



## **POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF BAHIA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: THE POWER ELITES DURING THE MILITARY REGIME**

Maurício Ferreira Silva<sup>1</sup>  
Ana Quele Passos<sup>2</sup>

**Abstract:** This paper deals with the political representation of the state of Bahia in the House of Representatives during the military regime. The objective is to identify, from the socio-political analysis, the major social segments that stood out in the legislative house in four analytical categories: gender, educational level, professional career and party affiliation. The methodological course was based on document analysis, collection and systematization of biographical data, following a qualitative and quantitative descriptive approach. The work results in the construction of a political radiography that, in turn, presents two important conclusions about the representative profile: the elitist bias, due to the identification with the privilege groups of society and the ideological attachment to the military governments.

**Keywords:** Political representation; House of Representatives; Military Regime; Elites of Bahia.

### **1 Introduction**

The wave of coups experienced by independent states since the 1960s in South America consolidated the interests of conservative elites who, based on authoritarianism and political repression, expanded throughout the region. The coups d'état through which Brazil (1964), Bolivia (1964), Argentina (1966; 1976), Chile (1973) and Uruguay (1973) passed, reverberated a mixture of interests of the national elites together with the pretensions of the armed forces, interconnected with the wishes of transnational political forces. In the Brazilian case, the civil-military dictatorship had the support of nationally recognized politicians, mainly linked to the ARENA (National Renewal Alliance), a party that represented the political interests of the military in the bipartisan system imposed after the coup.

In the process of strengthening the regime, this conservative coalition, represented mainly by military, industrial, financial and rural segments, was responsible for active participation in public positions of political representation, both at the regional and national levels. In the case of Bahia, as pointed out by Dantas Neto (2004), the coup reoriented the political-administrative line of the state government, revoked mandates, recovered the national influence of Juracy Magalhães and converted Luís Viana Filho and Antônio Carlos Magalhães into influential political figures in the regime. Under an exceptional political scenario, the

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<sup>1</sup> Political Scientist. Associate Professor at the Center for Arts, Humanities and Letters (CAHL) at the Federal University of Recôncavo da Bahia (UFRB). He works in undergraduate courses and in the Graduate Programs in Social Policy and Territories (POSTERR) and Social Sciences (PPGCS).

<sup>2</sup> Master's student in Social Sciences at the PPGCS-UFRB. Member of the Study and Research Group on Politics and Society (GEPPS-UFRB).

economic development project focused, based on the prominent role of the local political elite, on the precepts of the so-called “conservative modernization”.

This work has as main objective to analyze the elitist profile of the representation of Bahia in the House of Representatives during the military regime. In specific terms, it is divided into three stages: the first is consistent with the identification of representatives elected to represent Bahia in the Federal House during the military regime (1967-1982); the second refers to the identification, based on a survey of the representatives’ biographical profile, of the link to the influence groups in the four selected analytical categories - gender, educational level, professional career and party affiliation; the latter investigates the political alignment of the group of representatives with the military regime.

The research, of a descriptive character, followed a qualitative and quantitative approach, having as a starting point the mapping of the biographical profile of the federal representatives of Bahia who exercised mandates, which includes eventual alternates raised to the position of incumbents. In addition, the outlined methodological path was based on document analysis, collection and systematization of biographical data through secondary sources, such as the database of the Documentation and Information Center (CEDI), the Historical-Bibliographic Dictionary of Brazil (DHBB) of the Center for Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil (CPDOC/FGV) and data available on the websites of the House of Representatives and the Superior Electoral Court.

The article is structured in two main parts. The first is intended for debate around the theoretical fields of political elites and political representation in the light of the socio-political framework of the military regime. The second, in turn, presents the results of data collection around the four variables linked to the profile of parliamentary representation.

## **2 Elites and political representation**

The theoretical and methodological debate in the field of the theory of elites involves the recognition of a group of command, leader and governor, who in turn occupies strategic positions in a given power relationship. These principles are evidenced by distinguishing factors that characterize the elite and the “non-elite”. In this perspective, in a specific social context, the existence of a mass (majority of the population) that is not qualified to govern is intrinsic, because it does not have the necessary conditions to occupy certain spaces of power and command.

