)

LEADERSHIP	Mean	N	Standard Deviation	Median	Minimum	Maximum
DEM/PFL	659.64	11	425.260	378.00	350	1,459
PCdoB	382.00	19	91.108	363.00	330	754
PDT	398.84	19	301.148	347.00	83	1,429
PMDB	809.44	9	389.078	726.00	360	1,461
PP/PPB/PPR	604.17	12	439.845	443.50	179	1,447
PPS	729.83	6	566.031	371.50	350	1,461
PR/PL	729.20	10	421.350	725.00	338	1,461
PRB	484.67	3	211.614	365.00	360	729
PSB	426.78	18	326.203	347.00	39	1,260
PSC	973.33	3	523.597	1,039.00	420	1,461
PSDB	483.87	15	173.752	368.00	350	764
PT	368.81	21	69.321	364.00	168	525
PTB	906.38	8	545.955	955.00	254	1,461
PV	730.00	4	525.949	614.00	232	1,461
Total	541.32	158	365.576	369.50	39	1,461

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the General Secretariat of the Bureau (CD), 2021.
Note: F value (Anova test): 3.349. Significance: 0.001.

We used the survival analysis technique based on the Cox model of proportional risks to test the hypotheses (BOX-STEFFENSMEIER and JONES, 2004). The model is quite malleable since it does not assume a priori statistical distribution and has been widely used in studies on the survival of party leaders (HORIUCHI et al., 2013; ENNSER-JEDENASTIK and MÜLLER, 2015). The results of the models are presented in Table 4. Since the coefficient values are more difficult to interpret, we expose in the table the exponential values of the coefficient that, from the Formula $(1 - \text{Exp}(\text{Coef})) * 100$, indicate the values of proportional risks associated with leader

survival (LINS, 2021).

We estimated four Cox regression models of proportional risks. In Model 1, we entered all the variables of interest. In Model 2, we considered a dichotomous control variable: being a leader in the 52nd Legislature, the most unstable of the period. We also estimate two models disregarding this variable, given that the credibility (length of membership) tends to be greater in the left-wing parties (17 years, while the average of the leaders of the right-wing/center was ten years).

Table 4 – Cox regression results (proportional risks)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Coalition	0.835 (-0.975)	0.813 (-1.118)	0.909 (-0.531)	0.896 (-0.613)
Beginning of the Legislature	0.487 (-3.554) ***	0.502 (-3.337) ***	0.479 (-3.651) ***	0.490 (-3.456) ***
Bench	1.001 (0.560)	1.001 (0.457)	1.004 (1.312)	1.003 (1.296)
Left-wing	1.484 (1.821) *	1.454 (1.728) *	1.802 (3.276) ***	1.798 (3.271) ***
Expertise	0.914 (-1.836) *	0.916 (-1.771) *	0.920 (-1.701)*	0.922 (-1.645) *
Credibility	1.020 (-1.836)	1.022 (1.681)*		
52nd Legislature		1.231 (1.037)		1.168 (0.199)
Likelihood ratio test	43.05	44.01	40.71	41.31
Observations	158	158	158	158

Source: The author, 2021.

Notes: Z values are in parentheses.


***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10

The results indicate that assuming the leadership position at the beginning of the Legislature is the variable that maintains statistical significance at the level of p-value<0.01 in all models and seems to explain leader survival. In Model 1, it is possible to observe that parliamentarians who take office at the beginning of the Legislature have 51.3% more chance of remaining in office until the end than leaders who took command of the bench at another time of the respective Legislatures. This value is maintained at similar levels in the other models. In left-wing associations, leaders had a greater risk of falling during the Legislature: -48.4% in Model 1, -45.4% in Model 2, -80.2% in Model 3, and -79.8% in Model 4. This result is distinct from those found by authors who tested the ideological hypothesis in previous works (VAN

DYJK, 2013; ANDREWS and JACKMAN, 2007). In the Brazilian case, the leadership rotation seems to be affected by the parties' ideology. The expertise was also significant as a shield for the permanence of parliamentarians: the addition of a mandate represented fewer risks to survival (8.6%, 8.4%, 8%, and 7.8%, respectively).


