



INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS, PARLIAMENTARY AMENDMENTS AND LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE CITY COUNCIL: LESSONS FROM THE CASE OF SÃO CARLOS/SP

Thaís Cavalcante Martins¹
Maria Teresa Miceli Kerbauy²

Abstract: The article analyzes municipal parliamentary amendments, which are an informal rule that affects the behavior of councilors and the legislative process. In this case study, we evaluated the norms that guide the functioning of the São Carlos / SP City Council and sought to demonstrate how informal rules relate to official institutions, serving to establish political exchanges between local actors. During the research, we evaluated the official documents, which were submitted to content analysis. As a complementary research tool, we carry out 21 semi-structured interviews with councilors. Among the main results, we highlight that in the investigated period 42 entities started to have the possibility to be assisted formally by an unofficial institutional rule.

Keywords: Informal institutions; Parliamentary Amendments; Political exchanges; Political behavior; Councilors.

Introduction

The concept of institution, fundamental in Political Science, has exercised a vast influence on explaining political and social phenomena through neo-institutionalist theories. The new institutionalism represented the return of institutions to the center of political theory. This explanatory capacity has been highly associated with the study of formal rules and procedures. However, part of the political behavior cannot be adequately understood when analyzing only the effects of official norms.

Despite the conceptual difference, it is essential to recognize that the study of informal rules is an integral part of institutional analysis. As indicated by North (1990), institutions are formal and informal rules and procedures that structure social interactions, restricting and shaping the actors' behavior³.

In recent years, non-formal channels and informal institutions have attracted the attention of a group of researchers (NORTH, 1990; O'DONNELL, 1996; LAUTH, 2000, 2004; HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2004, 2006; LAWOTI, 2010; ULLOA, 2016) interested in identifying in other

¹ Doctorate student in Political Sciences by the Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar). She was a visiting researcher in the Area of Ciencia Política y de la Administración at the Universidad de Salamanca. Holder of a Capes Scholarship. Email: thais.cmaartins@gmail.com. ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4595-1849>.

² Doctor in Social Sciences by PUC/São Paulo, with a Post-Doctorate in Political Sciences by the Instituto de Iberoamérica - Espanha. Professor and researcher of UNESP/FCLAr. Research Productivity Scholarship holder of CNPq – Level 1C. Email: teresa.kerbauy@gmail.com. ORCID iD: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0622-1512>.

³ Considering the definition used by North (1990) as a reference, we used the terms “institutions” and “rules” as synonyms.

codes of conduct the explanation for the behaviors with an implication in the political process. Despite the contribution of countless scholars, the importance of informal rules in theoretical and empirical research does not seem to have found its full development. This research agenda still requires investigation.

Many of the limitations for developing this type of analysis result from methodological difficulties. Because informal institutions are not easily identifiable and measurable, as they are not usually written procedures, they can sometimes be omitted (NORTH, 1990; HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006). Despite the challenges in identifying informal patterns, scientific research has a series of procedures to contribute to this type of investigation. Case studies, ethnographic research, and comparative analysis are alternatives for developing the agenda (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006).

This diversity of research methods and procedures has contributed to the understanding that the existence of informal institutions is not necessarily harmful to democracies. Ulloa (2016) indicated that an extensive bibliography has associated informal norms with phenomena such as clientelism, corruption, and patrimonialism. Although there is systematic evidence regarding the problems surrounding the lack of transparency of informal institutions, some scholars argue that certain non-formalized rules contribute to stabilizing regimes (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2004, 2006; ULLOA, 2016, LEVITSKY and ZIBLATT, 2018).

The typology developed by Lauth (2000, 2004) and Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 2006) contributes to capturing the complexity of informal rules and their interaction with formal institutions, highlighting the different forms they relate to and their consequences. This typology makes it possible to perceive that certain informal rules facilitate coordination or decision-making, while others subvert and mitigate the efficiency of official political institutions.

Based on the typology mentioned above, we seek to investigate how informal institutions operate in the subnational legislature. The purpose of the analysis is to examine the non-formalized rules that affect the municipality's political behavior, governance, and legislative production. To this end, we conducted a case study in the municipality of São Carlos/SP⁴ to assess the emergence and effects of parliamentary amendments for political behavior in the City Council. In this study, we evaluated the period from 2001 to 2008, marked by the origin of the amendments and their consolidation.

It should be noted that municipal parliamentary amendments, as they are executed, are not specific to São Carlos. There is a record of their existence in other locations. However, we opted for a case study since we have not found other research considering the provision as an object of analysis at the municipal level. As indicated by Lijphart (1994), case studies are especially suitable for phenomena for which little information is available. The advantage of this

⁴ The municipality located in the state of São Paulo, 235 km from the state capital, has a population of approximately 240,000 residents.

type of method lies in investigating contextual factors and causal mechanisms, generating new hypotheses, and expanding the research agenda.

The study conducted is a descriptive analysis. Its primary contribution is to signal the existence of a provision that has not yet been investigated in research on the local legislative process. The main hypothesis is that parliamentary amendments are an important bargaining chip in the Executive-Legislative relationship and at the municipal level. This is because the amendments can ensure the distribution of resources to important electoral strongholds of the councilors.

As municipal parliamentary amendments are an informal institution and, therefore, not a written norm, the alternative found for the investigation was the evaluation of the local legislative production, which consists of the point of intersection between formal and informal rules. Thus, we investigated the official documents, such as bills, the City Council's Internal Regulations, and the Organic Law of the Municipality, submitting them to content analysis. We mapped the use of the provision in the City Council based on this procedure. In the course of the research, 21 semi-structured interviews were also conducted with the councilors⁵ to rescue the local policy elements that enabled the creation and maintenance of the amendments and complement and detail the information about the functioning of the informal norms. The interviews also served to identify the councilors' political position and their perception of their main electoral strongholds. Although the interviews play an essential role in determining the problem investigated, they are a complementary methodology - secondary - since the study's focus is on the interaction between formal and informal institutions.

The text is organized into three sections, in addition to this introduction. In the first section, we present the theoretical framework, identifying some of the main discussions that guided the study of institutions in Political Science. In the second section, we develop the concept of informal institutions, returning to the typology developed by Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 2006) and Lauth (2000, 2004). In the third section, we conduct a case study to understand the behavior of political actors and the interaction between the formal and informal rules of the subnational legislative process. Finally, we outline a few final considerations.