Classical theorists introduced the discussion of elites as an analytical and explanatory principle of social, political and cultural organization, which considered the imminent presence of hierarchies and “natural” inequalities among members of society. Such a position shows that the elitist view aimed at understanding political organization in praxis, interrelated with the

analysis and criticism of the concept of democracy that supposedly distanced itself from its ideal precepts. Therefore, with regard to socio-political organization, this assumption justifies the need for a ruling minority, capable of governing the majority of the population.

Society is always a dynamic unit of two factors: minorities and the masses. Minorities are specially qualified individuals or groups of individuals. The mass is the group of people not especially qualified [...] It is, of course, plain in these “upper” classes, when and as long as they really are so, there is much more likelihood of finding men who adopt the “great vehicle,” whereas the “lower” classes normally comprise individuals of minus quality. (ORTEGA Y GASSET, 1959, p. 58-60).

The sociological sense of the notion of elites gains resonance with the work of Pareto (1984), which gives it two different definitions. The elite comprised the upper stratum of a society, responsible for the organization, control and direction of the lower stratum, defined as “non-elite”. The upper stratum would comprise two elites, the governing and the non-governing.

In general, what defines the composition and the establishment in the groups in question are the individual aptitudes, therefore, according to this conception, the steering group has the necessary attributes for the control action. It is not, therefore, an isolated and circumstantial phenomenon, considering that, according to Gaetano Mosca, the separation between ruling groups and directed groups is a historical phenomenon, applied to the most distinct forms of social organization. This makes it impossible, for example, “for a democracy to function without the action of the popular masses being coordinated and disciplined by an organized minority, that is, also by a ruling class” (MOSCA, 1968, p. 307).

The governing power of the minority is manifested, above all, by the absence of conditions of self-control by the majority. Pareto and Mosca defend the notion that every society needs a ruling minority – a ruling elite – endowed with political qualities for the exercise of power. This elite, in turn, is not static, because it undergoes changes in its composition from time to time, either due to the internal dynamics itself or due to the recruitment of new members from the lower strata of society. In this light, the classic precepts of democracy's rotating leadership, especially universal suffrage, pose a risk to balance.

However, in the political struggle, in order to obtain the suffrages of the majority, each group strives to conform, at least in appearance, to the ideas and feelings that predominate in that same majority. This often allows liberal regimes to develop extraordinary strength, but, on the other hand, this obligation of conformity causes the ruling class to be influenced by more numerous elements, who are less aware of the real needs of society. This is the reason why the greatest danger to liberal institutions is the consequences of the exercise of the right of suffrage by the most uneducated sections of the population. (*Idem*, p. 313-314)

When considering associations as a constitutive means of the general will, Robert Michels prescribed the iron law of oligarchies that moved by the need for organization that

implies, in turn, the existence of a ruling minority. Among these channels, Michels (1982) observes that the increasing bureaucratization resorts to a distance with the will of the governed masses, therefore, representative democracy in its praxis complies with requirements prescribed by elitist theorists. Based on the analysis of the composition of political representation, it indicates that this picture was historically composed of *personas* who on a large scale belonged to groups of elites corresponding to each other.

In view of this argument, Josep Schumpeter returns to the principle of ruling elites as a characteristic of real democracy. Based on the precept of utility, Schumpeter (1984) translates the existence of elites as a necessary assumption for the conduct of democracy itself. Consequently, his criticism goes beyond the idealism prescribed in the original sense of the term, by which the people are seen as conductors of the democratic will and praxis. In this sense, direct participation and self-government of the people become impossible, because individuals tend to practices now distanced from reason and produce different perceptions that clash with the consensus predicted in the classical theory of democracy. Due to such contradictions, the tenor of democracy in a political sphere is materialized in the competition between elites and conflicts for power are guided by what he called “self-interest”.

The elitist assumptions surrounding political representation are based on a scenario of restricted competition, that is, established based on rules for controlling the functioning of representative democracy. However, it is important to note that the rise of elites in political representation is not limited to contexts of limited competition. As Dahl (2005) points out about contemporaneity, it is possible to verify the prominence of misrepresentations in the constitution of parliaments in the context of polyarchy democracy, which results in the absence of symmetry between the representations with the social layers represented.

