



## CORRUPTION AND LEGISLATIVE SUCCESS: POSSIBLE REFLEXES OF ‘MENSALÃO’ AND ‘LAVA JATO’ IN THE CONVERSION OF PROPOSALS IN LEGAL STANDARDS

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**Abstract:** This article investigates the phenomenon of political corruption and is dedicated to answering the following research question: what is the impact of the involvement of representatives in the *Mensalão* and *Lava Jato* schemes (independent variable - IV) on the conversion rate into legal standard of their own proposals (dependent variable - DV)? Involvement, in this study, is characterized by the condemnation of representatives in the *Mensalão* scheme and/or by indictment in *Lava Jato*. Hypothetically, it is reasonable to assume that advantages arising from corruption schemes tend to favor the approval of bills that meet the interests of these schemes. To assess the effect of IV in DV, logistic regression was used, with the addition of other variables as a concurrent cause. Results show conversion rate about 50% higher for the bills of representatives involved. The comparative analysis of these bills suggests parliamentary conduct based on sectorial interests and benefit concentration.

**Keywords:** corruption; legislative success; democracy; criminalization of political agents

### 1 Introduction

Corruption news published by the media in recent years has mentioned, with some frequency, the involvement of public agents and political actors in the Brazilian scenario in illicit actions of all kinds, with wide emphasis on the schemes of *Mensalão* and *Lava Jato* (Folha de São Paulo, 2019; Revista Veja, 2020; The Economist, 2019; R7, 2017). Large amounts, totaling billions of reais (Brazilian currency), are diverted or paid to groups of people in the exercise of public and elective positions, reaching representatives and government officials.

To prevent such acts, legal acts such as the Fiscal Responsibility Law (BRASIL, 2000), the Access to Information Law (BRASIL, 2011) and the Anti-Corruption Law (BRASIL, 2013b), among others, can be cited as examples aimed at increasing control over spending, transparency and accountability of the public apparatus by society. However, the way and

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intensity in which corruption is perceived by society goes beyond the legal or normative character.

The electoral process, for just over two decades and in a period prior to 2015, allowed a significant part of the funds received by candidates to come through donations from companies, reaching the order of 45% for candidates for federal representative in the elections that occurred between 2002 and 2014 (SPECK; MARCIANO, 2015). The amounts of campaign expenses declared to the Superior Electoral Court (Portuguese acronym: TSE) in the 2014 elections were approximately R \$ 5.1 billion reais, of which R \$ 1.1 billion was declared by candidates for federal representatives and just over R \$ 280 million declared candidates for the Federal Senate.

The motivations by which companies contribute to political campaigns are widely discussed in the literature (MCMENAMIN, 2012; PINTODUSCHINSKY, 2002; PORTUGAL, 2006; RUBIO, 2005; SANTOS, 2009). The point of interest, here, is the moment when these contributions leave the legality and slide into obscurity, becoming the focus of corruption and inserting competitive asymmetries in the electoral process, in the beginning, and in the political behavior of the agents involved, in stages during the exercise of their mandates.

According to a survey carried out, considering about 123 thousand bills filed since 1943 by representatives of the Brazilian House and Senate, less than 1% of these bills were converted into legal standards, against a percentage of 4% of the proposals in the United States Congress that are converted into law (JOTA, 2019). Findings of this nature alert to new issues that need to consider the political agent's power of influence. It is known that the institutional arrangement of the parliament gives more power to certain representatives than to others. Notably, members of the Board of Directors of the Houses of the National Congress and the Legislative Assemblies, party leaders and committee chairpersons have a greater formal capacity to influence legislative work (FIGUEIREDO; LIMONGI, 2001; LEMOS, 2008; SANTOS; MEDEIROS; SANTOS, 2008; RICCI; LEMOS, 2004; SANTOS, 2000). However, are there other factors capable of giving the equivalent representative power of influence?

In this sense, the present article investigates the phenomenon of political corruption as a possible explanatory factor for legislative success, which is treated here occasionally as the ability of a representative to convert bills of his/her authorship into a legal standard. And it is dedicated to answering the following research question: what is the impact of the involvement of a representative in the *Mensalão* ("big monthly payment") and *Lava Jato* (Car Wash) (independent variable – IV) on the conversion rate into legal standards for bills of his/her authorship (dependent variable – DV)? Involvement, in this study, is characterized by the condemnation of representatives in the *Mensalão* scheme and/or by indictment in *Lava Jato*. Hypothetically, it is reasonable to assume that advantages arising from corruption schemes tend to favor the approval of bills that meet the interests of these schemes. Then, in addition, the study seeks clarification on whether these norms have distributed benefits to certain identifiable

economic sectors or to specific geographic regions that characterize these representatives' own interest in guiding public policies.

This work innovates by presenting a quantitative approach to the impact of *Mensalão* and *Lava Jato* on Brazilian political activity. Research on this topic, in general, addresses legal aspects and problems of the Brazilian political-electoral system (MATOS FILHO, 2017; LIMA, 2018; FIGUEIREDO, 2018). It is important to emphasize that the statistical approach of this study does not exhaust the assumptions that establish the presence of a robust causal relationship (PARANHOS et al, 2013). On the contrary, it is known that in political matters, especially that of legislative success, there are a number of factors that must be considered and which are abstracted here, due to the unavailability of the respective data in a structured way. However, although with a reductionist scope, the research reveals a strong association between the events of *Mensalão* and *Lava Jato* with the approval of bills in the same period, a necessary condition for future studies dedicated to investigating the other requirements necessary to the causal relationships of these phenomena.

## **2 The corruption and its effects**

For Huntington (2006, p. 59), corruption in the public and political sectors can be understood as the behavior of public agents and politicians who deviate from accepted norms to serve private purposes. This is the meaning followed in this text. The same author (HUNTINGTON, 2006, p. 5) states that corruption has three highly damaging effects on democracy because: it increases social frustration as it reduces economic development; it reduces political participation, as it reduces opportunities for economic mobility when acting against economic and social progress; it increases political instability, as it weakens institutions.

The way society perceives the phenomenon of corruption has guided the agenda of several researchers. According to Kubbe (2013, p. 43) it is practically impossible to measure the phenomenon directly, because each determined fact has its own characteristics whose measurement, *post factum*, is not configured in an evident procedure and, therefore, does not easily adapt to comparative analysis. For Feres Júnior and Sassara (2016), it is in the media that corruption becomes a scandal, and it is through the scheduling and framing made by the media that a set of practices and facts is made public and formatted to constitute a product, with its own narratives, main characters and a proper name ("*Mensalão*", "*Lava Jato*", etc.). Therefore, the academic-scientific investigation of the theme requires additional effort to identify factors that explain the observed phenomena.

Speck (2000) highlights different approaches to assess the perception of corruption, such as opinion polls, the quantification of penalties or sanctions applied to public agents and the existence and effectiveness of public programs to combat corruption. One of the conclusions is that corruption is more accepted when it is not seen as an erroneous behavior, or when it is

disseminated by the social groups in which the individual is inserted (TAVITS, 2010). It must be noted that one of the ways to prevent citizens against the practice and effects of corruption is, precisely, education, both as a way of promoting honesty and mutual trust, and as a way of promoting increased wealth and equality, both associated with low levels of corruption (USLANER and ROTHSTEIN, 2016, p. 228).