1. Institution and Institutionalism

In recent decades, Political Science has reaffirmed the importance of institutions in the dynamics of political and social processes. Sometimes, its centrality has been represented by the maxim that "institutions matter". However, the debate around institutions is not new. The theme has already witnessed a "behavioral revolution", and institutionalism has gone from "old" to "new", the latter not corresponding to a unified current (PETERS, 2001; HALL and TAYLOR,

⁵ From a total of 24 parliamentarians that composed the Municipal Council in the analyzed period (2001-2008), one councilman died in 2011 and two did not return our contact. Therefore, 21 councilmen were interviewed.

2003; PERES, 2008; NASCIMENTO, 2009; TROIANO, 2015).

The old institutionalism, present in political analyzes until the 1950s, was centered on formalistic and descriptive observations and considered normative and unscientific (PETERS, 2001). This type of approach was considered insufficient to explain certain political phenomena⁶, which aroused the interest of academics in other variables (ROTHSTEIN, 2001).

In this context, behavioralism, or behaviorism, emerges as a critical approach to institutionalism, shifting the center of analysis to individuals, to their behavior and values. This school, influenced by American psychology, brought a greater concern with objectivity, empiricism, and multidisciplinary to Political Science, so that it was considered a "revolution" in the paradigms of science of the period. According to this conception, only an empirical and positive orientation could explain the political phenomena (PERES, 2008).

The multidisciplinary claim of behaviorism is one of the main objects of criticism of the new institutionalism. In addition to the difficulty in establishing an analytical specificity, behaviorism was also criticized for the incompatibility between its theoretical ambitions and the effective results of the research (PERES, 2008).

Another important criticism that falls on behavioral analysis refers to its voluntarist character. As noted by Immergut (1998), the new institutionalism consists of a reaction to the conception that the sum of individual preferences would explain collective behavior. Neo-institutionalism assumed that social action would be determined by institutions and not by the sum of preferences.

This theoretical current also rejected the structuralist conceptions that attributed the cause of social reality to the structure (HALL and TAYLOR, 2003). In other words, the new institutionalism was against the notion of both an autonomous individual and a subject determined by social structures. In this sense, this current sought to combine agency and structure⁷ (NASCIMENTO, 2009).

Despite being critical of previous currents, neo-institutionalism incorporated fundamental elements of these schools in its analysis. On the one hand, it returned to institutions as explanatory variables to understand political phenomena; on the other hand, he maintained scientific rigor in his investigations, with a view to objectivity.

The new institutionalism, which gained momentum in the late 1960s⁸, maintains its

⁶ Na example is the ascension of totalitarian regimes.

⁷ For more information regarding the debate on agency-structure in institutional analysis, see: Mahoney e Snyder (1999).

⁸ According to Rothstein (2001), two questions are fundamental to understanding the emergence of renewed interest in institutions in the period mentioned. The first is due to the failure of great theories such as behaviorism, structuralism, and Marxism in explaining social reality. For the author, these theories would be too general and would, therefore, have difficulties in explaining the multiplicity of the political entities observed. The second, resides in the collapse of the hypotheses of convergence in the social sciences. During the 1950s and 1960s, it was expected that "most Third World countries would follow the same path of modernization and that Western capitalist democracies would converge over time" (ROTHSTEIN, 2001, p. 210). However, instead of converging on similar processes, it was found that the differences persisted.

centrality in scientific investigations by studying the structuring of the preferences of the actors based on institutional constraints.

Despite the focus on institutions, this school's theorists do not agree on how to proceed with institutional analysis because a single current of thought does not constitute the theoretical approach. As highlighted in the seminal work of Hall and Taylor (2003), there are at least three approaches within the new institutionalism: historical, sociological, and rational choice.

Despite the theoretical and methodological differences in the approach of each of these analytical matrices, its common core resides in the conception of the institution as a central variable to explain political phenomena so that the institutions not only "matter" in explaining the occurrence of certain events, but are an integral part of the explanation itself.

It is worth noting that we are faced with a conceptual question regarding what institutions are. While for the old institutionalism, such a delimitation was not an issue, understanding institutions only as material structures - bodies linked to the State or government - the new institutionalism has a diversified concept, based on each of its approaches (NASCIMENTO, 2009).

The conception of what institutions are is not shared by all neo-institutionalists. In general, this debate does not take place explicitly. Goodin (1996) suggests that there is a significant diversity regarding what the disciplines "interpret as 'institutions' and why"⁹ (GOODIN, 1996 apud BLONDEL, 2008, p.06). This diversity is due to each matrix's inclination to bring the concept closer and look for definitions that are close to their theoretical traditions. In this context, the heterogeneity within the disciplines must be thought out from their varied methodological and epistemological positions.

In short, each of the institutionalisms develops its explanations of what an institution would be. Roughly speaking, historical institutionalism considers institutions as official organizations, procedures, and norms - although non-formal or formalized relationships are not excluded from the analysis.

Sociological institutionalism, in turn, understands institutions as norms and values that include cognitive schemes and moral models, responsible for "providing 'patterns of meaning' that guide human action" through behavioral models (HALL and TAYLOR, 2003, p. 209). In this matrix, institutions represent restrictions on behavior and are also responsible for the process of forming preferences.

Rational choice institutionalism understands institutions as a system of rules and incentives, from which individuals define their preferences based on strategic calculations (HALL and TAYLOR, 2003). In this perspective, institutions are seen as agents for reducing transaction costs and providing information that reduces uncertainties about behavior, leading to specific

⁹ All translations are free and the responsibility of the authors.

strategies that generate better results.

Shepsle (2008) suggests that there are two forms of thinking about institutions from the perspective of rational choice. The first considers institutions as external constraints, in which the rules of the game are given exogenously; the second form admits that "the players themselves provide the rules of the game"; and they are how players decide to play (SHEPSLE, 2008, p.25). In both interpretations, institutions are understood as components that structure the action of individuals.

Each matrix comprises institutions based on different theoretical perspectives. In general, institutions can be understood as "rules of the game"; however, the issue is to know what can be included as a rule: routines, procedures, culture, or social norms (ROTHSTEIN, 2001). Additionally, it is essential to indicate whether these rules are formal or informal. As already suggested by Rothstein (2001), "most people, almost always, act according to predefined norms of conduct, and most of these norms are not formalized as laws or other written regulations" (ROTHSTEIN, 2001, p. 215). Although not formalized, these rules are responsible for delimiting social behavior.

