



DIMENSIONS OF THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF FEDERAL REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CASE OF THE 55th LEGISLATURE POLITICAL REFORM

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Abstract: The article aims to analyze the votes of the so-called "Political Reform", in an attempt to identify the effects of political representation in face of actions that would seek to modify the structure of access to the legislature. We are concerned to test the hypothesis that deals with the preservation of the institutional structure by the representatives through the formation of norms that safeguard their interests of representation. Therefore, the endogenous process of political elites in the House of Representatives reduces the possibilities for institutional change that would guarantee space for social minorities. Using a probabilistic regression, using independent variables such as color, social class and gender, we observed that the representatives act in favor of maintaining their *status quo*, making it impossible to change something to increase the representative access of social minorities.

Key words: Political Representation; Political Reform; Social Minorities. House of Representatives.

Introduction

Understanding political representation and democracy permeates not only electoral decision-making bodies, but also those ratifying within the legislature itself. Therefore, studying the procedures for the approval of the matters and analyzing their results establishes a wide field of research in Political Science, capable of visualizing the gaps and concentrations of our legislative productions. In this way, looking at parliament and its constituents is a way of understanding the guidelines that our representative organization takes for itself and revert to public policies for society.

The objective of this work was to identify the representatives elected in the elections of 2006, 2010 and 2014 and to classify them according to the criteria of gender, race and assets. Thus, verifying if the vote of the legislators in the matters that aim to correct the representative discrepancies voted in the last three legislatures can be explained by the criteria of gender, race and social class.

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Thus, with this survey, we aimed to test the hypothesis that the predominance of white, male representation with assets above the national average makes it difficult to pass legislation that alters the *status quo* in favor of social minorities. We observed the so-called “Political Reform” that took place in the last analyzed legislature, verifying that before that, matters with a reform content of the representative system did not reach the voting plenary.

In the analysis of the data, we observed an inaction, on the part of the legislature, in the 53rd and 54th legislatures, in relation to the assessment of the matters that dealt with political representation, even if indirectly. Only in the 55th legislature, with an adverse context with political reform having a relevance beyond the context of institutional transformation, there was discussion of the matters related to the theme. In general, we observed four votes that indicated a preference by the elite conforming groups to bar matters favorable to social minorities or to approve matters that would harm them, verifying our hypothesis. For this, we use a quantitative data analysis, with the approach of probabilistic regression.

It is important to understand that these votes took place at a very delicate moment in Brazilian politics, preceding the institutional crisis that gave rise to the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff. The so-called “Political Reform” analyzed here occurred in 2015, and two years later there would still be discussions and more votes on different topics. This moment can be identified as a milestone in the weakening of the relationship between the executive and the legislative and the successive inability to dialogue that resulted in the 2016 coup.

The work is divided into four parts, the first being a brief explanation of the data collected and the profile of the representatives in the three legislatures analyzed. The second part comprises the use of the aforementioned methodology, exposing the probabilistic regression models resulting from the analyses of the collected material. In the third moment, we articulate the theoretical discussion and the results to test our hypothesis and justify some gaps in the process. Finally, in the final considerations, we resume the work as a whole and point out the limits and next steps of the research.

Research, data analysis and hypotheses

To analyze the data found throughout the research, the use of statistical approaches is understood, such as the creation of a database and the treatment of this data through descriptive statistics and non-linear regression tests under the Probit model. For that, the software IBM SPSS and STATAMP 13 will be used, to instrumentalize such materials for due analysis. The spatial and temporal cut in this research will be the federal representatives elected in the 53rd (2007-2010), 54th (2011-2014) and 55th (2015-2018) legislatures.

In the database, we collected the following aspects of the representatives: the variable “**color**”², from the list of concepts from IBGE, which points out its measures as: white; black; yellow; brown and indigenous. However, we will convert to the dichotomous variables “white” and “non-white”. The variable “**gender**” also taken from the IBGE, divided between the terms “male” and “female”. The variable “**assets**”, which is found in the database of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) and will later be transformed into “**social class**”, following an adaptation of the proposal by Leôncio Martins Rodrigues (2014), in his research on the new political elites in Brazil (Chart 1).

