



THE CAPACITY OF EXPERTISE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN FOREIGN POLICY: ANALYSIS OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF ACTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1990 TO 2017

Ulle Ráfaga Campos e Figueiredo ¹

Abstract: How does the Brazilian House of Representatives act in Brazilian Foreign Policy, given the current institutional configuration? This paper aims to describe the mechanisms that the House of Representatives holds for foreign policy, in addition to detailing how such instruments have been used. For the purposes of analysis, it was chosen to review cases from 1990 to 2017. Using the descriptive methodology and statistics related to the proposals presented to the Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense of the House of Representatives, it is intended to establish which provisions the legislative body holds to act in this matter, as well as describing how such action has occurred.

Keywords: Legislative; Foreign Policy; House of Representatives; Instruments.

1 Introduction

How does the House of Representatives act in Brazilian Foreign Policy given the current institutional configuration? This work seeks to describe the mechanisms that the House of Representatives has for foreign policy, in addition to detailing how such instruments have been used. A time frame from 1990 to 2017 was chosen for analysis purposes. The study focuses on this period because the year 1990 was the first year of the New Republic in which the head of the executive, as well as the entire composition of the legislature, had been democratically elected (NICOLAU, 2012). Considering that one of the main defenses of greater participation of the Legislative in foreign policy is related to the representativeness and control of society (LIMA; SANTOS; 2000), it is necessary that the analysis goes through this context of restructuring in the consolidation of Brazilian democracy.

The House of Representatives is not a traditional object of study when it comes to foreign policy. Most works on the subject, when dealing with the Legislative, tend to consider Congress as a whole, or else they emphasize the Senate. In fact, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate has more powers than the Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense of the House of Representatives (SCHIMIDT, 2011). Even so, several authors carried out their

¹ Master's student in Political Science at the Federal University of Pernambuco. Executive editor of the *Revista Política Hoje*. E-mail: ullerafaga@hotmail.com

analyses around it, including mentioning the need to assess legislative behavior in the House's committee, which is the first legislative body to which International Acts are sent for approval. (DINIZ & RIBEIRO, 2008; DINIZ, 2009)

There is a gap to be filled in the literature on the subject, with regard to specific studies on the role of the House of Representatives in foreign policy. Until recently, the bureaucratic isolation of the Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was a consensus on foreign policy. More recent studies have sought to highlight a pluralization of actors in Brazilian foreign policy (CASON & POWER, 2009). There was a great growth in articles dealing with the relationship between the Legislative and Executive branches that seek to highlight the role of the National Congress in Brazilian foreign policy (ALEXANDRE, 2006; FELIU & MIRANDA, 2011; FERREIRA, 2009; FIGUEIRA, 2009; MCDONNELL, 2016; MENDONÇA, 2012; NEVES, 2006; OLIVEIRA, 2013), but such studies only marginally address the House's performance, opening space for more in-depth work on the capacity of expertise of the House.

Therefore, this paper aims to make a theoretical effort to place the House in this specific foreign policy theme, as a decision maker in the national environment.

The descriptive arguments used here will fit what Gerring (2010) typifies as "indicator" arguments, that is, they are descriptive arguments about the one-dimensional components of a population, based on the empirical manifestation of a phenomenon. This will happen because the main focus of this work will be on the use of the instruments, observing their frequency of use, just as other authors have done in methodologies that will be explained later (GERRING, 2010).

The data used will all refer to proposals analyzed by the House of Representatives from 1990 to 2017, which are available for consultation on its website². A descriptive quantitative analysis was carried out focusing on the types of possible proposals that could be used to influence Foreign Policy.

New hypotheses regarding the use of the instruments will not be raised, based on the belief that the research in question fits in the context of circumstances where the causal truth has no defined limitations, and therefore the descriptive inference should be carried out regardless of any particular causal hypothesis. Otherwise, the description could be seen in ignorance of other causal potentialities. (GERRING, 2010)

The work will be divided into four more sections. In the first section, we will deal with the current institutional configuration with regard to the division and functioning of the branches discussed here, with a focus on performance in foreign policy. We will bring the instruments cited by the literature, with a description from the normative texts and we will deal with more

² The data are available through the House of Representatives website through the link: <http://www2.camara.leg.br/>. For the purposes of Replicability, I inform that the data was removed using the "Advanced Search" tool, provided by the website itself.

details about the Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense – of the House of Representatives – the body responsible for analyzing all proposals related to Foreign Policy, in addition to dealing with the general processing of proposals in the House, with an emphasis on the particularities related to the processing of international acts.

Next, we will focus on the literature specialized in the treatment of Foreign Policy in Brazil, commenting on what was expected considering the debate about globalization and the role of different actors in Foreign Policy. Then, we will define, what are the consensus of the authors currently in the treatment of the Legislative-Executive relation in this matter.

The third section will deal more specifically with the conclusions reached by the prominent authors of the study of decision making regarding the use of each of these instruments. An analysis of quantitative data on the use of these instruments will be carried out, to verify if the conclusions launched by these authors are still valid until today.

Then, in the final considerations of this work, we will show that the most recent aspects of the study of the different actors of foreign policy are supported by the data presented, which show an increasing performance of the House of Representatives, contradicting the common sense of minimum performance of formal approval of International Acts.

2 Institutional Configuration and Instruments of Action in Foreign Policy

2.1 Current Institutional Configuration

Sérgio Aranches (1988) identifies as the bases of the republican tradition of the country: presidentialism, federalism, bicameralism, multipartisanship and proportional representation. Thus, Brazil today adheres to a federative regime of presidential coalition with the bicameral legislature in a multiparty system. This means, initially, that the Union is formed by the union of states, municipalities and the Federal District, and that, with regard to the three branches³ that govern the country (Legislative, Executive and Judiciary), the Executive is occupied by a head of state, and the Legislative are composed of two houses (the House of Representatives and the Senate), occupied by Federal Representatives and Senators, all elected through the dispute between different parties. (ABRANCHES, 1988; LIMONGI, 2006)

In bicameralism, the National Congress is divided into two houses, which have their own prerogatives to legislate. As is practiced in Brazil, the rules of composition of the two houses are incongruous with each other; the political attributions are distributed symmetrically among them, which leads to the existence of two institutional veto players⁴. (ARAÚJO, 2014)

In the division of the government into three branches, it is generally understood that the branches are divided by the functions they exercise. The constant struggle between the branches

³ It is not relevant for the organization of this work to discuss the composition of the Judiciary, so that this issue will not be addressed.