In contemporary legislative bodies, professional and middle-class occupations are numerically over-represented; occupations in factory work are underrepresented (even among representatives of labor, socialist and communist parties, as well as many other categories – farmers and housemakers, for example). (DAHL, 2005, p. 43).

## **2.1 Representation in the exception regime**

The movement to substitute democratic regimes for dictatorships, verified in Latin America since the 1950s, occurred through coups d'état led by elitist segments of national and international interests with the use of the armed forces. The resulting military regimes predominated in the region for two decades, and “it was only in the late 1970s and 1980s that the military withdrew significantly from direct government control throughout the region” (HARTLYN, 2009, p. 128).

In Brazil, after the 1964 coup, the military imposed a model of government that tried to converge democratic precepts to dictatorial actions. From an ideological point of view, the

regime endeavored to legitimize the discourse on the need for "revolution" as a mechanism to combat the "communist danger" that threatened democracy. Concomitantly, in the sense of structural political dynamics, it was supported by the ambiguity of authoritarian actions - such as the closing of the National Congress – and the maintenance of a version of electoral competition, with legislative elections and the existence of political parties. Thus, Institutional Act 2 (AI2) imposed the mechanism of two parties for electoral disputes, the so-called bipartisanship.

In a broad sense, it can be said, however, that the “democratic guise” did not remove the elitist and authoritarian bias of the government, on the contrary. Military forces in collusion with sectors of civil society carried out the coup, aggregating “a heterogeneous group of new and old conspirators against Jango and the labor movement: civil and military, liberal and authoritarian, businessmen and politicians, middle class and bourgeoisie”. (NAPOLITANO, 2014, 43-44).


If, in scenarios of wide competition, the variables of privileges of the elites can be guaranteed, as Dahl (2005) points out, it is possible to verify that, in the case of the Brazilian military regime, the bicameral mechanism and restrictions on universal suffrage allowed greater control by the military over the representative bodies that existed before the 1964 coup. The competitive constraint, as can be seen around political representation in the state of Bahia, allowed the election of political actors from the privileged strata of society who were positioned, in ideological terms, in line with the political interests of the ruling elite.

### **3 Results**

Studies on Brazilian political representation show that, historically, some elites have stood out in legislative houses, which has provided a significant representative absence of social segments, such as women, blacks and indigenous people. Added to these are the groups with lower purchasing power and low schooling. On the other hand, as we will see in this section from the perspective of the period that comprises the military regime, there is a predominance of privileged segments composed of men with higher education in areas of social prestige.

### 3.1 The male supremacy

**Graph 1:** Representatives from Bahia by gender (1967-1982)



**Source:** Data organized by the authors.

Male representatives, as shown in the graph above mostly represented the parliamentary bench of Bahia at the House of Representatives. In the 43rd Legislature (1967-1970), the representation was 97.2% of men against only 2.8% of women. In the following legislature (44th) the percentage score shows 95.8% male representation compared to 4.2% female representation. If the female representation rate is low in the first two legislatures, it acquires mediocre contours in the following legislatures, where the total absence of female representation is noted. This means that no woman participated in the political representation of the state of Bahia between the years 1975 and 1982. Thus, as a result, a more elitist bias can be seen in the second half of the military regime, with male hegemony in the political representation of Bahia.

However, it appears that, in the general framework, women representatives exercised only 1.4% of this representation. In this case, it is noteworthy that the election of the only woman is intertwined with the contrast of a historical context marked by female underrepresentation and, on the other hand, by the arrangement played by political leaders in the transmission of political capital to supporters and family members. The teacher Neci Novais, wife of Manuel Cavalcanti Novais, a member of the elite of Bahia with a strong insertion in the political scenario of the state that dates back to the early 1930s, played the role of the only woman elected to the House of Representatives by Bahia in the surveyed period. Together with Manuel Novais, she served in the 42nd legislature (1963-1967) linked to the Brazilian Labor Party – PTB and, after the decree of bipartisanship, in the 43rd (1967-1971) and 44th (1971-1975) legislatures, this time already linked to the ARENA.

