ELECTORAL FINANCING IN STANDING COMMITTEES OF THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE META-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPANIES AND PARLIAMENTARIANS[1]

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Abstract: The article analyzes the relationship between the corporate electoral financing of federal deputies elected to the 55th Legislature (2015-2019) and the composition of the standing committees in the Federal Chamber during the 2016 legislative exercise. From corporate financing, the study seeks to answer: What are the connections between the business financiers of parliamentarians and the permanent committees of the Chamber of Deputies? What are the connections between parliamentary election funding and the composition of the standing committees of the Chamber of Deputies? What is the potential influence of these investors on these commissions? The sources of the research are the website of the Chamber of Deputies, and the information on candidates and on the electoral accounts provided by the Superior Electoral Court (TSE - BR). The data were organized, submitted to the methodology of Social Network Analysis (SNA) and processed in the Gephi program. The results reveal a highly hierarchical network of Standing Committees ranked according to the funding received by their members parliamentarians.

Keywords: Electoral financing; Chamber of Deputies; Standing Committees; Interest and pressure groups; Social Network Analysis.

1 Introduction

This article deals with the electoral financing relations between the large business groups in Brazil and the constitution of the Permanent Committees in the Chamber of Deputies [6]. The Permanent Committees occupy a privileged position as a legislative instance, as they present and analyze all the data, antecedents, circumstances and convenience of a proposed bill that, issued in the form of an opinion of thecommittee, will guide the Plenary in the appreciation of the matter. In the supervisory action, the commissions act as mechanisms to control the programs and projects executed or under execution in the Executive Branch, constituting an instrument of favor or pressure on the governmental sphere and on specific political groups.

The objective of the present study is to investigate the connection capacity and potential influence of the financing capital on the members of the permanent committees of the Chamber

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of Deputies. Based on the studies of Maltzman (2001), Souza (2012) and Mancuso (2015), the hypothesis supporting this research is that campaign donations declared between corporate and parliamentary funders evidence a structure with potential influence and corporate pressure in the legislative agenda within the Standing Committees of the Chamber of Deputies.

The data used for this analysis originate from the Electoral Data Repositories of the Superior Electoral Court (SEC), referring to the 2014 election, and the Territorial Studies Group (TSG / UEPG). We also use data available on the Chamber of Deputies website about thecommittees composition after the distribution of seats at the beginning of 2016[7]. The methodology used to answer the research questions is the analysis of social networks (ARS), which has methodological procedures, in addition to bibliographical and documentary research, the use of the Gephi computational tool for data analysis, especially using the resource conversion dual mode - one mode.

2 Electoral funding and committees a debate under construction

In addition to media scandals and judicial investigations, the relationship between capital financing groups and the Brazilian political elite has been marked by electoral funding from large corporations that transacted more than 66% of the total invested in 2010 (HOROCHOVSKI, 2016) in 2014, almost 75% of what was received by candidates for all positions (JUNCKES; HOROCHOVSKI; CAMARGO, 2016). This phenomenon originated a great development of academic studies on electoral investment in Brazil since the beginning of the decade of 2000. Although in Brazil this theme is emerging, Araújo (2012) cites the work of Bentley (1908) to affirm that the academy focuses on the issue of private influence on post-electoral behavior for over a century.

Mancuso (2015) divides into three branches the Brazilian literature on what he calls "electoral investment". The first deals with the relationship between investment and electoral performance; the second deals with the relationship between investment and the granting of benefits to investors and, finally, the third aspect focuses on the determinants of electoral investment. The author points out that this type of literature had its development leveraged for two reasons: the legislation approval (Law No. 8,713 / 1993), which allowed donations of legal entities with the obligation for committees and parties to hold account about the donations received to Electoral Justice; and the fact that the Electoral Court makes the accounts public on its website.

In the 2010 and 2014 elections, Brazilian law (Law No. 9,504/1997) allowed the electoral

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[7]The commission is permanent when it integrates the institutional structure of the Chamber or the Senate and is temporary when it is created to appreciate a specific project, for investigation or for official mission, and may be composed of deputies and senators, when it is called a mixed commission. Although we could have covered temporary committees, the scope of this work was limited to the permanent committees according to the possible approach in the time of the research, which works with the composition of the standing committees on a specific date of 2016. Future works are planned for to be developed in the scope of the Network Analysis Laboratory (LAR), covering temporary commissions. within the Network Analysis Laboratory (LAR) covering temporary commissions.

campaigns to have several sources: legal entities (up to 2% of gross revenues in the year prior to the election, private individuals cf. (up to 10% of the gross income of the year prior to the election, see article 23, § 1, I) and the candidates themselves (up to the maximum amount of expenses established by his party, see article 23, § 1, II). In addition to also allowing resources derived from the the comercialization of goods and realization of events, partisan fund and income from financial applications.

