



THE NATIONALIZATION OF PARTIES AND THE BRAZILIAN PARTY SYSTEM

Leonardo Rodrigues de Morais¹
Willber Nascimento²
José Alexandre da Silva Júnior³
Ranulfo Paranhos dos Santos Filho⁴
Albany Ferreira Lima⁵

Abstract

What is the level of nationalization of political parties and of the Brazilian party system? In this paper, we use the Jones and Mainwaring (2003) measure to assess the degree to which electoral support from political parties is homogeneous among state federative units. For that, we used data from the electoral disputes for the Chamber of Deputies between 1998 and 2014 made available by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). Methodologically, we calculated the index of nationalization based on the distribution of party votes by state and described the data based on descriptive statistics techniques and graphical tools. The results of this work indicate that the Brazilian party system seems to be structured among the three largest parties with representation in the Federal Chamber of Deputies: PMDB, PT and PSDB. However, this does not mean that these parties are large in all units of the federation.

Keywords: Nationalization; Political Parties; Party System; Brazil.

1 INTRODUCTION

The nationalization of the parties and the Brazilian party system is a subject little addressed by the academic literature (JONES and MAINWARING, 2003), especially in Brazil. This becomes more visible when we begin to assess the amount of production that touches on other characteristics such as ideology, electoral support, fragmentation, institutionalization and structuring of the Brazilian party system (NICOLAU, 1996; MAINWARING, 2001; KINZO, 2004, MELO and CÂMARA, 2012).

With the exception of the United States, which has a vast literature on the subject, most of the literature on party nationalization and the party system has turned its attention to advanced industrial democracies, according to Jones and Mainwaring (2003). However, some authors have

¹ Leonardo Rodrigues de Morais is a PhD student in Political Science from the University of Brasília (UnB). E-mail: leonardordm@hotmail.com.

² Willber Nascimento is a PhD student in Political Science from the Federal University of Pernambuco. E-mail: nascimentowillber@gmail.com.

³ José Alexandre da Silva Júnior holds a PhD in Political Science from the Federal University of Pernambuco. Professor at the Institute of Social Sciences (ICS) of the Federal University of Alagoas, Professor at the Professional Master in Public Policy at the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE). E-mail: jasjunior2007@yahoo.com.br.

⁴ Ranulfo Paranhos dos Santos Filho holds a PhD in Political Science from the Federal University of Pernambuco. Professor at the Institute of Social Sciences (ICS) of the Federal University of Alagoas, Professor at the Professional Master in Public Policy at the Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE). E-mail: ranulfoparanhos@me.com.

⁵ Albany Ferreira Lima is a PhD student in Political Science from the University of Minas Gerais (UFMG). E-mail: albanyinformatica@gmail.com.

broadened the scope of analysis and focused attention on Europe, Caramani (2000, 2004) and Latin America, Jones and Mainwaring (2003) and Jones (2010). Except for the works of Borges (2015), Jones and Mainwaring (2003) and Schmitt (2003), the literature on the subject in Brazil is still very scarce.

According to Jones and Mainwaring (2003), nationalized party systems reflect an important component of the dynamics of party competition, have an effect on factors such as the survival of democracy, political competition, and legislative behavior and public policies. In the existence of a nationalized party system, parties have national scope and tend to express themselves and act according to a common national orientation rather than dividing into regional or subnational issues (BORGES, 2015; MORGENSTERN at al, 2009; JONES, 2010).

The purpose of this paper is to measure the level of nationalization of parties in Brazil, but specifically to measure and track the levels of nationalization of Brazilian parties over time. To this end, we collected data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) for the Federal Deputy elections between 1998 and 2014. Nationalization was measured according to Jones and Mainwaring (2003). In practical terms, the Gini index of party voting across geographic units is calculated. The result is an indicator of the unequal voting of Brazilian political parties among states. We present and analyze this data based on descriptive statistics and graphical presentation techniques.

