



APPLYING THE COALITION'S PRESIDENTIALISM MODEL TO THE CITY OF SÃO PAULO: PREDOMINANCE OF THE EXECUTIVE OR GREATER SHARING OF POWER?

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Abstract: This article has the objective to study patterns of interaction between the Executive and the Legislative branches of government, in the City of São Paulo, between the promulgation of the City Council bylaw (1991) and the legislative period ended in 2016. We seek to observe if there are pattern differences' between the municipal level and the Federal level through the usage of the coalition's presidentialism model. We use data from all laws presented according to its presenter to work with the concepts of "dominance" and "success" at the municipal level. The main findings are described as: I - the percentage of laws presented and voted inside each legislature period is high; II - the majority of the laws presented came from the Legislative branch; III - The Executive branch has a greater success in its propositions even though this power underperforms what is seen at the Federal Level; IV - The Municipal Executive branch tax of dominance is low in comparison to the dominance presented by the Federal Executive, suggesting a greater share of power between powers in the Municipal level.

Keywords: Legislative Process; São Paulo; Municipal Legislative Branch; São Paulo's Executive branch; São Paulo City Council.

1. Introduction

Most of the studies on Executive and Legislative relations done by Brazilian Political Science adhered to the formation of majorities for the coalition of the Presidency of the Brazil in the Federal Legislature since the core of the discussion was related to the clash between political systems (Parliamentary or Presidential) and the democratic regime. The line of studies resulting from the work of Figueiredo and Limongi (2001) indicates the stability of the interaction between these branches by analyzing legislative production mostly coordinated by the Presidency and the high success rate of this institution in its legislative proposals. It is essential to specifically analyze the results of government coalitions in the Municipal Legislative Process in an extended period given the low occurrence of studies for the municipal level with this focus and the almost absence

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of texts that analyze more than two administrations of the São Paulo Executive. As the capital with the largest number of councilors in the country, an analysis of the relations between legal production of the Executive and Legislative Branches of São Paulo, is particularly important. Given the above, this article seeks to identify indicators of the efficiency of the administrations of the São Paulo City Hall (PMSP in Portuguese) between 1991 and 2016 in the execution of the parliamentary agenda of the Executive through calculations on the success and dominance of the Executive in the legislative process. The analyses presented in this work seek to dialogue with previous studies to allow advances in understanding the relations between branches.

We seek to broadly analyze the performance of the São Paulo Executive Branch in the legal production of the municipality between 1991 and 2016, including comparing administrations, through data analysis of the administrations between the enactment of the Organic Law of the Municipality (LOM in Portuguese) and the Internal Regulations of the City Council (RICM in Portuguese), and the end of 2016.

The article is divided into four parts. The first is a bibliographic review of the topic and its theoretical foundations. The second part consists of the explanation of the methodology used and the hypothesis of the work, while the third part consists of the data analysis on the Legislative Process of São Paulo. The article ends with conclusions and notes for the continuation of studies.

2. Coalition presidentialism: from the federal to the municipal spheres

2.1 The Brazilian institutional debate

This work is guided by studies on the Brazilian Political System (SPB in Portuguese), specifically those concerned with understanding the relationship between the Executive and Legislative Branches after the enactment of the Federal Constitution of 1988 (CF88).

The specialized literature that addresses the relations between Executive and Legislative in the city of São Paulo is guided by studies at the Federal level and indicates the need for the formation of coalitions to enable the so-called governability in the proportional and multi-party system. The first studies regarding the relationship between both branches presented a pessimistic content on the functioning of the SPB. Explanations based on an alleged connection between the preference for distributive public policies (amendments to the budget) and a fragility of the parties in Parliament and in the electoral arenas pointed to an inevitable decision-making paralysis of the system. Another relevant factor in these approaches would be the existence of a physiological pattern of interaction between the branches. The physiological model, according to Abrucio and Couto (1995), finds in the presidential system a framework that encourages obtaining a parliamentary majority by the Executive, ensuring the necessary governability and, at the same time, occasionally causing an “eclipse” of the Legislative by the Executive due to the lack of independence. This situation would generate an imbalance with clear overlap of the Executive, given the existence of a physiological interaction between the interests of the government and the

individual interests of each parliamentarian.

Abranches (1988) presents a fearful assessment of the Brazilian presidential model, denominated by the author as coalition presidentialism. In his view, Brazil lived an institutional dilemma in the transition to democracy, arising from the need to choose a political model sufficiently efficient to aggregate and process pressures derived from a heterogeneous social, economic, and political framework. Thus, the adoption of a proportional, multi-party and presidential model, in which the Executive is organized based on large coalitions, would have very high conflict potential and would make the stability of large coalitions unlikely in times of crisis (ABRANCHES, 1988, p.30).