For Ribeiro (2000), corruption is limited to the issue of illegal money transit, usually with the misuse of public funds as an end. In line with this understanding, Caldas, Costa and Pagliarussi (2016) found a significant concentration of corruption actions in spending on education and health in Brazil. Mauro (1998) and Gupta, de Mello and Sharan (2001) concluded that corruption results in budget distortions, because the secrecy required by corrupt transactions can lead to the deviation of government spending in priority areas, such as health and education, to unusual areas, such as defense and infrastructure works, in which it is easier to appropriate public resources. Sodr e and Alves (2010), when investigating the relationship between parliamentary amendments to the budget and corruption at the municipal level, observed that the increase in corruption seems to be more related to the fact that a municipality receives some amendment than to the total value of the amendments received.

In objective terms, given the fluidity of the actions taken by the agents involved, there is enormous difficulty in assessing the volume of economic, human and technological resources moved because of corruption. In Brazil, as an example, one of the public prosecutors responsible for conducting the *Lava Jato* operation estimates that, annually, around R \$ 200 billion would be diverted across the country (CARVALHO, 2016). This is equivalent to about 3.2% of the national gross domestic product, considering the figures released by the Central Bank of Brazil in the first quarter of 2017 (BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL, 2017).

It is noted, therefore, that public control, both by the State and by society, assumes an increasingly preponderant role over the mechanisms to fight corruption. It is no coincidence that there is a growing interest in increasing the transparency of the State, while seeking to provide society with ways of monitoring and controlling the application of public resources (KNIRSCH, 2011) and the actions of corruption (BERTOT; JAEGER; GRIMES, 2010).

However, an assessment of Brazilian institutions aimed at combating corruption points out that they face several difficulties, such as the low supply and measurement of vertical accountability (POWER; TAYLOR, 2011), interruption in the generation of opportunities and collective actions (PERSSON; ROTHSTEIN; TEORELL, 2013), compromising the response of the public apparatus to its institutional missions (TORRES, 2004), in addition to lacking greater independence in terms of political pressure, a phenomenon that is repeated across the globe (JOHNSTON, 2000; ROTHSTEIN; TEORELL, 2008). The political agents' own assessment, compared to other categories, shows that it is not just Brazilians who see parties and politicians among the most corrupt institutions and actors, as shown in Table 1.

**Table 1**– Perception of corruption by category: percentage of respondents who rated the category as “corrupt” or “extremely corrupt”.

Category	Brazil	Argentina	Chile
Political parties	81	78	76
Representatives	72	72	68
Police	70	70	53
Health professionals and servants	55	26	51
Judiciary Branch	50	65	67
Officials and public servants	46	77	58
Media	38	44	48
NGOs	35	22	32
Business	35	49	65
Educational system	33	23	60
Religious groups	31	34	45
Military	30	32	36

**Source:** Transparency International (2013). N = 2002, 1001, 1000.

In Brazil, in particular, the high percentage of the perception of corruption associated with political and parliamentary parties comes from data contemporary to the events under study in this article, and is consistent with facts that have occurred in recent years, particularly during the process of redemocratization. Period in which the country has faced a succession of events related to large-scale corruption, the so-called “schemes”, precisely involving political agents. Chart 1 presents a list of these events in the period 1989-2014.

**Chart 1** – Some of the main cases of corruption in Brazil, in the period 1989-2014, involving political agents in the exercise of their mandate.

Case	Period	Coverage	Nominal estimate	Description
<i>Anões do Orçamento</i> (Budget Dwarfs)	1989-1992	National Congress	R \$ 800 million	Seven representatives (the so-called “dwarfs”) of the Joint Committee on Budgets submitted amendments allocating values to philanthropic entities linked to relatives, in addition to charging contractors to allocate values to works that were overpriced
Collorgate or PC “schema”	1992	Presidency of the Republic	US \$ 10 million	Pedro Collor, the president's brother, publishes a dossier accusing him of fraudulent

				campaign spending and keeping accounts hidden. After several developments, Fernando Collor was deposed in a vote in the House of Representatives
TRT (Regional Labor Court) of São Paulo	1992-1999	Regional Labor Court of the State of São Paulo	R \$ 923 million	Despite losing the bid for the construction of the TRT-SP Forum building, Grupo OK, belonging to Senator Luis Estêvão, received large transfers by order of the TRT president, Nicolau dos Santos Neto, who also received a “commission”
<i>Mensalão</i>	2005	House of Representatives	R \$ 55 million	Denounced by the then representative Roberto Jefferson (PTB), politicians received “monthly fees” to support the PT (Workers Party)
<i>Sanguessugas (Leeches)</i>	2006	City Halls and National Congress	R \$ 140 million	Businessmen paid representatives to submit and approve amendments for overpriced purchase of hospital supplies and ambulances
<i>Operação Navalha (Razor Operation)</i>	2007	City halls, House of Representatives, Ministry of Mines and Energy	R \$ 610 million	Businessmen paid public servants to direct bids
<i>Máfia dos Transportes (Transport Mafia)</i>	2011	National Department of Transport Infrastructure (Dnit)	R \$ 23 million	Luiz Antônio Pagot (PR), who headed the agency, and party members charged a “commission” from businessmen who wished to participate in bids for major works
<i>Lava Jato Operation</i>	2014-	Petrobrás, National Congress, Presidency of the Republic, state government	R \$ 42.8 billion	The name refers to actions by the Federal Police and the Public Ministry with a view to elucidating “schemes” of corruption paid with funds diverted in a large part of the state-owned company. More than a hundred politicians from different parties have been denounced or are being investigated by the Public Ministry, which requested authorization from the Federal Supreme Court (“list of the Teori” and “list of the Fachin”.)

**Source:** Own elaboration from Praça (2011), Power and Taylor (2011), Barbosa and Maia (2017), Pereira and Sardinha (2017), Folha de São Paulo (1995), Araujo, Costa and Fittipaldi (2016).

There seems to be a consensus on the idea that the crisis faced by Brazil in the political-economic scenario stems, in large part, from acts of corruption such as those presented in Chart 1, especially those revealed in the *Lava Jato* operation and in the *Mensalão* scandal, which entail, among other losses, a clear reduction in opportunities and an adequate supply of public services.

Addressing the issue of corruption under the aegis of policy requires observing its impacts on the effects of institutions' ability to provide the goods and services that are expected of them. An example of the reduction of this ability is shown by Ferraz, Finan and Moreira (2012), who analyze the consequences of the diversion of funds destined to public child education on the performance of Brazilian students in evaluations such as PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment), where students from the country score among the worst global indexes.

Avritzer and Filgueiras (2011) align the organization of the political system, the organization of the State and the organization of forms and control, in addition to a moralistic perspective, which commonly falls like a veil over less careful analyses of the phenomenon, as dimensions of corruption in Brazil. The authors agree that the fight against corruption must be centered on the axis of controls: democratic, seen from the administrative-bureaucratic aspects, with the creation and strengthening of specialized agencies in the fight against corruption; judicial, reinforcing the control of the legal status over public administration; and non-state, exercised by society and focused on the public interest (AVRITZER; FILGUEIRAS, 2011, p. 16).