⁴ Veto Players are actors whose agreement is required to make the decision to change a policy. (TSEBELIS, 1995).

guarantees the preservation of a separation between the three and the severe maintenance of all of them, to prevent tyranny from implanting itself in the world, with the predominance of a branch and, within that branch, the predominance of a man. Thus, the conceptions that are based on this argument conclude that in presidential systems the division between branches must function as a mechanism of checks and balances to guarantee democratic control in the system. Hence the importance of studying the dynamics that exist between them in the performance of foreign policy. (BALEEIRO; BRITO & CAVALCANTI, 2012; FIGUEIRA, 2009)

In the Legislative, the House of Representatives has the assigned role of (1) authorizing the initiation of proceedings against the President and Vice President of the Republic and the Ministers of State; (2) carrying out the accountability of the President of the Republic, when appropriate; (3) preparing its internal regulations; (4) provide for its organization, operation, police, creation, transformation or extinction of positions, jobs and functions of its services; and the law initiative for setting the respective remuneration; in addition to (5) electing members of the Council of the Republic, pursuant to art. 89, VII of the Federal Constitution.

As can be seen, the current constitutional text does not treat the House of Representatives as an actor with a leading role in foreign policy. It happens that, in redemocratization, the context was the presence of a new international order progressively institutionalized from the social conflicts that marked the century. Thus, there was an exacerbation of nationalism, with the defense of sovereignty and the principle of self-determination of peoples, in contrast to the exchange between nations, which had been developing a growing system of greater international and regional coexistence. In this context, the strategy of the 1988 Federal Constitution was to guarantee the Executive control over Brazilian policies and institutions, which had constitutional and regulatory instruments that favored their decision-making predominance, disfavoring horizontal accountability. (FIGUEIRA, 2009; TÁCITO, 2012)

If the themes already predicted in the Constitution are considered to be within the competence of Congress, the treatment of themes directly related to Brazilian interests at the international level is absent, according to Article 48.

Article 49 of the Constitution provides that it is the exclusive competence of the National Congress to resolve definitively on treaties, agreements or international acts that entail burdens or serious commitments on national heritage. In addition to authorizing the President of the Republic to declare war, to celebrate peace, to allow foreign forces to transit through national territory or remain in it temporarily, except in cases provided for in a complementary law.

The expression “[...] that entail burdens or serious commitments on national heritage” (Art.49, Item I of the 1988 Federal Constitution) generated duality, in the sense of the interpretation to allow considering that certain types of agreements that do not fit in this classification did not require the legislative scrutiny. Likewise, mentioning the term “adjustments” in acts when processing International Acts was absent in the regulation of

attributions of both the Executive and Legislative branches. This possible "flexibility" of interpretations may even be related to attempts⁵ by the Representatives to insert Amendments to the Constitution that would change the decision-making process in matters of foreign policy.

Currently, the formal performance of the House of Representatives in foreign policy is exercised through the mechanisms present in its Internal Regulations, which we will deal with below.

2.2 Instruments of Action in Foreign Policy

2.2.1 The Processing of Proposals in the House of Representatives and the CREDN

In this section, we will focus on the description of the instruments considered in our analysis. The selection of instruments was carried out in consideration with the specialized literature, as well as some additions made based on the study of the House of Representatives' Internal Regulations and the Federal Constitution. All descriptions made here will be in accordance with official information from the House, available in its Internal Regulations and its website on the internet.

All matters subject to the House of Representatives' deliberation are treated as proposals. Proposals can be proposed to amend the Constitution – PECs (Proposed Amendments to the Constitution) Bills (Bills – PL, Complementary Bills – PLP, Conversion bills – PLV, Legislative Decree Bills – PDC and Bill Resolution – PRC), amendments, indications – INC, requirements – REQ, appeals, opinions or proposals for inspection and control. (Chapter 1, Art. 100 of the House of Representatives' Regulation)

Among the proposals, the following will be considered as instruments for action in foreign policy: (1) Bill – here also including Complementary Bills, (2) Requirements and Indications, (3) Legislative Decree Bills – for which the International Act is sent, sent to the House of Representatives through Presidential Messages – MSC, and (4) Proposed Amendments to the Constitution that specifically address changes in decision-making patterns on foreign policy.

Each proposal, except for amendment, appeal or opinion, has its own course in the processing within the House of Representatives. In general, first, the proposal is presented to the Board of Directors. Then, the General Secretariat of the Board dispatches the proposal to the competent committees. In the committee, the proposal receives a rapporteur, who gives his/her opinion on the matter. (Art. 24, *op.cit*; Website of the House of Representatives)


Standing committees, such as the Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense – CREDN, have, with some exceptions, the competence to discuss and vote on bills, without the

⁵ Within the period studied by this work, proposals from members of the House of Representatives were identified that aimed at changing the decision-making pattern in foreign policy matters, including giving greater possibility for *ex-ante* action by Federal Representatives. The following stand out: PEC 31/2003 Representative Ney Lopes (PFL-RN); PEC 70/2003 Representative Devanir Ribeiro (PT-SP); PEC 389/2005 Representative João Alfredo (PT-CE); PL 4938/1990 Representative Gerson Marcondes (PMDB-SP)

competence of the Plenary. If the matter has yet to be analyzed in plenary, it is forwarded to the rapporteur, without amendments. Assuming there are amendments, the rapporteur then analyzes the text and presents his report and vote. (Art. 24, op.cit; Website of the House of Representatives)

It is possible to propose the total or partial approval of the proposal, the rejection, the presentation of amendments, the filing, or to present a substitute bill, alternative, however, in this case it is necessary to open a deadline for amendments. After the discussion of the committee's matter, a vote is taken. The proposal with an approved opinion goes to the next committee. If it is not a matter with conclusive processing, and which has already been considered by the Committee for Constitution, Justice and Citizenship – CCJ, it goes to the plenary. (Art. 24, op.cit; Website of the House of Representatives).

Figure 1 – Ordinary Processing Flowchart at the House of Representatives




Source: Digital Citizenship School. House of Representatives. Adapted. Available at: <<https://escolavirtualdecidadania.camara.leg.br/site/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fluxograma-de-tramitacao-ordinaria.pdf>>. Accessed on February 21, 2018.