Contrary to Abranches, studies that emerged in the early 2000s presented data indicating that coalition presidentialism in Brazil was stable and that the President of Brazil had tools that ensured the governability of the system. This could be measured by the success rates of the President when approving his/her legislative agenda and by the rate of dominance of the President in relation to the set of laws approved (FIGUEIREDO; LIMONGI, 2001)⁴. These authors identified that the Brazilian coalition presidentialism works in a very similar form to other models, when comparing the rates of dominance and success of the Executive in relation to the Legislative in the Brazilian case with international experiences, especially from other democratic countries that adopt the parliamentary regime, which would even explain its stability. The authors emphasize the tools available to the Presidency of Brazil to create and maintain the parliamentary coalition and especially to ensure certain control of the agenda in the Federal Legislature. This approach paved a theoretical framework that indicated the direction of cooperation between the branches as opposed to the distributive conflict of the analyzes that indicated the alleged correlation between the release of amendments to the budget and parliamentary support to the government. Given the assumptions that there would be a connection between the preference for amendments to the budget and a fragility of the parties in Parliament and in the electoral arenas (caused by the assumption that the negotiation between Executive and Legislative would occur in an individualized manner and guided by the physiological individual bargain between the Executive and parliamentarians), some studies tried to test the hypothesis (at the federal level) that the release of parliamentary amendments by the Executive would condition the votes of interest to the government in Congress. Vasselai and Mignozzetti (2014) test an approximation between the executions of parliamentary amendments by the Executive to the preferences of the government between 1996 and 2010. After the analysis, the authors state that it is impossible to

⁴ These calculations are made by the authors through simple divisions that give rise to reasons. The division of "number of approved drafts from the Executive" over "total number of drafts approved by Congress" indicates the ratio of dominance of the Executive over the Legislative in that it indicates the percentage of approved drafts that are born in the presidential office. The authors divide the "number of drafts, originating in the Executive, turned into law by the Parliament" by the "total number of drafts sent to the Parliament by the Executive" to calculate the success rate of the Executive.

support the popularly widespread hypothesis.

Thus, other mechanisms, other than individual bargaining with parliamentarians, were used by the Executive to ensure support for their agendas. Figueiredo and Limongi indicate that these mechanisms stem mainly from the institutional architecture of our political system. The first point arises from the strength of the Executive Branch, which derives from (a) exclusive prerogatives of this branch to begin processing budgetary matters; (b) possibility of editing provisional measures (MP's in Portuguese) that consequently encourage parliamentary cooperation to the extent that it forces the Legislature to vote on the matter once the term of validity of the MP has ended; and (c) possibility of processing in an emergency regime or even highly urgent urgency if the parliamentary majority so decides in a vote. Two central aspects should be highlighted regarding the Legislative Branch: 1) the partisan discipline of the members of the coalition; and 2) the decision-making centralization in the Legislative, expressed in the College of Leaders, which has the power to define, together with the presidency of the House, the agenda of votes in the plenary.

The calculations “Success Rate” and “Dominance Rate” of the Executive used by Figueiredo and Limongi have been and continue to be extensively reproduced when the objective is to analyze the patterns of interaction between both branches. The most up-to-date data from Figueiredo and Limongi's studies can be found below in the Success and Dominance indices of the Federal Executive Branch.

The observation of the data organized by the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP in Portuguese) and which support the work of Figueiredo and Limongi allow us to verify a high degree of success of the Federal Executive. This branch enjoyed an average of 84% success and an average dominance of 88% over the Legislative agenda. It should be noted that these values are very close to the values presented by the authors regarding the sample of 20 parliamentary countries observed between 1971-1976 and 1978-1982. The executive dominance rate in these periods in such samples were 86.4% and 89.9%, respectively. An average success rate of 84% was observed during the period. Data on the sample of parliamentary countries indicate an Executive success rate of 81.3% (Figueiredo and Limongi, 2001, pp. 102). It should be noted that the successful calculations carried out by NECI consider only the drafts approved within the presidential mandate that sent the respective drafts.

Table 1 – Dominance and success rate of the Federal Executive compared to the Federal Legislative

President	Success	Dominance
Sarney	87%	89%
Collor	76%	94%
Itamar	88%	95%
FHC	91%	90%
FHC II	83%	88%
Lula	89%	88%
Lula II	87%	80%
Dilma	84%	83%
Dilma II	90%	83%
Temer	62%	89%
means	84%	88%

Source: CEBRAP Legislative Database. Elaboration: NECI (USP), 2021.