In 2013, the Comptroller General of Brazil (CGU) issued Ordinance no. 1309, of July 15, which approves the implementation of the Program to Strengthen Prevention and Combat Corruption in Brazilian Public Management (Proprevine), with partial funding from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (BRASIL, 2013a). In August of that year, the Anti-Corruption Law was enacted (BRASIL, 2013b), which provides for administrative and civil liability of legal entities for the practice of acts against public administration, national or foreign. This law (Law no. 12.846/2013, art. 16) allows the highest authority of each agency or public entity to enter into leniency agreements with the legal entities responsible for the harmful acts provided for therein, to facilitate the identification of others involved and obtaining information or documents that prove the facts ascertained. Leniency agreements are often compared to the provision of the witness immunity, provided for individuals and instituted by Law no. 8072 from 1990 (BRASIL, 1990).

In this situation rest the main challenges of public institutions, with particular emphasis on the Legislative Branch, in the recovery of institutional credibility and in the fight against corruption (POLVEIRO-JÚNIOR, 2006), considering that it has already been shown that the polls are not effective in punishing agents identified with corrupt practices (SOUSA;

MORICONI, 2013). In this sense, the present study aims to contribute to the identification of the possible effect of corruption on the legislative success of a proposed law.

### 3 Methodology

Data collection took place by directly reading the bills from the House of Representatives' Transparency portal (CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, 2019). Following practices of research reproducibility, which have been gaining a mandatory character before the world scientific community (MCNUTT, 2014), the step-by-step construction of the statistical model, the data set used and the programming codes in R language (RStudio environment v. 1.2.5033) written to obtain the results are available in public repository (CEFOP, 2019)<sup>4</sup>.

For the construction of the statistical model presented in this section, data were obtained from bills (PL), complementary bills (PLP) and proposed constitutional amendments (PEC) submitted to both the House of Representatives and the Federal Senate in 2003 to 2015. That is, the two periods of the Lula government and the first term of Dilma Roussef. In other words, the period collected covers the 52nd (2003-2007), 53rd (2007-2011) and 54th (2011-2015) legislatures, moments in which both *Mensalão* and *Lava Jato* Operation were in their most advanced stages. This survey resulted in 23,635 bills.

Then, proposals considered to have low legislative impact were excluded, that is, intended for purposes such as naming or changing the name of public places or works, instituting commemorative dates and honoring people or institutions, as well as those whose name was in white, remaining 23,287 bills, 228 of which were converted into legal standards (about 1%).

For this study, a corruption indicator, named IND\_CORRUPTION was created, whose valuation is related to the *Mensalão* event, based on Penal Action no. 470 Minas Gerais (STF, 2012), and to *Lava Jato* Operation, based on the so-called “list of the Minister Teori Zavascki” (LEÃO, 2016) and “list of the Minister Edson Fachin” (BARBOSA; MAIA, 2017), the latter comprising eight ministers of state, 24 senators, 39 federal representatives and three governors, all in the exercise of the mandate.

After complaints made to the Public Ministry and the Justice, including dozens of executives from the Odebrecht and Petrobrás companies, the Prosecutor General of the Republic (PGR) referred to the Federal Supreme Court (STF), which is the body capable of authorizing the opening of an investigation against mandate holders in the Federal Senate and the House of Representatives (BRASIL, 2004, art. 53, §1º), the requests for such procedures. With the authorizations issued by that Court, politicians who were cited in the injunctions became indicted, initiating different inquiries, the initial phase for investigating information. In cases

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<sup>4</sup> <https://github.com/Cefor/corruptcao>



where the denunciations were formalized, the accused became defendants and, after trial, were convicted or acquitted.

Obedying this logic, the corruption indicator was marked as "true" (or 1) for politicians whose names appeared in the condition of **indicted**, in the case of *Lava Jato* Operation, or in the condition of **convicted**, in the case of *Mensalão* and as "false" (or 0) for the others. It is important to note that the simple citation of a representative on the lists did not characterize involvement in a corruption scheme, which was considered only for the conditions indicted and convicted described.

Coalition data available in the Legislative Database of CEBRAP (Brazilian Center of Analysis and Planning) (CEBRAP, 2019) were added to the records of the proposals, considering the year of the proposal and the party of the respective author at the time.

After building the database, logistic regression was performed using the **glm** (general linear model) function of the R language, using the Boolean indicator for conversion into a legal standard, called IND\_CONVERSION\_LEW as the dependent variable (DV) (1 – for converted bills; 0 – for non-converted bills). And, as an independent variable (IV) the corruption indicator (IND\_CORRUPTION), testing other variables in Chart 2 as competing causes. In this study, only the variables available in the open data portals of House of Representatives and CEBRAP were considered, except for the variable IND\_CORRUPTION, whose construction has already been clarified. The choice of logistic regression was because the dependent variable is dichotomous.

**Chart 2** – Analysis variables used in the logistic regression models.

Variable	Description
IND_CONVERSION_LAW	Dependent variable, indicates whether a bill has been converted into a legal standard (1 – converted; 0 – not converted).
IND_CORRUPTION	Independent variable, categorical, indicates the involvement of representatives in the <i>Mensalão</i> and/or <i>Lava Jato</i> schemes (1 – involved; 0 – not involved).
SIG_TYPE_PROPOSAL	Control variable, categorical, indicates the type of proposal: PL (Bill); PLP (Complementary Bill); PEC (Proposed Constitutional Amendment).
NUM_LEGISLATURE	Control variable, categorical, corresponding to the number of the legislature in which the proposal was presented: 52, 53 ou 54.
COALITION	Control variable, categorical, contains the name of the coalition to which the author's party belonged at the time of the proposal.
AREA_THEMATIC	Control variable, categorical, contains the thematic area of the proposal.

**Source:** Own elaboration. Variables: IND\_CORRUPTION based on STF (2012), Leão (2016) and Barbosa and Maia (2017); COALITION extracted from CEBRAP (2019); others, extracted from CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS (HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES) (2019).

The selection of the statistical model was guided by the iterative technique of comparing nested models, starting from the main explanatory variable IND\_CORRUPTION, adding a new control variable to each iteration and checking the model's quality indicators. The models were evaluated using the deviance statistics criterion (HILBE, 2009, p. 246), which observes two requirements: (1) the proposed model must be statistically different from the null model (the one with only the intercept); (2) the proposed model should not be statistically different from the saturated model (the one that has a coefficient for each observation in the data set). Deviance statistics are tested by chi-square functions.

After measuring the quantitative results, a comparative qualitative analysis was carried out, under the neo-institutionalist approach, of the bills converted into standards and identified with the corruption indicator, combining the methodological approaches of the studies by Amorim-Neto and Santos (2003) and Lemos (2001). The neo-institutionalist current was chosen because it is less focused on the analysis of constitutional and regimental rules, and more focused on the real phenomena under analysis (results of deliberations, behavior of agents, etc.), which can be objectively gauged, seeking to explain how political actors act, what are their motivations and, in the present case, what are the potential gains obtained in the process, in terms of benefits distributed through approved legislation.