2. On rules and formal and informal institutions

Institutions intervene in the political process and its results in different ways, such as acting on representation, governance, and the quality of democracy. However, the analysis of formal institutions has proved to be insufficient to understand part of the political behavior (LAWOTI, 2010) because, in various contexts, there are institutions that analysts do not consider as important variables. These are informal institutions.

According to Helmke and Levitsky (2004), the distinction between formal and informal institutions has been thought of differently. A common approach refers to the state-society approach. According to this perspective, formal institutions would encompass state bodies such as courts, legislatures, and constitutions; informal institutions would be present in the religious, kinship sphere, and other societal organizations. However, this interpretation does not explain the existence and functioning of a range of informal institutions that operate within formal institutions and largely delimit behaviors (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2004).

A second approach emphasizes the implementation of rules as a mechanism for distinguishing between different types of institutions. This interpretation considers informal institutions as having "self-executing" rules, while formal institutions would have rules to be applied by third parties - usually the State. For Helmke and Levitsky (2004), although this explanation is useful from an analytical perspective, the form of proceeding with the differentiation is problematic because it does not admit the execution of informal rules by external agents or by the State (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2004, 2006).

The authors offer a third definition. For them, formal institutions can be understood as

"rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and applied through channels widely accepted as official". In turn, informal institutions refer to "socially shared rules, usually unwritten, created, communicated, and applied outside officially sanctioned channels" (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006, p. 05). It is worth mentioning that informal rules are often applied by State actors and institutions.

Informal institutions, therefore, carry a regularized list of recognized and accepted actions, practiced by actors whose expectation is to continue acting according to these rules, considering that the break with the rules would bring sanctions or social disapproval (O'DONNELL, 1996; HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006).

Lauth (2004) suggests that, while formal institutions are guaranteed by official agencies and have their disapproval sanctioned by the State, informal institutions are based on their existence and effectiveness. In other words, the sanctioning power of these institutions would be related to social exclusion mechanisms or the condition that their non-use would minimize the chances of access to shared goods and services. In this sense, institutions would shape behavior without the need for a legal and coercive apparatus that guarantees its existence (AGUIAR, 2015).

While this conceptual distinction is important, it is incomplete. Informal institutions add characteristics that are more complex than the definition of unwritten norms supposes. This point is recognized by Helmke and Levitsky (2006), who indicate the need to observe the differences between institutions and other informal phenomena. In this sense, the researcher interested in this type of institution must be aware of the following situations: a) informal institutions are not weak institutions; b) they are distinguished from other informal behaviors that have regularity; c) they do not refer to informal organizations; and d) they are not to be confused with culture.

Regarding the first aspect, it is important to clarify that many of the formal institutions are ineffective. However, their weakness does not necessarily imply the presence of informal institutions. The second issue concerns the fact that not all standardized behaviors are effectively linked to shared rules. In other words, regularity in behaviors can be the product of various incentives (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006).

Another fundamental point is the differentiation between institutions and organizations¹⁰. While institutions can be understood as the rules of the game, organizations incorporate their actors (AGUIAR, 2015). That is, "as formal organizations (such as political parties or unions) can be distinguished from formal rules, informal organizations (such as clans or mafias) must be distinguished from informal institutions" (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006, p. 07).

¹⁰ Regarding the differentiation between institutions and organizations, Blondel (2008) states that "in politics, the emphasis was almost automatically placed on organizations, and not on procedures or rules, when the issue of defining institutions arose. Counting rules: they are part of the institutional process; but rules and procedures become applicable, in politics, only through organizations, as they must be applicable to a large number of people who did not participate (because, in most cases, they do not have the right to do so) in the decision-making process" (BLONDEL, 2008, p. 723).

Finally, it is important to emphasize that informal institutions should not be confused with culture because they are not about shared values, but rather beliefs and expectations of a specific set of actors - who may or may not be rooted in broader social values (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006).

This brief definition makes it possible to understand some characteristics of informal institutions. Lauth (2004) indicates that, in addition to the existence of different types of non-formal rules, they interact in a diversified manner with official norms and have numerous consequences. The typology developed by Lauth (2000) and updated by Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 2006) involves two dimensions and allows us to perceive that certain informal rules facilitate coordination or decision-making, while others subvert, mitigate, or replace the efficiency of official political institutions.

The first dimension seeks to highlight the degree of convergence between institutional results - which means investigating whether informal rules produce a divergent or similar result to that expected in the case of strict adherence to formal rules. The second dimension seeks to verify the effectiveness of formal rules - which indicates whether the rules of the official scope are, in fact, complied with in practice. When rules and procedures are ineffective, political actors believe that the cost of violation is low. These two dimensions produce the typology presented in Chart 1:

Chart 1 – Typology of Informal Institutions

Results/Efficacy	Effective formal rules	Non-effective formal rules
Convergent	Supplementary	Substitutive
Divergent	Accommodating	Competitive

Source: Helmke and Levitsky, 2006, p. 14.

Supplementary informal institutions coexist with effective official rules. This type of informal rule conditions the behavior of the actors without violating the effects of the official rules or producing substantially different results. In this sense, this type of institution could increase the efficiency of official rules, facilitating coordination and decision-making (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006). These rules would improve governance by filling in the gaps left by formal rules and improving the efficiency of the legislative process (MEJÍA ACOSTA, 2004 apud AGUIAR, 2015).

Accommodating informal institutions create incentives for actors to behave in a form that alters the substantive effects of formal rules but without directly violating them. This type of norm often originates in situations in which political actors or elites find it difficult to achieve certain results but are unable or prevented from openly violating official rules. Thus, these institutions make it possible to reconcile the actors' interests with the existing formal institutional


arrangements (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006).

On the other hand, **substitutive** informal institutions arise from the interaction between ineffective formal rules and converging interests. They operate in contexts in which official norms are not truly enforced, but the actors seek results compatible with what is proposed in this context. This type of institution achieves the goals idealized by the official rules (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006).

Finally, **competitive** informal institutions structure incentives that are irreconcilable with what is proposed by the formal rules. To follow one rule, actors must necessarily violate another. Therefore, this type of institution is incompatible with written rules, combining inefficiency and divergent results (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006).

Figure 01 represents the interaction between informal (I) and formal (F) institutions for the establishment of the categories presented:

Figure 01 – Interação between Formal and Informal Institutions for the establishment of the categories




Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Helmke and Levitsky (2006).