Chart 1 - Conversion of class into assets

CLASS	ASSETS
Lower class	Up to 200 thousand
Middle Middle Class	Between 200 thousand to 1 million
Upper middle class	Between 1 million to 2 million
Upper class	Between 2 million to 10 million
Millionaires	Over 10 million

Source: Rodrigues (2014).

The aforementioned author uses the list below to establish the social class of federal representatives for the year 2010, in view of the availability of only the variable “assets” in the TSE database. Below is the table illustrating the measures and their conversion³. In Chart 2, we have an assimilation of our measures with the structure built by the author.

² The color variable was mandatorily introduced only in 2012, in municipal elections, and only in 2014 did we have a general election with the information provided in the electoral platform. For the previous legislatures, we used a system of hetero-classification, which corresponds to the conference of 3 or more individuals pointing out the group belonging to each individual analyzed, and a comparative analysis of those elected from these legislatures who have run for other elective positions since 2012.

³ The concept of “social class” will be used according to the understanding of Leôncio Martins Rodrigues. For the author, such a concept is a more flexible form than is commonly used in academia.

Chart 2 - Class conversion into adapted assets

CLASS	ASSETS
Lower class	Up to 300 thousand
Middle Class	Between 300 thousand to 2 million
Upper class	Between 2 million to 10 million
Millionaires	Over 10 million

Source: Rodrigues (2014), adapted by the author.

In the tables below, we have the profiles of those elected from all the legislatures proposed here, regarding their constitutive characteristics in the terms previously exposed. The P0, or Profile Zero, corresponds to the majority group of the House of Representatives, the social “elite” composed of men, whites, middle/upper class/millionaires. Then we have profiles 1, 2 and 3 (Tables 1, 2 and 3) that bring together the characteristics of social minorities in subgroups, respectively. We can notice the huge discrepancy of these groups in their percentage of representation at the congress, reproducing what was already expressed in the previous bibliographic review.

Table 1 - Profile of those elected in the 53rd Brazilian legislature

PROFIL E	SCORE	PERCENTAGE	CAPTION
P0	285	55.5%	WHITE/MIDDLE-UPPER-MILLIONAIRE/MALE
P1			
P1 ¹	165	32.1%	LOWER CLASS
P1 ²	99	19.2%	NON-WHITE COLOR
P1 ³	45	8.7%	FEMALE
P2			
P2 ¹	48	9.3%	LOWER CLASS AND NON-WHITE COLOR
P2 ²	28	5.4%	LOWER CLASS AND FEMALE
P2 ³	15	2.9%	FEMALE AND NON-WHITE COLOR
P3	10	1.9%	LOWER CLASS, FEMALE AND NON-WHITE COLOR

Source: Author's elaboration based on data from DIVULGACAND.

In relation to the representation structure over these three legislatures, we have had significant changes, which exposes relevant issues for the analysis of elites in the House of

Representatives. We can start this discussion by strengthening Profile Zero, which has increased over the years. In the tables below, we bring together the middle, upper and millionaire classes, together with white men, to facilitate the reading in terms of the intended analysis. However, the numerical increase of this group mainly comprises those entering the middle/upper class in federal positions since 2006.

Table 2 - Profile of those elected in the 54th Brazilian legislature

PROFIL E	SCORE	PERCENTAGE	CAPTION	
P0	311	60.6%	WHITE/MIDDLE-UPPER-MILLIONAIRE/MALE	
P1	P1 ¹	116	22.6%	LOWER CLASS
	P1 ²	108	21.0%	NON-WHITE COLOR
	P1 ³	45	8.7%	FEMALE
P2	P2 ¹	43	8.3%	LOWER CLASS AND NON-WHITE COLOR
	P2 ²	17	3.3%	LOWER CLASS AND FEMALE
	P2 ³	11	2.1%	FEMALE AND NON-WHITE COLOR
P3		4	0.7%	LOWER CLASS, FEMALE AND NON-WHITE COLOR

Source: Author's elaboration based on data from DIVULGACAND.