In the flowchart from top to bottom, from left to right: **EARLY STAGE:** INITIATIVE, PRESENTATION, DISTRIBUTION. **COMMITTEES STAGE:** COMMITTEES, OPINIONS AND AMENDMENTS. **CONCLUSIVE BRANCH? NO> PLENARY STAGE:** PLENARY, DISCUSSION. AMENDMENT PRESENTED? YES> COMMITTEES. NO> VOTING. **CONCLUSIVE BRANCH? YES> APPEAL STAGE:** DEADLINE FOR APPEAL. APPEAL PRESENTED? NO> PROPOSAL APPROVED? YES> FINAL APPROVAL. NO> FILING

In the case of International Acts, the procedure has its particularities. First, the Act is sent to the House by means of a Presidential Message, which contains the entire content of the treaty, accompanied by the reasons presented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Portuguese acronym: MRE). The Message is then distributed to the relevant Committees. The treated matter is then presented as a Legislative Decree Bill. Approved, it goes to the Plenary.

Figure 2 – Flowchart of Processing of International Acts in the Legislative



Source: Sou da Paz Institute. Arms Trade Treaty. Adapted. Available at: <<http://www.soudapaz.org/o-que-fazemos/documento/arms-trade-treaty-1>>. Accessed on February 21, 2018.

The CREDN (Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense) is a Standing Committee, instituted by the Resolution dated September 15, 1936, with the name “Diplomacy and Treaties”. After some changes, it came to be called by its current name by Resolution No. 15, 1996, art. 32, item XV of the current Internal Regulations of the House of Representatives.

It is responsible for: (a) diplomatic and consular, economic and commercial, cultural and scientific relations with other countries; relations with international multilateral and regional entities; (b) Brazilian foreign policy; Brazilian foreign service; (c) international treaties, acts, agreements and covenants and other foreign policy instruments; (d) public and private international law; international legal order; nationality; citizenship and naturalization; foreigners’ legal regime; emigration and immigration; (e) authorization for the President or Vice-President of the Republic to be absent from national territory; (f) national defense policy; strategic studies and information and counter-information activities; (g) Armed and Auxiliary Forces; military public administration; military service and alternative civilian provision; passage of foreign forces and their stay in the national territory; (h) matters pertaining to the

border strip and areas considered essential to national defense; (i) military law and national defense legislation; maritime, aeronautical and space law; (j) international disputes; declaration of war; armistice or peace conditions; civil and military requisitions in the event of imminent danger and in time of war; (m⁶) other matters relevant to its thematic field. (Art. 32, op.cit; Website of the House of Representatives⁷).

2.2.2 Bills

Bills are intended to regulate matters within the competence of the Legislative Branch, with the sanction of the Presidency of the Republic. There are, in addition to Ordinary Bills, Complementary Bills, which deal with specific matters defined by the Federal Constitution, and need an absolute majority to be approved by the House, in addition to requiring two rounds of examination. In the analysis performed here, both were considered together, in “Bill”. With regard to foreign policy, for example, Complementary Bills deal, among other matters, with the transit of foreign forces in the national territory, as defined by Article 21, IV of the Federal Constitution. Such bills can be used to act in foreign policy when addressing agenda soft issues, such as those related to the granting of visas to foreigners (which adds art. 15-A to Law 6,815, of August 19, 1980, establishing criteria for the granting of a temporary visa and work authorization in the cases specified therein.), the registration of foreigners in the country (PL 1664/2007 that extends, for foreigners in an illegal situation in the national territory, the deadline for requesting provisional registration), and even more complex issues, such as PL 7115/2014, which ensures the protection of the interests of Brazilian companies and their subsidiaries, which operate abroad, against restrictive or arbitrary measures by the States in which they carry out their activities. (Art. 108, op.cit; PACHECO, 2015).

2.2.3 Legislative Decree Bills

Legislative Decree Bills are those that regulate matters of exclusive competence of the Legislative Branch, without sanction by the Presidency. It is through them that international treaties are assessed, sent to the House of Representatives through Presidential Messages, and can be presented by any Representative or Committee. In addition to the Bills related to Presidential Messages for the appreciation of treaties, there are also those authored by the Representatives, such as PDC 11/2007. Which establishes guidelines for the negotiation of international acts that regulate Brazilian obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and cooperative actions to face global climate changes resulting from the rise in the average

⁶ The same sequence used in the House's Internal Regulations was reproduced. Resolution No. 20 of 2004, skipped the letter "I" in the sequencing of this item.

⁷ History and Assignments. Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense. Available at: <<http://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-permanentes/credn/conheca-a-comissao/index.html>>. Accessed on February 21, 2018.

temperature on the planet. (Art.108, op.cit)

2.2.4 Requirements and Indications

Requests are proposals designed to formalize requests from Federal Representatives. They enable a greater search for information by the Representatives and a greater participation in the topics led by the Executive. Indications are the proposals through which the Representative suggests to another Branch the adoption of a measure, the performance of an administrative or management act, or the sending of a bill on the subject of his/her exclusive initiative, as well as suggests the manifestation of one or more Committee on a certain matter, aiming at the elaboration of a bill on a matter of initiative of the House. The indications may serve to act in foreign policy in the sense of bringing suggestions about certain actions within diplomacy, such as INC 4865/2005, which suggested that the MRE demand retraction from Mr. Pascoal Lamy, referring to his claims that the Amazon and others tropical forests to be considered world public goods and submitted to collective management or international community management. (art. 113 and 114, op.cit; FIGUEIRA, 2009; PACHECO, 2015)

2.2.5 PECs for Change in Decision-Making

Proposed Amendments to the Constitution are proposals that aim to promote changes in the constitutional text. Through them, as already proposed, representatives can make attempts to change the decision-making process related to foreign policy, attributing a higher level of formal consultation to the legislature even in the *ex-ante* stage of the process. (FIGUEIRA, 2009)

2.2.6 Secretariat for International Relations of the House of Representatives

It is also important to note that the House of Representatives has a specific secretariat for international relations, with the activity included in the House's Internal Regulations. Created in 2015, it aims to expand the scope of diplomatic and parliamentary cooperation activities, which were already developed at the institution. It is its responsibility to establish the guidelines for parliamentary diplomacy at the House, in addition to promoting cooperation with parliaments of foreign states and supporting delegations, entourages and representatives of representatives on official missions. (Art.21, op.cit)

It is not an object of study in the specialized literature, which is probably due to its recent creation, so data related to its activity will not be included in the analysis of the use of instruments, but even so, the presence of a body such as this while indicative of a real opportunity to act in foreign policy.