This paper is organized as follows: in the next section we review the main theoretical points of the literature on party nationalization and their importance for the functioning of democracy; in the following, we describe the methodology of the study, we emphasize measurement and replication questions of this study; the next section deals with the presentation and analysis of the results and finally, in the last section we will make our final remarks.

2 NACIONALIZATION

Nationalization directs attention to the analysis of electoral performance among the various electoral districts. More specifically for the pattern of your distribution. It is generally agreed in the literature that a nationalized party is one that has a homogeneous level of electoral support among all the electoral districts of a country. Additionally, a party system is nationalized not only when major parties are distributed throughout the national territory, but also when national issues significantly affect local voter choice (JONES and MAINWARING, 2003; CARAMANI, 2004; MORGENSTERN and POSTTHOFF, 2005; MORGENSTERN, SWINDLER and CASTAGNOLA, 2009; MUSTILLO and MUSTILO, 2012) .

This phenomenon has long been ignored by mainstream partisan research, but has recently entered the comparative agenda. The nationalization of parties and hence party systems is not only important as an indicator of the distribution of party electoral support. It is related to and affects a country's political system in many shades (JONES and MAINWARING, 2003;

CARAMANI, 2004; MORGENSTERN and POSTTHOFF, 2005).

The degree of nationalization is related to party competition (Jones and Mainwaring, 2003). Although the percentage of votes of two parties may be similar, the degree of nationalization of each party can vary considerably and affect electoral strategies. From this point of view, regionalized parties act differently from those with homogeneous voting among the units.

Borges (2015) analyzes the Brazilian case and shows how national political institutions comprise a range of parties with different degrees of nationalization and how this is related to presidential and state government disputes. In its terms, this presidentialization of disputes fosters electoral coordination at the state level and, therefore, contributes to the nationalization of federal legislative elections (BORGES, 2011, p. 678).

The degree of party nationalization, therefore, can affect the formation of coalitions as well as alliances. A nationalized system can make it easier to build alliances centered on national issues rather than locally oriented ones (JONES and MAINWARING, 2003; BORGES, 2015). To some extent, nationalization is indicative of how the ties between voters and parties are structured (CARAMANI, 2004; MORGENSTERN and POSTTHOFF, 2005). A system with a low degree of nationalization encourages voters to create and maintain links with locally inserted candidates and or parties, and the decisive issues will be those of a parish nature.

The Brazilian political system is interesting in this sense. The electoral coalitions promote, in a certain way, the nationalization of parties, since competing as a coalition entails fewer costs than launching independent candidates. Speck and Campos (2012) assess how another feature of our political system, the time of free propaganda, affects nationalization. According to them, the distribution of this campaign resource considering unique criteria (number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies) favors small parties that guarantee equivalent propaganda time throughout the national territory. Free propaganda time of parties is an important bargaining chip in building coalitions between large and small parties (DINIZ, 2000).

The literature also points to the possible impacts of party nationalization on the process of elaboration, approval and implementation of public policies. In this case, the fate of public policy may be strictly parochial if the government has a low degree of nationalization. The Brazilian institutional combination certainly fosters a high degree of individualism of the representatives alone (AMES, 2003). Borges (2015), evidenced the existence of varying degrees of party nationalization. In this case, much of the parochialism of national representatives may be a function of the high degree of regionalism of some parties. And in many cases, where resources are scarce and regional economic disparities exist, the result of transfers under this logic can be disastrous (JONES and MAINWARING, 2003).

This topic already brings us close to the conditions of a nationalized party system. General executive elections and concomitance between these and national legislative disputes provide incentives for nationalization (BORGES, 2015). In addition, factors such as the degree of

centralization of political power as well as programmatic capacity of parties and low fragmentation contribute to the nationalization of parties and the party system, consequently (MUSTILO, 2017). Finally, the same author identifies that the degree of nationalization is positively associated with the very quality of the democratic regime.

though the nationalization of parties and the party system is a phenomenon with broad theoretical implications for the functioning of democracy, the theme has been little addressed nationally (FERREIRA, BATISTA and STABILI, 2008). We still know little about the degree of nationalization of our parties and party system throughout the Brazilian electoral process. This article aims to evaluate, empirically, our parties in this regard.