The lower class, in turn, had a significant drop, since from the 53rd legislature to the 54th, there was a decrease of 9.5%, and 12.9% to the 55th legislature. There were 165 federal representatives belonging to the lower class in the year 2007, while in 2015 there were only 50. All other minority groups and subgroups have suffered casualties over the years. The lower class of non-white color had 48 individuals in 2007, decreasing to 43 in 2011 and, finally, decreasing to 13 in 2015.

Table 3 - Profile of those elected in the 55th Brazilian legislature

PROF LE	SCORE	PERCENTAGE	CAPTION	
P0	332	64.7%	WHITE/MIDDLE-UPPER-MILLIONAIRE/MALE	
P1	P1 ¹	50	9.7%	LOWER CLASS
	P1 ²	103	20.1%	AND NON-WHITE COLOR
	P1 ³	51	9.9%	FEMALE
P2	P2 ¹	13	2.5%	LOWER CLASS AND NON-WHITE COLOR
	P2 ²	13	2.5%	LOWER CLASS AND FEMALE
	P2 ³	10	1.9%	FEMALE AND NON-WHITE COLOR
P3		4	0.7%	LOWER CLASS, FEMALE AND NON-WHITE COLOR
TOTAL	513	100%		

Source: Author's elaboration based on data from DIVULGACAND.

The female lower class, on the other hand, had 28 representatives in the 53rd legislature, dropping to 17 in the next and only 13 in the last election. Still, the women elected of non-white color in the first scenario were 15, decreasing to 11 in the following and decreasing to 10 in the last. Finally, the lower class of females and of non-white color in 2006 had 10 elected women, decreasing to four in the two subsequent elections. This panorama shows that, in addition to a situation of clear minority segregation in the congress, of important and expressive groups in civil society, there was an increase in the representative difference between civil society and the House of Representatives over the years.

The general hypothesis that we seek to test in this work comprises the crossing of the independent variables “**color**”, “**gender**” and “**social class**” with the dependent variable “**vote**”. Thus, our questioning is about the possibility of elites in the House of Representatives influencing the disapproval of the matters that deal with institutional changes that seek to expand the representativeness of social minorities. To test the hypothesis we will use the nonlinear regression approach in the Probit model. Thus, the independent variables are gender, color and social class and the dependent variable to be used here is “Favorable Vote” and “Dissenting Vote”. This strategy corresponds to the fact that we have a dichotomous model of response to dependent variables, facilitating the statistical analysis of the data.

The tables below comprise the themes: private/public campaign financing, electoral systems and quotas for women. Other topics were also voted in the process of carrying out the Brazilian political reform, such as the end of mandatory voting and barrier clauses, however, the decision to address only these matters is due to their impacts in terms of representativeness. We then have the votes of the devices, authors and rapporteurs, profiles and their political parties of the respective matters: PEC (Project of a Constitutional Amendment) n° 182/2007 - agglutinative amendment n° 22; PEC n° 182/2007 - art. 1st of the substitute; PEC n° 182/2007 - agglutinative amendment n° 2; PEC n° 182/2007 - dtq 18 - psdb - art. 1st of PEC 14/2015; Agglutinative amendment n° 57.

It is worth mentioning that the process of assessing these matters was widely criticized, considering that the president of the House of Representatives, Eduardo Cunha, dissolved the Political Reform Special Committee. Which historically worked in the debate and assessment of the respective matters, removing the rapporteur Marcelo Castro (PMDB-PI) from the reporting function and appointing representative Rodrigo Maia (DEM-RJ), having received numerous criticisms during the votes we have the assessment of reporting indicated in only one individual. Still, being the result of a later debate, all matters were disapproved at the congress.

Table 4 - Relationship between matter, author, rapporteur and political parties:

MATTER	AUT:OR	PROFILE	PARTY	RAPPORTEUR	PROFILE	PARTY
Private/public campaign financing for Political Parties and candidates	Celso Russomano	White, upper class, male	PRB-SP	Rodrigo Maia	White, middle class, male	DEM-RJ
Single Non-Transferable Vote	Rodrigo Maia	White, middle class, male	DEM-RJ	Rodrigo Maia	White, middle class, male	DEM-RJ
Mixed-member proportional representation	Marcus Pestana	White, middle class, male	PSDB-MG	Rodrigo Maia	White, middle class, male	DEM-RJ
Quotas for women	Moema Gramacho	Non-white, lower class, female	PT-BA	Rodrigo Maia	White, middle class, male	DEM-RJ

Source: Author's elaboration based on data from DIVULGACAND.