It was also verified whether the authors of these bills occupied a prominent position in the year in which the respective bill was converted into a legal standard, as a position on the Board of Directors of the House of Representatives, party leader or committee chairperson, with a view to evaluating the influence of this position on legislative success. This information has a complementary character; it was obtained through documentary analysis of the representatives' biographies and was only added in the final phase of the analysis because it is a universe of 30 bills. Such a survey would not be feasible for the more than twenty thousand proposals extracted from the open data portals.

#### **4 Results and comparative analysis**

The results found for the logistic regression of the basic model, considering only DV and IV, are shown in Chart 3.

**Chart 3** – Model 1:  $IND\_CONVERSION\_LAW = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IND\_CORRUPTION$

<b>Result of the glm function of R</b>					
formula = IND_CONVERSAO_LEI ~ IND_CORRUPCAO					
	Estimate	Standard Erro	Value z	p(> z )	exp(Est)
(Intercept)	-4.66882	0.07176	-65.060	<2e-16 ***	0.0094
IND_CORRUPCAO_TRUE	0.45161	0.19199	2.352	0.0187 *	1.5708
--- Significance: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1					
Zero deviation: 2563.4 at 23286 graus de liberdade					
Residual deviation: 2558.4 at 23285 graus de liberdade					
AIC: 2562.4					
<b>Estatística do Desvio</b>					
There is no difference between saturated and proposed models: p = 1.0000					
There is a difference between null and proposed models: p = 2.57059e-02					

**Source:** Own elaboration. The exp (Est) column was included by the authors and represents the exponential  $e$ , function inverse of the  $\ln$  Neperian logarithm function, for each estimated coefficient (Estimate column).

It can be seen from Chart 3 that the logistic regression coefficients are significant ( $p < 0.05$ ), which leads to the following interpretations:

- 1)  $\beta_0$  (intercept) corresponds to the odd, in the logarithmic domain, of a representative to convert a bill into a legal standard when  $IND\_$  is false; therefore, in the real domain ( $e^{\beta_0}$ ), the odd is estimated at 0.94%; in other words, less than 1% of the bills presented by representatives are converted into a legal standard, which is consistent with the survey carried out by JOTA (2019).
- 2)  $\beta_1$  ( $IND\_CORRUPTION\_TRUE$ ) corresponds to the odds ratio in the logarithmic domain, and compares the odd of legislative success when  $IND\_CORRUPTION$  is true with the odd of legislative success when  $IND\_CORRUPTION$  is false; therefore, in the real domain ( $e^{\beta_1}$ ), the odd of a representative possibly involved in corruption converting a bill into a legal standard is 57.08% higher than that of a representative not involved.

Having verified the significance of  $IND\_CORRUPTION$  as an explanatory factor for converting projects into law, new variables were tested as a concurrent cause. Chart 4 shows the result of adding each new control variable to the basic model. It is observed that the addition of  $SIG\_TYPE\_PROPOSAL$  and  $AREA\_THEMATIC$  are not significant. The first case is justified by the fact that there is an extreme predominance of PLs (87.7%) in relation to PLPs (5.9%) and PECs (6.4%). The second, due to the fact that the thematic areas do not have an appropriate structure in the open database, where it is possible to identify overlap and repetition of themes with different descriptions, totaling 512 areas, which does not correspond to reality.

**Chart 4** – Adding control variables to the basic model.

Result of function add1 of R					
Model: IND_CONVERSION_LAW ~ IND_CORRUPTION					
	Gl	Deviation	AIC	LRT	p(>Chi)
<original model>		2528.4	2562.4		
SIG_TYPE_PROPOSAL	2	2527.5	2565.5	0.874	0.6459
NUM_LEGISLATURE	1	2501.5	2537.5	26.836	2.215e-07 ***
COALITION	9	2460.6	2512.7	67.729	4.238e-11 ***
AREA_THEMATIC	451	2295.4	3231.4	233.007	1.0000
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Significance: 0 '***' 0.001 '***' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1					

**Source:** Own elaboration. Gl is the number of degrees of freedom. AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) is a comparative test whose lower values indicate preferred models. LRT (Logistic Regression Test) records the variation of the deviation between the original model and the model with the addition of the respective variable.

On the other hand, the addition of NUM\_LEGISLATURE and COALITION are significant and were considered in this study, individually and together. Chart 5 illustrates the addition of NUM\_LEGISLATURE to the basic model.

**Chart 5** – Model 2:  $IND\_CONVERSION\_LAW = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IND\_CORRUPTION + \beta_2 NUM\_LEGISLATURE$

Result of the glm function of R						
formula = IND_CONVERSION_LAW ~ IND_CORRUPTION + NUM_LEGISLATURE						
	Estimate	Standard Error	Value z	p(> z )		exp(Est)
(Intercept)	-4.42952	0.10703	-41.385	<2e-16 ***		0.0119
IND_CORRUPTION_TRUE	0.43543	0.19223	2.265	0.0235 *		1.5456
NUM_LEGISLATURE_53	0.04273	0.14458	0.296	0.7676		1.0437
NUM_LEGISLATURE_54	-1.07006	0.20053	-5.336	9.49e-08 ***		0.3430
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Significance: 0 '***' 0.001 '***' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1						
Zero deviation: 2563.4 at 23286 degrees of freedom						
Residual deviation: 2515.0 at 23283 degrees of freedom						
AIC: 2523						
Deviation Statistics						
There is no difference between saturated and proposed models: p = 1.0000						
There is a difference between null and proposed models: p = 1.773754e-10						

**Source:** Own elaboration. The exp (Est) column was included by the authors and represents the exponential *e*, function inverse of the *ln* Neperian logarithm function, for each estimated coefficient (Estimate column).

The results of Chart 5 indicate that the coefficients of legislatures 52 (intercept) and 54 are significant and point to a reduction in the chance of conversion into law. The coincidence of this fact is that the *Mensalão* and *Lava Jato* schemes were triggered, respectively, in legislatures 52 and 54, which could have slowed legislative success due to the instability of the political scenario generated. However, the inclusion of the legislature in the model did not substantially alter the influence of the corruption indicator on the dependent variable. In this model, the increase in the chance of the representative involved converting a bill into a legal standard was 54.56%, against 57.08% in the basic model.