The influence of political financing on the generation of public agendas is addressed by Fleischer (2000), who studies the forms of retribution and compensation of the investments made by campaign "donors", and by Souza (2012), who defines the formulation of public policies such as the struggle for power and resources among social groups. This struggle is mediated by political and economic institutions that take public policies to a certain direction and privilege some groups to the detriment of others.

The electoral financing network is a gateway to a specific political sector in the state apparatus. In this network, individuals tend to donate according to party ideology, and party agents are part of the logic of alliances that allow the best positioning in the dispute for public positions, and legal entities focus their resources according to electoral viability of parties and candidates (MANCUSO, SPECK, 2015).

3 Methodological proceduress

Electoral financing data from the 2014 elections used in this study are based on the Superior Electoral Court (SEC). The data about the composition of permanent committees during 2016 are based on the Chamber of Deputies. The 2014 electoral financing data was made available by the Territorial Studies Group (TEAP) of Ponta Grossa State University (PR), available for consultation and download in the Atlas of Electoral Financing Networks, through the address http: // www .getepolitica.org /. The identification and selection of members for the Standing Committees was done based on the data collection in a transversal cut, in September 2016, by consulting the page of the Chamber of Deputies with comittees composition updated.

The first step was to set up a network of financing relationships for elected Federal Deputies in 2014 and permanent committee members during the year 2016. The primary material for this study is the electoral financing network of the 513 elected federal deputies and their respective 3,916 electoral funders, a legal entity, including identified original donors. Gephi software is used in this task, as it is an interactive platform for visualization and exploration of networks and complex systems, dynamic and stratified graphs.

In this way an exclusive network of electoral financing of federal deputies can be can be observed in the graph exposed by Figure 1. The parliamentarians are represented by the knots (circles) in the color blue and the electoral financiers by the color green. Donations are represented by the edges (lines) in red.

Figure 1 – Graph of the financing network of the elected federal deputies.

Source: Authors (2017), based on TSE data organized in relational database by TEAP / UEPG.

At the center of the graphic are the best connected financiers and parliamentarians (prominent green and blue nodes, respectively) who will be identified later in their participation in the Standing Committees. Although parliamentarians are most prominent because of their centrality, there is a notable difference between the small business financiers, peripherally distributed in the graph, and the great corporate representatives who occupy the center of the network.

The second step was to carry out a test of connectivity produced by the financiers among the parliamentarians, because without this assumption there would be no reason to investigate any capacity to engender the influence of the financiers within the committees. The parliamentary funding network has been submitted to the dual mode - one mode of modal conversion, which makes possible to visualize the metarrelationships among deputies through the capital of their electoral financiers[8].

The bimodal network, that is, the one with two types of nodes (donors and receivers) is converted to one of its modes by applying the dual mode-one mode algorithm. We have thus obtained a network capable of showing the interconnection between parliamentarians and produced by the electoral investment operations directed simultaneously to two or more

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[8]Horochovski, Junckes and Camargo (2016) explain and use this modal conversion in the analysis of the roles of the different players in the electoral financing network of the general elections of 2014.

candidates. Figure 2 illustrates the technique used in this analysis.

Figure 2 – Dual Mode Conversion - One Mode

Source: The authors (2017).
Legend: Deputy XY, Deputy YZ, Financier SS.

The third step was to add the information regarding the donations received by the parliamentarians of a committee in a single recipient / commission node. In order to identify the financiers of members of each standing committee in the Chamber of Deputies, the information regarding the financier / parliamentary relation becomes transformed in financier / commission relation.

Among the 513 members of the Federal Chamber, the seven members of the Directing Board, elected by their peers, are barred from participating in committees and leaderships, according to Article 14 of their InternalRegulation. In this way, 506 deputies are allocated to the Standing Committees. However, in a consultation held in 16/09/2016, they were on the page of the committees composition information about the 509 members. From this list with the 509 parliamentarians, they are are associated with the attribute referring to the Standing Committee to which they are informed as members.

Finally, a new multimodal conversion was carried out in the aggregate financier / commission network, to generate a network of committesfrom the multiple donations destined by electoral investors to the federal deputies members of the Standing Committees of the Chamber of Deputies.

4 Results and discussion

This research focuses on relations established in the Standing Committees of the Chamber of Deputies identified through the links of electoral financing. For this analysis a progressive reading of the constitution of these relations is made, although it is known that the effective performance of the committees can be subject to the regimental maneuvers of the party leadership and the board of directors of the Chamber, mainly in the service of the Executive's interests, as pointed out byPereira and Mueller (2000).