3 Literature on the Executive-Legislative Relationship in the Treatment of Foreign Policy

The literature presents several arguments to place what was expected, in the context of globalization and the increasingly intense interaction between countries, that there would be greater involvement of the National Congress in matters of Foreign Policy. In this regard, the considerations of Martin (2000), Lima (2001), Figueira (2009) and Galdino, Oliveira and Ribeiro (2009) stand out.

Martin (2000) states that international politics and domestic politics are not “creatures” that inhabit different universes, but fields to which similar models and concepts can be applied. It works with the State’s commitments and its credibility, operating under the premise that the participation of an organized Legislative has a positive effect on international relations, giving credibility to the State in question. This would happen because the participation of the Legislative would be an indicative that the decisions taken would have been the result of a domestic debate that would have passed through the appropriate democratic instances, which, therefore, would lead to more stable and thus more credible decisions. (MARTIN, 2000)

Specifically, in the Brazilian case, Lima and Santos (2001) state that there was an inherent congruence in the preferences of the Legislative and the Executive in the post-war period, as seen in the efforts for industrialization in the period. Thus, it made sense that there should be a delegation of tasks to the executive, which maintained his apparently minor role in matters related to Foreign Policy. This situation lasted until the emblematic example of congruence between the branches, which were the tariff policy and the country’s reluctance to open its economy to imports, ceasing to serve the objective of industrialization. Then there was a gap between the Executive and the Legislative in the scope of foreign trade policy, which increased with superinflation. The former congressional delegation for the Executive to define the objectives of government action and the centralization of decisions in the Executive, together with the isolation of the Itamaraty had, as a more visible effect, the lack of democratic control over governmental decisions within the scope of politics foreign trade. (MARTIN, 2000; LIMA & SANTOS, 2001; FIGUEIRA, 2009; GALDINO, OLIVEIRA & RIBEIRO, 2009)

Itamaraty’s professionalism, negotiation skills and relative autonomy in Brazilian foreign policy agendas have, until recently, kept it relatively immune to changes and interference in government agendas (MILANI & PINHEIRO, 2013).

There is a constant criticism made to the isolation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in foreign policy, being considered by its critics even as a monopoly (op.cit., 2012). However, a consensus has been created regarding the participation of other entities in in foreign policy, in addition to the increase in the performance of some entities, as is the case of the National Congress.

The topic of diversification of the actors relevant to foreign policy began to show greater relevance in the 1990s, with the publication of several studies in the area. Several authors

considered the academic responsibility to consider the interaction of the other actors in the process, given the complexity of the dynamics in question. Thus, the current presence of the decision-making process, thematic diversity and political dynamics in the study agendas allow the researcher to explore more complex relations with regard to foreign policy.

Milani and Pinheiro (2013) state that despite the recurring fact in the study of the discipline of attributing to a single individual or a single institution the origin of foreign policy decisions, supposing that the presence of charismatic leaders or the monopoly of an agency can alone explain the definition of the country's interests at the international level has become analytically less convincing. For the authors, Foreign Policy needs research parameters that incorporate the different actors present in its decision-making process, in their most distinct forms of participation and considering the various models of political interaction.

Regarding the treatment of actors other than the Executive, common sense, when it comes to the relationship between the Legislative and the Executive in foreign policy, is that Congress serves only as a formality of automatic seal of treaties signed by the Executive. It is important to note that in our republican history representatives have rarely rejected the approval of an international agreement sent by the Executive. Oliveira (2004) maintained "the nullity of the performance of political actors and the Brazilian legislative", attributing this behavior to the low electoral performance of foreign policy issues. (ALEXANDRE, 2006; OLIVEIRA, 2004).

In general, although there is space for a valuable discussion about the ideal model of action in foreign policy in terms of participation and the balance between branches, it would first be necessary to reach a conclusion on the main debate today, if the common sense of the low participation of the Legislative would, in fact, be correct.

The arguments in this area are divided into different positions on two different objects. Firstly, we have to consider the role of the Legislative in general, then, more specifically, there are positions regarding the low rate of rejection of international acts by Congress.

In the first object, there is a line of literature that comments on the low interest of the Houses, due to the specificity of the theme, which requires specialized know-how and the low political return associated with involvement with foreign policy. As such, Congress' power to influence foreign policy decision making is limited to the *ex-post* approval of international agreements or treaties, in addition to the participation of members of Congress in Parliamentary Committees dealing with foreign policy. (ALEXANDRE, 2006; FIGUEIRA, 2009; MENDONÇA, 2012)

The useful function of representatives is the search for reelection, which indicates that they will adopt measures that contribute to this objective. Accordingly, representatives would participate in Parliamentary Committees that would most directly express the interest of their electorate. As foreign policy matters would be considered low priority by the general public, there would be no return to justify the involvement. It is important to remember, however, that

this perspective considers foreign policy as mostly belonging to the agenda hard, that is, it evokes sensitive characteristics in the relationship of States, moving away from public diplomacy and entering the area of secret diplomacy. This approach, widely disseminated in the literature, does not highlight the items on the agenda soft, which deals with the distributive aspect of themes closer to the daily lives of citizens (ALEXANDRE, 2012; FIGUEIRA, 2009; LIMONGI, 2002).

In addition, this perspective focuses much more on the formal instruments and direct influence applicable to the Legislative – and in this case directly applied to our object of study at the House of Representatives. Although they do not completely disregard informal instruments – or at least not formally institutionalized for use as such – and of indirect influence, the main focus of this perspective is on the *ex-post* assessment of International Treaties.

For them, then, the House would have an almost minimal influence in terms of the possibility of action, justified by the lack of interest of the Representatives in acting on a theme with no electoral interest, in addition to the very decision-making structure in foreign policy, which favors the Executive.

As for the second object, the low⁸ rate of rejection of the Executive's proposals, this perspective considers that it is a sign of inertia, or non-performance. Diniz (2009) even raises the possibility that the House did not actually act as a veto player, given the very low rejection rate.