Each matter is linked to the effective transformation of access by social minorities in the national congress. The maintenance of private/public financing of companies in the campaigns influences the unequal opportunity for electoral dispute, being a negative factor for social minorities, those who are unable to raise large amounts of donations because they are not the focus of business groups. Thus, complying with the private financing proposal would perpetuate inequality in access to goods/assets and, consequently, to electoral success. In the

same understanding, we have national authors who research the importance of campaign financing for the candidacies of social minorities, emphasizing that belonging to one or more social minorities raises the degree of obstacles to accessing the legislature (AMORA, 2008; SPECK, 2006; SACCHET & SPECK, 2012; CAMPOS & MACHADO, 2017).

Changes in electoral systems, whether by the “Single Non-Transferable Vote” or “Mixed-member proportional representation”, which, if eliminated, would reduce the number of small parties that are more easily elected by this institutional structure, having in their seats different representatives of minority groups. This would also correspond to a change in access, because these electoral systems and the end of the coalition mechanism favor the most voted candidates, eliminating proportionality and thus the greatest access channel for minorities in the congress. Those who defend the “Single Non-Transferable Vote”, a voting model in which the federated units become districts in which the candidate with the highest number of votes wins, envision privileging regional leaders. The defenders of the “Mixed-member proportional representation” combine factors of the proportional system, the current one, with the Single Non-Transferable Vote”. They advocate the division of the national territory in several districts and the holding of two electoral rounds, in which the party is voted at first, deciding the number of seats in parliament, and then one of the candidates presented by the parties in the second round is chosen (CINTRA, 2006, p. 129).

The central prerogative of the defenders of the majority system is the instrumentalization of governance, that is, the improvement of the decision-making process in the legislative instance. Under the aegis of this model, the executive branch would not find it difficult to establish coalitions. Even if the majority system inclined towards bipartisanship, it would follow the tendency of the party that heads the federal government to maintain the majority in the National Congress (KLEIN, 2007, p. 37). However, such statements do not find energetic supports that can sustain themselves. Some specific failures can put the very notion of democracy at risk, as pointed out by Lago and Ramos (2012, p. 723):

People who live in the same spaces have different desires, expectations and demands, while others separated by long physical distances have great proximity and affinity with regard to opinions, ideas and projects of society. Therefore, when translating such "worldviews" into political options, for example, when choosing a representative, voters need options to ensure the defense of these conceptions, which are characteristic of them, about reality, not the representation of geographical spaces that no longer serve as a factor in the construction of identities (LAGO and RAMOS, 2012, p. 723).

Under this approach, the argument that the districts would produce benefits to the electoral system because they represent diminished regions is put in check. In particular, this model disadvantages political minorities that only achieved legislative participation due to the proportional voting system. With the district vote, minorities representing blacks, indigenous people, the lower class, LGBT, for example, would have greater difficulties in making

themselves represented legislatively. It is worth mentioning that, as a rule, it is these minority sectors of our society that most demand to act in the production of a legal system that still neglects them (LAGO; RAMOS, 2012, p.724-725).

Finally, quotas for women correspond to a theoretical and practical issue widely debated by academics and public managers. Worldwide, more than 100 countries have adopted quotas from one of two perspectives, namely: quotas for party lists or quotas for seats in the legislature (KROOK, 2008, p. 360). As we have seen, women have serious institutional impediments to their access to the legislature. The financing by companies, the prejudice of the electorate, the precarious selection on the part of the parties, the various journeys faced by women that prevent them from dedicating themselves to political life, the lack of political capital, all of these concepts already discussed give female candidates a disproportionate representation and, therefore, a low political force within parliament. Bush (2011) Bush (2011) points out that the adoption of quotas are symptoms of international pressure and not of political maturation, but they are still extremely important for the political system as a whole, in the introduction of women into political life. He then says:

Why should we care? First, quotas seem to matter. Tripp and Kang used crossnational regression analysis to show that quotas are the strongest predictor of the proportion of women in national legislatures. And women's representation seems to matter. Women's representation has long-term impacts on the public's political attitudes and female politicians tend to invest in different types of public-good projects than their male counterparts. (BUSH, 2011, p. 131).