The verification of the data regarding the parliamentary agenda of the Brazilian Executive Branch during the second democratic experience confirms the hypothesis of the stability of coalition presidentialism, thus refuting the pessimistic prognoses that assumed a high potential for conflict between the branches with possible decision paralysis. Government crises have been and continue to be experienced by many governments without necessarily implying their dissolution or the inability to resolve obstacles between the branches.

Before addressing this model of Executive-Legislative relations at the municipal level, it is important to highlight those recent analyses have revealed a new and distinct dynamic in Brazilian coalition presidentialism, in which the Parliament gains greater projection and prominence in face of the President of Brazil.

Araújo and Silva (2012) already indicated the importance of parliamentarians in the formulation of public policies through a less binary analysis on the performance of branches in bills that are processed in Congress. For the authors, it is necessary to observe the role played by parliamentarians in the federal legislative process, even in matters of Executive initiative.

Likewise, Freitas (2013) points out that one of the institutional aspects indicated by Limongi and Figueiredo as an explanatory variable of the Executive's ability to control the Legislative agenda would be oversizing. The argument that the possibility of the government coalition requesting that a particular matter be evaluated under “urgency” or “very urgent urgency”, and consequently be voted in the plenary, removing it from the thematic committees of the house, was often indicated as one of the explanations of the high success rate of the Executive. However, Freitas indicates that 45% of the drafts that can be processed under urgency regime - PL's (Ordinary Bills) and PLP's (Complementary Bills) – approved between 1988 and 2010 were

deliberated within commissions before being voted in the plenary.

Thus, the Brazilian Parliament does not act only as a passive actor to the demands of the Executive. Parliamentarians play an active role in assessing the content of matters, especially in the commissions in which the drafts are processed. It is the negotiation itself that allows the obtaining of consensus on the matters and subsequently ensures high levels of discipline observed in the plenary (FREITAS, 2013, pp. 116), and demonstrates that the approvals of matters originated from the Executive are also the result of efforts of parliamentarians, especially the rapporteurs in the commissions.

Almeida (2015) launches this discussion with a comprehensive analysis of the recent legislative production of the Chamber of Deputies. When analyzing the federal non-budgetary laws (whose initiative is not exclusive to the Executive Branch), the author points out a clear decrease in the performance of the Presidency in these formulations. Until 2004, this type of matter from the Executive corresponded to about 60% of the total non-budgetary matters of the Legislative Process; from 2008, this number falls by half of the total non-budgetary matters presented (Almeida, 2015, pp. 46). Parliament's performance in this type of law increased from 38.4% to 80.9% in comparison between 1995-2002 and 2007-2014.

Comparing the periods, we highlight: (1) the decrease in the amount of Bills approved in urgency regime, from 28.7% to 13.8%; and (2) the increase in the amount of Bills approved conclusively in the parliamentary commissions, from 9.8% to 29.1% of the total. When considering all types of bills on the initiative of Congress, the percentage of bills that were conclusively approved in commissions increased from 52.9% in 1995-2002 to 83.8% in 2007-2014.

Thus, studies that analyze the legal production in the relationships between the Executive and Legislative Branches at the Federal level have demonstrated the deepening of the role of congressmen in the legislative process. If Freitas (2013) had already noted the importance of the role of parliamentary commissions and the role of the reporters to ensure the necessary consensus to maintain the high level of party discipline in the plenary, Adams (2015) took it a step further and revealed, when observing an increase in the number of matters approved conclusively and the decrease of the non-budgetary drafts originating in the Executive Branch, that the balance of power in the Executive and Legislative seems to be leaning towards the latter. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent this recomposition of forces will affect the ability of the President of Brazil to implement his/her agenda and the very stability of the Brazilian political system.

2.2 Studies on the relationship between the Executive and Legislative Branches in São Paulo

The lack of studies aimed at the Executive-Legislative relationship at the municipal level would already be enough stimulus to ask whether the “modus operandi” of federal coalition presidentialism and its results in terms of legislative production applies at the municipal level.

The analytical and empirical framework exposed at the end of the previous section on changes in the power relationship between the President of Brazil and the National Congress also points us to a path of investigation to observe whether the growing prominent role raised by the Legislature at the federal level is reflected in the municipality of São Paulo.