The finding that, in absolute terms, only one woman entered office during the period, exposes the elitist bias centered on the male figure as the “controller” of the political field in the state. It should be noted that this reality finds resonance on the national scene, as the military regime was characterized by male supremacy in the command posts of the armed forces and, consequently, in the administrative positions of the subnational and national governments.


### **3.2 An elite of higher education**

Brazilian politics has historically been marked by the presence of actors and representatives who have a high educational level (RODRIGUES, 2009). When analyzing the bachelors in Brazilian politics, Simões (2006) points out that these, mainly in the area of law, played a great role in the political field and had the characteristic of the issue of training through educational formation.

The high school education of representatives is a striking feature of the national political representation framework. Considering the period researched here, it can be concluded that the majority of the population was excluded from the representative activity, considering that the participation rate of higher education in the total of initial enrollments represented only 2% until the 1970s (PNUD/IPEA, 1996). This exclusionary and elite condition of representation remains during the 1980s, because the rate of able people who attended higher education did not exceed 6% (FIGUEIREDO FILHO, 2010).

In regional terms, it appears that the state of Bahia was marked by a high rate of illiteracy during the 1960s. This reality motivated the students gathered at the First National Seminar on University Reform of 1961, organized by the National Students Union (Portuguese acronym: UNE), to denounce the educational system, because “only 1% of the population of Bahia had access to higher education” (SOUZA, OLIVEIRA and MAGALHÃES, 2015). In 1990, the average number of years of studies for the population of Bahia was less than 04 (four), which placed the state in the sixth lowest expectation of educational development. (PNUD/IPEA, 1996).

Unlike the majority of the population of Bahia at that time, the federal representatives of the state had a high level of education ratified by the title of higher education, which distinguishes them socially. The data below constitute, in our understanding, further evidence of the high level of elitism of Bahia's political representation during the period.

**Graph 2:** Representatives from Bahia by educational level

**Source:** Data organized by the authors.

The level of education of federal representatives in Bahia is in line with the profile presented at the national level, which portrays the characteristic formation of elite groups of the time. According to data from the 43rd legislature, 97.2% of the elected representatives had a higher education degree, the highest rate seen in the analyzed period; on the other hand, those who held the secondary education level accounted for only 2.8% of the total.

Subsequent legislatures are consistent with the same average of higher education, with an index above 90%. Secondary education holders represent less than 5% of the 70 representatives who served 120 terms as representatives of the parliamentary bench of Bahia in the House of Representatives during the military regime. This, as stated, exposes the exclusionary face of the representation process in the four legislatures surveyed.

### 3.3 Professional career: the social prestige in vogue

The literature on the political recruitment process, the composition of political-institutional bodies and the study of political elites incorporate the category “professional career” as an important analytical indicator of the political class and its professionalization. Such categorization, in addition to describing and tracing information, can also highlight aspects of influence for the political recruitment process of the time. According to Norris (2013), political recruitment goes beyond the mere indication of representation and configures the selection of specific actors, in view of the arrangement of strategic positions in the political spheres.

In this way, professional occupations, especially those that have a greater technical understanding of the laws, can contribute to access to parliament, such as professions that come



from the legal area or that have a certain social prestige, such as liberal professionals such as doctors, engineers and entrepreneurs. According to Codato, Costa and Massimo (2014), the position of a given profession has the potential to provide criteria for convergence with recruitment and the professionalization of political activity:

The three criteria linked to the aspiring a politician's profession, which, combined, would measure the opportunities offered by the social relations system, are: a) flexible career (generous vacations, time availability and professional autonomy); b) social status (position of the occupation before others according to the recognition and prestige socially shared in a given community 12); and c) affinity with political activity (occupations that allow familiarity with the public machinery and with the stratagems of politics or provide a network of important contacts in the environment). From this, three categories of occupations arise which differently meet the requirements stipulated to do well in the political business: professions with a high disposition for the political activity, with a medium disposition for the political activity or with a low disposition for the political activity (CODATO, COSTA AND MASSIMO, 2014, p.355).