On the other hand, we have authors who consider that there is, indeed, the influence of the Legislative on Foreign Policy, even if it is not formally institutionalized. Such actors are more open to considering informal instruments, such as the deliberate delay in assessing proposals for international acts by the Executive, as well as the indirect influence, exercised by the mere existence of the House as a veto player, which could contribute to the congruence of preferences of the branches or even cause the Executive itself to change its behavior in the face of the possibility of a veto, which would therefore make the option of considering the preferences of the House when negotiating the international act or even simply not proposing something that would not be accepted by the House. (DINIZ, 2009; FIORINA, 1982; LINDSAY, 1993; MARTIN, 2000; MCCUBBINS; NOLL, & WEINGAST, 1987; WEINGAST, 1984)

In this perspective of assessment, which admits a more flexible view of the performance, Martin (2000) strongly defends that the participation of the Legislative could not have as a measuring instrument only the institutionalized mechanisms, considering the anticipation of preferences that occurs on both sides. Lindsay (1993) and Weingast (1984) present arguments that complement this logic, when dealing with “anticipated reactions”, where the possible action

⁸ DINIZ & RIBEIRO (2008) and DINIZ (2009) analyzed the Presidential Messages sent to the House of Representatives between 1988 and 2006, finding only three cases of explicit rejection.

of the Legislature as a veto player would force the executive to consider its *ex-ante* preferences. In Lindsay's words:

[...] in any stable institutional arrangement, people will react strategically. Just as in chess games they consider their opponents' possible moves and plan several steps ahead, Congress and the Executive will anticipate each other's behavior and modify their own behavior accordingly. Presidents are especially prone to anticipating Congress' mood in foreign policy, because public rejections threaten to weaken their credibility on the world stage (LINDSAY, 1993).

Diniz (2009) even uses this argument directly with the House in her article "International acts and legislative action", in which she concludes that although the provisions of the Brazilian Constitution leave little room for Representatives to maneuver in terms of direct action, she found, yes, indicative of an indirect influence of the House on foreign policy issues, as highlighted by Lindsay (1993).

4 Use of Instruments of Action

4.1 Analysis

The instruments analyzed here were chosen with reference to in the works of Figueira (2009), Diniz & Ribeiro (2008) and Diniz (2009). Figueira studies the decision-making process in foreign policy in Brazil where she considers the balance of power in the dynamics of the Itamaraty and the Legislative as actors in foreign policy. On the legislative side, it focuses on the analysis of PECs for changes in the decision-making process for international agreements, bills, requirements and indications both in the House of Representatives and in the Federal Senate. Diniz and Ribeiro's work focused on the processing of international acts, carried out at the House of Representatives through Legislative Decree Bills. It is important to note that Diniz and Ribeiro already focus their analysis directly on the House of Representatives, being some of the few authors to do this.

The data used were from the processing of proposals related to the instruments at the CREDN, and were provided by the House of Representatives, through demand of the open data system, and complements were made by the advanced search tool of the website, so that all data used here are freely available for consultation. The organization of the data for the analysis was done to replicate the method applied by Figueira (2009), in which she analyzes the processing of the proposals between the years 1988 to 2006. In relation to the variables, she focuses only on the quantitative and temporal aspects. In this work, we add to the analysis the aspect of authorship of the proposal, divided into the matters presented by the Representatives, the Executive, and others.

As noted, the basis of this work was the articles published by Diniz and Ribeiro, as well as the work of Figueira.

In the 2008 article, “The role of the Brazilian congress in foreign policy: an empirical contribution to the debate”, Diniz and Ribeiro use the Presidential Messages regarding international agreements sent to the House of Representatives between 1988 and 2006. Operating under the perspective that the Brazilian institutional model does not completely restrict the foreign policy decision-making process, they carry out a quantitative analysis in the Messages, processed as Legislative Decree Bills, in addition to a qualitative analysis in the proposals that were not approved. In the end, they consider that it is possible to identify the existence of a broader participation than most of the literature comments.

In the article published in 2009, “International Acts and Legislative Action”, Diniz deepens the theoretical debate by adding Lindsay's perspective on possibilities for indirect action, both in the influence exerted by the mere existence of the House as a veto player, and by the probability of having informal *ex-ante* discussions. She uses the same methodology as the 2008 article, and adds to the conclusions that even though the provisions of the Constitution leave little room for direct action by the representatives in the deliberation of treaties, it is possible to find indications of the Legislative's influence on foreign issues.

Although the analysis made here of the Legislative Decree Bills does not include the qualitative methodology, very well applied at the time, we will include Bills by the Representatives' own authorship, in addition to bills by other authors, which were not considered by the authors.

Figueira, in her doctoral thesis defended in 2009, “The Decision-making process in Brazilian foreign policy” seeks to understand the pattern and decision-making dynamics in the matter in a period of redemocratization, from 1988 to 2007. She concludes that there was an increasing participation of the Legislative Branch in foreign policy, although timid, and that despite attempts to change the decision-making pattern, the decision-making process remains significantly centered in the “hands” of the Executive.

It is important to note that, although this work uses methodological aspects of these authors, there are differences in the treatment of the data. First, Figueira does not explicitly say that the proposals were chosen for analysis passed through the CREDN, although this is the expected procedure according to the rules. Diniz and Ribeiro, for their part, despite including all cases related to Presidential Messages, carried out a different analysis based on the result of the deliberation of the acts.

For the purposes of standardizing treatment, in this analysis all cases that were processed at the CREDN were considered, disregarding the approval or non-approval of the proposals, because the use of the instrument was carried out regardless of the effect produced.

Proposals that had passed through the CREDN, but that did not deal with foreign policy,

international relations, international law, and/or any thematic related to the themes mentioned above were excluded from the analysis. Finally, the year of each proposal in the analysis was the year in which the proposal was presented, and not the year in which the Committee on Foreign Relations analyzed the proposal.


Chart 1 – Literature on the Use of Foreign Policy Practice Instruments

Instrument	Who Approaches	Analyzed Period	Conclusions
Bills	Figueira (2009)	1988 to 2007	Upward trend over the years, but few cases.
Legislative Decree Bills	Diniz & Ribeiro (2008) Diniz (2009)	1988 to 2006	Little possibility of formal influence. Increasing desire of Representatives to act in foreign policy.
Requirements and Indications	Figueira (2009)	1988 to 2007	Most used instruments. They do not have the same regulatory strength as PLs and PDCs.
PECs for Change in the Decision-Making Process	Figueira (2009)	1988 to 2007	In general, parliamentarians seek to adopt the current North American model as a reference, where Congress has a strong role in counterbalancing the Executive.