In a study conducted in the 1990s, Abrucio and Couto (1995) state that it is difficult to replicate the analyses of the interaction between the Legislative and Executive Branches in the federal context to municipal realities. The difficulties encountered by the Federal Executive in setting up its support base in Congress do not appear in municipal or state spheres. In these cases, legislators do not have political guarantors (Governors and Senators) available to Federal Deputies. Furthermore, it would be necessary to observe the differences found in the pattern of interaction between branches in small and medium-sized municipalities compared to capitals and large cities, because: "If, on the one hand, [in capitals and large cities] there is no ultrapresidentialism, on the other, there is also no situation in which the parliament has a significant power of veto, such as the National Congress" (ABRUCIO; COUTO, 1995, p. 59)⁵. Abrucio and Couto also point to the existence of factors exogenous to institutional rules capable of modulating government practices in São Paulo, such as: (i) the existence of regional administrative structures as the main currency of exchange (regional administrations/sub-prefectures); (ii) the existence of possible political leaders in the municipal parliament; and, (iii) public opinion.

Despite these analytical difficulties, Issa and Oliveira (2017) sought to analyze the legislative process in the municipality of São Paulo between 2008 and 2016 precisely from the perspective of the interaction between the Executive and Legislative Branches. In sharp contrast to the federal standard, the data found by the authors indicate that most of the bills approved in this period originated from the city council, demonstrating a low rate of mastery of the agenda by the Executive. However, this finding does not indicate that the Executive is hostage to the Legislature in São Paulo, given that the Executive enjoys high success rates in its proposals sent to the House.

Preliminary conclusions of the authors thus point to the denial of the thesis that the São Paulo city councilors would not worry about the formulation of public policies in the municipality and would only work for the granting of honors and changes of street names. By showing that the Executive enjoyed high success rates between 2008 and 2016 at the same time that it had low rates of dominance of legal production, the authors highlight the activism of the local Legislative Branch while suggesting that this activism does not contradict the demands of the Executive.

When studying the legislative production in São Paulo between Erundina and Kassab,

⁵ Ultrapresidentialism will be understood as the "compressor roll" tactic, where the Executive has ensured a sufficient majority to approve any measures in the Legislature.

Garcia (2013) states that the plenary of the City Council of São Paulo is predictable in that the Executive Branch could approve practically all the bills of its initiative that went to the plenary, even when the Executive did not have a majority coalition (GARCIA, 2013, pp. 41).

Such analyses become an important starting point for the present study, as we will apply a similar model, but extended to a broader period.

3. Methodology, Database, and Hypothesis

With access to a part of the CEBRAP Legislative Database, it was possible to understand how the authors calculate the success and dominance rates of the Executive Branch to reproduce them to the municipal level within a delimited temporal space.

A database was requested from the Ombudsman of the city of São Paulo, based on the Law on Access to Information (LAI), article 4, item I, observing the Organic Law of the Municipality (LOM) and the Internal Regulations of the São Paulo City Council (RICM), with the following characteristics: listing, by date of presentation, of all the I - amendments to LOM (PLO in Portuguese) drafts; II - Bills (PL in Portuguese); III - legislative decree drafts (PDL in Portuguese); IV - resolution drafts (PR in Portuguese) submitted to the São Paulo City Council between April 26th, 1991 and December 31st, 2016. It was also requested that such a listing contain the specification of the type of project submitted, its syllabus, and its origin (Legislative, Executive, Standing Committees of Technical-Legislative Character, TCM). The last request concerns the most recent status of the drafts: approved, sanctioned, processing in commission, etc.

The database obtained contained the proponent of each of the submitted drafts, listing all the bills submitted between April 26th, 1991 and December 31st, 2016. Of the 22,883 drafts listed, 7,316 had been enacted by December 31st, 2016.

Of all the drafts submitted during this period, those submitted and enacted within the same period were of particular interest. This methodological option aims to verify the strength (or weakness) of the Executive in the processing of the drafts of its interest within the mandate, especially concerning the drafts of competing jurisdiction⁶. Therefore, this option has a direct influence on the result of the dominance and success rates of the Executive calculated in this work.

A brief study of the Organic Law of the municipality of São Paulo (LOM) and Internal Regulations of the municipality of São Paulo (RICM) was necessary to facilitate the understanding of the jurisdiction of submitting each type of draft. The chart below summarizes this brief analysis:

⁶ Drafts whose submission can be made both by the Executive and Legislative is understood as having competing jurisdiction;

Chart 1 – Types of drafts

Types of Drafts	Can the Executive forward?	Can the Legislative forward?
Drafts for Amendments to the Organic Law (PLO)	YES	YES
Bills (PL)	YES	YES
Legislative Decree Drafts (PDL)	NO	YES
Resolutions Drafts (PR)	NO	YES

Source: The chart was elaborated by analyzing articles 234, 235, 236, and 237 of the São Paulo RICM, and articles 36, 37, and 137 of the São Paulo LOM.