**Chart 6** – Model 3:  $IND\_CONVERSION\_LAW = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IND\_CORRUPTION + \beta_2 COALITION$

<b>Result of the glm function of R</b>						
formula = IND_CONVERSION_LAW ~ IND_CORRUPTION + COALITION						
	Estimate	Standard Error	Value z	p(> z )		exp(Est)
(Intercept)	-5.1458	0.2382	-21.604	< 2e-16 ***		0.0058
IND_CORRUPTION_TRUE	0.4134	0.1981	2.087	0.036915 *		1.5120
COALITION_Dilma 2	-0.7515	0.5065	-1.484	0.137887		0.4717
COALITION_Dilma 3	-0.5826	0.3836	-1.519	0.128810		0.5584
COALITION_Lula I 1	1.0271	0.2777	3.699	0.000217 ***		2.7930
COALITION_Lula I 2	0.5646	0.3263	1.730	0.083580 .		1.7587
COALITION_Lula I 4	0.5259	0.3396	1.548	0.121515		1.6920
COALITION_Lula I 5	0.1554	0.4264	0.365	0.715468		1.1682
COALITION_Lula II 1	1.2959	0.3141	4.126	3.69e-05 ***		3.6543
COALITION_Lula II 2	0.8659	0.2760	3.137	0.001708 **		2.3772
COALITION_Lula II 3	0.2721	0.3129	0.870	0.384486		1.3128
---						
Significance: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1						
Zero deviation: 2532.2 at 23113 degrees of freedom						
Residual deviation: 2460.6 at 23103 degrees of freedom						
AIC: 2482.6						
<b>Deviation Statistics</b>						
There is no difference between saturated and proposed models: p = 1.0000						
There is a difference between null and proposed models: p = 2.170064e-11						

**Source:** Own elaboration. The exp (Est) column was included by the authors and represents the exponential  $e$ , function inverse of the  $\ln$  Neperian logarithm function, for each estimated coefficient (Estimate column).

Chart 6 presents significant coefficients for the “Lula I 1”, “Lula I 2” ( $p < 0.1$ ), “Lula II 1” and “Lula II 2” coalitions, with an increased chance of conversion into law for all the cases. Conversely, for the Dilma government coalitions, the coefficients are not significant and have no impact on DV. This result seems to reflect the profiles of each president: if, on the one hand, President Lula was recognized as a skilled political articulator, on the other, President Dilma was marked by the inability to dialogue with political actors. Many times, President Dilma had stopped receiving representatives and senators from her own party, which led the government to lose votes and space to set agendas in the National Congress. The inclusion of coalition data in the model also did not substantially alter the influence of the corruption indicator on DV. The increase in the chance of the representative involved converting a bill into a legal standard was 51.20%.

Finally, Chart 7 considers the basic model with the addition of the two control variables, in which case the effect of the legislature is canceled and only the “Lula I 1” coalition appears significant. Again, the corruption indicator remains influential on the DV variation, with an increase of 51.18% chance.

**Chart 7** – Model 4:  $IND\_CONVERSION\_LAW = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IND\_CORRUPTION + \beta_2 NUM\_LEGISLATURE + \beta_3 COALITION$

<b>Result of the glm function of R</b>						
formula = IND_CONVERSION_LAW ~ IND_CORRUPTION + NUM_LEGISLATURE + COALITION						
	Estimate	Standard Error	Value z	p(> z )		exp(Est)
(Intercept)	-4.9903	0.3565	-14.000	<2e-16 ***		0.0068
IND_CORRUPTION_TRUE	0.4133	0.1981	2.086	0.0370 *		1.5118
NUM_LEGISLATURE_53	-8.5757	267.7058	-0.032	0.9744		0.0002
NUM_LEGISLATURE_54	-0.1542	0.4264	-0.361	0.7177		0.8571
COALITION_Dilma 2	-0.7528	0.5065	-1.486	0.1372		0.4711
COALITION_Dilma 3	-0.5839	0.3836	-1.522	0.1280		0.5577
COALITION_Lula I 1	0.8717	0.3837	2.272	0.0231 *		2.3909
COALITION_Lula I 2	0.4091	0.4202	0.974	0.3302		1.5055
COALITION_Lula I 4	0.3704	0.4306	0.860	0.3896		1.4484
COALITION_Lula I 5	NA	NA	NA	NA		NA
COALITION_Lula II 1	9.7162	267.7057	0.036	0.9710		16583.60
COALITION_Lula II 2	9.2862	267.7056	0.035	0.9723		10788.27
COALITION_Lula II 3	8.6924	267.7057	0.032	0.9741		5957.54
---						
Significance: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1						
Zero deviation: 2532.2 at 23113 degrees of freedom						
Residual deviation: 2460.6 at 23102 degrees of freedom						
AIC: 2484.6						
<b>Deviation Statistics</b>						
There is no difference between saturated and proposed models: p = 1.0000						
There is a difference between null and proposed models: p = 2.170064e-11						

**Source:** Own elaboration. The exp (Est) column was included by the authors and represents the exponential  $e$ , function inverse of the  $\ln$  Neperian logarithm function, for each estimated coefficient (Estimate column).

By the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC the model of Chart 6 is slightly better than that of Chart 7. However, what deserves attention in all models is that none of the control variables seems to affect the explanatory potential of the corruption indicator. Although the research design does not allow the identification of the temporal precedence of IV over DV, nor to fully guarantee that this relationship is not spurious, necessary conditions to establish a robust causal mechanism, the relevant impact of IV in the variation of DV cannot be disregarded.

Therefore, in view of the expressive percentage in the increase in the chances, it is important to understand to what extent the representatives involved already had some political prestige that could lead to the expected result. In this sense, 30 bills were identified, among the 213 converted into legal standards, whose authorship was by representatives with a corruption index marked as true. Of these, in only seven (23.33%) the authors occupied a prominent position in the year in which the bills were converted into a legal standard. Despite the recognized power of influence resulting from the occupation of these positions, this factor was not dominant in the present study.

Subsequently, a comparative analysis, of a descriptive character, was undertaken from these 30 bills, based on the final sanctioned text, according to the list available in the Appendix of this article. A neo-institutionalist approach was adopted to assess whether, perhaps, the

legislative production of these representatives showed a distributive (or parochial) inclination, that is, laws that distribute benefits to certain identifiable economic sectors or to a specific geographic region from which the representatives comes.


The studies by Amorim-Neto and Santos (2003) and Lemos (2001) were considered for the purpose of comparison with the data of the present research. The first evaluated the effective legislative production in the period from 1982 to 1998, arising from bills authored by representatives, while the second concentrated on bills of congressional authorship (senators and representatives), from 1991 to 2001, focusing on the social area. In both, it is concluded that the legislative production did not have a distributive character, that is, in general, national legislation does not favor a specific region or specific sector class, producing cross-sectional effects in the various social groups.

Amorim-Neto and Santos (2003) used the Taylor-Robinson typology (1999), used for the study of the Honduran parliament, which deals with bills regarding the level of aggregation and the nature of the effects.

Regarding the **level of aggregation**, it is understood that the legislation can be individual, local, regional, sectorial and national. Individual, when it targets only one or a few individuals, such as, for example, bills that grant specific pensions to widows of former presidents. Local, when its object is a single or a few municipalities, but never the totality of municipalities in a state, region or country. Regional, when its object is one or a few states or regions, but not all the states or regions of the country. Sectorial, when targeting a specific sector of the economy or branch of professional activity, for example, bills to regulate the exercise of a new profession. And national, when it affects all groups of citizens, regions, states and municipalities without distinction.

In this respect, the comparison of the results of the present study with that of Amorim-Neto and Santos (2003) is illustrated in Graph 1.

