



POLICY CONDITIONS IN THE LEGISLATIVE SUCCESS OF BRAZILIAN GOVERNORS: A QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (QCA)

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Abstract: This article verifies what are the political / contextual conditions that enable Brazilian governors to obtain satisfactory results in the conduct of their legislative agenda. To undertake such an analysis, an alternative indicator of legislative success for the Executive was developed: the Executive Legislative Power Index (IPLE). It is expected that this index will vary depending on combinations between the size of the opposition (x1); fragmentation of the assembly (x2) and; the ideological polarization of the assembly (x3). Through the Comparative Qualitative Analyzes (QCA) analysis, the legislative process in nine Legislative Assemblies in two legislatures was examined. The main results are: i) the size of opposition is a necessary condition for legislative success and; ii) the success in carrying out its agenda will occur in 60% of the cases in assemblies without opposition and with low fragmentation.

Keywords: Legislative Assemblies; Governors; Legislative Success; IPLE; QCA

Introduction

This article is part of the field of legislative studies, with the Brazilian legislative assemblies as the object of study (ABRÚCIO, 1998; SANTOS, 2001; TOMIO and RICCI, 2012a, 2012b, SANTOS and ANASTASIA, 2016; SILAME, 2018; TOMIO and RICCI, 2018). The focus will be on the relationship between the executive and legislative branches to verify the governors' legislative strengths. The article analyzes data on legislative production in nine Brazilian states during two legislatures². Additionally, the article proposes an alternative indicator to measure the executive's legislative success.

Santos (2001) and Tomio and Ricci (2012b; 2018) highlight the diversity between the executive and the legislative relationship patterns. Santos (2001) observed that there are active parliaments that can shield the executive's discretion and that legislatures have their own agenda and standards that refer to ultra-presidentialism (ABRÚCIO, 1998). Tomio and Ricci (2012b) highlight the high legislative success (average of 87%) and low dominance (average of 27%) of state executives. For the authors, one of the possibilities of explaining the variation in executive success rates is the need to understand the political and party dynamics in each state (NUNES, 2008). That said, the question that guides this article can be formulated in the following terms: What are the political/contextual conditions that enable Brazilian governors to achieve legislative success? The paper assumes that the size of the opposition, fragmentation, and ideological

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² The states of Bahia, Ceará, Minas Gerais, Pará, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and São Paulo are considered in the 2007/2011 and 2011/2015 legislatures.

polarization in parliaments explain the variation of the executive's legislative success in time and space since they configure many contexts.

This article is structured in five sections and final considerations. The first section will present a non-exhaustive review of the literature on the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the Brazilian states. The second section presents the Executive Legislative Power Index (IPLE in Portuguese), an alternative indicator for measuring the legislative success of governors. The third section explores data related to legislative production in the states considered. In the fourth section, the result of interest (legislative success of the executive) and the political variables (causal factors) considered will be calibrated. The last section analyzes the legislative success of governors using the technique known as Qualitative Comparative Analyzes (QCA). Finally, the final remarks.

1 - The executive-legislative relationship in Brazilian states

The purpose of this section is to present part of the literature that addresses the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches in Brazilian states after re-democratization³, in a non-exhaustive manner. In "Barões da Federação", Abrucio (1998) developed the term "state ultra-presidentialism" when analyzing the executive and legislative relationship in several states. According to the author, this phenomenon is characterized by a complete dominance of the executive over the legislative process. With the cancellation of check and balance mechanisms, governors would have different resources to rely on inorganic majorities. In summary, on the one hand, there are the governors with the key to the vault, on the other, there are parliamentarians interested solely and exclusively on allocating resources to their electoral bases to leverage their political careers. Therefore, the assemblies present a governmental logic⁴, in which a "confirmatory pact" is in force, submitted to the executive.

Abrucio's seminal work serves as a reference for the other productions that followed. Several authors propose a critical dialogue with the author's work. Santos (2001a) organizes a collection to observe whether the logic of "ultra-presidentialism" is still present in the states' executive-legislative relationship. The analysis conducted for several states shows that two assemblies presented such a pattern. This pattern was observed by Domingues (2001) for Espírito Santo, and by Abrucio *et al.* (2001) for São Paulo. Other states presented autonomous and independent legislative assemblies, as is the case with the Legislative Assembly of Minas Gerais (ALMG) and the Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro (Alerj), observed respectively by Santos

³ The first direct election for state governors took place in the context of political openness in 1982. The promulgation of the 1988 Constitution, followed by direct elections for President in 1989, can be considered a historical landmark of the transition from dictatorship to democracy. The works analyzed mostly contemplate the post-1988 period.

⁴ The author differentiates between situationism and government. For Abrucio, situationism encompasses parliamentarians who participate in the government bench. Governance is a major phenomenon that involves virtually all deputies interested in obtaining a "patronage chunk" from the executive branch. This phenomenon is noteworthy, as Abrucio notes that even minority governments could approve their agenda.

(2001b) and Anastasia (2001). A third set of states, Ceará and Rio Grande do Sul, presented a dynamic informed by the political-party dispute in the states that is substantiated by the action of situation and opposition in the parliament (MORAES, 2001; GROHMANN, 2001), and are, therefore, not subservient to the executive. The findings of the collection organized by Santos show diversity and convergence regarding the phenomenon of "ultra-presidentialism".

The fact is that the reform of the Brazilian State, the privatization policies, and the entry into force of the Fiscal Responsibility Law (LRF in Portuguese), which occurred throughout the 1990s, remove the resources that allowed governors to place the assemblies under their yoke, which would make the "ultra-presidentialism" thesis dated.