Of the analyses proposed in the next section, special attention is given to the drafts of competing jurisdiction between branches (PL's and PLO's) since mainly PL's are the initiatives that most influence the day-to-day of the city. Furthermore, Decrees and Draft Resolutions respond to administrative functions of the House, with no relation to legislative activity (MEIRELES, 1991, *apud* CAETANO, 2005, p.109) since they address the internal organization of the City Council and the distribution of titles and other honors.

The main hypothesis to be tested in this work, after the committed literature review, can be described as:

H1: The Executive-Legislative relationship in the municipality of São Paulo between 1991 and 2016 followed the pattern found at the federal level, with high success rates and dominance of the Executive over the São Paulo Legislature.

A descriptive analysis of the data will be presented in the next section to confirm or refute such a hypothesis, by analyzing the matters that were processed in the city of São Paulo between 1991 and 2016, focusing especially on matters of competing jurisdiction submitted and enacted within the same mandate.

4. Results and Discussion

The calculations were performed based on the Database treatments to obtain descriptive statistics regarding the Legislative Process of the municipality of São Paulo during the mentioned period.

Table 2 shows the total number of matters submitted and enacted regardless of origin and of whether they were approved within the mandate in which they were proposed or not. Of the total matters submitted, 7,316 were approved, representing 32%.

Table 2 – Total matters submitted and enacted regardless of origin and date of approval

Government	Erundina	Maluf	Pitta	Suplicy	Serra Kassab	Kassab	Haddad	Total
Total enacted matters ¹	267	1,322	999	1,231	1,312	1,165	1,020	7,316
Total matters submitted ¹	1,031	4,598	3,586	3,577	3,695	3,043	3,353	22,883
% of enacted/total matters	25.9%	28.8%	27.9%	34.4%	35.5%	38.3%	30.4%	32.0%
¹ Total matters submitted regardless of origin and regardless of whether within the government or not								

Source: SGP-31 Database (CMSP). Elaboration: The author.

The next Table (Table 3) shows the total of matters submitted and enacted within each government, also indicating the percentage that these matters represent on the total enacted. Of the 7,316 matters enacted in the period of this research, 5,564 were submitted and enacted within the same mandate. The dominance and success rates of the Executive were calculated based on this number, given the methodological option already mentioned earlier. The percentage of matters submitted, regardless of the proponent, and enacted within the same mandate is high and challenges beliefs that the Legislative Process would be less agile and fast; 76.1% of the matters enacted in the City Council are approved within four years. Future research can evaluate the reasons that lead certain matters to be enacted with such speed while a considerable amount of the matters submitted are not enacted even in the course of the 25 years analyzed.

Table 3 – Total matters enacted within each government

Government	Erundina	Maluf	Pitta	Suplicy	Serra Kassab	Kassab	Haddad	Total
Total matters promulgated within the government ¹	204	1,016	806	997	827	882	832	5,564
Total enacted matters ¹	267	1,322	999	1,231	1,312	1,165	1,020	7,316
% of matters enacted within the gov./total enacted	76.4%	76.9%	80.7%	81.0%	63.0%	75.7%	81.6%	76.1%
¹ Total matters submitted regardless of origin								

Source: SGP-31 Database (CMSP). Elaboration: The author.

The next Table (Table 4) seeks to identify the percentage of matters submitted and enacted within the same mandate over the total of matters submitted during each mandate regardless of the type of proponent. Approximately ¼ of the matters submitted during the

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analyzed period was enacted within four years. This information apparently contrasts with the previous information presented in Table 3. However, as indicated above, there is some kind of preference capable of causing some matters are appreciated within four years while others simply are not fully analyzed or take time to be analyzed.

Table 4 – Total matters submitted and enacted within each government

Government	Erundina	Maluf	Pitta	Suplicy	Serra Kassab	Kassab	Haddad	Total
Total matters promulgated within the government ¹	204	1,016	806	997	827	882	832	5,564
Total matters submitted ²	1,031	4,598	3,586	3,577	3,695	3,043	3,353	22,883
% of matters enacted within the gov./ total matters submitted	19.8%	22.1%	22.5%	27.9%	22.4%	29.0%	24.8%	24.3%
¹ Total matters enacted within each government and regardless of origin								
² Total matters submitted regardless of origin								

Source: SGP-31 Database (CMSP). Elaboration: The author.