The observation of the typology allows identifying the complexity of the interaction between the institutions. These categories may or may not be mutually exclusive, depending on the type of interaction between institutions. Depending on the prism of the investigation, the institution may receive a certain classification. An example observed by Helmke and Levitsky (2006) addresses clientelism, which can both violate the procedures of liberal democracy (O'DONNELL, 1996 apud HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006), and replace deficient formal mechanisms of local representation (TAYLOR-ROBINSON, 2006 apud HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006).

There are several examples regarding the possibilities of classification in the collection organized by the authors. In the chapter written by Brinks (2006), informal rules are classified into different categories based on their interaction with the various formal institutions. In the Van Cott (2006) chapter, different categories are combined to analyze the same set of informal institutions¹¹. These multiple possibilities of classifying informal and formal institutions are represented in Figure 2:

¹¹ Van Cott (2006) demonstrates how indigenous laws can be classified in all categories.

Figure 02 – Multiple interactions between Informal and Formal Institutions



Source: Elaborated by the authors based on Van Cott (2006).

It should also be noted that the interactions between different types of institutions are dynamic, which contributes to the fact that informal rules serve as catalysts for institutional change. On the one hand, they can induce the creation of formal norms to frame practices considered beneficial but unofficial. On the other hand, they can drive ineffective formal institutions into decline by replacing them with others or even inhibit the development of effective formal institutions, encouraging individuals to act based on informal rules. However, they can also contribute to the stability of official rules by improving these rules' performance or their benefits (HELMKE and LEVITSKY, 2006).

3. Political exchanges and parliamentary amendments in São Carlos

In this section, we evaluate individual parliamentary amendments in the municipality of São Carlos/SP. Here, we refer to amendments of an imposing nature¹² and not those made with the annual budget bills or budget guidelines. The first refers to a tacit agreement between the Executive and Legislative branches and is not registered or formalized as an official rule. The second consists of the formal assignment of councilors and is provided for in the Municipal Organic Law¹³.

Individual parliamentary amendments have been in force in São Carlos since 2001. Its origin dates back to a period of reordering party forces and political elites in the municipality. The 2000 elections, characterized by the expansion of the Labor Party (PT) in several Brazilian municipalities, instituted a different scenario in local politics, marking the arrival of new political leaders, including in the municipalities of São Paulo. In the state of São Paulo, the party expanded, above all, in the region of Ribeirão Preto and Araraquara, where the municipality of São Carlos

¹² We refer to an “imposing nature” because the amendments are similar to this budget model, even though the provision evaluated here is informal.

¹³ Regarding public revenues, the City Council is responsible for voting on the Annual Budget, Multi-Year Plan, Budgetary Guidelines, and the parliamentarian may propose amendments to the annual budget project only when compatible with the Multi-Year Plan and the Law of Budgetary Guidelines. According to the provisions of the Organic Law of the Municipality of São Carlos, the mayor is responsible for opening up credit, subsidies, assistance, and matters of any nature that creates or increases public expenses.

is located.

In the 2000 election, after fierce competition, the PT candidate for Mayor won the elections by a difference of 128 votes, defeating the candidates linked to the municipality's traditional elites. Although the PT elected the Mayor and the City Council's largest bench for that legislature, this was not enough to ensure governance.

Of the 21 councilors, only 7 were part of the government coalition, while 14 declared opposition. The result was an unstable relationship between the executive and legislative branches. Two Parliamentary Commissions of Inquiry (CPI in Portuguese) were established in the first months to investigate irregularities in the hiring of companies to provide services in the municipality and express the weight and influence of the opposition politicians linked to the former leaders.

Even at the beginning of his term, the Mayor faced other difficulties in governing. One of the main obstacles was related to the annual budget's approval in 2001, referring to the following year. At that time, opposition councilors sent many amendments to the draft Annual Budget Law. Although the formulation of amendments to the budget is a parliamentary task to assist the executive branch in adequating resources for specific areas, in the context of local policy, the volume of amendments represented a strategy on the part of the councilors to hinder the execution of the budget formulated by the executive branch.

The wrestling between powers regarding budget formulation and execution counted on the Judiciary's intervention to reestablish the original text. The conflict over the budget caused wear and tear on the government and gave rise to political exchanges to establish government stability. The solution found was the creation of an informal rule: individual parliamentary amendments. The "gentlemen's agreement", as defined by the then Mayor of the municipality at the time, represented a commitment made between the executive and legislative branches to reconcile interests.

Studies that seek to understand the relationship between the powers often address the distribution of portfolios and political appointments as a resource for managing the coalition. In the municipality, depending on its size and electoral magnitude, sometimes the councilor is the only representative of his party, which may not exercise effective legislative coordination. Thus, legislators' parliamentary amendments, provisions for individual use¹⁴, can condition behaviors given councilors' specific interests. This does not mean that the distribution of positions - recognized as a formal rule - does not have significant weight at the local level, but it is important to pay attention to other provisions.

Parliamentary amendments consist of the transfer of funds to municipal entities of a charitable, sporting, educational, cultural, or scientific nature or a public interest civil society

¹⁴ Also defined as: individual indications of the donation of values. See: São Carlos City Council. Available at: <https://camarasaocarlos.sp.gov.br/artigo/?a=noticia&id=5311>. Accessed on April 30th, 2020.

organization, based on the legislators' indication. The provision aims to meet the demands of organized groups or the electoral bases of councilors. They are what the literature calls pork-barrel politics (BAIÃO and COUTO, 2017).

Government and opposition councilors have, theoretically, used the mechanism since the origin of São Carlos. When the norm was created, the allocated amounts corresponded to 1% of the total municipal budget¹⁵ and were shared among all representatives. Thus, entities could receive transfers as long as no permanent expenses were created.

Although amendments do not appear as written norms, local legislative production is the intersection between formal and informal rules. For the parliamentary amendment to be destined, it is necessary to sign an agreement with the social entities¹⁶ to declare them as public interest through the formulation and approval of a bill¹⁷.

Thus, to consolidate the entity's recognition, councilors interested in submitting amendments to certain entities must submit an ordinary bill to the Legislative House. After its approval, the bill will proceed to the Mayor's sanction. Only after the Law's approval can the request for the allocation of funds be forwarded¹⁸.

From a formal perspective, only non-profitable and legally constituted entities can be recognized as a public utility. However, even in the face of the entity formalization, parliamentary amendments remain an informal rule. Even though it goes through the legislative process, there is no formal regulation on its functionality.