However, it is still possible to perceive the existence of "ultra-presidentialism" in the states of Pernambuco, Espírito Santo, and Maranhão (LEITE and SANTOS, 2010; RAINHA, 2018; BORGES, 2018). Therefore, it can be considered one of the forms of relationship between the executive and legislative branches since the literature indicates variations in the form in which support is given to governors. Works after those published in Santos's volume (2001a) also present the other two variants of the relationship between the executive and the legislative. One dynamic indicates a legislative role of parliamentarians in the conduct of their agenda (TOMIO and RICCI, 2012a and 2018b; BRAGA and FRANCE, 2008; TOMIO and MIRANDA, 2018; GRAÇA and PINTO, 2018) and the other regards the party construction to support the executive in the states (NUNES, 2008; PERONDI and CARREIRÃO, 2009; TOMIO and MIRANDA, 2018).

A common point to the many works mobilized in this section is the executive's high legislative success rate, often considered evidence of "ultra-presidentialism". However, the mere observation of the approval of the governors' agenda can be a mirage since it is little conflicting because the 1988 Federal Constitution constrains it. It is the responsibility of the states to legislate concurrent and supplementarily with the Union and municipalities on matters regarding public policies (health and education) and exclusively on administrative, financial, and tax matters. The high rates of legislative success of projects originating from the executive are more related to the nature of the state agenda than to the subservience of the legislative branch. In any case, in this scenario of legislative protagonism of the executive, which takes place around an administrative agenda of the state, it is more rational for the parliamentarian to delegate powers to the executive and orbit a successful government (ABRUCIO *et al.*, 2001; NUNES, 2008; LEITE and SANTOS, 2010; ARAÚJO, 2016; TOMIO and RICCI, 2012a; 2018a).

Another point in common is to show that the agenda approved by the legislative has low relevance and aims to concentrate resources in the electoral bases of the parliamentarians. However, this does not mean corroborating the "ultrapresidentialism" thesis since many studies indicate that, despite the clientelist agenda approved by parliamentarians in state assemblies, there is a public policy agenda desired and pursued by the legislative even if not achieved

(ANASTASIA, 2001; SANTOS, 2001b; CERVI, 2009; TOMIO and RICCI, 2010; 2012a; 2012b; GRAÇA and PINTO, 2018).

Some works that point to supplant the dynamics of "ultra-presidentialism" as a form of relationship between the executive and the legislative highlight the behavior of disciplined benches in the assemblies of Minas Gerais and Santa Catarina (NUNES, 2008; CARREIRÃO and PERONDI, 2009). The organic nature of parliamentary behavior - mediated by political parties - is a strong indication contrary to the "confirmatory pact" thesis.

Furthermore, state assemblies bring together deputies with diverse interests who can maximize a particularist or more universalist agenda. Understanding the micro-foundations that inform political actors' legislative behavior is essential to debate the "state ultrapresidentialism" thesis. It is expected that assemblies presenting more particularist behavior of parliamentarians would be guided by individual action, less partisan behavior, creating favorable conditions for governism to prevail.

Several works indicate that the behavior of state deputies varies according to the level of electoral and parliamentary competitiveness in the states and the structuring of party subsystems. The ideology can define whether the parliamentarian performance will be more focused on its base or more comprehensive in terms of propositions (CASTRO *et al.*, 2009; CERVI, 2009; INÁCIO and AMARAL, 2013; MELO, 2011; 2015). The work also demonstrates that the variation observed in the executive's success rates can be explained from the political agents' more or less particularistic motivations. The distributive behavior of parliamentarians associated with their local support network induces the approximation of deputies with the executive (INÁCIO and AMARAL, 2013). According to the authors, there are spaces for independent or opposition action by parliamentarians depending on the party subsystems' degree of competitiveness. Stable party and electoral systems also induce more partisan behavior for the parliamentarian.

If, on the one hand, parliamentarians act to maximize their electoral chances, on the other, the executive aims to maximize the approval of their agenda. Nunes (2011; 2012) demonstrates the formation of governmental coalitions at the state level based on party agreements.

Nunes (2011) demonstrates that, as in the national context, the state political system tends to generate coalition governments based on party agreements. The author mapped the strategies of governors to compose majorities within state legislatures. The formation of coalitions varies depending on the number of actors in competition, the distribution of preferences, and their relative ideological distance. Analyzing the scenario at ALMG, Nunes finds that party leaders politically coordinate with the governor even though state deputies are after pork to allocate in their strongholds.

Nunes (2012) is attentive to the bargain's relational nature and complexity that involves deputies, parties, and the governor in building parliamentary support. Therefore, the author envisions four negotiation strategies that involve the executive. Two strategies allow the governor

to negotiate with parties, and the other two allow direct negotiations with individual parliamentarians. The first strategy is for the executive to negotiate party support by distributing positions and secretariats between coalition partner parties (which characterizes the building of coalitions in the Chamber of Deputies). In the second strategy, the governor can release distributive benefits via party leaders. The other two forms of negotiation involve the same resources of the executive. However, they are negotiated directly with the deputies. According to data collected by a survey⁵ with state deputies, more than 50% of respondents believe that the best strategy is to negotiate resources via party leaders or not.

In another article, Nunes (2012) lists four plausible strategies for the governor to obtain parliamentary support. The first strategy would be for the governor to set up a multiparty coalition by negotiating positions/secretariats with the parties - a classic thesis of how coalition presidentialism works in the Chamber of Deputies. The second strategy would be for the governor to negotiate the release of pork with the parties. The third option would be to negotiate positions directly with parliamentarians. The last strategy would be the direct negotiation of pork with the deputies. Nunes' findings (2011; 2012) allow us to state that, differently from what the literature has suggested, governors do not need to choose between prioritizing pork or positions to maximize their support.