Figures 2 and 3 highlight the values of the variables: beginning of the Legislature (strata, 0 = No; 1 = Yes) and being of the Left-Wing Party (strata, 0 = No; 1 = Yes). It is possible to observe the probability of survival over time by comparing the groups. Leaders who take office at the beginning of the Legislature are more likely to remain until the end. Leaders of right-wing and center parties are more likely to remain in office until the end of the Legislature when compared to leaders of left-wing parties.

Figure 2 – Beginning of the Legislature survival curve (strata, 0 = No; 1 = Yes)



Source: The author, 2021.

Figure 3 – Left-wing party survival curve (strata, 0 = No; 1 = Yes)



Source: The author, 2021.

The other variables included in the model follow the expected direction. However, it is impossible to reject the null hypothesis that the values found occur by chance¹⁴. The exception in our model is the credibility hypothesis. Contrary to what we originally conceptualized, the leaders most committed to the party did not have more leadership time. This effect can be explained by considering the overlap between ideology and credibility. As highlighted by Marenco and Serna (2007, p. 108, our translation), left-wing parties have parliamentarians with supported political careers:

(...) both in collective resources to achieve greater social and political capital, and in the establishment of a constellation of social networks and in the rooting of their social bases of support. These new political elites build their

¹⁴ The Schoenfeld residue values are presented in the annex.

careers based on long trajectories, [...], and in party Fidelity, supported by organized structures of electoral professional type (MARENCO and SERNA, 2007, p. 108, our translation).

Put another way, the selection of candidates and those elected by left-wing parties tend to have more organization-centered political careers than center and right-wing parties. This selection is reflected in the choice of key positions. The organization has more internal control mechanisms, which increases leadership rotation in the CD.

At the same time, our results are convergent and distinct from the literature findings, even given the necessary adaptations. We are dealing with the case of a presidential and not parliamentary country. Still, we can observe that the more experienced subgroup of this select group tends to stay longer in office and that beginning the Legislature in charge of the party (*grace period*) tends to mean more stability, and the difference in the survival time of the leadership is also explained by ideology.

5 Conclusion

Many theorists on the forms of government and governability analyze the figure of party leaders: these are considered essential for the proper functioning of democratic institutions. In the Brazilian case, the CD regimentally institutionalized the figure of the party leader as the deputy elected by his/her peers and who holds the prerogatives of voting and control of the legislative agenda together with the presidency of the House.

The leader is a deputy with greater circulation, money, and prerogatives. We therefore understand it to be a position sought by parliamentarians. Based on this finding, we sought explanations in the international literature regarding the time spent by parliamentarians in front of the party leadership. These variables were tested in the cases of deputies who exercised party leadership in the CD between 1995 and 2014.

In the general test (Table 4), it was possible to observe three statistically significant variables: leaders who assume the function at the beginning of the Legislature, expertise, and ideology. There is a positive relationship in the first two cases: when leaders begin the term in office they survive longer and experience is important to explain this variation. The survival time is shorter for left-wing parties, which differs from the Brazilian case.

We performed an investigation on the regimental figure of the party leader in the light of international literature and combined analyses on the parliamentary and presidential regimes. Far from exhausting the theme, it seems appropriate to note that this figure is one of the keys to understanding our political system and deserves further analysis.

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Appendix 1 – Schonfield residuals for independent variables

Variables	chisq	df	p
Coalition	1.932	1	0.164
Beginning	5.145	1	0.023
Legislature			
Bench	6.619	1	0.01
Left-wing	4.54	1	0.03
Mandates	0.23	1	0.631
Membership Time	0.053	1	0.817
52nd Legislature	0.898	1	0.343
Global	18.842	7	0.008

Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the General Secretariat of the Bureau (CD).