Expenses related to parliamentary amendments - in the evaluated period - were registered by the Government Secretariat as "general charges of the municipality"¹⁹. As of 2005, the total amount to be allocated to amendments has been included in the budget²⁰. The requirements for

¹⁵ According to what would be provided for in the Budget Guidelines Law. The resource would come from "the municipal treasury, arising from the collection of taxes and constitutional transfers". Information obtained by the Access to Information Law (LAI in Portuguese), nº 12,527 of November 18th, 2011, request filed under process nº 8733/2020 at the São Carlos City Hall.

¹⁶ The agreements are instruments signed by the government with an entity of a public or private nature or with a legal entity governed by private law (association or foundation) for the achievement of certain objectives of collective interest (CAMPOS, 2014, our translation). The agreements may or may not involve the transfer of funds, but they must comply with the provisions of Law 8,666/93.

¹⁷ As provided for in article 16 of Municipal Law 12,837 of July 30th, 2001, which provides for the Budgetary Guidelines, "in conducting programs of Municipal jurisdiction, the Municipality may adopt the strategy of transferring resources to private non-profit institutions, provided specifically authorized by Municipal Law and with an agreement, adjustment, or the like, whereby the duties and obligations of each party and the form and terms of accountability are clearly defined".

¹⁸ As of 2006, the Budgetary Guidelines Law (LDO in Portuguese) began to refer to the need for "legislative authorization" for the "transfers of resources to the private sector", but it does not make direct mention of parliamentary amendments and their destinations.

¹⁹ Only after 2018 did parliamentary amendments appear on the Transparency Portal of the Municipality of São Carlos, making it possible to consult them. For more information, see: https://scarlos.giap.com.br/apex/scarlos/f?p=839:5:13401237241107::NO::GLOBAL_EXERCICIO:2020. Accessed on April 25th, 2020.

²⁰ Article 14 of the 2006 LDO provides that, "the Budget Law should aim at the budgetary surplus with the purpose of providing, albeit in part, the adjustment of municipal accounts, according to the official accounting records of the City Hall, reserving BRL 1,560,000.00 (one million and five hundred and sixty thousand reais) of the Budget to **meet parliamentary amendments**, to invest in works and equipment that do not entail an increase in continued expenses, and/or to allocate to Municipal Funds" (emphasis added).

“transferring resources to the private sector” have also been included in the budget guidelines²¹. However, the conditions described do not make direct reference to parliamentary amendments.

At first, the request for the release of the resource was made through a letter sent by the councilors to the executive branch, indicating the entities already agreed to be served and the amounts to be allocated²².

As it is an informal rule, there are no defined deadlines for releasing resources, which the municipal executive defines. As members of the coalition or opposition, the position of parliamentarians is a differentiating element that can define when the amendments will be made available by the Mayor. Time management, therefore, becomes essential in the relationship between branches, in a context where such amendments are a device for managing the coalition.

In this context, an alternative available to councilors is to approach the government to ensure a faster transfer of resources, under the Mayor's control, to the social entities linked to their electoral bases²³. This effectively occurred in the case investigated. After the establishment of parliamentary amendments, the government's base was expanded from seven to 14 councilors; the Mayor was re-elected²⁴ in the subsequent election and had a legislative majority in his second term²⁵.

In the São Carlos City Council, parliamentary amendments are informal rules that create incentives for parliamentarians to behave differently from what is prescribed by official rules without directly violating them. Councilors are not encouraged to formulate laws that serve the interests of their strongholds since there are institutional restrictions for this²⁶. They seek to accommodate interests through informal rules.

According to Helmke and Levitsky (2006), these rules contradict the spirit, but not the

²¹ According to Law n° 8,742/1993, Law n° 9,790/1999, and Law n° 9,637/1998.

²² The amendments are still in force in São Carlos. However, some procedures have been modified - which shows that the institution is dynamic. Among them is the form of request for access to resources, which can occur by amendment to the Budget Law or official letter. We sent a request for information to the City Council and, in response, we were informed that currently “the values of the parliamentary amendments are destined by the respective councilors through an amendment to the Annual Budget Law (LOA) and, when allocated *a posteriori*, it is edited for each transfer bill of the law for opening additional or special additional credit for the subsequent transfer to the entity, which is made by the City Hall through a term of promotion or collaboration” (request for information filed in the e-Sic of the City Council under n° 20203548906210). Still on the procedures for the transfer of funds to municipal entities, the City Hall reported that “the councilor sends an official letter to the Municipal Government Secretariat (SMG in Portuguese) that conducts the balance control and destination of amendments to the entities and to the direct and indirect government. Once released by SMG, the letter goes to the Department of Agreements of the Municipal Secretariat for Planning and Management to verify the entity's regularity, that is, whether it can or not receive resources through the third sector” (clarification obtained by LAI, filed under process n° 8,733/2020 at the São Carlos City Hall).

²³ In recent years, a number of scholars have indicated the importance of financial transfers to electoral holdings as an imperative for the political survival of legislators. For more information on this literature, see: Baião e Couto, 2017.

²⁴ It is important to clarify that we are not attributing the reelection of the Mayor to the institute of parliamentary amendments. Other variables must be considered. In the pre-election period, Newton Lima's approval rates were relatively high, which can be understood as an important element for his reelection and expansion of the electoral coalition.

²⁵ For the 2004 elections, based on TSE resolutions 21,702 and 21,803, the number of positions in the City Council was reduced from 21 to 13. The re-elected Mayor began his term with a legislative majority, six councilors. Between the two legislatures, the renewal rate in the Chamber was of only 23%.

²⁶ It is forbidden for the councilor to present a bill that implies the creation or increase of public expenditure not foreseen in the budget prepared and executed by the Executive.

writing of the formal rules. Based on its typology, it is possible to identify that parliamentary amendments make it possible to reconcile the interests of the actors with existing formal institutional arrangements. It is, therefore, an informal **accommodating** institution in which councilors are unable to transgress official rules openly, although they have difficulty in achieving the desired result - the distribution of benefits.

From an institutional perspective, parliamentary amendments, as practiced in the municipality of São Carlos, condition behavior and cause sanctions. As Lauth (2004) suggested, the non-use of the recognized and accepted norm would minimize the chances of access to goods and services shared by the actors.

As it is an unwritten norm, there are many difficulties in capturing the frequency with which the amendments are used, who they are for, and the amounts distributed. However, this rule interacts with official institutions through formalizing entities, making it possible to map the bases of interest by investigating local legislative production.