Unlike Nunes, Sandes-Freitas and Massonetto (2017) consider that the formation of coalitions in the state does not follow the same logic observed at the federal level. Therefore, the distribution of secretariats and positions does not obey the proportionality of the seats obtained in parliament by the partners affiliated in the elections - only those with greater legislative weight are awarded. Governors tend to reward their own party by distributing secretariats, and most governments are minorities. Therefore, coalitions at the state level would work under the aegis of "ultra-presidentialism", with the government as a pole of attraction for parliamentarians, regardless of party negotiations by state departments.

A possible synthesis between the work of Nunes (2012) and Sandes-Freitas and Massonetto (2017) is that obtaining support for the executive's agenda in state legislatures involves a complex network of negotiations that may or may not involve political parties and that, depending on the political-party context in their states, governors must assess what resources they should mobilize. It is worth noting that the strategies available to the governor are not mutually exclusive. He/she may distribute individual positions/benefits to some parliamentarians of a specific party and negotiate positions/benefits with party leaders from another party. In this case,

⁵ This relates to the research "Trajetórias, perfis e padrões de interação de legisladores estaduais em doze unidades da federação". During the months from September 2007 to February 2008, the first round of the survey of deputies was conducted in the legislative assemblies of Bahia, Ceará, Goiás, Minas Gerais, Mato Grosso, Pará, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, São Paulo, and Tocantins. Out of a total of 624, 513 state deputies were interviewed. In 2012, a new survey was conducted, with 439 parliamentarians being interviewed. The project was funded by FAPEMIG, CNPq, and CAPES. The work of Castro et. al. (2009); Melo (2011;2015), Nunes (2012), and Inácio e Amaral (2013) also use data from this research.

understanding the expectations of political actors concerning their interests and possibilities of gains is the state governors' great political task to obtain support for their agenda. In other words, considering political variables is of paramount importance for some governors to be more successful than others.

2 - Executive's Legislative Power Index (IPLE)

The purpose of the section is to present the Executive Legislative Power Index (IPLE in Portuguese) construct. This index is proposed as an alternative measure to evaluate the executive's legislative success⁶. The expectation is that the index is sensitive to variations in the political contexts observed in the states. The construction of the index aims to address two of the main criticisms of the canonical indicators of legislative success, namely, the static aspect of a procedural phenomenon and the possibility of introducing the very element of conflict between the powers.

That said, the construction of the executive's power index considered two variables⁷. The first is the rate of legislative success, i.e., the percentage of projects authored by the executive that is approved, considering the total number of initiatives presented by this branch. In this work, the governor who approves a number superior or equal to 87% of his/her projects will be considered successful. The threshold was established based on a successful government reference, the average approval of executive projects in legislative assemblies (TOMIO and RICCI, 2012b; TOMIO and RICCI, 2018b).

The second variable considered is the governor's ability to maintain his/her vetoes. Through the veto, the executive can prevent the initiatives approved by the legislative from departing from its preferences and guarantees that its projects are preserved from significant changes introduced by parliamentarians. The governor who maintains at least 70% of his/her vetoes will be considered successful (SANTOS, 2001; TOMIO and RICCI, 2012b, GRAÇA, 2016).

The first step adopted to calculate the IPLE was to transform the percentage values into proportion. The values were added and divided by two, as presented in the formula below:

$$\frac{P_{\text{Legislative Success}} + P_{\text{Veto maintenance}}}{2}$$

The index ranges from 0 to 1, with value 1 as the situation in which the state governor obtains 100% of legislative success and veto maintenance.

⁶ Although the IPLE is intended as an alternative to measure the legislative success of the executive, the initiative is not unprecedented (DINIZ, 2005; NUNES, 2013).

⁷ Despite being an important indicator of the legislative process, the Dominance Rate was not considered for the calculation of the index. In the Legislative Assemblies, the percentage of legislation of low relevance approved is very high. This type of initiative almost always originates among legislators, and its volume may be greater than the relevant legislation. Its accounting ends up overestimating the participation of the executive.

3 - Legislative Production in the States (Canonic indicators)

This section presents data on legislative production. Table 1 shows the number of projects presented in each assembly and authorship for the 2007/2011 and 2011/2015 legislatures. In total, there were 25,089 legislative proposals, adding up all assemblies⁸. We highlight the great activism in the proposition of laws by the legislative branch, responsible for proposing, on average, around 82% of the laws, which is consistent with the low-cost of presenting propositions, as already observed by Tomio and Ricci (2012a).

Table 1 – Number of bills introduced per Assembly and per author (2007/2011 and 2011/2015)

State****	Nº of Bills Introduced ***	Nº of Bills Introduced by the executive	Nº of Bills Introduced by the legislative	Nº of Bills Introduced by others
BA1	2398 (100)	201 (8.38)	2167 (90.37)	30 (1.25)
BA2	1167 (100)	291 (24.93)	860 (73.70)	16 (1.37)
CE1	1337 (100)	27 (2.00)	1306 (97.70)	4 (0.30)
CE2	950 (100)	56 (5.89)	884 (93.05)	8 (0.84)
MG1	3134 (100)	273 (8.71)	2832 (90.36)	29 (0.92)
MG2	2473 (100)	358 (14.48)	2083 (84.23)	32 (1.29)
PA*	549 (100)	134 (24.40)	402 (73.22)	13 (2.37)
RS1	1554 (100)	692 (44.53)	773 (49.74)	89 (5.73)
RS2	1296 (100)	742 (57.25)	480 (37.04)	74 (5.71)
PE*	641(100)	403 (62.87)	215 (33.54)	23 (3.59)
RJ**	No Information	105	No Information	No Information
SC*	2437 (100)	608 (24.95)	1752 (71.89)	77 (3.16)
SP1	4518 (100)	137 (3.03)	4356 (96.41)	25 (0.55)
SP2	2635 (100)	115 (4.36)	2498 (94.80)	22 (0.83)
Total	25089 (100)	4037 (16.1)	20608 (82.14)	442 (1.76)

Source: Elaborated by the author based on the database *Legislativos Assembleias Estaduais (TOMIO and RICCI);

** Santos and Graça (2009) and; Banco de Produção Legislativa Subnacional do CEL-DCP.

***The period of data production for the states of Rio de Janeiro, Pará, and Pernambuco refer to the first biennium of the 2007-2008 legislature.