3 DATA AND METHODS

In this section, we present the information about the methodological strategy taken for the construction and analysis of this work. We can start the presentation by Chart 1 containing the central characteristics of the research design.

Chart 1 - Research Design

Item	Description
Search Issue	What is the level of nationalization of Brazilian political parties?
Type of study	Descriptive / Exploratory
Objective	To describe the nationalization of Brazilian political parties.
Sample	Parties that disputed the Federal Deputy elections
Period	1998-2014
Data Source	TSE, available through the <i>electionsBR</i> package in the R software.
Methods and Techniques	Descriptive statistics; Cluster Analysis

Source: The authors.

This is essentially descriptive work. Being a subject little addressed in Brazilian Political Science, we think it is good to evaluate this indicator and make the academy aware of the progress towards party nationalization in Brazil. Our goal here is to describe the degree of nationalization of political parties from 1998 to 2014 with respect to federal legislative elections.


3.1 Calculating the nationalization of political parties

To measure party nationalization we use the methodology proposed by Jones and Mainwaring (2003). Jones and Mainwaring (2003) suggest the use of the Gini coefficient. Gini is a widely used indicator for the calculation of inequality of a given distribution. Its most famous application for sure is with income distribution. The index ranges from 0 to 1 and the closer to its upper limit the higher the concentration. Since the degree of party nationalization refers to the degree of homogeneity of party vote distribution among subnational units, the Gini indicator would be a good way to measure the phenomenon. In addition to the applicability of the measure

and its validity, Gini has other advantages. Jones and Mainwaring (2003) point out that this indicator (1) can trace changes in the party's level of nationalization over time; (2) verify the rise and decline of the party system and parties (PNS); (3) can be used to compare parties within the same electoral / party system and / or between different systems in comparative studies.

We calculate party nationalization by considering the percentage of votes of Brazilian political parties per federation unit for all Federal Deputy elections since 1998. In addition, we have classified the size of parties according to their national percentage of votes for each election. There are different approaches (DANTAS and PRAÇA, 2002; MELO and EVANGELISTA, 2016; NASCIMENTO et al. 2016) in the national literature. We follow the model of Nascimento et al. (2016) changing the unit of analysis. While the authors used the percentage of votes by state and year, we used the national percentage of votes. So the size of the party may vary with each election. We adopted the same K-means cluster method and defined the number of groups based on the explained variance (the elbow method) (HAIR et al., 2009, KODINARIYA and MAKWANA, 2013). As can be estimated from the variance graph below.

Graph 1 – Cluster variance..



Caption. To the left: Sum of Squares within Clusters, below: Number of Clusters.

Source: Authors' elaboration from TSE data. <<http://www.tse.jus.br/>>.

The data used were all provided by the TSE⁶. We collect this data with support from the *electionsBR* package (MEIRELES, SILVA and COSTA, 2016) available on the R statistical

⁶ <<http://www.tse.jus.br/>>

platform. To ensure transparency and replicability, we will make the data and scripts publicly available⁷. In general terms this work is a descriptive effort of the party nationalization level in the last five elections and allows the use of these indicators in future studies. In the next section we present the search results.

4 RESULTS

In this section, we describe the degree of nationalization of Brazilian political parties by reference to the Party Nationalization Score (PNS) developed by Jones and Mainwaring (2003). Table 01 presents the general descriptive statistics about nationalization for the last five Federal Deputy elections.