The political reform of 2015 was the first to propose the modification of the systems that regulate representation directly or indirectly. However, such a discussion is a recurring factor in the political sphere, obtaining a congressional platform with Bill 2679/03, approved by the Political Reform Special Committee in 2003 (KLEIN, 2007). However, political reform went beyond the limits of the committee that met sporadically, with an emphasis on electoral moments or in the course of corruption scandals, becoming again, in the following years, electoral speech.

The structure has not changed at all, plastering representativeness in the eyes of the population. After the protests of 2013 and the elections of 2014, we started 2015 with the promise of several political reforms organized in the electoral debate of the previous year that, in fact, would become a bargaining chip, a way to benefit a category that already comprises the institutional structure in its daily sphere, the parliamentary elite in the national congress.

Therefore, we built four hypotheses, based on the discussions above, about the prospect of disapproving or approving matters that would negatively modify the electoral institution, creating more obstacles for social minorities to access the legislature.

- H1: White, middle-class/wealthy men are more likely to vote in favor of private/public campaign financing;
- H2: White, middle-class/wealthy men are more likely to vote in favor of the “Single Non-Transferable Vote”;
- H3: White, middle-class/wealthy men are more likely to vote in favor of the “Mixed-member proportional representation”;
- H4: White, middle-class/wealthy men are more likely to vote against the quotas for women.

Analysis method and results

In all, five matters were analyzed in this work, and the results for the models are available in the tables below. Most variables are statistically significant and in the expected direction and the general adjustment of the models is appropriate. To test the significance of the models as a whole, the true ratio is calculated twice (ALDRICH; NELSON, 1984). This measure is analogous to the F statistic in regression and is distributed as a chi-square variable, of 32.87, 7.26, 8.56, 13.32 and 31.88, significant at the levels .0000, .0064, .0035, .0004, respectively. The overall rate of correct classification is estimated at 61.57%, 56.14%, 78.90%, 56.39% and 65.45%. That is, the percentage of correct classifications of our models is acceptable, showing their suitability for the objectives of this work. Next, we will discuss the results of each matter against the model and the analysis of each profile in relation to the favorable vote. Below, we can see a schematic table of the matters voted, the date of the vote and the votes (Table 5).

Table 5 - Relation of the matter voted, date and vote:

MATTER VOTED	DATE	FAVORABLE VOTE	DISSENTING VOTE
Private/public campaign financing	26/05/2015	264	207
Mixed-member proportional representation	26/05/2015	99	369
Single Non-Transferable Vote	26/05/2015	210	267
Quotas for women	16/06/2015	293	101

Source: Author's elaboration based on data from DIVULGACAND.

Table 6 presents the synthesis of the model applied to assess the correlations between electoral financing and the result of the votes.

Table 6 - Probability model for voting on public and private campaign financing for private individuals and companies

Independent variable	Coefficient	T Statistic	Derivative on Average
Color	-.498	-3.26	-.196
Gender	-.620	-3.05	-.242
Social Class	-.460	-3.02	-.181
Constant	1.17		

Percentage of correct classifications of the model: 61.57%

Fourth log Likelihood ratio: -288.6, p<0001

N= 445

The test shows that the probability of the representative voting in favor of social minorities, that is, voting "no" for this financing model, in relation to gender, being the male individual, decreases 24.2% in relation to the female. When referring to color, the white candidate decreases the probability by 19.6% compared to a non-white candidate. In relation to social class, the probability decreases 18.1% when of middle class/upper class/millionaire, in relation to the lower class. All assessments were made considering all other variables at the midpoint.

Table 7 - Probability model for voting on the "Single Non-Transferable Vote" System

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	COEFFICIENT	T STATISTIC	DERIVATE ON AVERAGE
COLOR	-.251	-1.68	-.251
GENDER	-.033	-0.17	-.033
SOCIAL CLASS	-.292	-1.96	-.292
CONSTANT	.625		

Percentage of correct classifications of the model: 56.14%

Fourth log Likelihood ratio: -308.9, p< 0641

N= 456

The test shows us that the probability of the representative voting in favor of social minorities, that is, voting "no" for this electoral system, in relation to gender, being the male, decreases 3.3% in relation to the female. When referring to color, the white candidate decreases the probability by 25.1% compared to a non-white candidate. In relation to social class, the probability decreases 29.2% when of middle class/upper class/millionaire, in relation to the lower class. All assessments were made considering all other variables at the midpoint.