The potential capacity of the corporate financiers for the intermediation exercise between the parliamentarians was initially tested and can be perceived using the modal conversion of the networks, earlier explained. Applied to the members financing network, this feature allows to visualize the metarrelationships among the deputies produced by the multiple donations made by the corporate financiers (Figure 3). In the conversion of the bimodal network (with financiers and parliamentarians) into unimodal (parliamentary only), the name of each parliamentarian is replaced by the acronym of his political party, with online grouping to facilitate the visualization of representative lines of multiple donations. Each of the 39,430 lines in the following graph represents one or more of the 120,516 donations to different parliamentarians added by party affiliation. The lines of the network expose the impressive connection and intermediation capacity achieved by the private financiers in the Parliament.

Figure 3 – Network of parliamentarians connected by corporate voters

Source: Authors (2017), based on TSE data organized in relational database by TEAP / UEPG.

An approximate idea of the connectivity produced by the electoral investors can be obtained if we consider that the 100 parliamentarians best connected by corporate investment relations are related to at least 298 of their peers through their respective direct financiers. It should be highlighted that the most well-connected parliamentarian is meta attached to 367 colleagues. Perhaps this parliamentarian, as a candidate, has never had direct contact with some

or many of these 367 parliamentarians linked to him through the financing relations, however, between himself and any of his colleagues there is only one direct donor in common, which holds a potential to bring them closer to their electoral financing interests.

In addition, the network of parliamentarians connected by corporate electoral investmentsdemonstrates how little concentrades=d, by party affiliation, is corporate investment, as companies finance parliamentarians from several different parties. This dispersion of inter-party ties produced by corporate agents in electoral financing confirms studies on the electoral financing networks of 2010 and 2014 by Horochovski et al. (2015) and Horochovski, Junckes and Camargo (2016).

Verified connectivity capacity achieved by the electoral investors, the network of committees generated by the financiers of the parliamentarians that compose this network is built. In order to identify the financiers of the members of each standing committee in the Chamber of Deputies, the financier / parliamentary relations was transformed into financier / commission relation. To this end, the information regarding the donations received by the parliamentarians of a committee was added on a single committee node.

The procedure for adding the donations received by the 509 parliamentarians in their respective committees formed a network called the "Financing network of the Standing Commissions". Figure 4 below shows the graph of the aggregate network, where the committees are represented by the knots (circles) in the blue color and the electoral financiers by the color green. Donations are represented by the edges (lines) in red.

**Figure 4** – Graph of the financing network of the Permanent Committees.

Source: The authors (2017), based on TSE data organized in relational database by TEAP /UEPG.

The previous network, about financing of standing committees, consists of a total of 3,932 nodes, of which 3,907 are corporate donors represented in green, and the others in blue, 25 committes. The red lines (edges) express the 19,448 aggregate donations that represents the total of R $ 506,441,229.00 in electoral financing. Because some committees allow members of other committees in their composition, amount corresponding to donations destinedfor these deputies is computed once for each comittee they compose. The size of the nodes is graduated by weighted degree (volume of resources received or donated in / by the node) and the distribution / position of each node corresponds to its centrality in the network. The centrality exerted by the large corporate financiers and the gravitational position occupied by the committees are highlighted, as can be seen in Figure 5. The graph of financing networkof the Standing Committes is reduced to grade 3, that is, only those investors who have made at least three donations remain in the network.

Figure 5 – Graph of the financing network of the Permanent Commissions, reduced by grade 3

Source: Authors (2017), based on TSE data organized in relational database by TEAP / UEPG.

From the worksheets generated from the financing network of the Standing Committees, the number of donations accumulated by the members of each committe (degree) is identified and the list of the capital input into each committee[9] is extrated through the electoral financing of companies to their deputies (weighted degree). Thus, we obtain a stratification of the committees from the most to the least contemplated by the electoral financing of its members (Table 1). It is important to note that the amount contributed in to committees needs to be relativized according to the number of parliamentarians who compose them, because while the first has 129 members, in the last one this number is close to 30. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze these values composing them with the average of donations per member, the average of resources received by parliamentarians, and the average values in each committe. In addition to a larger number of parliamentarians, committees at the top of the list have a higher average of donations received, with higher average values, and, in addition, a higher median. The opposite happens with the committes that appear in the base of the list[10].

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[9]When a committee is mentioned, it is a, metonymy for the deputies of this commission, but the identification of each parliamentarian as well as the values received individually from the business financiers in the 2014 electoral campaign are not part of the object of this study.