Source: Figueira (2009); Diniz & Ribeiro (2008) and Diniz (2009). Data compiled by the author.

4.2 Use of Bills

Graph 1 – Bill Proposals Assessed by the CREDN from 1990 to 2017



Source: Data compiled by the author from the House of Representatives website. Graph generated by Excel, version 2016.

Figueira (2009), when analyzing the bills approved by the CREDN until 2007, observed few cases, although as an upward trend. Despite a decrease in 2010, this trend is still present today. Of the 193 cases analyzed, 89 were filed, and among the filed cases, the Representatives authored 76, which is around 55% of the proposals authored by the Representatives. By January 2018, only 5% of the bills submitted by the representatives had been transformed into an Ordinary Law, against 70% of bills submitted by the executive. Such data lead us to believe that, in the use of PLs to act in foreign policy, there is an increasing desire for participation of the House of Representatives, having proposed 145 PLs since the year 1990, and with an upward trend, as stated by Figueira. However, the protagonism follows from the Executive, with a considerably higher approval rate than the other actors.


Table 1 – Bill Proposals Assessed by the CREDN from 1990 to 2017

Author	Representatives			Executive			Others			
	Quantity	%Type	%Author	Quantity	%Type	%Author	Quantity	%Type	%Author	
Rejected	76	85%	55%	8	9%	20%	5	6%	33%	89
Attached to PL	11	92%	8%	0	0%	0%	1	8%	7%	12
Ordinary Law	9	24%	5%	26	70%	65%	2	6%	13%	37
Removed	3	0%	0%	0	0%	0%	0	0%	0%	3
Proceeding	46	78%	32%	6	10%	15%	7	12%	47%	59
Total	145			40			15			

Source: Data compiled by the author from the House of Representatives website. Table generated by Excel, version 2016.

4.3 Use of Legislative Decree Bills

Graph 2 – Legislative Decree Bills Proposals Assessed by the CREDN from 1990 to 2017



Source: Data compiled by the author from the House of Representatives website. Graph generated by Excel, version 2016.

The analysis of the Legislative Decree Bills showed a role of the Executive in the proposals already processed. There were 78 proposals for international acts by the Executive, against only 23 proposals by Federal Representatives.

Regarding the House's performance, two facts are particularly significant. Firstly, it was the existence of clear attempts at *ex-ante* influence, such as changes in the decision-making process for processing agreements through PDCs.

PDC 8/1999, by the Representative Pedro Valadares (PSB-SE) has in its menu the proposal to provide for the appreciation of international acts by the National Congress. Likewise, PDC 852/2001, by the Representative Henrique Fontana (PT-RS) calls a referendum to decide on Brazil's participation in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The clearest attempt at *ex-ante* action was PDC 11/2007, by the Representative Antonio Carlos Mendes Thame (PSDB-SP), which dealt with the establishment of guidelines for the negotiation of international acts that regulate Brazilian obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and cooperative actions to face global climate changes resulting from the rise in the average temperature on the planet.

It also drew attention to the high rate of rejection of proposals from representatives in this segment, even higher than in bills. Of the 28 proposals made by members of the House, 14 were filed⁹, about 60% of the proposals. This also meant that 74% of the rejected proposals came from representatives. In addition, no proposal has actually been approved. Among the remaining proposals, four were attached to other bills, 4 were removed by the author and only 2¹⁰ still have a chance of being approved, awaiting a rapporteur at the CREDN, having been submitted only in 2016 and 2017.

The data allow us to infer, as put forward by Diniz and Ribeiro, the existence of a strong desire for participation, evidenced by the presence of PDCs that aimed to give more space to the performance of the Representatives, but such attempts, as well as other bills, were blocked.

Table 2 – Legislative Decree Bills Proposals Assessed by the CREDN from 1990 to 2017

Autor	Deputados			Executivo			Outros			Total
	Quantidade	%Tipo	% Autor	Quantidade	%Tipo	% Autor	Quantidade	%Tipo	% Autor	
Rejected	14	74%	60%	4	21%	5%	1	5%	50%	19
Attached	3	100%	13%	0	0%	0%	0	0%	0%	3
Approved	0	0%	0%	55	100%	70%	0	0%	0%	55
Removed	4	100%	18%	0	0%	0%	0	0%	0%	4
Proceeding	2	10%	9%	18	86%	25%	1	4%	50%	21
Total	23			78			2			


Source: Data compiled by the author from the House of Representatives website. Table generated by Excel, version 2016.

⁹ All cases of filed proposals are justified by the use of Article 105 of the Internal Regulations of the House of Representatives, which indicates that the bill was still in progress at the end of the Legislature. Even those bills for which filing was requested ended up being filed again under the terms of the same article.

¹⁰ PDC 398/2016 suspends the Ordinance without number of Ordinance of May 17, 2016 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which grants diplomatic passports; PDC 849/2017 suspends the Presidential Decree No. 9,199/17 of November 21, 2017, which regulates the Migration Law (13.445/17).

4.4 Use of Requirements and Indications

Graph 3 – Requirements and Indications Proposals Assessed by the CREDN from 1990 to 2017




Source: Data compiled by the author from the House of Representatives website. Graph generated by Excel, version 2016.

As they are easy to process instruments, with very low political cost involved in their use, it was expected that Requirements and Indications¹¹ would be the most used instruments, despite having less legal force compared to Bills and Legislative Decree Bills. In the case of Requirements, specifically, there is a clear upward trend. There were an average of 158 cases per year of Requirements, with Requirements of Information, 24 cases per year of Indications by Representative.

¹¹ For the analysis, Requirements and Indications that had in their menu or indexation any of the following terms were selected: “internacional (international)”; “exterior (foreign)”; “exteriors (foreign)”; “exterior (abroad)”; “estrangeiro (foreigner)”

4.5 Use of PECs for Change in Decision Making

Graph 4 – PECs Related to Foreign Policy Processed in the House from 1990 to 2017



Source: Data compiled by the author from the House of Representatives website. Graph generated by Excel, version 2016.

Between the years 1990 and 2017, 54 Proposed Amendments to the Constitution were submitted to the House of Representatives, which dealt with foreign policy matters. Of these, only ten dealt with changes in the decision-making standard regarding International Acts.