Table 8 - Probability model for voting on the “Mixed-member proportional representation” system

Independent variable	Coefficient	T Statistic	Derivative on Average
Color	-.516	-3.12	-.127
Gender	.116	0.49	.034
Social Class	-.124	-0.71	-.034
Constant	1.23		

Percentage of correct classifications of the model: 78.90%

Fourth log Likelihood ratio: -220.3, p< 0358

N= 436

The test shows that the probability of the representative voting in favor of social minorities, that is, voting "no" for the “mixed-member proportional representation” system, in relation to gender, being the male, decreases 3.4% in relation to the female. When referring to color, the white candidate decreases the probability by 12.7% compared to a non-white candidate. In relation to social class, the probability decreases 3.4% when of middle class/upper class/millionaire, in relation to the lower class. All assessments were made considering all other variables at the midpoint.

Table 9 - Probability model for voting on Quotas for women

Independent variable	Coefficient	T Statistic	Derivative on Average
Color	-.161	-0.94	-.055
Gender	-1.67	-10.25	-.357
Social Class	-.112	-0.67	-.039
Constant	2.20		

Percentage of correct classifications of the model: 65.45%

Fourth log Likelihood ratio: -248.9, p<0001

N= 411

The test shows us that the probability of the representative voting in favor of social minorities, that is, voting “yes” for quotas for women, in relation to gender, being the male, decreases 35.7% in relation to the female. When referring to color, the white candidate decreases the probability by 5.5% compared to a non-white candidate. In relation to social class, the probability decreases 3.9% when of middle class/upper class/millionaire, in relation to the lower class. All assessments were made considering all other variables at the midpoint.

Thus, we can affirm that the hypothesis verified here is true, in the perspective of an action by the representatives expressed in the preservation of the *status quo* by the groups elected in the polls that deal with issues that seek to modify the institutional instruments that can

guarantee access for minority groups to representation or undermine the institutional guarantees already established. We cannot affirm that this action is conscious, specifically aimed at barring the access of minority groups, however, representatives are rational individuals who seek to maximize their earnings and facilitate their reelection objective.

In addition, from the analytical point of view adopted here, we understand that the institution conforms to rules that promoted the structuring of elites to vote against social minorities. Because even though all the matters analyzed here have been rejected by the representatives, as seen above and exposed in the tables below, the probability of the dissenting vote is in almost all cases belonging to the elites discussed here.

Table 10 - Probability of favorable vote on the public and private campaign financing model for private individuals and companies of the social types:

PROFILE	PROBABILITY
MAN, WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.342
MAN, WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.521
MAN, NON-WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.537
WOMAN, WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.585
MAN, NON-WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.709
WOMAN, WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.750
WOMAN, NON-WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.762
WOMAN, NON-WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.879

Source: Author's elaboration based on data from DIVULGACAND.

Therefore, the political reform that took place in 2015, even with few significant changes, can demonstrate the action of the majority groups to expand their power in relation to the institutional structure of Brazilian politics.

Table 11 - Probability of favorable vote on the "Single Non-Transferable Vote" model of social types:

PROFILE	PROBABILITY
MAN, WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.518
WOMAN, WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.532
MAN, NON-WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.617
WOMAN, NON-WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.630
MAN, WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.633

WOMAN, WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.645
MAN, NON-WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.723
WOMAN, NON-WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.734

Source: Author's elaboration based on data from DIVULGACAND.

Table 12 - Probability of favorable vote on the “Mixed-member proportional representation” system model of social types:

PROFILE	PROBABILITY
MAN, WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.797
WOMAN, WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.723
MAN, WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.760
WOMAN, WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.763
WOMAN, NON-WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.866
MAN, NON-WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.889
WOMAN, NON-WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.891
MAN, NON-WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.911

Source: Author's elaboration based on data from DIVULGACAND.