****The numbers 1 and 2 in front of the state acronyms refer to the legislature considered. Number 1 indicates legislature 2007-2011. Number 2 refers to legislature 2011-2015.

Table 2 shows the total number of laws approved in each of the assemblies analyzed and the total number of laws approved by initiative. Altogether, 14,386 laws were approved, adding all legislative houses. Of this total, the legislative approved 10,482 laws, around 73%, and the executive approved approximately 25%. Legislative activism by the assemblies results in a large number of approved projects.

⁸ It was not possible to obtain all data from Rio de Janeiro.

Table 2 – Number of bills approved per assembly and per author (2007/2011 and 2011/2015)

State****	Nº of Bills Approved in the Assemblies ***	Nº of Bills from the executive Approved	Nº of Bills from the legislative Approved	Nº of Bills from others Approved
BA1	1642	169	1458	15
BA2	1014	189	814	11
CE1	630	27	599	4
CE2	488	56	426	6
MG1	1650	206	1423	21
MG2	2175	304	1848	23
PA*	271	119	140	12
PE*	579	398	160	21
RS1	947	602	277	68
RS2	928	637	237	54
RJ**	397	86	295	16
SC*	1650	531	1047	72
SP1	1059	128	914	17
SP2	956	102	844	10
Total	14386 (100)	3554 (24.70)	10482 (72.90)	350 (2.40)

Source: Elaborated by the author based on the database *Legislativos Assembleias Estaduais (TOMIO and RICCI); ** Santos and Graça (2009) and; Banco de Produção Legislativa Subnacional do CEL-DCP.

***The period of data production for the states of Rio de Janeiro, Pará, and Pernambuco refer to the first biennium of the 2007-2008 legislature.

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However, the disaggregated observation of the data, as seen in Table 3, shows a diversified reality between assemblies, which can denote diversified interactions between the branches.

Table 3 – Number of Bills introduced by the executive, number of Bills from the executive approved, and Legislative Success Rate of the executive in the Legislative Assemblies (2007/2011 and 2011/2015)

State****	Nº of Bills Introduced by the executive ***	Nº of Bills from the executive approved	Success Rate of the executive (%)
BA1	201	169	84.08
BA2	291	189	64.95
CE1	27	27	100.00
CE2	58	56	96.55
MG1	273	206	75.46
MG2	358	304	84.92
PA*	134	119	88.80
PE*	403	398	98.76

RJ**	105	86	82.00
RS1	692	602	87.00
RS2	742	637	85.85
SC*	608	531	87.34
SP1	137	128	93.43
SP2	115	102	88.70

Source: Elaborated by the author based on the database *Legislativos Assembleias Estaduais (TOMIO and RICCI); ** Santos and Graça (2009) and; Banco de Produção Legislativa Subnacional do CEL-DCP.

***The period of data production for the states of Rio de Janeiro, Pará, and Pernambuco refer to the first biennium of the 2007-2008 legislature.

****The numbers 1 and 2 in front of the state acronyms refer to the legislature considered. Number 1 indicates legislature 2007-2011. Number 2 refers to legislature 2011-2015.

Finally, the rate of veto maintenance was analyzed, i.e., the ability of the executive to make its preferences prevail in relation to the legislative in situations in which the conflict is explicit. Table 4 shows the number of vetoed projects, the number of vetoes maintained, the number of vetoes rejected, and the maintenance rate⁹.

Table 4 – Number of Vetoes, Number of Vetoes Maintained, Number of Rejected Vetoes, and Veto Maintenance Rate in Legislative Assemblies in Bills prepared by the executive/legislative (2007/2011 and 2011/2015)

State****	Nº of Bills Vetoed ***	Nº of Vetoes Maintained	Nº of Rejected Vetoes	Maintenance Rate (%)
BA1	2	2	0	100.00
BA2	2	1	1	50.00
CE1	0	-	0	100.00
CE2	2	2	0	100.00
MG1	41	22	19	53.66
MG2	37	31	6	83.79
PA*	12	11	1	91.67
PE*	0	-	-	100.00
RJ**	23	19	4	82.60
RS1	22	15	7	68.20
RS2	41	25	16	61.00
SC*	190	152	37	80.00
SP1	232	-	0	100.00
SP2	166	-	0	100.00

Source: Elaborated by the author based on the database *Legislativos Assembleias Estaduais (TOMIO and RICCI); ** Santos and Graça (2009) and; Banco de Produção Legislativa Subnacional do CEL-DCP.

***The period of data production for the states of Rio de Janeiro, Pará, and Pernambuco refer to the first biennium of the 2007-2008 legislature.

****The numbers 1 and 2 in front of the state acronyms refer to the legislature considered. Number 1 indicates legislature 2007-2011. Number 2 refers to legislature 2011-2015.

⁹ The executive in São Paulo vetoed 398 laws. However, until the end of 2014, no veto had been considered by ALESP. All vetoes were considered in the following legislature, in 2015. The result was highly favorable to the executive: only 3 vetoes were overturned, which represents a maintenance rate of 99.25%.

Observing the data allows conclusions analogous to those already reported in other works on legislative production in Brazilian states (SANTOS, 2001; NUNES, 2008; TOMIO and RICCI, 2010; 2012a; 2012b; 2018b).