Of these ten, only eight were proposed to give more prominence to the House of Representatives in international matters. This would happen, according to three of them, by establishing the competence of Congress to make *ex-post* changes in the content of the treaties, when in the legislative process. Other cases would be (one case) of the denunciation¹² of the International Act, (one case) of the choice, made by Congress, of negotiators for certain types of International Agreement, and (three cases) of the establishment of the prior appreciation of the National Congress, when the celebration certain international act.

None of them passed. Proposals made since 2015 are still in progress.

¹² Denunciation as a unilateral act, with the opposite legal effect to that produced by the instruments of ratification and accession. Through the denunciation, a State expresses its willingness to stop being part of the international agreement. With regard to bilateral treaties, the denunciation produces the extinction of the treaty itself; in relation to multilateral, the treaty remains in force, but without the participation of the State that formulates it.


Chart 2 – PECs for Change in Decision-Making in International Acts from 1990 to 2017

Focus at the Legislative	Change Type	PECs
Yes	Establishing that the National Congress is competent to decide on all international acts, and to make <i>ex-post</i> changes	PEC 36/1999; PEC 122/1999; PEC 402/2001;
Yes	Establishing the prior appreciation of the National Congress, when certain international acts are celebrated	PEC 478/2001; PEC 478/2001; PEC 70/2003
Yes	Establishing that it is up to Congress, after a claim, to choose negotiators for certain multilateral international acts	PEC 387/2001
Yes	Denunciation of international acts	PEC 75/2015
No	Establishing that certain International Acts are submitted to popular referendum	PEC 389/2005
No	Equating international human rights treaties approved by three-fifths of the two legislative houses	PEC 257/2016

Source: Data compiled by the author from the House of Representatives website. Chart generated by Excel, version 2016.

4.6 General Use of Instruments

Graph 5 – Use of Instruments by the House of Representatives from 1990 to 2017



Source: Data compiled by the author from the House of Representatives website.

Graph generated by Excel, version 2016.

In total, there were 5256 proposals by representatives in the last 28 years. In terms of comparison, disregarding Requirements and Indications, which can only be proposed by congressional representatives, there were 351 proposals from Federal Representatives, in 880 cases, about 40% of the total. With an average of foreign policy proposals of around 200 per year, it is essential to recognize the importance of studying the performance of the House of Representatives, even if it is not a protagonist action.

5 Conclusion

Throughout this work, an effort was made to place the House of Representatives in the current institutional configuration. The instruments considered here were described, as well as general aspects of the proceedings in the House. The review of the existing literature allowed pointing out the different aspects existing in the treatment of Foreign Policy when considering the Legislative as an actor, which, together with the analysis of the data, led us to a field of new possibilities, when considering possible paradigm changes in this area of study.

The general conclusion of the specialized authors of the area is that there is an increasing participation of the Legislative in international matters, indicated by the aspects that consider a

flexibility in what is in fact influence, and admit direct and indirect influence beyond the mere approval of *ex-post* acts. The analyses carried out here showed that it is safe to say that the conclusions that have been reached are still true today, given that they are consistent with the conclusions reached in this study.

There is a constant use of instruments, with frequent upward moments. Therefore, the analysis of the data allows us to infer a growing desire for participation of the House of Representatives in foreign policy, as explained by the Legislative Decree Bills and the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution. The use of Bills, Requirements and Indications is also constant and high, with Requirements and Indications being the most used instruments, followed by Bills.

Although the analysis did not include mechanisms for informal and indirect action, we believe that the use of the instruments, as described in this paper, is a strong indicator that there is sufficient evidence to question the common sense of the Legislative's participation, represented here by the House of Representatives. Only as a formality of automatic seal of international treaties, and that the House must be seen as an active actor, which moves almost 200 foreign policy proposals of its own, annually, and which deserves to have this performance studied more deeply.

In advancing the theme, it would be interesting to study why, despite the indications of a desire for greater participation in foreign policy on the part of parliamentarians, they themselves bar the attempts to change the decision-making pattern. As well as whether there really is a thematic role in the themes that they would deal with foreign policy, such as agenda soft items.

References

ABRANCHES, Sérgio. *Presidencialismo de Coalizão: o dilema institucional brasileiro*. Rio de Janeiro: **Dados**, v.31, n. 1, 1988.

ALEXANDRE, Cristina V. M., **O congresso brasileiro e a política externa (1985-2005)**. Rio de Janeiro: EdPUC, Instituto de Relações Internacionais, 2006.

ARAÚJO, Paulo Magalhães. Bicameralismo e Poder Executivo no Brasil: revisão de projetos presidenciais entre 1989-2010. **Opinião Pública**, Campinas, v. 20, n. 1, p. 67-95, abr. 2014.

BAENA SOARES, João C. **O Processo Legislativo e a Aprovação de Acordos Internacionais Assinados pelo Brasil**. Brasília: Instituto Rio Branco, 2005.

BALEEIRO, Aliomar; SOBRINHO, Barbosa L. **Constituições Brasileiras**, 3. ed. Brasília: Senado Federal, Subsecretaria de Edições Técnicas, 2012.5 v.

BONAVIDES, Paulo. A evolução constitucional do Brasil. **Estudos Avançados**. São Paulo, v. 14, n. 40, p. 155-176, dez. 2000.

BRASIL. Congresso Nacional. **Atribuições do Congresso Nacional**. Disponível em: <http://www.congressonacional.leg.br/portal/congresso/atribuicoes>. Acesso em: 28 de abril de 2016.

BRASIL. [Constituição (1988)]. **Constituição Da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988**. Disponível em: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/ConstituicaoCompilado.htm. Acesso em: 28 abr. 2016.

CARDOSO, Evorah. **Demandas do Legislativo pela condução da política externa brasileira: constituição de um novo veto player?** São Paulo: USP, 2006.

CASON, Jeffrey; POWER, Timothy. Presidentialization, Pluralization, and the Rollback of Itamaraty: Explaining Change in Brazilian Foreign Policy Making in the Cardoso-Lula Era. **International Political Science Review**, v. 30, n. 2, p. 117-140, 2009.

DE FARIA, Carlos A. P. O Itamaraty e a política externa brasileira: do insulamento à busca de coordenação dos atores governamentais e de cooperação com os agentes societários. Rio de Janeiro: **Contexto Internacional**, v. 34, n. 1, p. 311-355, 2012.