Table 13 - Probability of favorable vote on the model of quotas for women:

PROFILE	PROBABILITY
MAN, WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.598
MAN, WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.641
MAN, NON-WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.659
MAN, NON-WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.699
WOMAN, WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.973
WOMAN, WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.979
WOMAN, NON-WHITE, MIDDLE/UPPER CLASS/MILLIONAIRE	.981
WOMAN, NON-WHITE, LOWER CLASS	.986

Source: Author's elaboration based on data from DIVULGACAND.

Discussion of results

First, there is an urgent need for a discussion on the legislative organization and the legislative process, which may thus explain a good part of the results of this research. Regarding the relationship between Executive and Legislative, the party aspect is predominant, given that the party leaders dictate the works of the congress and they may or may not be part of a presidential coalition. Thus, in controlling these leaders, the presidency has power over the legislature. This says a lot about the predominance of the executive agency power, and about the strength of the party elites and the governing body to be able to articulate their interests within legislative works (FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1995; 1997; 1998; PALERMO, 2000).

As the specialized literature indicates, the differences between the results of the bills presented by the Executive and the Legislative are striking. The overall approval rate for executive bills is high, and rejection rates are rare. The opposite is conceived in the legislative (PALERMO, 2000). However, the political reform was not a “normal” process. Captained by dissident groups from the presidential coalition, the effort of a portion of the congressional elites was to weaken the structures that supported candidates belonging to social minorities, reaching the main parties of the left and center that conformed the situation. In addition, the initiative can be read as a new logic of the legislative agenda that, extraordinarily, contradicted the interests of the Executive.

As we can see in the tables above, the model guarantees us to predict the probability of each profile voting in favor of social minorities. Thus, we see that in four out of five cases, the least probability lies in profile 0, that is, men, white of middle/upper class/millionaire. Only in the case of the “Mixed-member proportional representation” did we see a distortion in the results, because within this vote there were extra-party agreements that probably produced a non-compliance with the other cases. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the assessment of this matter took place before the voting of the “Single Non-Transferable Vote” system, this disposed by a large portion of the representatives as the perfect mechanism for the country, underestimating the debate and the vote of the first, which had a low vote in favor.

In a superficial analysis, the reader could argue that, as all the matters that were assessed that would offer some risk to political representation were subtracted, the research would not have contributed in the perspective of demonstrating the formation of an internal elite in the House of Representatives. However, when observing the votes, we can see that these matters were not approved, with the exception of the “Single Non-Transferable Vote”, due to veto players. When dealing with a study on the assessment of the creation of health systems in Europe, Immergut (1996) addresses the theme:

Political decisions require agreement at several points along a chain of decisions made by representatives in different political arenas. The fate of legislative proposals, such as those for national health insurance, depends upon the number and location of opportunities for veto along this chain. (IMMERGUT, 1996, p. 8)

However, it is also important for us to understand that the expressive increase of representatives belonging to conservative groups and the proliferation of small physiologist parties, as we will see later, and a greater elitization of the 2015 legislature, changed the stability of the system. In this way, reconfiguring the so-called *de facto rule*, that is, the way in which political parties and representatives from electoral results respond to the *de jure rules*, or the rules of the formal institution (IMMERGUT, 1996; MAHONEY).

In Brazil, there was stability over a period of almost three decades with regard to the representative model. Thus, we follow a path dependence that structured the Brazilian electoral competition and the national legislative process in favor of elites, which were discussed here. According to Capoccia and Kelemen (2011, p. 341), relatively long periods of stability are followed by critical junctures moments, in which “dramatic” reforms or changes can succeed. These critical moments are the starting point for analyzing the institutional trajectory, and in Brazil, punctuated by us, the 1988 constitution.

Therefore, the stability envisioned (in a way, there is not a considerable change in the representative framework of 2006 and 2010, however we can see the progress of the groups belonging to the elite) in the first two legislatures analyzed here, with no relevant assessment regarding the representation of social minorities in the House of Representatives, begins to weaken. We point out this weakening due to the appropriation of the elite by the electoral system that came from 1988, which progressively conquered the majority space in the institutional structure and decided to deepen the inequalities with a political reform in absentia of the other groups. An essay about a critical moment for the institution occurs in 2015, exposing a conflict between legislative and executive, in the election of the president of the House of Representatives, Eduardo Cunha, and in the assessment of the political reform itself. Thus, what guarantees the government's victory against these investees are its veto players, even in tight votes. However, it is also these actors, in the opposition, who reject the quotas for women.