4 - Calibrating the Result of interest

The first section showed how the construction of the IPLE took place. Now, it is a matter of seeing how the index behaves for each of the studied legislatures. Table 5 shows the frequency distribution of the two variables that make up the IPLE and the index value in all states. The last line shows the value of the IPLE considering the empirical parameters stipulated to classify a successful government. The threshold defined for considering a powerful state executive is the IPLE value of 0.785 (calibration). This value will serve as a reference (cutoff point) when using the Crisp-set/QCA technique. Of the fourteen cases considered in the study, only four presented values lower than the established cutoff point.

Table 5 – Legislative success of the executive, Veto Maintenance Rate in Legislative Assemblies, and IPLE.

State****	Legislative Success of the executive (%)	Veto Maintenance Rate *	IPLE (y)
BA2	64.95	50.00	0.575
MG1	75.46	53.66	0.646
MG2	84.92	83.79	0.843
RJ**	82.00	82.60	0.823
RS2	85.85	61.00	0.734
SC*	87.34	80.00	0.837
BA1	84.08	100	0.920
RS1	87.00	68.20	0.776
SP2	88.70	100	0.943
SP1	93.43	100	0.967
CE1	100	100	1
CE2	96.55	100	0.983
PA*	88.80	91.67	0.902
PE*	98.76	100	0.994
Parameter	87.00	70.00	0.785

Source: Elaborated by the author based on the database *Legislativos Assembleias Estaduais (TOMIO and RICCI); ** Santos and Graça (2009) and; Banco de Produção Legislativa Subnacional do CEL-DCP.

***The period of data production for the states of Rio de Janeiro, Pará, and Pernambuco refer to the first biennium of the 2007-2008 legislature.

****The numbers 1 and 2 in front of the state acronyms refer to the legislature considered. Number 1 indicates legislature 2007-2011. Number 2 refers to legislature 2011-2015.


4.1 - The political nature of the executive's success. Calibration of the Causal Conditions

Which political factors explain the variation of the IPLE? The political variables to be considered in this work will be the percentage of parliamentarians in opposition to the governor, party fragmentation, and ideological polarization. Theoretically, it is expected that the transaction costs to approve the executive's agenda will increase when the governor faces a larger contingent of opposition parliamentarians and very fragmented and polarized parliaments. Therefore, it is expected that: 1) governors who find a less numerous opposition will have fewer difficulties in conducting their government agenda, reflecting on IPLE; 2) a similar expectation exists when governors operate in legislative assemblies that have fewer relevant parties; and 3) less polarized legislative assemblies provide a favorable environment for governors to achieve legislative success.

Size of the Opposition

The first causal condition to be calibrated will be the size of the opposition in the assemblies. The threshold of 33.4% was established as the cutoff point. This amount corresponds to one-third of the deputies and the necessary quorum to establish a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry (CPI in Portuguese). Assemblies with values $\leq 33.4\%$ do not have a significant contingent of opposing parliamentarians. Graph 1 shows the percentage of deputies who consider themselves opposed to the executive in the fourteen cases analyzed. Only two governors faced a scenario in which the opposition was numerous in the assembly. Both cases were registered in Rio Grande do Sul.

Graph 1 – Percentage of State Deputies who consider themselves opposition (weighted SP2)*



Source: Elaborated by the author based on data from the research “Trajetórias, perfis e padrões de interação de legisladores estaduais em doze unidades da Federação” of the Centro de Estudos Legislativos of DCP-UFGM.

* The data for São Paulo in 2012 (SP2) was underestimated for some parties. An imputation was done based on the distribution of the parties' actual frequency represented in the Legislative Assembly of São Paulo. The responses to the questionnaire went in the same direction, thus the same value was attributed. Half was distributed as an opposition and half as a government when there was a conflict between the response pattern and frequency.

Legislative fragmentation (effective number of parliamentary parties)

Assembly fragmentation was made operational through the Effective Number of Parties (NEP in Portuguese), where $(N) = 1/HH..$

The absence of empirical parameters provided by the literature required us to arbitrate an empirical threshold from the data itself. For this purpose, we calculated the weighted average of the NEP, considering the number of seats in each assembly analyzed in this work as the weighting factor, as shown in the formula below:


$$\bar{x} = \frac{\sum Nep_i * n^\circ \text{ of seats}_i}{\sum n^\circ \text{ of seats}_i}$$

Where, “i” are n possible assemblies. In the case in question, we considered the values of the nine cases.

Assemblies that obtained a NEP value ≥ 8.45 (superior or equal) are found in the set of

fragmented assemblies.

Graph 4 – NEP for each State considering the threshold (2006 and 2010)



Source: Elaborated by the author based on data from the Superior Electoral Court and Electoral Databank (NICOLAU).

Ideological Polarization


In addition to the contingent of parliamentary opposition to the executive and the party fragmentation observed in the assemblies, the ideological distance between the parties with representation in the assembly can configure a causal condition that affects the result of interest. There is an inversely proportional relationship between polarization and the relationship between the powers (MAINWARING and SCULLY 1995 apud SANTOS *et al.*, 2014). The Weighted Ideological Polarization Index (IPP in Portuguese)¹⁰ was used, which considers the parliamentary weight of the parties, since the proportion of seats in a party and its position on the ideological scale make up the index, as shown below:

$$IPP = \sum p_i (x_i - \sum p_i x_i)^2$$

Where p_i is the proportion of seats in a party (i) and x_i the positioning of a given party (i) on a left right scale, where 1 means left and 10 means right.

Based on Santos *et al.* (2014), we will use the average IPP value, calculated considering all the assemblies, to define the cutoff point. The average observed value was 2.2. Thus, assemblies with values superior to 2.2 belong to the set of polarized assemblies.