Table 1 - PNS Descriptors (*Party Nationalization Score*)

Election	N	Minimum	Maximum	Average	Deviation	Coef.Var
1998	30	0.222	0.717	0.449	0.140	0.311
2002	30	0.207	0.717	0.437	0.163	0.373
2006	29	0.244	0.752	0.487	0.139	0.286
2010	27	0.200	0.759	0.489	0.149	0.305
2014	32	0.194	0.732	0.497	0.149	0.299


Source: Authors' elaboration from TSE data. <<http://www.tse.jus.br/>>

On average, Brazilian political parties are poorly nationalized. And on average, there were no visible changes in this indicator in the last elections. It was registered 0.449 in 1998 and finished the series in 2014 with 0.497. These data should be interpreted considering the Gini indicator, so these scores are quite low in terms of the measure taken. Brazilian parties have an uneven distribution among states. However this indicator can be viewed comparatively. El Salvador, a country with a moderately nationalized system (JONES and MAINWARING, 2003) averaged 0.788 nationalization in 2000.

Indeed, these averages can be misleading given the wide variation in the level of nationalization given the high magnitude of competing parties. Graph 2 shows that there are a number of parties with higher nationalization averages. The highly fragmented party system is related to lower nationalization on average.

⁷ This work is organized and hosted on the Open Science Framework website. The project and its components can be accessed at <<https://osf.io/gbzsx/>>. However, we are welcome to order by E-mail: <nascimento.willber@gmail.com > or <leonardordm@hotmail.com>.

Graph 2 - Histogram of party nationalization



Caption. To the left: Frequency. Below: Party Nationalization (PNS).
Source: Authors' elaboration from TSE data. <<http://www.tse.jus.br/>>
 Black line = average; red line = median.

The histogram shows that the distribution of nationalization differs between elections. So nationalization seems to be affected by other variables. But the point of the graph is to show that there are parties well ahead of the average we discussed earlier. Roughly, at least 50% of the parties in the sample have above average nationalization scores. So, this average is a poor indicator of the nationalization of major parties. A good presentation would be the average nationalization by party size. Table 02 summarizes these results.

Table2 - Nationalization average by party size.


Election	Party size	N	Average	Deviation	Coef.Var
1998	Small	22	0.398	0.108	0.271
	Medium	3	0.464	0.103	0.222
	Large	5	0.666	0.045	0.067
2002	Small	21	0.376	0.142	0.378
	Medium	5	0.511	0.106	0.208

	Large	4	0.665	0.059	0.088
	Small	18	0.417	0.109	0.262
2006	Medium	7	0.553	0.082	0.149
	Large	4	0.691	0.069	0.100
	Small	16	0.410	0.126	0.307
2010	Medium	8	0.560	0.073	0.131
	Large	3	0.718	0.059	0.082
	Small	21	0.428	0.129	0.301
2014	Medium	8	0.602	0.076	0.126
	Large	3	0.701	0.020	0.028

Source: Authors' elaboration from TSE data. <<http://www.se.jus.br/>>

On average, small parties are less nationalized than medium parties are. However, interpreting the PNS, we will realize that both small and medium are parties with concentrated voting, that is, more regionalized, since the indicator below 0.50 indicates high concentration. This information can be better viewed with graph 3.

Graph 3 - Nationalization versus party size (by election).



Caption. To the left: Nationalization Average (PNS). Below: Party size (small, medium, large).


Source: Authors' elaboration from TSE data. <<http://www.tse.jus.br/>>

As we also see, small parties are not primarily responsible for concentration. Medium parties are also quite regionalized. In the last elections, these party groups have become more differentiated from nationalization, indicating more clearly that party size is in fact associated with its degree of nationalization. This would be expected since both measures concern party voting.

This, however, is not directly obvious. Nationally large parties can receive significant votes in large districts, or more specifically in districts controlled by them. As we can see, in 2010 the PNS variation was high among the large parties. The PSDB was responsible, which although it is of a size compatible with its peers was much less nationalized (PNS = 0.650) when compared with PT (0.759) and PMDB (0.744).