Between 2001 and 2008, 42 agreements were signed with associations and foundations based in the municipality²⁷. The agreements are a modality for performing services of interest to the government that involve the performance of public interest activities, with no impediment to their execution, provided the transfers are following the budget prepared by the executive.

Counselors are prohibited from allocating resources from the formal perspective, as this is a prerogative of the Mayor. The amendments do not cause an explicit break with this rule since it is the Executive who directs the values. However, this occurs from the direct recommendation of the councilors. Thus, in the analyzed period, 42 entities have formally obtained - through agreements - the possibility of being assisted by an unofficial institutional rule - individual parliamentary amendments.

The member associations serve the most varied objectives. They are assistance, educational, sports, and scientific entities, social and professional organizations. Table 1 shows the number of agreements signed by area.

²⁷ For analysis purposes, we do not include agreements signed with federal or state entities for the execution of certain policies. In other words, we consider only associations, foundations, or entities liable to become beneficiaries of parliamentary amendments.

Table 1 – Agreements with municipal entities (2001-2008)

Theme area	N	%
Health	02	4.76
Social Assistance	09	21.42
Education	09	21.42
Science	02	4.76
Sports	07	16.66
Culture and Leisure	02	4.76
Environment	02	4.76
Unions and professional segments	07	16.66
Residents Association	02	4.76
Total	42	100

Source: Elaborated by the authors using data from the São Carlos City Council.

As highlighted in Table 1, the largest portion of the agreements was signed with assistance and educational entities, followed by sports entities and those linked to specific professional segments. The areas with the least number of agreements were health, science, culture, environment, and residents' associations.

It is important to underline that these entities were not necessarily assisted with the same values or received transfers from a single councilor. They can run for the same electoral bases, especially if the entities exercise more prominent activities. As it is an informal rule, the lack of transparency in the forwarding of amendments does not allow us to confirm who were the main beneficiaries of each legislator for the period evaluated.

Furthermore, the higher number of agreements in an area does not necessarily imply the more significant funds received. However, it can indicate the recognition of a plurality of strongholds to be attended. In another study, we demonstrated that councilors in São Carlos identified social movements, territorial bases, unions, associations, and professional categories as the main electoral strongholds (MARTINS and KERBAUY, 2017)²⁸.

In 2015, with the approval of Constitutional Amendment (EC in Portuguese) n° 86, there were important changes in the Brazilian budget execution model. The primary change refers to individual parliamentary amendments, which became mandatory. With this change, the legislation reserved 1.2% of the previous year's net current revenue for the implementation of these amendments, half of which (0.6%) must necessarily be allocated to the health area.

Despite changes in the understanding of the budget's execution, São Carlos has not managed to formalize the amendments as an official rule²⁹. After almost 20 years of its creation

²⁸ Groups indicated as being important electoral segments by the councilors in São Carlos: members of unions or associations (23.8%); social movements (52.4%); residents of a specific neighborhood or region of the municipality (47.6%); religious groups (19%); professional categories (28.6%); others (33.3%). For this question in the interview, the 21 councilors could nominate more than one group that they believed to be an important segment of their electoral base. For more information see: (MARTINS and KERBAUY, 2017).

²⁹ More recently, the local press and the City Council began to publicize the use of amendments, highlighting the role of parliamentarians in meeting the most varied demands. Here, we highlight and illustrate some of these materials: *UPA Santa Felícia recebe computadores novos*. Available at: <https://www.acidadeon.com/saocarlos/politica/NOT,0,0,1480385,UPA+Santa+Felicia+recebe+computadores+novos>.

and five years of the promulgation of the EC, why maintain parliamentary amendments as an informal rule? The answer to that question regards more than one reason.

It is worth remembering that the norm emerged to solve a collective action problem. Selective incentives³⁰ were mobilized to expand the government's coalition to ensure governance. Although the amendments are available to all parliamentarians, it is not mandatory for its implementation since it is an informal rule. Thus, they may selectively come up against obstacles to be made available - or even not attended to - if the councilors refuse to compose or collaborate with the government. If the rule becomes official, the Mayor's negotiating power will be diminished.

Another important point refers to the restrictions established by EC 86/2015. The norm provides that half of the tax budget (0.6%) must be allocated to the health area. It occurs that the electoral bases of the councilors are dispersed in organizations that work in other areas. Therefore, the formalization of amendments would imply a reduction in the diversity of entities benefited by legislators.

The case investigated shows us is that the permanence of **acomodating** informal institutions is more likely when all the actors involved benefit from their creation and maintenance (SIAVELIS, 2006). Mayors and councilors are favored by the informality of the rule, which encourages individuals to continue acting in this way. Furthermore, repeated interactions can contribute to the permanence of informal institutions (AXELROD, 1984 apud SIAVELIS, 2006). It is worth mentioning that the creation and maintenance of the parliamentary amendment was a project of the local political elite. According to Siavelis (2006, p.53), informal institutions are more likely to persist when a small group of actors is responsible for creating them and communicating their rules and sanctions in case of violation.

aspx. Access on April 8th, 2020. *Vereador Sérgio Rocha destina recursos à entidade Madre Cabrini*. Available at: <https://camarasaocarlos.sp.gov.br/artigo/?ent=70792&a=noticia&id=3641>. Access on April 8th, 2020. *Emenda da vereadora Cidinha do Oncológico vai permitir abertura de Restaurante Popular em São Carlos*. Available at: <https://camarasaocarlos.sp.gov.br/artigo/?ent=70792&a=noticia&id=5897>. Access on April 8th, 2020. *ONG SUPERA recebe equipamentos adquiridos com emenda do vereador Elton Carvalho*. Available at: <https://camarasaocarlos.sp.gov.br/artigo/?ent=70792&a=noticia&id=5911>. Access on April 8th, 2020. *Vereador Gustavo Pozzi destina R\$ 100 mil ao Cantinho Fraternal*. Available at: <https://camarasaocarlos.sp.gov.br/artigo/?ent=70792&a=noticia&id=3827>. Access on April 8th, 2020. *Triciclos adquiridos com emenda do vereador Edson Ferreira são entregues em CEMEI no Novo Mundo*. Available at: <https://camarasaocarlos.sp.gov.br/artigo/?ent=70792&a=noticia&id=5367>. Access on April 8th, 2020. *Vereador Kiki destina recursos de emenda parlamentar a projeto da Cáritas Paroquial de São Nicolau de Flue*. Available at: <https://camarasaocarlos.sp.gov.br/artigo/?ent=70792&a=noticia&id=5033>. Access on April 8th, 2020. *Marquinho Amaral destina emenda parlamentar para o SUPERA*. Available at:

<https://camarasaocarlos.sp.gov.br/artigo/?ent=70792&a=noticia&id=3237>. Access on April 8th, 2020.