¹⁰ Another way to measure polarization is the Polarization Index: $IP = (x_d - x_e)/9$, where x_d is the party with the most extreme right-wing ideological identification, and x_e is the party with the most extreme left-wing ideological identification. (SARTORI and SANI, 1992 apud MONTERO and SÁEZ, 2009).

Graph 5 – Weighted polarization index

Source: Elaborated by the author based on data from the research “Trajetórias, perfis e padrões de interação de legisladores estaduais em doze unidades da federação”.

Having concluded the result of interest (IPLE) and three causal conditions, the next section summarizes the analytical matrix and undertakes the result analysis.

5 - Data analysis

One of the aspects related to the complexity of the object in Political Science refers to the multi-causal nature of social phenomena. Qualitative Comparative Analyzes (QCA) presents itself as an analytical alternative to address research designs with few cases and multi-causal explanatory models (PÉREZ-LIÑAN, 2010; SANTOS *et al.*, 2014; SANDES FREITAS and BIZARRO NETO, 2015). The QCA is an approach oriented to the study of cases that combine quantitative and qualitative analysis elements, given that it is a technique guided by variables and for cases, respectively (BERG-SCHLOSSER *et al.*, 2009; WAGEMANN, 2012).

The QCA aims to verify causal relationships, linking causal conditions to a given result of interest, characterized as a powerful instrument of causal inference in the cross-analysis of data (WAGEMANN, 2012). Thus, the technique “*permite analizar sistemáticamente todas las combinaciones posibles de condiciones causales con el fin de identificar mecanismos de causalidad coyuntural, es decir, configuraciones de factores que resultan suficientes para producir el resultado de interés*”. (SANTOS *et al.*, 2014).

Where Y represents the phenomenon of interest that, according to the equation, is a function of the combination of multiple causal conditions ($X_1, X_2, X_3 \dots X_n$). For the case under analysis, Y represents the success/failure of the legislature measured through the IPLE. X_1 is the contingent of opposition parliamentarians, X_2 is fragmentation of the assembly, and X_3 is the

ideological distance verified between the parties present in the Assembly. Thus, the analysis model is expressed as follows:

$$Y_{\text{Legislative Success (IPLE)}} = f(X_{\text{opposition}} + X_{\text{fragmentation}} + X_{\text{polarization}})$$

To undertake a QCA analysis, it is necessary to follow a comparative protocol established by Charles Ragin to verify which causal configurations impact the result of interest (PÉREZ-LIÑAN, 2010: 138)¹¹, step to be taken in the next subsection.

5.1 - Data Matrix

Table 7 presents the Data Matrix. It is a Table where the occurrence or not of the result of interest (y) and the causal conditions ($x_1, x_2, x_3 \dots x_n$) is verified through a binary coding, where 0 (zero) means no occurrence and 1 (one) occurrence. The first column presents the cases. In the second, it is possible to observe the occurrence or not of the result of interest (y). The following three columns show the occurrence or not of x_1 (Opposition), x_2 (Fragmentation), and x_3 (Polarization), considering the calibration of all variables.

Table 7 – Data Matrix

State	Result of interest (y)	Opposition (x ₁)	Fragmentation (x ₂)	Polarized (x ₃)
BA1	1	0	0	1
BA2	0	0	1	1
CE1	1	0	0	0
CE2	1	0	1	1
MG1	0	0	1	0
MG2	1	0	1	1
PA*	1	0	0	0
PE*	1	0	1	0
RJ**	1	0	1	0
RS1	0	1	0	0
RS2	0	1	0	1
SC*	1	0	0	0
SP1	1	0	0	0
SP2	1	0	0	1

Source: The author.

¹¹ The protocol involves four analytical phases, namely: 1) Construction of the Comparative Table, which aims to organize qualitative information and assist in the identification of possible necessary conditions; 2) Articulate the typological theory by constructing the Truth Table and identifying sufficient causal configurations; 3) Examine the configurations for which there are no historical examples; and 4) Reduce the number of sufficient configurations through a logical minimization process to obtain the primary implicants (RAGIN, 2008; RIHOUX and RAGIN, 2009 *apud* PÉREZ-LIÑAN, 2010: 138).

The construction of the Data Matrix is a fundamental step to identify the necessary conditions. The QCA technique allows the assessment of the need and sufficiency of causal conditions for the occurrence of a result, comparing the number of systematic cases while recognizing the complexity within the specific cases (RIHOUX and RAGIN, 2009; WAGEMANN, 2012; DEVERS *et al.*, 2013). Thus, it is possible to identify regularities within a subset of conditions and assess whether a case belongs to a result of interest (set) and even the degree of belonging of the case to a set¹².

5.2 - Analysis of the Necessary Conditions

The method called similitude by John Stuart Mill is applied to verify whether a condition is necessary for the occurrence of a result of interest. For this, the chosen cases must coincide in their result. The method is applied in two steps. First, only positive results are considered, i.e., those for which the result of interest is equal to 1 are selected. Subsequently, it is necessary to identify any causal condition (x) common to all cases. In the words of Pérez-Liñan (2010: 139): *“La regla para identificar necesidad es simple: si X es condición necesaria para Y, todas las instancias de Y deben mostrar la presencia de X.” (emphasis added)*. If Y, then X ($Y \Rightarrow X$). Thus, the absence of opposition is a necessary condition for the occurrence of the result of interest, according to the analysis of the Table. In other words, for all Y, the absence of X₁ was observed with a coverage of 83%. Of the twelve cases in which the opposition is weak ($X_1 = 0$), ten presented the result of interest. Additionally, the consistency for the configuration is equal to 1. All cases that present the result of interest ($Y = 1$) have the condition of interest.