On average 11 parties can be taken as the most important in the federal legislative dispute by party size criteria. Graph 04 below shows the variation of the average nationalization according to party size for 1998 to 2014.

Graph 4 - PNS average by party size




Caption. To the left: Nationalization Average (PNS), to the right: Party size (small, medium, large). Below: Election.

Source: Authors' elaboration from TSE data. <<http://www.tse.jus.br/>>

We note that the most oscillating are the small parties. Its variation follows a pattern of rising and falling with each new plea. On the other hand, the medium parties show a much higher pattern of nationalization over the period than the large parties. For these there is a decline of nationalization in average terms in the last election. We can now assess nationalization among the most important parties electorally according to their size. We filter the large and medium

parties. Graph 5 shows the largest parties.




Caption. To the left: Nationalization Average (PNS), to the right: Parties. Below: Election.

Source: Authors' elaboration from TSE data. <<http://www.tse.jus.br/>>

It should be noted that, according to our criteria, the DEM party ceased to be large from 2006 onwards, yet it represented one of the great ones in previous years. Interestingly, the nationalization of DEM has been in decline since the beginning of our series (except 2010). The PSDB, the traditional Brazilian political party, suffered a serious shake-up in terms of nationalization upon its departure from the Presidency in 2002. The PT (Workers Party) party, which was in charge of the Presidency from 2002, has noticeably affected its degree of nationalization. It surpassed the PMDB in 2006 and 2010 where it reached its peak of nationalization. The result of the ballot box in 2014, however, was not favorable to the PT. Although they managed to maintain the presidency, the party's nationalization fell to 2002 levels.

Graph 05 - Typical average parties + PC of B and PV.



Caption. To the left: Nationalization Average (PNS), to the right: Parties. Below: Election.

Source: Authors' elaboration from TSE data. <<http://www.tse.jus.br/>>

In graph 05 we evaluate the most important parties in terms of alliances with large parties. In the field of the medium parties plus the PC do B and PV, we note that the most nationalized party is the PP and, in fact, their scores increase in the last three elections. On the other hand, the PSB is the party with variation and in a positive sense. With the 2006 elections being a milestone in the level of party nationalization. This party had as reference the role of local leaders in spreading the party acronym throughout Brazil focusing on the Northeast with the leadership of Eduardo Campos and his alliance with the PT.

4.1 Descriptive and comparative analyses of the nationalization level of Brazilian parties.

In this section, we will perform descriptive and comparative analyses of the level of nationalization of Brazilian parties. We initially described the nationalization levels of the seven largest parties in the National Congress for the last five elections. Table 03 summarizes the PP, DEM, PTB, PMDB, PSDB, PDT and PT nationalization levels for the 1998 to 2014 elections.

Table 3 - Level of nationalization of the seven largest Brazilian parties.

Parties	Election year	% Average Votes National	PNS
DEM	1998	21.1	0.65
PMDB	-	19.7	0.71
PSDB	-	15.2	0.70
PP	-	10.9	0.60
PT	-	9.4	0.64
PTB	-	5.8	0.55

PDT	-	4.4	0.48
DEM	2002	16.7	0.62
PMDB	-	15.9	0.71
PSDB	-	12.8	0.60
PP	-	7.9	0.67
PT	-	14.5	0.71
PTB	-	5.3	0.49
PDT	-	4.3	0.45
DEM	2006	11.5	0.61
PMDB	-	18.4	0.74
PSDB	-	11.0	0.65
PP	-	7.8	0.62
PT	-	12.7	0.75
PTB	-	4.8	0.59
PDT	-	4.7	0.52
DEM	2010	8.2	0.62
PMDB	-	17.1	0.74
PSDB	-	9.1	0.64
PP	-	7.4	0.63
PT	-	15.2	0.75
PTB	-	4.8	0.54
PDT	-	5.2	0.53
DEM	2014	4.3	0.53
PMDB	-	14.0	0.71
PSDB	-	9.8	0.67
PP	-	6.4	0.66
PT	-	12.1	0.70
PTB	-	3.9	0.48
PDT	-	4.6	0.62