Even when considering the specificities of the researched period, especially with regard to the suffrage limitations for the legislature, it can be seen that the profile of representation is consistent with the precepts of differentiation and consequent privilege in terms of professions. According to Simões (2006), among lawyers, legislators, judges, Law professors, legal writers and attorneys, there are common characteristics that differentiate them socially, giving them status and high social recognition:

What do among lawyers, legislators, judges, Law professors, legal writers and attorneys have in common? First: they have a common language reference, what has been called a foreign language to the layperson and of formation; second: they are recognized as having this specific type of knowledge; and, finally: they are accepted as pairs by each other. In short, they are part of a *coterie*. (Group of people who provide mutual support) (SIMÕES, 2006, p.38)

Through such descriptions, groups of professionals organize themselves as members of a *coterie* (group of people who provide mutual support), which contributes in a shared way to social recognition and prestige. In this sense, the hypothesis that guides this category of analysis infers that the political representation of Bahia in the House of Representatives in the researched legislatures was made up of politicians belonging to socially recognized professions.

It should be noted that, according to the information provided and cataloged by the House of Representatives' Documentation and Information Center, some representatives declared more than one profession. Thus, the professional occupations of the 70 representatives of Bahia elected between 1967 and 1979 were analyzed, among alternates and incumbents, who listed 143 professional occupations. In addition, there is the dubiousness between the professions declared and the professions exercised, considering that the archives do not differentiate between the original training and full professional practice. In this sense, there are situations in which the representative obtained a certain academic education, migrated to

another activity and recorded the whole course as a “profession”, as was the case of the representative Antônio Carlos Magalhães who, in his profile, inserted the professions “doctor and journalist” without ever having practiced professional activity in medicine, despite academic training in this field.

The multiplicity of declarations, however, indicates adherence to the professions of greatest distinction and social recognition. Regardless of political parties, these professions are characteristic of elite groups in society in Bahia, which denotes the important role they play in accessing the framework of political and institutional representation. For better understanding, the professional staff was organized based on the following distribution: Legal Careers (lawyer, judge, public prosecutor, *desembargador* and public prosecutor), Rural Activities (rancher, farmer, agriculturalist, grower and landowner), Teachers, Health Professionals, Public Officials, Public Servers, Industrial, Commercial and Banking, Military, Press (Journalist and television communicologist) and Others (includes the professions that are presented less frequently: civil engineer, agronomic engineer, economist, businessman, accountant, administrator and accounting technician).

**Table 1:** Professional Career

<b>PROFESSIONAL CAREER</b>	<b>%</b>
Legal Careers	25.2%
Rural Activities	16%
Teachers	14%
Health professionals	11.9%
Public Servers	6.3%
Industrial, Commercial and Banking	6.3%
Press	5.6%
Military	1.4%
Others	13.3%

**Source:** Data organized by the authors.

The representation of Bahia during the military regime has in its professional career framework the preponderance of professions from the legal area, with 25.2%. Subsequently, rural activities with an index of 16%, while teachers and health professionals represented 14% and 11.9% respectively. In line with the categories presented by Codato, Costa and Massimo (2014), there is a prominence of professional occupations of high social recognition, such as health professionals, who here, in turn, were mostly made up of doctors (with the exception of two dentists). This profile also shows for flexible careers and others with greater professional autonomy, such as legal careers and those who exercise rural activities.

In addition to professionals from the legal and medical fields, it is worth mentioning

here the citations to the areas of education, public services and communication. It is possible to verify that the citation to the category "teacher", with predominance of link with the universities, indicates the "belonging" to the academic elite, providing a certain intellectual condition to the political activity. Finally, the average presence of public servants and journalists/press indicates both proximity and expertise around "public affairs", fostering the necessary political capital to enter the political sphere.

### 3.4 Party-political profile: support for the regime

The artificial democratic structure symbolized by bipartisanship took on strong connotations in Bahia in favor of the ARENA. The surveyed period indicates this supremacy both from the perspective of the House of Representatives, as we will see below, and from the control of the executive branch, because all the governors "chosen" by the Legislative Assembly of Bahia were linked to the party of the situation, the political arm of the military regime. For its party, MDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement), in addition to representing the oppositional statute in isolation, was obliged to live with internal differences during the period. For Jacobina (2010), the MDB of Bahia can be divided into "authentic-orthodox" and "moderate-adhesives":


In the MDB there was the "authentic" group that exposed a strong criticism of the regime and government of Antônio Carlos Magalhães (ACM) 1971-1975 and the MDB adherent that was against these criticisms, especially the ACM [...] Members of the authentic MDB of Bahia, in fact made opposition, while the MDB adherent made agreements with the Arena and in some cases, as in the parliamentary elections of 1974, this faction prevented members who represented the greater opposition from having space in the media. (JACOBINA, 2010, p.40).