[10] The list with the name of each of the 25 standing committees and their acronyms is listed in Annex 01.

Table 1 – Contribution of electoral funding to the members of the standing committees in the Chamber of Deputies in 2016

Standing Committee.	N of donations received (Grade)	N of Members	Average donations per member (N)	Total Received (R $) (Weighted Grade)	Average received per member (R$)	Medium (R$)
CCJC	2.033	129	15,8	133.561.889	1.035.363	880.558
CFT	1.529	81	18,9	104.414.834	1.289.072	1.189.958
CME	1.419	82	17,3	99.431.739	1.212.582	1.010.515
CAPADR	1.585	90	17,6	98.563.494	1.095.150	1.034.443
CREDN	1.007	66	15,3	80.777.051	1.223.895	800.300
CSSF	1.292	101	12,8	78.939.236	781.577	550.404
CCTCI	1.019	74	13,8	78.713.826	1.063.700	695.642
CVT	1.025	84	12,2	68.772.477	818.720	656.151
CE	1.068	83	12,9	66.624.029	802.699	487.903
CDC	785	41	19,1	52.574.929	1.282.315	1.044.758
CSPCCO	690	57	12,1	51.973.765	911.820	746.544
CTASP	695	44	15,8	48.053.696	1.092.129	845.050
CDU	621	35	17,7	41.789.543	1.193.987	943.844
CTUR	544	37	14,7	40.919.062	1.105.921	1.003.197
CMADS	711	36	19,8	38.997.667	1.083.269	536.109
CFFC	431	38	11,3	30.705.704	808.045	610.338
CESPO	446	42	10,6	27.499.152	654.742	463.088
CDEICS	403	35	11,5	27.011.968	771.771	445.000
CCULT	375	36	10,4	23.636.181	656.561	677.680
CLP	318	26	12,2	21.072.081	810.465	544.742
CMULHER	307	30	10,2	19.885.614	662.854	469.002
CIDOSO	227	26	8,7	19.885.304	764.819	408.855
CINDRA	295	36	8,2	19.821.729	550.604	405.242
CDHM	299	33	9,1	18.286.622	554.140	242.500
CPD	324	34	9,5	13.286.386	390.776	341.460
TOTAL	**19.448**	**1.376**	**14,1**	**1.305.197.978**	**22.616.975**	**17.033.280**

Source: Authors (2017), based on TSE data organized in relational database by TEAP / UEPG.

Considering all the data, it is evident the selective and focused interest of the financing capital for a certain group of parliamentarians, especially those who have greater centrality in the electoral financing network, which promotes a hierarchical structure of parliamentary committees. The CCJC, CFT, CME and CAPADR committees ranked first, respectively, as the most funded, accounting for 33.4% of the total financing for parliamentarians. The CINDRA, CDHM and CPD committes are the least funded. The committes created in early 2016, CMULHER and CIDOSO appear just above the last three places. These five committees, at the end of the list, are the target of only 6.9% of the total financing of Standing Committees Members.

Given that financiers have a high capacity to directly connect parliamentarians and that this capacity is asymmetrically distributed among the different standing committees, the aim was to identify a committee network constituted through electoral investment meta-links. The multimodal, dual mode network conversion feature (one mode) was once again used to evidence

existing but hidden connections made by investors in their donations to two or more candidates / committees.

By clarifying the links between committees, once the figure of the financier has been removed, it becomes possible to perceive the "central committees" with the greatest number and volume of investments in common, and, on the contrary, the "peripheral committees", with the lesser interconnectivity produced by multiple donations. Figure 6 below presents the graph with the links between the 25 committes produced by the corporate financiers.

Figure 6 – Network of commissions constituted by corporate electoral investments.

Source: The authors (2017), based on TSE data organized in relational database by TEAP /UEPG.

The most significant linkages are between the CCJC and CFT, with 525 common investors; CCJC and CME with 386 and CAPADR and CCJC with 356. The less expressive ones appear between CINDRA and CMULHER with 30 common links; and CIDOSO and CINDRA, and CINDRA and CLP with 27 common donors.

The weight of the bonds, expressed by the thickness of the edges, is the variable that determines the intensity of the capital intercommittees relations. The color of the nodes, determined by the class modularity partition, shows the communities formed by the links[11]. The size of the nodes is defined by the ranking of centrality of weighted degree, that is, the volume of resources and relationships established. It should be noted that the number of parliamentarians who are members of the central committees is higher than in the committees on the periphery, and therefore this could in itself lead to a greater interconnection between these committees.