Table 5 disaggregates the movement of understanding these differences. Of the total number of matters enacted and submitted within the same government, we verified how many are bills (PL), draft Amendments to the Organic Law (PLO), draft Legislative Decree (PDL), and how many are draft Resolutions (PR). Note that: (1) the vast majority of the matters submitted are bills – matters of competing jurisdiction, as already indicated. Of the 22,883 matters submitted in the period, 19,358 were bills; (2) Bills also represent the majority of the matters submitted and enacted within the same government. Of the 5,564 matters submitted and enacted within four years, 3,818 were bills; (3) PLOS (another type of matter with competing jurisdiction between the branches) represent a negligible amount of the total of matters submitted and approved. Of the 22,883 matters submitted during the period, only 223 were PLO's, and of the 223 matters submitted, only 17 were submitted and enacted within the same mandate. In general, PLO's and bills represent 85.5% of the matters submitted in the City Council, and bills alone represent 84.5% of the matters submitted. Of the matters submitted and enacted within the same government, PLO's and bills represent 68.9% of the total, and bills alone represent 68.6%.

Table 5 – Matters enacted within each government by type, regardless of origin

Government	Erundina	Maluf	Pitta	Suplicy	Serra Kassab	Kassab	Haddad	Total
Total matters enacted within the government¹	204	1,016	806	997	827	882	832	5,564
Bills	146	824	594	636	456	523	639	3,818
PDL	46	149	183	318	354	328	167	1,545
PR	11	40	29	38	13	27	26	184
PLO	1	3		5	4	4	0	17
Total matters submitted²	1,031	4,598	3,586	3,577	3,695	3,043	3,353	22,883
Bills	827	4,040	3,090	2,970	3,096	2,508	2,827	19,358
PDL	139	424	373	384	460	405	415	2,600
PR	47	95	101	172	111	87	89	702
PLO	18	39	22	51	28	43	22	223
% of matters enacted within the gov./total	19.8%	22.1%	22.5%	27.9%	22.4%	29.0%	24.8%	24.3%
Bills	17.7%	20.4%	19.2%	21.4%	14.7%	20.9%	22.6%	19.7%
PDL	33.1%	35.1%	49.1%	82.8%	77.0%	81.0%	40.2%	59.4%
PR	23.4%	42.1%	28.7%	22.1%	11.7%	31.0%	29.2%	26.2%
PLO	5.6%	7.7%	0.0%	9.8%	14.3%	9.3%	0.0%	7.6%
¹ Total matters enacted within each government regardless of origin								
² Total matters submitted regardless of origin								

Source: SGP-31 Database (CMSP). Elaboration: The author.

The following Table (Table 6) begins the analysis on dominance and success of the Executive over the Legislative. It verifies the percentages of the total of matters enacted within each government over the total submitted, separating the origin of the matters between Executive and Legislative. At this time, most of the matters submitted originate in the Legislative. Of the 22,883 matters submitted during the period, 21,219 originated in the Legislature. However, the success rate of the Executive is much higher than the success rate of the Legislative. While the former approves 47.1% of its matters within four years, the latter approves 22.5% of the matters it proposes within four years. When prominently analyzing the success rates of the PT Executives, we noticed clear differences, which suggest to be attributed to the methods adopted in the parliamentary negotiation of each of the governments. Erundina had only 27% of its drafts, while Suplicy approved 62.6% of the drafts it submitted, and Haddad approved 64.9%. However, there is a much greater success of the Executive than the Legislative in their respective parliamentary agendas in all administrations.

Table 6 – Executive and Legislative Success Rate in matters submitted and approved within the mandate

Government	Erundina	Maluf	Pitta	Suplicy	Serra Kassab	Kassab	Haddad	Total
Total matters enacted within the government	204	1,016	806	997	1,520	882	832	5,564
Originating in the Executive	58	201	53	199	75	99	98	783
Originating in the Legislative	146	815	753	798	752	783	734	4,781
Total matters submitted	1,031	4,598	3,586	3,577	6,131	3,043	3,353	22,883
Originating in the Executive	215	442	208	318	162	168	151	1,664
Originating in the Legislative	816	4,156	3,378	3,259	3,533	2,875	3,202	21,219
Success rate	19.8%	22.1%	22.5%	27.9%	24.8%	29.0%	24.8%	24.3%
of the Executive	27.0%	45.5%	25.5%	62.6%	46.3%	58.9%	64.9%	47.1%
of the Legislative	17.9%	19.6%	22.3%	24.5%	21.3%	27.2%	22.9%	22.5%

Source: SGP-31 Database (CMSP). Elaboration: The author.