The opposing fragility contributed to the strengthening of the governing party, which grew supported by the personalism of local political figures who had a strong insertion among national political elites. Consequently, the concentration of political representation in some interest groups and the consequent "personification" in certain leaders is evident. This phenomenon can be seen, as pointed out by Dantas Neto (2003), in the performance of Antônio Carlos Magalhães, protagonist of the political group called by specialized literature as *carlismo*.

From 1967 to 1974, *Carlismo* established itself as the main force of the ARENA in Bahia, although it remained, still, as a political group only state. The City Hall of Salvador (1967-1970) served as an administrative window and political springboard and the effort continued during the first term of governor of ACM (1971-1975), when, at the time when it maintained the civil society of Bahia under strong authoritarian constriction, invested against political-electoral bases of rival conservative groups, with the intention, in part consummated, to neutralize or pulverize them. (DANTAS NETO, 2003, p.223).

In general terms, the party structure of the ARENA, which incorporated specific groups of local interest with a strong rise in the state, linked to the repressive dynamics inherent in the military regime, consolidated the situationist political representation, both in the executive sphere, with the indirect choice of the governor by the Legislative Assembly, as well as the legislative, as shown in the graph below:

**Graph 3:** Representation by party bench



**Source:** Data organized by the authors.

The data related to representation in the legislature demonstrate the predominance of politicians linked to the ARENA during the entire period surveyed. In the 43rd Legislature (1967 to 1971), the representation of the bench of Bahia was formed by 80.6% of representatives of the ARENA, compared to 19.4% of the MDB. In the 44th legislature, the MDB grew by 1.4%, reaching 20.8%; however, the ARENA maintains supremacy, reaching 79.2% of the representatives.

During the years 1975 to 1979, which correspond to the 45th legislature, the ARENA resumed growth, reaching 80.5% of seats, against 18.5% of the MDB. It is worth mentioning that this constitutes the lowest representation index presented by the MDB of Bahia at the Federal House during the military regime. However, already in the midst of the political opening movements, the MDB manages to expand its participation, even if in a timid way: in the 46th legislature, it reaches 22.9% of the seats, against 77.1% of the ARENA.

In short, as already pointed out, ARENA ensures, during the military regime, its preponderance with regard to the political representation of Bahia in the House of Representatives. This finding is evident in the analysis of the period in an integrated manner, where it appears that the ARENA made up 79.5% of the representation, compared to 20.5% of the MDB.

The political arrangement highlights the successful organization of the ARENA in

Bahia. According to Madeira (2002), mainly the politicians who came from the former National Democratic Union (UDN) and the Republican Party (PR) constituted the ARENA of Bahia. These political actors already had a strong influence due to the trajectory of both state and national politics, resulting in considerable party cohesion that contributed to a high degree of political stability on the federal scene.

It was found that the ARENA of Bahia, in addition to having federal benches made up basically of experienced representatives, with relatively long previous trajectories and with direct ties to the political parties existing in the multiparty phase prior to the period analyzed, has a dynamic due to the predominance of its main leaders. This analysis identified the presence of five leaders, at the forefront, heading the main wings of the party in the State [Antônio Carlos Magalhães, Roberto Santos, Lomanto Júnior, Luís Viana Filho/Neto and Juraci/Jutaí Magalhães]. (MADEIRA, 2002, p. 45).

In contrast, the MDB of Bahia was composed of the majority of the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) and the Social Democratic Party (PTB). This composition led to the creation of internal groups that, in general, pointed out different positions in relation to the military regime. In this sense, it is possible to affirm, still, that the “authentic ones” succumbed to the governmental articulations taken over by the “adherents”, which influenced the electoral results and contributed to the strengthening of the ARENA. The exponential growth of the MDB at the national level in the 1974 election is undeniable proof of this reality, which shows that, for the House of Representatives, its vote went from 28% to 44% (BENEVIDES, 1986). Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, the average MDB vote in Bahia was 20.5%, with its worst performance exactly in the 1974 election, registering 18.5%. In short, the national advance of the opposition represented by the MDB was not reflected in Bahia.