**Graph 1** – Comparison of the proportion of laws regarding the level of aggregation



**Source:** Own elaboration.

It can be seen from Graph 1 that there were no bills of a local or individual nature approved by these representatives, a situation that can be associated with the fact that bills of an honorary nature, which, very often, pay individual tributes or geographically located, including at the municipal level, were excluded from the universe of this study.

On the other hand, it appears that the bills classified as sectorial represented 43% of the total, against 19% found by Amorim-Neto and Santos (2003), which may constitute an indication that representatives supposedly associated with corruption tend to see a more substantial portion of bills of that order approved.


Regarding the **nature of the effects**, Amorim-Neto and Santos (2003) define that the legislation can be beneficial, onerous, mixed or neutral. Beneficial, when it grants benefits to an individual, organ, region, social group or even the country as a whole. Onerous, when imposing financial or regulatory burdens. Mixed, when at the same time it benefits some people and burdens others (for example, legislation that imposes, as a regulation, measures to prevent the deterioration of the environment is considered mixed, as it imposes burdens on the productive sector and, simultaneously, aims to achieve ecological benefits). Finally, the legislation is considered neutral, especially in honorary bills and in those in which an existing contract or legislation is sought to be specified in detail, granting greater legal certainty without the



objective of harming or helping certain people or segments (AMORIM-NETO; SANTOS, 2003).

In this regard, the exploratory analysis of Graph 2 points to a relative convergence between the studies regarding the proportion of mixed bills (23% against 21%) and reveals a drop for half of the onerous ones (3% against 6%). Bills of a beneficial nature converted into law represent 37% here against 49% in the study by Amorim-Neto and Santos (2003). Bills with a neutral effect, which in that study cover 23% of legal production, correspond to 37% in this study. In view of the percentage growth of neutral bills – which do not imply actions that burden, grant or redistribute benefits – it could be concluded that there is no relationship, or weak relationship, between the nature of the effects and the possible association to acts of corruption. However, such growth comes accompanied by the reduction of beneficial bills for which, in the present study, the concentrated character predominates (see Appendix), that is, not distributive, which may suggest a direction.

**Graph 2** – Comparison of the proportion of laws regarding the nature of the effects




Source: Own elaboration.

Lemos (2001), when analyzing the legislative production of social themes from a distributive perspective, considers two dimensions: form and scope.

Regarding the **form**, the laws are classified into legislation of regulation (of the economy or establishment of procedural rules) and legislation of transfer of income, patrimony or resources at the federal level for the benefit of groups, regions and companies.

With regard to this dimension, the results, illustrated in Graph 3, show relative convergence, suggesting the absence of a relationship, or weak relationship, between the form of the law and possible association with acts of corruption.

**Graph 3** – Comparison of proportion of laws regarding the form




**Source:** Own elaboration.

Regarding the **scope**, the laws are divided into two categories: concentrated, which grants financial, patrimonial, or even status privileges exclusively to an individual, group, company or geographical location; diffuse, which does not directly concern individuals, companies, groups or localities, or, when it does, it aims to mitigate adverse, economic or natural conditions, thus granting diffuse benefits.

In this regard, the comparison of the results of the present study with that of Lemos (2001) stands out due to the divergence of the findings, as shown in Graph 4.

**Graph 4** – Comparison of the proportion of laws regarding scope



**Source:** Own elaboration.

From Graph 4, focusing on the data of the present study, it can be considered that the group of representatives mentioned tends to achieve legislative success in bills in the social area, whose effects are more concentrated than diffuse. This result seems to be somewhat similar to that observed in Graph 1, which indicates a predominantly sectorial parliamentary performance, with more concentrated effects and benefits. As an example, of the nine bills converted into law that were in the social area and had concentrated effects, seven were classified with sectorial aggregation level. It is true that such parliamentary action could be influenced by economic-business pressure groups or, also, by associations representing professional categories. However, the identification of these relationships is beyond the scope of this study.

Conversely, the results of Lemos (2001) point to high diffusion and low concentration, a trend that seems more in line with intuition than is expected for bills in the social area, whose scope, by definition, must be comprehensive. It is understood from this exploratory investigation that the inversion of graphs found in Graph 4 may be the work of the central object of the study, the effect of looking at the lens of corruption.

## 5 Final considerations

Returning to the research question, on the impact of the involvement of representatives in the *Mensalão* and *Lava Jato* schemes on the conversion rate into legal standards for bills of their own. It is possible to say, considering the perspective of the quantitative method adopted, that a significant percentage of more than 50% increase in the chances of achieving legislative success was revealed, with less influence from the legislature in which the bill was presented, from the coalition to which the representative belonged or from the position he/she held. This finding is a first and important step, and strengthens the hypothesis that possible benefits from corruption schemes tend to favor the approval of bills that meet the interests of these schemes. In this sense, comparative qualitative analysis was used, as a complementary research resource, which pointed to parliamentary conduct with sectorial interest and concentration of benefits, characteristics that seem closer to acts of corruption. Although the comparative analysis developed here was not supported by inferential requirements, which would require full access to the data that supported the studies used in the comparisons, the descriptive character of this approach brings to light qualitative elements that provide a more accurate understanding of the nature of bills converted into legal standards. This understanding is essential in the identification of performance standards capable of signaling specific interests of the group under study, and represents an important contribution in a field whose space to be explored is wide.

The difficulties of the legislative process in the midst of the disorder and complexity established in the Brazilian regulatory system are already well known, the main cause of major anomalies such as gaps and legal antinomies. Lopes (2009) highlights that a relevant factor for this torrent of legislative production is the need that the legislator has to meet the electoral demands and, even without knowledge of what really makes up the legal system, produces more and more rules, in an inconsequential way, based only on opportunism. In this scenario, any advantage in the approval of bills represents a competitive differential.

It is noteworthy, with regard to the establishment of robust causal relationships, that only the assumption of finding the influence of IV on DV was achieved. Huge challenges still lie in meeting the two other assumptions (PARANHOS et al, 2013). The temporal precedence of IV over DV comes up against the difficulty of directly measuring the phenomenon, because each ascertained fact of corruption has its own characteristics whose measurement occurs *post factum* (KUBBE, 2013, p. 43). The non-spurious relationship requires a large survey of data and information whose magnitude goes beyond the scope of a single article or research effort. However, it is clearly known that bill approval is only one element of legislative success.

Still disturbing is the fact that corruption, in its various facets, has more spurious variables than those that can be perceived and explained by the numbers in this study. Brazilian society has observed, in an “impotent” way, a panorama of endemic corruption amid

institutional storms that devastate the three branches of government. However, recent advances in transparency and in combating illegal acts cannot be ignored, which converge towards the construction of a new collective conscience, perhaps the only way capable of nipping the problem in the bud.

Then, in an optimistic perspective, it would reach the point where legislative success would be measured by the success of the whole society.