Source: Authors' elaboration from TSE data. <<http://www.tse.jus.br/>>

For the 1998 elections, the PMDB appears as the party with the highest level of nationalization among the seven largest analyzed, with 0.71. PSDB is slightly behind with 0.70 and then DEM⁸ with 0.65. The DEM is the party with the highest average voting percentage among them, 21.1%. But slightly below the nationalization score for that year, which holds a more unequal voting pattern among subnational units compared to the PMDB and PSDB. The PT with only 9.4% of the national average vote, obtained a score of 0.64, only 0.01 difference from the DEM. Suggesting a homogeneous share of votes among subnational units. The PDT appears with the nationalization score 0.48, and 4.4% of the average national vote.

In the next election, in 2002, the PMDB and the PT are tied with a score of 0.71. The

⁸ The DEM was the then PFL (Liberal Front Party). In the 1998 elections, the DEM did not officially exist, the change of name to Democrats took place in 2007. Until that date, the DEM competed with the old denomination (PFL). We use the current party denomination (DEM) in all tables and analyses to avoid possible confusion with the change of acronym.

average national voting percentage was also very close, the PMDB 15.5% and the PT 14.5, just a percentage point difference. The PMDB remained at the same level as in the previous election, while the PT managed to rise nationally and expand its vote. The significant change in the PT nationalization score and the increase in the voting percentage can perhaps be explained by the election and victory of the former president of the Workers Party (PT), Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

In 2006, the PT and the PMDB were almost tied with a score of 0.75 and 0.74, respectively. And a little below, the PSDB with 0.65. After the 1998 election, the PSDB significantly reduced the level of party nationalization from 0.70 to 0.60, a 10-point decrease from one election to the next. Melo (2007) and Limongi and Cortez (2010) agree that the presidential elections have structured the national party system around two points of reference, namely PT and PSDB. This polarization makes sense if we look at the presidential dispute. Which may explain the fall in the PSDB nationalization score in the 2002 election, with the victory of the PT. It remains to be seen whether this polarization has helped parties to stand up to the national electorate and increase the presence of these parties in states and municipalities. As far as the PMDB is concerned, it has behaved like a party of regional leaders, willing to make alliances with the ruling party in exchange for positions and benefits, and does not launch candidates into the presidential race, despite its weight in the states and at the Congress (MELO, 2007; MAINWARING, 2001). Among the parties analyzed, the PMDB is the only one that has managed to maintain an average score of 0.72 in the last five elections.

The 2010 election repeats the nationalization levels for PT 0.75 and PMDB 0.74, and it can be said that for PSDB as well, which did not repeat its previous score by a value of just 0.01 hundredth. The DEM and the PP⁹ deserve attention for the average nationalization levels that they maintain between disputes. Although not exceeding a score of 0.60, both remain relatively constant at this level of nationalization.

In the last congressional dispute, the PMDB upheld the average level of nationalization for the last five elections, 0.71. A little lower than the previous election, 0.74. The nationalization level of the PT also falls proportionally to that of the PMDB, 0.70. The PT and PMDB nationalization levels seem to move together. The fall of one coincides with the fall of the other. PSDB and PP have very similar levels of nationalization 0.67 and 0.66.

Table 04 presents the level of party nationalization with more than 10% of the national voting average in at least one of the last five elections. This criterion makes it possible to see the parties with the highest percentage of national voting and whether these parties have the highest levels of nationalization, as well as whether they have been decreasing or increasing over time.