The relations established in this scenario point to the support of representatives from Bahia to military governments. Such support, as highlighted by Dias (2016), dates back to the period before the 1964 coup, with the assembly of the coalition that elected Lomanto Júnior as Governor in 1962 and with participation in the conspiracies for the establishment of the military regime in the country:

The circle closed at the congress with the active participation of representatives from Bahia, among them, Antônio Carlos Magalhães who besides having negotiated the candidacy of Castelo Branco behind the scenes was the main disseminator of the Sorbonne tactic of creating a tense psychological climate that favored the fall of Goulart. Between May 1963 and March 1964, of the 23 statements made by federal representative Antônio Carlos Magalhães, 15 referred to President João Goulart or his close assistants with the clear intention of eroding the image of the ruler and promoting his political destabilization. (DIAS, 2016, p. 35).

Finally, scenario of the party in question leads us to two important conclusions. First, it appears from the data presented that in no legislature surveyed the supremacy of the ARENA was threatened, even in the period of relative rise of the MDB at the national level. Because of

this, secondly, there is a significant institutional adhesion of the representation of Bahia to the imposed regime. In addition to partisan ties, this adhesion resides in the very exclusive and elitist essence of representation, because even composing the authorized opposition to the government, the MDB, mostly “adherent”, recruited its representatives from the privileged source of society in Bahia. These congregated elements contributed to diminish the "weight" of the parliament as an instrument of struggle and resistance against the military dictatorship.

#### **4 Final considerations**

The notion that the political formation of the Brazilian State was composed by the ruling elites of each era (CARVALHO, 2003) and that was configured in the process of circulation and reproduction of these groups acquires veracity in the analysis of the representation of Bahia in the Federal House during the military regime. The elitism of representation worked in all aspects in the case of Bahia.

The main reason for the success of the process is due to the strategy of the military ruling class to adapt liberal democratic precepts to decision centralization, which created a paradoxical situation within the scope of the national political organization. As of the 1964 coup, society was limited in its ability to choose political representation: suffrage only for the legislative branch in a context of competition limited to two political parties, one of the order and the other of the opposition. As a control strategy, the limitation on participation aimed at limiting the opposition’s access to decision-making channels, because the leading positions of the executive branch at national and regional levels were already curtailed.

The work sought to demonstrate the establishment of this elitist profile based on the investigation of four variables. It can be seen that the political representation of Bahia in the House of Representatives during the military regime was organized according to the lines that point to the reordering of local elites to the political sphere. Therefore, the socio-political characteristics of the representatives in Bahia point to a profile composed mainly of male representatives, with a high level of education, which presents professional occupations with greater willingness to access the public sphere and great social recognition. In the partisan sphere, there is the ascendancy of the party of order over the opposition, even in the elections in which the MDB managed to expand its electoral participation at the national level, which constitutes the unconditional adhesion of the federal legislature to the military regime.

It should be noted that the movements ordered by the elites are evident, between the lines of the relations of the political-electoral system, which, in turn, is also perceived in the group that permeates the composition of the political representation of Bahia. Therefore, for Simoni Júnior, Dardaqué & Mingardi (2016), the more similar the political body in relation to those represented in its social cleavages, the smaller the distance of interests between these sets

of actors would be, and therefore the greater chance of dealing with themes that really were of public interest.

The institutional representative profile resulting from the analysis process differs from the social reality of the state in the period, which is characterized, above all, by the low level of higher education and a greater demographic balance between men and women (Brasil, 2020). This panorama of conflict between the social indices and the data evidenced in the profile of the representation of Bahia results, in the understanding proposed here, from the imposition of a restrictive competition agenda provided by the current electoral legislation. The distance between representatives and represented exposes the contradictions of a representative schizophrenic model, created to disguise the real interests of the system: the authoritarian control of political institutions by ruling groups from military and civilian elites.

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