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#### APPENDIX

##### List of bills converted into law analyzed whose authors had the corruption index marked as true

Bill	Menu	Resulting law	Link	Classification
PL 5203/2009	PROVISIONS ON THE INTERGESTING COMMITTEES OF THE UNIFIED HEALTH SYSTEM AND THEIR RESPECTIVE COMPOSITIONS AND GIVES OTHER MEASURES.	Ordinary Law 12.466/2011	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ato2011-2014/2011/lei/L12466.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ato2011-2014/2011/lei/L12466.htm</a>	MIXED REGULAÇÃO DIFFUSE
PL 1089/2003	ALTER DEVICES OF DECREE-LAW No. 467, OF FEBRUARY 13, 1969, ESTABLISHES THE GENERIC MEDICINAL PRODUCT FOR VETERINARY USE, PROVIDES ON THE USE OF GENERIC NAMES IN PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS FOR VETERINARY USE AND GIVES OTHER MEASURES.	Ordinary Law 12.689/2012	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ato2011-2014/2012/Lei/L12689.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ato2011-2014/2012/Lei/L12689.htm</a>	MIXED REGULATION DIFFUSE
PL 4280/2008	PROVISIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF THE ACTIVITY AND THE REMUNERATION OF THE LOTTERY PERMISSIONARY, FIXES CONDITIONS FOR ITS PERFORMANCE AS A BANK CORRESPONDENT, AND GIVES OTHER MEASURES.	Ordinary Law 12.869/2013	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ato2011-2014/2013/Lei/L12869.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ato2011-2014/2013/Lei/L12869.htm</a>	NEUTRAL REGULATION DIFFUSE
PL 1015/2007	ADD DEVICE TO ART. 158 OF THE BRAZILIAN TRANSIT CODE, TO MAKE NIGHT LEARNING OBLIGATORY.	Ordinary Law 12.217/2010	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12217.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12217.htm</a>	MIXED REGULATION DIFFUSE
PL 3883/2004	ADD ITEM TO ART. 473 OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF LABOR LAWS, APPROVED BY DECREE-LAW No. 5,452, OF MAY 1, 1943, TO ALLOW THE WORKER'S ABSENCE IN SERVICE, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO SALARY, IN THE HYPOTHESIS OF PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERNATIONAL BODY MEETING, TO WHICH	Ordinary Law 11.304/2006	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ato2004-2006/2006/lei/L11304.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ato2004-2006/2006/lei/L11304.htm</a>	BENEFICIAL REGULATION CONCENTRATED

	BRAZIL HE/SHE IS AFFILIATED. NEW MENU OF THE FINAL WRITING: ADD ITEM TO ART. 473 OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF LABOR LAWS - CLT, APPROVED BY DECREE-LAW No. 5,452, OF MAY 1, 1943, TO ALLOW THE WORKER'S ABSENCE IN SERVICE, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO SALARY, IN THE HYPOTHESIS OF PARTICIPATION IN AN OFFICIAL MEETING OF AN INTERNATIONAL BODY MEETING, TO WHICH BRAZIL HE/SHE IS AFFILIATED.			
PL 6483/2006	PROVISIONS ON THE SUPPLY OF DIFFERENTIATED FOOD FOR CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS WITH DIABETES IN BRAZILIAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS.	Ordinary Law 12.982/2014	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-2014/2014/Lei/L12982.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-2014/2014/Lei/L12982.htm</a>	BENEFICIAL REGULATION CONCENTRATED
PL 6785/2006	PROVIDES ON THE OBLIGATION OF THE SERVICES OF CIVIL REGISTER OF NATURAL PERSONS TO COMMUNICATE THE REGISTERED DEATHS TO THE FEDERAL REVENUE AND THE PUBLIC SECURITY SECRETARIAT.	Ordinary Law 13.114/2015	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2015/Lei/L13114.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2015/Lei/L13114.htm</a>	MIXED REGULATION DIFFUSE
PL 6303/2005	ALTERS THE MENU OF THE DECREE-LAW No. 4,657, OF SEPTEMBER 4, 1942.	Ordinary Law 12.376/2010	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12376.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12376.htm</a>	NEUTRAL REGULATION DIFFUSE
PL 7410/2010	CHANGES PARAGRAPH 9 OF ART. 8-E, OF LAW No. 11,530, OF OCTOBER 24, 2007, TO INCLUDE TRAFFIC WARDENS AMONG THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE SCHOLARSHIP-TRAINING PROGRAM.	Ordinary Law 13.030/2014	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-2014/2011/Lei/L12467.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2011-2014/2011/Lei/L12467.htm</a>	BENEFICIAL INCOME TRANSFER CONCENTRATED
PL 4495/2008	PROVISIONS ON REGULATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THE "SOMMELIER" PROFESSION.	Ordinary Law 12.467/2011	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2011/Lei/L12467.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2011/Lei/L12467.htm</a>	BENEFICIAL REGULATION CONCENTRATED
PL 4591/2004	AALTERS LAW No. 10,482, OF JULY 3, 2002, WHICH PROVIDES ON JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DEPOSITS OF TAXES,	Ordinary Law 11.429/2006	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2006/Lei/L11429.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2006/Lei/L11429.htm</a>	NEUTRAL REGULATION DIFFUSE

	WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF STATES AND THE FEDERAL DISTRICT AND GIVES OTHER MEASURES.			
PL 2977/2004	CREATES THE OBLIGATION TO PERFORM QUARTERLY MEDICAL EXAMS FOR BRAZILIAN ATHLETES TO CHECK THE HEALTH, AND CREATES THE SPORTS COMMITTEE FOR PREVENTION AND ASSISTANCE OF SPORTS ACCIDENTS - CEPAAD.	Ordinary Law 12.346/2010.	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12346.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12346.htm</a>	BENEFICIAL REGULATION CONCENTRATED
PL 7409/2010	PROVISIONS ON THE OBLIGATION OF AUTOMOBILE AGENCIES, OF NEW OR USED VEHICLES, INFORM THE VALUE OF TAXES AND POSSIBLE FINES SO THE VEHICLE CAN CIRCULATE FREELY.	Ordinary Law 13.111/2015	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2015-2018/2015/Lei/L13111.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2015-2018/2015/Lei/L13111.htm</a>	MIXED REGULATION DIFFUSE
PL 5498/2009	AMENDS LAW No. 9,096, OF SEPTEMBER 19, 1995 (LAW OF POLITICAL PARTIES) AND LAW No. 9,504, OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1997, WHICH "ESTABLISHES RULES FOR ELECTIONS".	Ordinary Law 12.034/2009	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ ato2007-2010/2009/lei/112034.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ ato2007-2010/2009/lei/112034.htm</a>	NEUTRAL REGULATION DIFFUSE
PL 84/2007	ALTERS LAW No. 9,096, OF 1995, TO ESTABLISH THE DISTRIBUTION CRITERION OF THE PARTY FUND.	Ordinary Law 11.459/2007	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2007-2010/2007/Lei/L11459.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2007-2010/2007/Lei/L11459.htm</a>	NEUTRAL REGULATION DIFFUSE
PL 4246/2012	PROVISIONS ON THE EXERCISE OF THE DRIVER PROFESSION.	Ordinary Law 13.103/2015	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ ato2015-2018/2015/lei/113103.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ ato2015-2018/2015/lei/113103.htm</a>	MIXED REGULATION CONCENTRATED
PLP 123/2004	REGULATES THE SOLE PARAGRAPH OF ART. 146 AND ITEM IX OF ART. 170 OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND GIVES OTHER MEASURES. NEW MENU OF THE FINAL WRITING: INSTITUTES THE NATIONAL STATUTE OF THE MICRO ENTERPRISE AND THE SMALL BUSINESS. CHANGES DEVICES OF LAWS No. 8,212 AND 8,213, BOTH OF JULY 24, 1991, OF THE CONSOLIDATION OF LABOR LAWS - CLT, APPROVED BY DECREE-LAW No. 5,452, MAY 1, 1943, LAW No. 10,189, FEBRUARY 14, 2001,	Complementary law 123/2006	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/LCP/Lcp123.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/LCP/Lcp123.htm</a>	BENEFICIAL REGULATION CONCENTRATED