³⁰ We refer to “selective incentives” in the terms of Olson (1999). The author suggests that there are three forms to avoid the problem of collective action: formation of small groups, selective incentives, and coercion. Selective incentives can be used to ensure individual collaboration.

4. Final considerations

Throughout the text, we sought to highlight the importance of institutions for understanding the political process. For this, we returned to some of the main debates about institutions and neo-institutionalism. We sought to underline how each of the currents in this analytical matrix understands the concept of institution. Undoubtedly, the outlined characterizations are brief and incomplete. There are works identified with these matrices much more robust than the description made here. However, the main objective of the characterization was to highlight the theoretical framework of the analysis.

Despite the importance of investigating formal rules and procedures for Political Science, they have often proved insufficient to understand part of political behavior (LAWOTI, 2010). In various contexts, there are institutions that, although not considered by analysts as important variables, have a high explanatory capacity. The study of informal rules is an integral part of institutional analysis and has only recently received greater attention from scholars.

We sought to highlight some of the main characteristics of informal institutions and their definition and the types of interactions established with official rules. We began from the typology developed by Lauth (2000) and Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 2006) to capture the complexity of unofficial rules.

Considering this typology, we sought to investigate the informal institutions that operate in the subnational legislature to identify and examine the non-formalized rules that affect political behavior, the legislative process, and the governance in the municipality.

From the case study conducted in the municipality of São Carlos/SP, we verified the presence of parliamentary amendments as an informal rule that guides the behavior of councilors. In the municipality analyzed, we emphasized that, due to the local political context, parliamentary amendments are an important bargaining chip in the executive-legislative relationship, through the distribution of resources to the electoral strongholds of councilors - the municipal entities.

We sought to highlight the interaction between this informal rule and the formal institutions of the local legislative process. As demonstrated, for an entity to be serviced, it must be declared a public utility by official political bodies. In the period from 2001 to 2008, more than 40 entities were considered to be in the public interest, which allowed them to be assisted by funds transferred by the executive branch based on the councilors' recommendations. As it is an informal rule, it is impossible to state which entities were effectively assisted and the corresponding values. In any case, the councilors declare that the entities are important electoral strongholds.

In the process of conciliation of interests, governance and the transfer of resources are the main desired results. Parliamentary amendments have an impact on political behavior since they can bring councilors closer to the government base, reorder policy formulation by increasing the number of bills of an administrative nature, which refer to the declaration of public utility, and produce incentives for the type of strategy adopted by the actors in the legislative process.

References

- AGUIAR, Osmar O. **As regras informais e o processo decisório na Câmara dos Deputados**. 2015. Dissertação (Mestrado Profissional em Poder Legislativo), Programa de Pós-Graduação do Centro de Formação, Treinamento e Aperfeiçoamento da Câmara dos Deputados/CEFOP, Brasília, 2015.
- BAIÃO, Alexandre L.; COUTO, Cláudio G. A eficácia do *pork barrel*: a importância de emendas orçamentárias e prefeitos aliados na eleição de deputados. **Opinião Pública**, v. 23, n. 3, pp. 714-753, 2017. Disponível em: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0104-62762017000300714&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=pt. Acesso em: 2 jun de 2018.
- BLONDEL, Jean. About Institutions, Mainly, but not Exclusively, Political. In: BINDER, Sarah A.; RHODES, R. A. W.; ROCKMAN, Bert A. (Eds.). **The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 716-730.
- BRASIL. **Presidência da República. Lei 8.742/1993**. Dispõe sobre a organização da Assistência Social e dá outras providências. Brasília, 07 de dezembro de 1993. Disponível em: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/18742.htm. Acesso em: 30 de abril de 2020.
- BRASIL. **Lei 9.637/1998**. Dispõe sobre a qualificação de entidades como organizações sociais, a criação do Programa Nacional de Publicização, a extinção dos órgãos e entidades que menciona e a absorção de suas atividades por organizações sociais, e dá outras providências. Brasília, 15 de maio de 1998. Disponível em: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/19637.htm. Acesso em: 30 de abril de 2020.
- BRASIL. **Lei 9.791/1999**. Dispõe sobre a qualificação de pessoas jurídicas de direito privado, sem fins lucrativos, como Organizações da Sociedade Civil de Interesse Público, institui e disciplina o Termo de Parceria, e dá outras providências. Brasília, 23 de março de 1999. Disponível em: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L9790.htm. Acesso em: 30 de abril de 2020.
- BRASIL. **Emenda Constitucional 86/2015**. Altera os arts. 165, 166 e 198 da Constituição Federal, para tornar obrigatória a execução da programação orçamentária que especifica. Brasília, 17 de março de 2015. Disponível em: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/emendas/emc/emc86.htm. Acesso em: 24 jun de 2018.
- BRASIL. Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. **Resolução n. 21.702**. Instrução sobre o número de vereadores a eleger segundo a população de cada município. Brasília, 02 de abril de 2004. Disponível em: <http://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao-tse/res/2004/RES217022004.html>. Acesso em: 25 junho de 2018.
- BRASIL. Tribunal Superior Eleitoral. **Resolução n. 21.803**. Dispõe sobre os critérios de fixação do número de vereadores nos municípios, de acordo com o disposto no art. 29, IV, da Constituição Federal. Brasília, 08 de junho de 2004. Disponível em: <http://www.tse.jus.br/legislacaotse/res/2004/RES218032004.html>. Acesso em: 25 junho de 2018.
- BRINKS, Daniel M. The rule of (non) law: prosecuting police killings in Brazil and Argentina. In: HELMKE, Gretchen; LEVITSKY, Steven (2006). **Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America**. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, p. 201-226.
- CAMPOS, Conceição M. C. Convênios da Administração Pública: algumas questões pontuais. **Governnet, Boletim de convênios e parcerias**, n. 106, pp. 119-147, 2014. Disponível em: <http://www.governnet.com.br/edicao.php?cod=415>. Acesso em: 18 jun de 2018.
- HALL, Peter A.; TAYLOR, Rosemary C. R. As três versões do neoinstitucionalismo. **Lua Nova**, n. 58, p. 193-223, 2003. Disponível em: <http://www.scielo.br/pdf/ln/n58/a10n58.pdf>. Acesso em: 6 jun de 2018.
- HELMKE, Gretchen; LEVITSKY, Steven. Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: a Research Agenda. **Perspectives on Politics**, v.2, n. 4, pp.725- 40, 2004. Disponível em:

https://www.jstor.org/stable/3688540?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. Acesso em: 8 jun de 2018.