The only parties that could meet the 10% criterion of the national voting average were:

⁹ The Progressive Party (PP) was the former Brazilian Progressive Party (PPB), founded in 1995 and changed its name to Progressive Party (PP) in 2003. Source: <<http://www.trf-ba.jus.br/arquivos/tse-historico-partidos-politicos>>

DEM, PMDB, PP, PSDB and PT. However, not all of them were able to reach this level in all elections except the PMDB only. The PT stays out only because of the 1998 election, but reaches a percentage very close to the threshold: 9.4% of the average vote. The subtitles with the highest level of nationalization throughout the disputes are: PMDB, PT and PSDB.

Table 04 - Level of nationalization of parties with more than 10% of the national vote.

Parties	Year Election	% Votes National	PNS
DEM	1998	21.1	0.65
PMDB	-	19.7	0.71
PP	-	10.9	0.61
PSDB	-	15.2	0.70
DEM	2002	16.7	0.63
PMDB	-	15.9	0.71
PSDB	-	12.8	0.60
PT	-	14.5	0.71
DEM	2006	11.5	0.61
PMDB	-	18.4	0.74
PSDB	-	11.0	0.65
PT	-	12.7	0.75
PMDB	2010	17.1	0.74
PT	-	15.2	0.75
PMDB	-	14.0	0.72
PT	-	12.1	0.70

Source: Authors' elaboration from TSE data. <<http://www.tse.jus.br/>>

In table 5, we have a party nationalization ranking. The ranking is ranked in three positions for each election year from 1998 until the last election for the National Congress. The purpose of the ranking is to observe the presence of the most nationalized and least nationalized parties in the party system.

Table 5 - Nationalization Ranking.

Year Election	Parties Ranking	PNS
	Most nationalized	
1998	PMDB	0.71
-	PSDB	0.70
-	DEM	0.65
2002	PMDB	0.71
-	PT	0.71
-	PP	0.67
2006	PT	0.75
-	PMDB	0.74
-	PSDB	0.65
2010	PT	0.76
-	PMDB	0.74
-	PSDB	0.64
2014	PMDB	0.72

-	PT	0.70
-	PSDB	0.67
	Less nationalized	
1998	PDT	0.48
-	PTB	0.55
-	PP	0.60
2002	PDT	0.48
-	PTB	0.49
-	PSDB	0.60
2006	PDT	0.52
-	PTB	0.59
-	DEM	0.61
2010	PDT	0.53
-	PTB	0.54
-	DEM	0.62
2014	PTB	0.48
-	DEM	0.53
-	PDT	0.62

Source: Authors' elaboration from TSE data. <<http://www.tse.jus.br/>>

The parties with the highest level of nationalized ranking are: PMDB, PT and PSDB. These parties have little variation in nationalization levels over time. And the pattern of structure of the national party system (LIMONGI AND CORTEZ, 2010; MELO, 2007) seems to be structured in reversal of these three parties: PT and PSDB, for the presidency, and the PMDB, regionally. The low level of nationalization of these parties, compared to the major parties such as the PMDB, PT and PSDB does not mean that they are insignificant in the electoral arena and that their strategies are meaningless to the others. Despite the low level, they remain constant and are present in the electoral arena and are part of the seven largest parties in the National Congress.

5 Conclusion

In line with the results, the structure of the Brazilian party system seems to be structured between the three parties with the highest level of nationalization observed PMDB, PT and PSDB. This does not mean that these parties are large in all federal units. Electoral competition assumes a distinct format in each unit of the federation, and the sum of these results defines the composition of the National Congress (MELO, 2007) as well as the situation and the opposition. Although smaller parties have low levels of nationalization, these levels remain constant over time with slight variations, sometimes for more or less.

Nationalization is an important theme and helps us better understand the party system, the number of parties, the degree of polarization between them and the dynamics of competition. Studies on the nationalization of parties and the party system in Brazil are still scarce and there is much to be done in this regard, however, this work aims to take the first step in this direction. We

intend to broaden our analysis in the future by comparing different measures of nationalization of parties and the party system as well as increasing our historical series.

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