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[11] The concept of class modularity is described by Newman (2010, pp. 354-92, Graph partitioning and community detection). The Gephi software uses in its calculations an algorithm of modularity of classes of conception of Blondel, Guillaume, Lambiotte and Lefebvre (2008).

However, as with the data in Table 1, in addition to a larger number of parliamentarians, central committees presents higher averages and medians of donations received. The opposite occurs with peripheral committees.

From the studies and results obtained it is possible to infer the strategic allocation of resources by financiers to committees with legislative relevance and corresponding to their normative attributions in the mercantile relations. In the same way, it is concluded that there is a disinterest, or a mitigated interest, on the agenda of the committees less contemplated by the joint financing of their members. In addition, we must take into account that financiers have preference for the most competitive candidates, who are usually those with a strong presence in parliament or relevant political capital, both of which make them more likely to get seats in the most important committees".

The six committees that have the highest number of links with all other committees are: CCJC, CFT, CAPADR, CME, CSSF and CE, with 36% of total links in the set of 25 Standing Committees. The six peripheral committees, with fewer metalinks, are: CPD, CDHM, CLP, CMULHER, CIDOSO and CINDRA, with only 14.2% of the multiple donations.

The CCJC connects the other committees with the largest amount of financingand is also the Standing Committee that most connects with the other ones with 5,576 links, presenting a great legislative scope in its agenda. The CFT, secondly, presents 4,721 links of its members in common with the members of the other committees. The CAPADR and CME, following the list, have their attributions defined as indicated in their own denominations, on agendas of recognized industrial, commercial and territorial relevance. It is important to reaffirm that the greater absolute number of members generates more links and, of course, the opposite also occurs. Thus, the result shows that corporate capital donates more frequently and higher values to those candidates who, once elected, become members with the largest number of parliamentarians, not having a cause-effect relation, but rather complementarity.

The committees that are related to the smaller volume of ties with the other 25 have in common, in addition to a smaller number of parliamentarians, a predominant social, domestic and family agenda, for dealing with inclusion and equity rights when addressing issues relating to the rights of women, the elderly and people with disabilities. CINDRA, last in the list, also of an inclusive nature, is in line with the precursors in the list, since in its creation proposals for ways of reducing the inequalities of the Amazon region were envisaged (BRAZIL, Chamber of Deputies, 2014).

5 Final considerations

It was initially demonstrated in this study that electoral financing relationships in 2016 forged a network of connected parliamentarians for corporate investment that shows a high potential for influence and corporate pressure on the legislative agenda within the Standing Committees of the Chamber of Deputies. The exploration of meta-links between donors and

candidates, provided the identification of 39,430 cases in which a donor connects two parliamentarians. It was possible to reveal a high capacity of intermediation of the corporatefinanciers, to the point that one of the parliamentarians shares its 41 financiers with 367 other colleagues of the parliament. Thirteen of these donors have donated more than $ 100,000 to this deputy and thus have a potential access to 71% of the members of the Chamber from their "parlamentarian". The intense connection between parliamentarians produced by corporate financiers is therefore replicated among the standing committees of the Chamber.

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ANEXO 01 – Siglas das Comissões Permanentes da Câmara dos Deputados

CAPADR - Comissão de Agricultura, Pecuária, Abastecimento e Desenvolvimento Rural

CCTCI - Comissão de Ciência e Tecnologia, Comunicação e Informática

CCJC - Comissão de Constituição e Justiça e de Cidadania

CCULT - Comissão de Cultura

CDC - Comissão de Defesa do Consumidor

CMULHER - Comissão de Defesa dos Direitos da Mulher

CIDOSO - Comissão de Defesa dos Direitos da Pessoa Idosa

CPD - Comissão de Defesa dos Direitos das Pessoas com Deficiência

CDU - Comissão de Desenvolvimento Urbano

CDEICS - Comissão de Desenvolvimento Econômico, Indústria, Comércio e Serviços

CDHM - Comissão de Direitos Humanos e Minorias

CE - Comissão de Educação

CESPO - Comissão do Esporte

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CFT - Comissão de Finanças e Tributação
CFFC - Comissão de Fiscalização Financeira e Controle
CINDRA - Comissão de Integração Nacional, Desenvolvimento Regional e da Amazônia
CLP - Comissão de Legislação Participativa
CMADS - Comissão de Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento Sustentável
CME - Comissão de Minas e Energia
CREDN - Comissão de Relações Exteriores e de Defesa Nacional
CSPCCO - Comissão de Segurança Pública e Combate ao Crime Organizado
CSSF - Comissão de Seguridade Social e Família
CTASP - Comissão de Trabalho, de Administração e Serviço Público
CTUR - Comissão de Turismo
CVT - Comissão de Viação e Transportes