The following Table (Table 7) presents the dominance data of the Executive over the Legislative considering: (1) only the matters submitted and enacted within the same mandate and (2) only the matters of competing jurisdiction between the branches. Erundina and Marta dominated the Legislature more than Haddad, for example. With the exception of Pitta's administration, one can single out a movement to decrease the dominance of the Executive Branch in legislative production over the years. Of the total of 3,835 matters submitted and enacted within four years, that had competing jurisdiction, about 20% originated in the Executive only. Only three of the 17 PLO's submitted and enacted within four years were submitted by the Executive. In all cases, there is a low number of PLO's submitted. In conclusion, the relationship between the branches is based basically on bills concerning the legislative process of the municipality. The Executive's dominance rate represents the overall dominance rate of the Executive over the Legislative Process.

Table 7 – Executive dominance rates only for matters enacted within the mandates

Government	Erundina	Maluf	Pitta	Suplicy	Serra Kassab	Kassab	Haddad	Total
Total enacted within gov. (Executive + Legislative)	147	827	594	641	460	527	639	3,835
Bills	146	824	594	636	456	523	639	3,818

PLO	1	3	0	5	4	4	0	17
Total enacted within gov. (Legislative)	89	626	541	442	385	428	541	3,052
Bills	88	624	541	438	381	425	541	3,038
PLO	1	2	0	4	4	3	0	14
Total enacted within gov. (Executive)	58	201	53	199	75	99	98	783
Bills	58	200	53	198	75	98	98	780
PLO	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	3
Executive's dominance rate	39.5%	24.3%	8.9%	31.0%	16.3%	18.8%	15.3%	20.4%
Bills	39.7%	24.3%	8.9%	31.1%	16.4%	18.7%	15.3%	20.4%
PLO	0.0%	33.3%		20.0%	0.0%	25.0%		17.6%

Source: SGP-31 Database (CMSP). Elaboration: The author.

The following Table (Table 8) shows the success rate of the Executive, counting only the matters enacted within the government, in bills and PLO's. At this time, we identify those governments with the highest success rates in their investments in Parliament: Haddad, Suplicy, and Kassab. On the other hand, Pitta and Erundina have the lowest success rates.

Table 8 – Success Rate of the Executive Branch

Government	Erundina	Maluf	Pitta	Suplicy	Serra Kassab	Kassab	Haddad	Total
Total matters enacted within gov. with Executive origin	58	201	53	199	75	99	98	783
Total matters submitted by the Executive	215	442	208	318	162	168	151	1,664
Executive's Success Rate	27.0%	45.5%	25.5%	62.6%	46.3%	58.9%	64.9%	47.1%

Source: SGP-31 Database (CMSP). Elaboration: The author.

The following Table (Table 8) shows the success rate of the Executive, counting only the matters enacted within the government, disaggregated in bills and PLO's. Most of the matters sent by the Executive to the Legislative Process are bills. Of the 1,664 matters sent by the Executive, 1,656 were bills, and of the 783 matters sent by the Executive that were approved within the mandate, 780 were bills. The Executive maintained a success rate of its matters of about 47.1%.

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Haddad and Suplicy had the highest success rates: 64.9% and 62.6%, respectively.

Table 9 – Executive success rate for matters enacted within the government, disaggregated into bills and PLO's

Government	Erundina	Maluf	Pitta	Suplicy	Serra Kassab	Kassab	Haddad	Total
Total enacted within gov. (Executive origin)	58	201	53	199	75	99	98	783
Bills	58	200	53	198	75	98	98	780
PLO	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	3
Total matters submitted (Executive origin)	215	442	208	318	162	168	151	1,664
Bills	215	441	208	315	162	167	148	1,656
PLO	0	1	0	3	0	1	3	8
Executive's Success Rate	27.0%	45.5%	25.5%	62.6%	46.3%	58.9%	64.9%	47.1%
Bills	27.0%	45.4%	25.5%	62.9%	46.3%	58.7%	66.2%	47.1%
PLO		100.0%		33.3%		100.0%	0.0%	37.5%

Source: SGP-31 Database (CMSP). Elaboration: The author.

The last Table (Table 10) seeks to contrast the results of dominance and success rates of the Executive between the two governmental spheres mentioned during this work, Federal and Municipal.