The concept of veto players refers to agents capable of limiting the processing of the legislative process, approving or disapproving the proposed matters. The scope of decision, according to Immergut (1996) is decided at the place where the veto opportunities lie, which in the case at hand is the executive, because it acted to block the opposition's proposals, personified by parties that largely belong to the right or center-right. However, the correlation of strength available from the 55th Legislature did not corroborate great support for the government and the very context of political reform reveals that the decision-making body

would be changing to the legislative, given the expressive vote. Which, even not reaching 308 votes constitutionally required for approve a constitutional amendment, they approached in a sensitive way.

All the matters dealt with here, as mentioned above, comprised a unique moment in Brazilian politics. Given that such a far-reaching political reform, instrumentalized in the context of corruption scandals, of a police operation aimed at assessing evidence of laundering and embezzlement of public funds, including for political parties, of the conservative political context that was consolidating and the instability of the governmental coalition, with premises of requests for impeachment of the President Dilma Rousseff. In view of these aspects and the percentages of correct classifications for each model, we understand that to further strengthen our hypothesis; we must raise other approaches to assess the action of representatives in assessing the matters included here.

Final considerations

Our work included an analysis of the institutional obstacles to social minorities in their access to the federal legislative, including an endogenous dimension of the political structure, that is, the legislative process. We conducted the research to ascertain the formation of an elite cadre, represented by men, white of middle/upper class/millionaire. These would benefit from the institution's rules in the electoral dispute and, once elected, would operate in the logic of maintaining these benefits or improving them.

In this work, we collect data on the elected representatives of three legislatures, namely, 53rd (2007-2010), 54th (2011-2014) and 55th (2015-2018), referring to their assets, color and gender. From this, we seek to elect matters that would modify, directly or indirectly, the question about representativeness in the institution. We chose four matters in this sense, observing their impacts through theoretical and practical constructions by national and international authors. They are: private/public campaign financing, electoral systems and quotas for women. All were considered in the 55th legislature, the last one analyzed here.

Based on the votes of the elected federal representatives, we submitted the database to a probabilistic statistical model, modifying the independent variable "assets" by "social class", as described. Thus, we obtain the confirmation of the hypothesis that deals with the formation of an elite that would act to prevent gains in relation to the representativeness of minorities or to deepen inequalities with new institutional mechanisms aimed at fostering the unequal *status quo* of the House of Representatives.

The electoral dispute is marked by a consolidation of benefits to groups historically linked to power, founders of the institutional precepts that currently govern the institution. Women, non-white, and the working class have always been separated from the structural decisions of the State and the rules for their access, and this is reflected in the data that we and

other diverse authors that we have dealt with throughout the work have shown. The logic of under-representation is linked to a strong institutional factor, by maintaining privileges and under a liberal discourse of merit. Even though our research is limited to three legislatures, we can emphasize that nothing has been done effectively in Brazil about this representative inequality.

Another substantial point that deserves highlighting and future analysis is whether the 2015 political reform can be considered an institutional milestone that weakened the Dilma Rousseff government and what was its role in the 2016 coup, in addition to its results in the 2018 election. Something instigates to analyze these institutional relations of conflict so that we can tread the path of the erosion of the relationship between Executive and Legislative.

The study produced here raised questions about the qualitative nature of the assessment of the matters. We question ourselves about factors that are more substantiated in the choice of the elected vote, starting from a qualitative perspective, analyzing the political trajectory of groups from the elite and social minorities. In addition, we note that it is necessary to draw an analysis that involves all aspects of the formation of a federal representative and what would be the impacts that these variables would have on the vote of the matters aimed at producing equality consolidation actions. Although the quantitative method gives us the facts in numbers, there are questions between the lines of political action that would influence electoral competition and legislative production that should be studied based on our results, taking as a guide the facts mentioned here.

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