Table 8 – Data Matrix (y=1)

State	Result of interest (y)	Opposition (x ₁)	Fragmentation (x ₂)	Polarized (x ₃)
BA1	1	0	0	1
CE1	1	0	0	0
CE2	1	0	1	1
MG2	1	0	1	1
PA*	1	0	0	0
PE*	1	0	1	0
RJ**	1	0	1	0
SC*	1	0	0	0
SP1	1	0	0	0
SP2	1	0	0	1

Source: The author.

¹² Based on the set theory, the Crisp/QCA technique makes it possible to verify the belonging of a variable to a set by establishing dichotomous variables of belonging (1) and non-belonging (0)

5.3 - Analysis of the Sufficient Conditions (Articulation of the Typological Theory)

The analysis of sufficient conditions allows determining causal configurations by verifying the possible combinations and interactions of the various causal conditions (x) considered in the study for the occurrence of the result of interest (y) (PÉREZ-LIÑAN, 2010). It is necessary to articulate the Typological Theory by elaborating the Table of Truth and carrying out a systematic analysis of situations defined by the causal conditions considered to analyze sufficient conditions.

According to Pérez-Liñan (2010: 140) “*la regla para identificar suficiencia invierte así el criterio de necesidad: si la configuración causal X es condición suficiente para Y, todas las instancias de X deben ofrecer también la presencia de Y. (emphasis added by the author).*” Thus, the occurrence of y in the absence of x is possible due to the existence of other plausible causal explanations.

The number of possible causal configurations is given by the formula k^j , where K are the possible values for each of the causal conditions and J is the number of causal conditions mobilized in the model. Therefore, there are eight logically possible causal configurations since $k^j = 2^3$.

The ninth column of the Table highlights the consistency of each of the causal configurations. Consistency is the proportion of positive cases in a given causal configuration and expresses the degree to which empirical evidence supports the claim that an set relationship exists (RIHOUX; RAGIN, 2009). Consistency is calculated by (N_y/N) . This indicator's analysis allows verifying if a given causal configuration is sufficient since the literature adopts the value of consistency above 0.8 as a reference value (RAGIN, 2006).

Table 9 – Truth Table Y= IPE

Configuration	X ₁	X ₂	X ₃	Y=0	Y=1	N	N _y	Consistency ^(N_y/N)	Response ¹³
1	0	0	0		SC; SP1, CE1, PA	4	4	1.00	[V]
2	0	0	1		BA1; SP2	2	2	1.00	[V]
3	0	1	1	BA2	MG2; CE2	3	2	0.67	[C]
4	0	1	0	MG1	RJ; PE	3	2	0.67	[C]
5	1	0	0	RS1		1	0	0	[F]
6	1	0	1	RS2		1	0	0	[F]
7	1	1	0	-	-	-	-	-	[?]
8	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	[?]

Source: The author.

Table 9 shows two configurations that present the result of interest, i.e., they are sufficient [V]. These are configurations 1 and 2, which are represented by the respective Boolean expressions:

Configuration 1: $\sim X_1 * \sim X_2 * \sim X_3 \Rightarrow Y$

&

Configuration 2: $\sim X_1 * \sim X_2 * X_3 \Rightarrow Y$

Configuration 1 shows that the absence of opposition and the absence of a fragmented and polarized parliament allows the executive to obtain results of interest. Configuration 2 shows that governors will be successful in a context in which there is no opposition and no fragmentation even in the face of an ideologically polarized parliament. Configurations 5 and 6 did not show results of interest, so they are considered false [F].

Finally, it is necessary to show the cases considered contradictory [C]. These can be seen in Configurations 3 and 4. A configuration is considered contradictory when the occurrence and non-occurrence of the result of interest can be observed. The values presented for the consistency index were 0.67 in both configurations. In total, there were six cases, four of which presented results of interest. Configuration 3 shows an absence of opposition in a fragmented and polarized

¹³ When a configuration presents the result of interest, it is called true [V]. Settings that do not show the result of interest are considered false [F]. Some configurations may present the presence and absence of the result of interest at the same time. These configurations are contradictory [C], having consistency values below 0.8. It is also possible to have configurations for which there are no historical examples. These settings are called residuals or remnants [?].

assembly. The result of interest was observed in the term of Antônio Anastasia in Minas Gerais (MG2) and the second term of Cid Gomes (PSB) in Ceará (CE2) and was not observed in the second term of Jacques Wagner (PT). Two results of interest and one non-result were also observed in Configuration 4. Both Sérgio Cabral (PMDB) in Rio de Janeiro and Eduardo Campos (PSB) in Pernambuco achieved legislative success. Aécio Neves (PSDB) obtained an IPLE score below the parameter in his second term. The context informed by Configuration 4 is that of absence of opposition and a fragmented and non-polarized parliament.

It can be conjectured that governors in their first term contribute to their success in carrying out their agenda since the future possibility of re-election makes the executive a pole of attraction of support due to its capacity to distribute positions and pork in the long run. These scenarios were observed in all states where Configurations 3 and 4 obtained results of interest, apart from Ceará, where the governor was also successful in the second term. Special attention will be devoted to analyzing the so-called logical or counterfactual remnants, a step to be taken in the next subsection.

5.4 - Justification for the treatment of counterfactual remnants¹⁴.

The Truth Table shows that Configurations 7 and 8 have no empirical case. In other words, for a given causal configuration, determined by the articulation of the typological theory, the cases studied do not constitute an example. These configurations are called counterfactual or logical remnants and are represented below:

Configuration 7: $X_1 * X_2 * \sim X_3 \Rightarrow [?]$

Configuration 8: $X_1 * X_2 * X_3 \Rightarrow [?]$

The causal configuration expressed by Configuration 7 addresses a scenario in which the opposition is stronger and the parliament fragmented but not polarized. Configuration 8 refers to a context in which there is an expressive contingent of the parliament's opposition, which, in turn, is fragmented and polarized.