Table 10 – Dominance and success rates of the Federal Executive and the São Paulo Executive

President	Success	Dominance	Mayor	Success	Dominance
Collor	76%	94%	Erundina	27%	40%
Itamar	88%	95%	Maluf	46%	24%
FHC	91%	90%	Pitta	26%	9%
FHC II	83%	88%	Suplicy	63%	31%
Lula	89%	88%	Serra Kassab	46%	16%
Lula II	87%	80%	Kassab	59%	19%
Dilma	84%	83%	Haddad	65%	15%
Dilma II	90%	83%			
Temer	62%	89%			
means	75%	79%	means	47%	20%

Source: CEBRAP Legislative Database and SGP-31 Database (CMSP). Elaboration: The author.

The Municipal Executive, despite enjoying as important legal prerogatives as the Federal Executive, such as exclusive jurisdiction to initiate certain types of matters, power of veto, possibility to request urgency in the evaluation of drafts, provide positions, and public functions, does not perform as fine-tuned legislative coordination as the Federal Executive. None of the mayors of São Paulo between 1991 and 2016 achieved a success rate close to the average success of the Federal Executive. The mayor who performed best was Haddad, with 65% of his submitted matters approved within his own mandate. Even more discrepant is the dominance rate of the municipal legislative process by the Executive, which suggests greater cooperation between the branches or even greater protagonism of the Legislature – although, as evidenced by Issa and Oliveira (2017), this does not necessarily represent a counterpoint to the demands of the Executive.

5. Conclusion

The efforts undertaken in the execution of this work were oriented in the direction of providing a broad perspective of the interaction between Executive and Legislative Branches in the municipality of São Paulo (strictly concerning legal production) during a relatively long period compared to previous research that focused few administrations of the period. The application of success and dominance rates of the Executive Branch in the Legislative Process allowed not only comparisons between the different administrations of the municipality but also between the municipality and the Union.

The results found are significantly interesting and provoke some reflections. First, following the federal standard, the São Paulo Executive has a much higher success rate in approving its matters, more than twice that of the Legislative Branch. This shows that the

Executive has much better conditions to carry forward its agenda from the coalition built in the face of a fragmented Legislative in partisan terms.

In any case, the difference between success rates in both federal spheres is striking. The success rate at the federal level reaches 75%, while in São Paulo the percentage remains below 50%. In other words, the President of Brazil implements $\frac{3}{4}$ of his/her agenda, while the mayor of São Paulo does not meet the conditions to carry forward even half of his/her political platform. These data cause surprise since it was expected that the mayor had greater ease of implementing his/her agenda. Unlike smaller municipalities, where ultrapresidentialism prevails, but certainly with greater ease than the President of Brazil, who must address a much more complex National Congress, formed by two Houses, and with a more intense degree of party fragmentation. In this sense, the hypothesis of the article in its first dimension is partially refuted. In other words, the Executive's success rates are neither low nor lower than those of the Legislative, but neither are they high, deviating from the federal standard.

Regarding the dominance rate, we found an even more unexpected and discrepant result compared to the federal sphere. While in this sphere the Executive dominates the legal production, reaching, in the historical average, almost 80% of the total of laws approved, the municipal Executive presents not only a lower value but an extremely low value of 20%, which makes the City Council the dominant power in the legal production. These data suggest that the power dynamics between the Executive and Legislative Branches, at least at the municipal level in São Paulo, differs from the federal sphere, having a more shared character, or even favorable to the Legislative, so that councilors in São Paulo have much greater conditions to advance their agenda in parallel with the Municipal Chief Executive. The data peremptorily refute the second dimension of the hypothesis presented and indicate a more balanced political game, which requires further studies for a full understanding. It is worth noting that the tendencies verified by Almeida (2015) in the federal sphere follow the same line, although to a lesser degree, that is, of a strengthening of the Legislative in face of the Executive.

Designing future analyses on the topic, it is worth making some notes. The first is to evaluate the type of law addressed. There are many budget laws passed at the federal level, which does not seem to occur in other spheres. Likewise, it is important to observe whether municipal laws refer mainly to tributes and decorations, which could explain the strength of the municipal Legislature in legal production. From there, qualitative studies could bring more elements to better understand these dynamics of more shared power observed in the present study. This will be critical, as the data gathered revealed a completely different pattern of Executive-Legislative interaction than would be expected. From the strongly centralized dynamics in the Executive at the federal level and the ultrapresidentialism verified in smaller municipalities, we move to the other end of the pendulum, in which the Legislature has a preponderant role in the legal production of São Paulo. Thus, only new analyses will reveal whether the glaring differences found relate

more to the type of data analyzed or if we are in fact facing a new pattern of Executive-Legislative interaction.

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DATABASES USED

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