	COMPLEMENTARY LAW No. 63, JANUARY 11, 1990; AND REPEALS LAWS No. 9,317, OF DECEMBER 5, 1996, AND 9,841, OF OCTOBER 5, 1999.			
PL 2742/2003	EXTENDS THE DEADLINE FOR THE CONCESSIONS AND DISPOSALS OF LAND MADE BY STATES IN THE BORDER STRIPS TO BE RATIFIED, AND GIVES OTHER MEASURES.	Ordinary Law 13.178/2015	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2015-2018/2015/Lei/L13178.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2015-2018/2015/Lei/L13178.htm</a>	NEUTRAL REGULATION DIFFUSE
PL 6316/2009	PROVISIONS ON THE INSTALLATION OF FREE SHOPPING ON THE BORDER STRIPS.	Ordinary Law 12.723/2012	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2011-2014/2012/Lei/L12723.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2011-2014/2012/Lei/L12723.htm</a>	BENEFICIAL REGULATION CONCENTRATED
PL 4673/2004	RECOGNIZES THE PROFESSION OF INTERPRETER OF THE BRAZILIAN SIGN LANGUAGE – LIBRAS AND GIVES OTHER MEASURES.	Ordinary Law 12.319/2010	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ ato2007-2010/2010/lei/112319.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ ato2007-2010/2010/lei/112319.htm</a>	NEUTRAL REGULATION CONCENTRATED
PL 7639/2010	PROVIDES ON THE DEFINITION, QUALIFICATION, PREROGATIVES AND PURPOSES OF COMMUNITY HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS - ICES, DISCIPLINES THE TERM OF PARTNERSHIP AND GIVES OTHER MEASURES.	Ordinary Law 12881/2013	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ ato2011-2014/2013/lei/112881.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ ato2011-2014/2013/lei/112881.htm</a>	BENEFICIAL REGULATION CONCENTRATED
PL 7522/2010	AMENDS ART. 3 OF LAW No. 9.504, OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1997, THAT "ESTABLISHES NORMS FOR ELECTIONS".	Ordinary Law 12.976/2014	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2011-2014/2014/Lei/L12976.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2011-2014/2014/Lei/L12976.htm</a>	NEUTRAL REGULATION DIFFUSE
PL 3778/2008	TRANSFORM THE BILL OF REVIEW, INTERPOSED AGAINST DECISION THAT DOES NOT ADMIT EXTRAORDINARY OR SPECIAL APPEALS, IN THE BILL OF REVIEW IN THE OWN PROCESS.	Ordinary Law 12.322/2010	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12322.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12322.htm</a>	NEUTRAL REGULATION DIFFUSE

PL 1756/2007	ALTERS DEVICES OF LAW No. 4,886, OF DECEMBER 9, 1965, REGULATING THE ACTIVITIES OF AUTONOMOUS COMMERCIAL REPRESENTATIVES, PROVISING ON FIXING THE VALUE OF ANNUITIES, FEES AND EMOLUMENTS DUE TO THE PROFESSIONALS OF THE CATEGORY, NATURAL AND LEGAL PERSONS, TO THE REGIONAL COUNCILS OF THE TRADE REPRESENTATIVES WITH WHICH THEY ARE REGISTERED.	Ordinary Law 12.246/2010	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12246.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12246.htm</a>	MIXED REGULATION CONCENTRATED
PL 1661/2003	PROVIDES ON THE JUDICIAL AND EXTRAJUDICIAL DEPOSIT OF AMOUNTS RELATING TO MUNICIPAL TAX CREDITS AND GIVES OTHER MEASURES.	Ordinary Law 10.819/2003	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/2003/L10819.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/2003/L10819.htm</a>	NEUTRAL REGULATION DIFFUSE
PL 814/2007	ADD DEVICE TO THE CONSOLIDATION OF LABOR LAWS - CLT, TO PROHIBIT THE WORK OF THE PREGNANT OR LACTATOR IN UNUSABLE ACTIVITIES, OPERATIONS OR LOCATIONS.	Ordinary Law 13.287/2016	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2016/lei/L13287.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2016/lei/L13287.htm</a>	BENEFICIAL REGULATION DIFFUSE
PL 818/2003	AMENDS ART. 1,121 OF LAW No. 5,869, 1973 – CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, TO INCLUDE, AS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT FOR THE CONSENSUS SEPARATION PETITION, THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SPOUSES ON THE VISITOR REGIME OF MINOR CHILDREN, AND GIVE OTHER MEASURES.	Ordinary Law 11.112/2005	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2005/lei/L11112.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2005/lei/L11112.htm</a>	NEUTRAL REGULATION DIFFUSE
PLP 22/2003	GIVES NEW WORDING TO ARTICLE. 45 OF COMPLEMENTARY LAW No. 31, OF OCTOBER 11, 1977. NEW MENU: INSTITUTES, IN THE FORM OF ART. 43 OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, THE AMAZON DEVELOPMENT SUPERINTENDENCE-SUDAM; ESTABLISHES ITS	Complementary law 124/2007	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/LCP/Lcp124.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/LCP/Lcp124.htm</a>	BENEFICIAL INCOME TRANSFER DIFFUSE

	COMPOSITION, LEGAL NATURE, OBJECTIVES, AREA OF COMPETENCE AND ACTION INSTRUMENTS; PROVISIONS ON THE AMAZON DEVELOPMENT FUND - FDA; CHANGES PROVISIONAL MEASURE No. 2,157-5, OF AUGUST 24, 2001; REPEALS COMPLEMENTARY LAW No. 67, OF JUNE 13, 1991; AND GIVES OTHER MEASURES.			
PL 1033/2003	INSTITUTES THE ADDITIONAL SALARY FOR DANGEROUSNESS FOR SURVEILLERS AND EMPLOYEES IN VALUE TRANSPORT.	Ordinary Law 12.740/2012	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/LCP/Lcp124.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/LCP/Lcp124.htm</a>	ONEROUS INCOME TRANSFER CONCENTRATED
PL 7664/2014	AMENDS ART. 34 OF LAW No. 9,656, OF 1998.	Ordinary Law 13.127/2015	<a href="http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2015-2018/2015/Lei/L13127.htm">http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2015-2018/2015/Lei/L13127.htm</a>	BENEFICIAL REGULATION CONCENTRATED

Article received on 2020-10-02

Article resubmitted on 2020-28-04

Article accepted for publication on 2020-08-05