HELMKE, Gretchen; LEVITSKY, Steven. **Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America**. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006.

IMMERGUT, Ellen M. The theoretical core of the new institutionalism. **Politics & Society**, v. 26, n. 1, pp. 5-34, 1998. Disponível em: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0032329298026001002>. Acesso em: 2 jun de 2018.

LAUTH, Hans-Joachim. Informal Institutions and Democracy. **Democratization**, Published by Frank Cass, London, v. 7, n. 4, p. 21-50, 2000. Disponível em: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13510340008403683>. Acesso em: 10 jun de 2018.

LAUTH, Hans-Joachim. Informal Institutions and Political Transformation: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections. In: ECPR JOINT SESSIONS OF WORKSHOPS – Uppsala 2004, W18: Comparing Transformations: The Institutional Paradigm, **Paper for presentation**, 2004. Disponível em: <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/d9288181-8a8c-4268-9eb9-3c98922f1893.pdf>. Acesso em: 8 jun de 2018.

LAWOTI, Mahendra. Informal Institutions and Exclusion in Democratic Nepal. **Himalayan, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies**, v. 28, n.1, p. 17-32, 2010. Disponível em: <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2fe9/4b5e0df80c5f558ca426a521388b532faaba.pdf>. Acesso em: 10 jun de 2018.

LEVITSKY, Steven; ZIBLATT. **Como as democracias morrem**. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2018.

LIJPHART, Arend. **Electoral systems and party systems: a study of twenty-seven democracies, 1945-1990**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

MAHONEY, James; SNYDER, Richard. Rethinking agency and structure in the study of regime change. **Studies in Comparative International Development**, v. 43, n. 2, p.03-32, 1999. Disponível em: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02687620>. Acesso em: 5 jun de 2018.

MARTINS, Thais C.; KERBAUY, Maria Teresa M. O perfil da elite política local: uma análise da autopercepção dos vereadores sobre a representação. **Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Política**, v.8, n.2, pp. 136-159, 2017. Disponível em: <https://revistas.ufpr.br/politica/article/view/51400/33926>. Acesso em: 6 jun de 2018.

NASCIMENTO, Emerson O. Os novos institucionalismos na ciência política contemporânea e o problema da integração teórica. **Revista Brasileira de Ciência Política**, n.1, p. 95-121, 2009. Disponível em: <http://periodicos.unb.br/ojs248/index.php/rbcp/article/view/6593/5319>. Acesso em: 4 jun de 2018.

NORTH, Douglass C. **Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance**. Series Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge University Press, 1990.

O'DONNELL, Guillermo. Otra Institucionalización. **Política y Gobierno**, v. 03, n. 2, p. 219-244, 1996. Disponível em: <http://www.politicaygobierno.cide.edu/index.php/pyg/article/view/938/814>. Acesso em: 2 jun de 2018.

OLSON, Mancur. **A lógica da ação coletiva**. São Paulo: Edusp, 1999.

PERES, Paulo S. Comportamento ou Instituições? A evolução histórica do neo-institucionalismo da ciência política. **Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais**, v. 23, n. 68, p. 53-72, 2008. Disponível em: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-69092008000300005&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=pt. Acesso em: 6 jun de 2018.

PETERS, B. Guy. Las instituciones políticas: lo viejo y lo nuevo. In: R. Goodin; H. Klingemann (Eds.). **Nuevo Manual de Ciencia Política**. Madrid: Istmo, 2001, pp. 304-328.

ROTHSTEIN, Bo. Las instituciones políticas: una visión general. In: R. Goodin; H. Klingemann (Eds.). **Nuevo Manual de Ciencia Política**. Madrid: Istmo, 2001, p. 199-246.

SÃO CARLOS. **Prefeitura Municipal de São Carlos. Lei Municipal nº 12.837**. Dispõe sobre as Diretrizes Orçamentárias – LDO – para o exercício de 2002 e dá outras providências. São Carlos, 30 de julho de 2001. Disponível em: https://file.gtp.net.br/lei/arquivo/70792/CODIGOLEI_7361.pdf. Acesso em: 30 de abril de 2020.

SÃO CARLOS. **Prefeitura Municipal de São Carlos. Lei Municipal nº 13.605**. Estabelece as Diretrizes a serem observadas na Lei Orçamentária do Município para o exercício de 2006 e dá outras providências. São Carlos, 01 de julho de 2005. Disponível em: https://file.gtp.net.br/lei/arquivo/70792/CODIGOLEI_8891.pdf. Acesso em: 30 de abril de 2020.

SÃO PAULO. Tribunal de Contas do Estado de São Paulo. **Comunicado SDG 018/2015**. Disponível em: http://www4.tce.sp.gov.br/sites/tcesp/files/downloads/sdg_18_2015.pdf. Acesso em: 24 junho de 2018.

SHEPSLE, Kenneth A. Rational choice institutionalism. In: BINDER, Sarah A.; RHODES, R. A. W.; ROCKMAN, Bert A. (Eds.). **The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 23-38.

SIAVELIS, Peter. Accommodating Informal Institutions and Chilean Democracy. In: HELMKE, Gretchen; LEVITSKY, Steven. **Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America**. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, p. 33-55.

TROIANO, Mariele. As instituições importam...mas, e aí? **Revista Agenda Política**, v.3, n. 1. p.04-08, 2015. Disponível em: <http://www.agendapolitica.ufscar.br/index.php/agendapolitica/article/view/52/49>. Acesso em: 12 jun 2018.

ULLOA, Carlos Alberto N. Institucionalismo informal: tras las huellas de un discurso institucionalista informal. **Perfiles Latinoamericanos**, v. 24, n. 47, p. 283-306, 2016. Disponível em: http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0188-76532016000100012&lng=en&nrm=iso&tlng=es. Acesso em: 10 jun de 2018.

VAN COTT, Donna Lee. Dispensing justice at the margins of formality: the informal rule of law in Latin American. In: HELMKE, Gretchen; LEVITSKY, Steven. **Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America**. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006, pp. 249-273.