DINIZ, Simone. Atos internacionais e atuação do legislativo. **Teoria & Pesquisa: Revista de Ciência Política**, v. 17, n.11, p. 19-32, 2009.

DINIZ, Simone; RIBEIRO, Cláudio. O. The role of the Brazilian congress in foreign policy: an empirical contribution to the debate. Rio de Janeiro: **Brazilian Political Science Review**, v. 3, n. 5, p. 21-39, 2008.

FELIU, Pedro & MIRANDA, Rosana. Congresso Nacional e Política Externa. O caso do envio de tropas ao Haiti Argentina, Brasil e Chile. **Revista Política Hoje**, v. 20, n. 1, p. 32-41, 2011.

FERREIRA, Marcelo C. Congresso Nacional e política externa da integração: um controverso debate acadêmico. **Ponto-e-vírgula**, v. 5, n. 12, p. 202-214, 2009

FIGUEIRA, Ariane C. R. **Processo Decisório em Política Externa no Brasil**. São Paulo: USP, Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, 2009.

FIGUEIREDO, Argelina; LIMONGI, Fernando. **Executivo e Legislativo na Nova República**. São Paulo: EdFGV, 1999.

FIORINA, Morris P. **Congress: The Keystone of Washington Establishment**. New Haven: Yale Press, 1989.

GALDINO, Manoel; OLIVEIRA, Amâncio J. S. N.; RIBEIRO, Pedro F. Política externa chilena e espectro ideológico político-partidário: um estudo sobre a Câmara dos Deputados 2002-2006). Rio de Janeiro: **Dados**, v. 52, n. 4, p. 835-870, 2010.

GERRING, J. Mere Description. **British Journal of Political Science**, n. 42, p. 721-746, 2010.

LIMA, Maria R. S.; SANTOS, Fabiano. O Congresso e a Política de Comércio Exterior. **Lua Nova**, n. 52, p.121-149, 2001.

LIMA, Maria R. S. Instituições Democráticas e Política Exterior. **Contexto Internacional**, v. 22, n. 2, p.31-47, 2000.

LIMONGI, Fernando. A democracia no Brasil: presidencialismo, coalizão partidária e processo decisório. **Novos Estudos**, São Paulo, n. 76, p. 17-41, nov. 2006.

LIMONGI, Fernando. **Da Teoria da Modernização ao Novo Institucionalismo**. São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo, 2002.

LINDSAY, J. Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters. **Political Science Quarterly**, v. 107, n. 4, p. 607-628, 1993.

MARCH, James G.; OLSEN, Johan, P. The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life. **The American Political Science Review**, v. 78, n. 3, p. 734-749, 1984.

MARTIN, Lisa. **Democratic Commitments: legislatures and international cooperation**. Princeton University Press, 2000.

MCDONNELL, Robert M. **Explaining the Determinants of Foreign Policy Voting Behaviour in the Brazilian Houses of Legislature, with a Focus on the Senate**. São Paulo: EdUSP, 2016.

MENDONÇA, Christopher B. O Congresso Nacional e a Política Externa. *In*: SEMINÁRIO NACIONAL DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS, 1., Brasília, 2012.

MILANI, Carlos R. S. & PINHEIRO; Letícia. A Política Externa Brasileira e Os Desafios De Sua Caracterização Como Política Pública. Rio de Janeiro: **Contexto Internacional**, v. 35, n. 1, p. 11-41, 2013.

MONTESQUIEU. **O Espírito das Leis**. São Paulo: Martin Claret, 2010.

MORAIS, Thais. O Debate Em Torno Do Sistema Político Brasileiro: Análises, Polêmicas E Desafios. **Revista Inter-Legere**, v. 3, n. 5, p. 21-37, 2009.

NEVES, João de C. O Congresso Nacional e a política externa brasileira. *In*: ALTEMANI, Henrique; LESSA, Antônio Carlos (org.). **Relações internacionais do Brasil: temas e agendas**. São Paulo: Editora Saraiva, 2006, p. 43-61. v. 2.

NICOLAU, Jairo M. **Eleições no Brasil: do Império aos dias atuais**. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2012.

NICOLAU, Jairo M. **Sistemas Eleitorais**. 5.ed. rev. e atual. Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2004.

OLIVEIRA, Amâncio J. **Partidos políticos e política externa: o comportamento legislativo na Câmara de Deputados, 1995-2009**. São Paulo: Centro de Estudos das Negociações Internacionais, 2013.

OLIVEIRA, Rodrigo R. **O Congresso Nacional e a Política Externa Brasileira**. Posicionamento dos senadores frente às negociações para a formação da ALCA (1994-2005). Brasília: EdUnB, 2011.

PINHEIRO, Letícia; SALOMÓN, Mónica. Análise de Política Externa e Política Externa Brasileira: trajetória, desafios e possibilidades de um campo de estudos. **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, v. 56, n. 1, p. 40-59, 2013.

POLETTI, Ronaldo. **Constituições Brasileiras**, 3. ed. Brasília: Senado Federal, Subsecretaria de Edições Técnicas, 2012.v. 3.

PORTO, Walter C. **Constituições Brasileiras**, 3. ed. Brasília: Senado Federal, Subsecretaria de Edições Técnicas, 2012. v. 3

PUTNAM, Robert D. Diplomacia e política doméstica: a lógica dos jogos de dois níveis. **Revista de Sociologia Política**, Curitiba, v. 18, n. 36, p. 147-174, 2010

SCHIMIDT, Stefanie T. **Política Externa e o Poder Legislativo**: um olhar sobre a Comissão de Relações Exteriores e Defesa Nacional do Senado Federal. São Paulo: USP, 2011.

TÁCITO, Caio. **Constituições Brasileiras**, 3. ed. Brasília: Senado Federal, Subsecretaria de Edições Técnicas, 2012. v. 3

TSEBELIS, George. Processo Decisório em Sistemas Políticos: veto players no presidencialismo, parlamentarismo, multicameralismo e pluripartidarismo. **Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais**, n. 34. p. 48-71, 1997.

WEINGAST, Barry R. Congress, Regulation and the Decline of Nuclear Power. **Public Policy**, n. 22, p.23-47, 1980.

Article received on 2020-30-01

Resubmitted on 2020-30-04

Accepted on 2020-11-05