The fact that there are no historical examples for a given configuration does not exempt the researcher from trying to make any inference to it since the analysis of the logical remnants “*es un componente integral del análisis configurativo de condiciones suficientes*” (RAGGIN and SONNETT, 2004 *apud* PÉREZ-LIÑAN, 2010: 142-143).

Therefore, it is up to the researcher to treat these “residues”. Pérez-Liñan (2010: 143) presents four possibilities. The first is to include more cases from the observation of primary

¹⁴ The analysis undertaken in the previous subsection concerns the parsimonious solution. This “reduces complexity to a minimum considering that: (a) the variables are independent; (b) the absence of a variable cannot contribute to the positive result; and (c) the result of the unverified configurations does not matter, that is, it can be positive or negative”(GURGEL and VASCONCELOS, 2012: 596, our translation).

sources to fill the empirical gap. The second also aims to fill this gap by consulting secondary sources to verify similar cases throughout history that may represent a given causal configuration. However, variable treatment and access to primary and secondary sources are often impossible due to the work's originality. The third possibility of a theoretical nature allows the researcher to attribute values based on inferences made from the available data to the cases without historical examples. Therefore, all remnants can be treated as true or false. To do so, the researcher must base this decision on observing sufficient causal configurations. The fourth possibility of an empirical nature is to treat a few of the remaining configurations as false and others as true and to explore the conclusions from this observation. According to Pérez-Liñan, this allows us to systematically analyze our theoretical conclusions when changing the assumptions about unobserved historical situations.

The first two possibilities were not available to the researcher due to the limitations mentioned above. Thus, the residues were treated empirically, testing them as false, a technique known as complex solution analysis. “The complex solution does little to reduce the variables. It considers that: (a) the absence of a variable can contribute to the positive result; and (b) all possible configurations not verified in the sample do not generate positive results ” (GURGEL and VASCONCELOS, 2012: 596, our translation).

The intermediate solution was also tested. It “is generated from the verification of the configurational pairs of the variables found by the parsimonious solution, assuming multifinality” (GURGEL and VASCONCELOS, 2012: 596, our translation), i.e., assigning random values of false (0) or true (1) to the result of interest of the logical remnants.

The analysis of the logical remnants considering the complex and the intermediate solution reinforces the findings of the parsimonious solution. Thus, this work assumes the logical remainders as false [F] since, when verifying the result of interest ($y = 1$) in the parsimonious solution, the causal conditions x_1 (opposition) and x_2 (fragmentation) were not present in the causal configurations.

5.5 - Logical Minimization or decreasing the complexity

The technique allows to determine and prioritize “conditions of occurrence”. The researcher can proceed with a process of reducing complexity given the sufficient causal configurations to explain the result of interest. This process is known as logical minimization and defines the primary implicants for the result of interest to occur (BERG-SCHLOSSER *et al.*, 2009; PÉREZ-LIÑAN, 2010).

The only causal condition that differs in the configurations is the absence of a polarized parliament in Configuration 1 and the presence of a polarized parliament in Configuration 2. Thus, proceeding to the process of logical minimization, we have that the result of interest will occur regardless of the presence or absence of x_3 (polarization) if the absence of x_1 (opposition) and x_2

(fragmentation) occur:

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{Configuration 1: } \sim X_1 * \sim X_2 * \sim X_3 \\ \& \\ \text{Configuration 2: } \sim X_1 * \sim X_2 * X_3 \\ \sim X_1 * \sim X_2 \end{array}$$

Therefore, the boolean expression reveals two primary implicants:

$$\sim \text{opposition} * \sim \text{fragmentation} \Rightarrow \text{Legislative Success (IPLE)}$$

In conclusion, governors may have legislative success when they operate in Legislative Assemblies that do not have an opposition contingent superior to 33.4% and that are not fragmented, according to the established parameter.

5.6 - Model coverage

The explanatory capacity of the QCA model is given by the coverage index since it expresses how much the minimized solution covers the observed cases (RIHOUX and RAGIN, 2009). First, each true configuration's coverage is calculated [V]. Then, the minimized solution coverage is verified. The formula for calculating coverage is as follows:

$$\text{Coverage} = N_y / \sum_{Y=1}$$

Where: y is the number of cases with results of interest.

Configuration 1 presented four cases with results of interest in a total of ten cases. Therefore, the coverage of Configuration 1 is 0.40. Configuration 2 presented two cases in ten, with the coverage of the causal configuration equal to 0.20. When considering the primary implicants resulting from the logical minimization process, we have a coverage of 0.6 (60%).

Final Remarks

The best word to define legislative production in Brazilian states is diversity. The examination of the decision-making process shows significant variation - in time and space - which cannot be explained by constitutional aspects, as has already been demonstrated by Tomio and Ricci (2010). This article addressed the explanation that mobilizes variables of a political nature to explain such variation. To this end, an alternative measure was used to measure the executive's Legislative Success, the IPLE. The assumed expectation was that the indicator would vary according to the size of political variables of opposition, fragmentation, and ideological polarization of the assemblies. The QCA analysis technique was used to verify the sensitivity of the IPLE to variations in political contexts. State governors will have legislative success when the assemblies do not present a numerically strong opposition since, whenever the governor was successful, the absence of opposition was present.

The sufficiency analysis showed four of the eight possible causal configurations

presenting the results of interest, with two configurations proving to be true and the other two being contradictory. The first true configuration presents an assembly scenario with no strong opposition, no fragmentation, and no ideological polarization. The second configuration consists of assemblies that have no strong opposition and no fragmentation but are polarized. The logical minimization process revealed two primary implicants: the absence of strong opposition and the absence of fragmentation in six cases, thus obtaining a coverage of 60%. However, future research must incorporate other variables - political and/or institutional - to improve the fit of the model – given that the CSF presupposes the interaction between the causal conditions.

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