



THE CAREER OF THE DEVIATES: AMBITION POLITICS AND LEVEL OF PROFESSIONALISM ON THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES¹

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Abstract: What is the effect of the level of professionalism of the federal deputies on their political ambition? Based on the theoretical assumption that professional deputies are those who have assumed positions and have more experience in the party and the Chamber of Deputies, our objective is to test the hypothesis that the more professional the federal deputy is the greater the chance to choose progressive ambition. Methodologically, we systematized an original database with information about the political career of the parliamentarians, having as dependent variable the type of ambition of the respective federal deputies. We used chi-square association test, comparison between means and a logistic regression model. The results indicate that the most ambitious parliamentarians do not seem to differ from the others in terms of experience, either inside or outside the Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, the expected effect of the professionalization of the federal deputies on the progressive ambition can not be verified.

Keywords: Political Ambition; Political Professionalization; Chamber of Deputies.

1 Introduction

What is the effect of the level of professionalism of the federal deputies on their political ambition? Political ambition refers to the standards of political careers, one of the earliest studies being conducted in the United States by Joseph Schelsinger in 1966. The directions that a politician can follow in his career are basically four: (1) to apply for re-election (static ambition); (2) apply for positions lower than yours (regressive ambition); (3) apply for a position higher than yours (progressive ambition); and, (4) for various reasons, you may decide not to run for office.

This article intends to contribute by testing the hypothesis that the more professional the federal deputy, the greater the chance to choose progressive ambition. To do this, we set up a database with a sample of 142 cases, containing information on career choice and political and partisan experience of federal deputies. The professionalization of parliamentarians was measured by their time of experience in the party, their experience in important positions in the party, the

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
number of mandates exercised in the Chamber of Deputies and their experience in occupying prominent positions in the House. Political ambition was classified by examining the career choices of parliamentarians. Methodologically, chi-square association test, comparison graphs between means and logistic regression model will be used.

2 Political ambition and the professionalization of parliamentarians

The studies on ambition begin with the seminal work of Schlesinger (1966). This author is one of the first to include in the subject of political ambition the examination of the structure of career opportunities. He analyzed the relationship between this structure and variables such as party organization and interparty competition. Considering that the whole political system is organized around this structure of opportunities, the study of the career ambitions would allow a better understanding of the political career choices. Therefore, political survival strategies are defined from the ambition of the politician to the positions available in the structure of career opportunities. In view of this, the structure can only be fully understood from the perspective of individuals, the institutional characteristics of the political system and the dynamics of competition for certain positions, in view of their competencies and benefits.

Following the definition of the literature (Schlesinger, 1966, LEONI, PEREIRA, RENNÓ, 2003, ROEDE, 2012, PEREIRA, RENNO 2013), the ambition of the federal deputies can be: regressive, when the parliamentarian is applying for a position in the state legislature or municipal; static, when he applies for re-election; and progressive, when the deputy applies for positions with access to better benefits (salaries, funds, more staff), such as the positions of Senator, Mayor, Governor or President of the Republic. As a last resort, the parliamentarian may not decide not to run for office.

In our case, we obtained the type of ambition of each parliamentarian comparing the position exercised (federal deputy) with the position chosen by him in the following elections. The parliamentarians who did not run for office are considered as *Lame duck* of the electoral contest, and the others have their ambition classified according to the position chosen. Figure 1 illustrates the structure of career opportunities for federal deputies.



Source: Own development

According to Black (1972), as the costs of gaining a position increase, the benefits derived from this position must grow faster than costs, so that the benefit of the more expensive positions is greater than that obtained from less expensive positions. Otherwise, the rational individual would not seek to progress in career to more costly positions.

Samuels (2000) argues that the phenomenon to be analyzed in Brazil is the renewal, not the reelection. For him, the Chamber of Deputies does not offer great advantages for parliamentarians. Among the disincentives are the low decision-making capacity and the scarce resource volumes, making incumbent unmotivated (SAMUELS, 2003). The result is the formation of a vicious cycle: the Legislative is not attractive to its main cadres, and renewal makes it even more fragile in the process of formulating public policies, which generates low attractiveness.

Figure 2 – Vicious cycle of ambition



Source: Own development.

For positions that represent career advancement, pay-offs are primarily about the privileges attached to maintaining these positions: Executive-level positions at any level of the Federation offer the highest benefits. For example, positions in the Senate have higher funding advantages, advisory staff, and longer terms. Therefore, the associated benefits always further incentives offer one more incentive. The counterbalance to it is the greatest risk involved in progressive ambition. In general, executive positions involve majority disputes, which means that only one candidate can win (NICOLAU, 2012). What is expected is a sharpening of the electoral competition and the increase of the cost of the campaign.

2.2 Professionalism of parliamentarians.

In general, the measurement of legislative professionalization has been made from three indicators: a) legislator's salary; b) staff provided for the legislator; and c) total days present in parliamentary sessions (SQUIRE, 1992). From this index, the professionalism among the Legislative Houses can be compared to each other. Squire (1992) noted that, over the years, deputies began to devote themselves fully to the Legislative, becoming professional politicians.

How do the political ambition and the professionalization of the Legislative relate? According to Santos (2003), there are two relevant institutional dimensions that condition the career profile in the Legislative: the first is the degree of electoral competitiveness and the second, the degree of influence of the Legislative in the definition of a decision agenda. In order to make the argument clearer, he rated both high and low. Table 1, below, reproduces its outline.

Chart 1 – Competitiveness and Decisional Power of the Legislative

		Decisional Power	
		High	Low
Competitiveness	High	1	2
	Low	3	4

Source: Santos (2003, pg. 131).

The decision as to whether or not to remain in the parliamentary career depends on an individual calculation made by each parliamentarian. In it, the main determinants are the expected value of the mandate and the expectation of remaining in parliament. The Chamber's ability to retain politicians in the House is positively related to opportunities to intervene in the decision-making process, that is, the greater the legislative power of the legislature, the greater its retention power. In addition, the deputy's willingness to re-introduce himself to the electorate and acquire a new mandate depends on the greater or lesser risk of losing the vacancy to a challenger in the electoral contest (SANTOS, 2003).

Therefore, it is natural to imagine that the pattern of recruitment and retention of legislators will be different in each of the possibilities presented in Table 1. Santos (2003) exemplifies that if in a given political system legislators re-elected with relative ease and the Legislative defines the public agenda, then it is likely that the parliament will be filled by members who are keen to invest in parliamentary careers. This combination appears in quadrant 3, which corresponds to a low electoral competitiveness and high legislative power of decision. If, on the other hand, the task of obtaining a new mandate is difficult for the representatives and the Executive has enormous agenda power, canceling the Legislative as a relevant decision locus, then one expects a certain lack of commitment from the members to the legislative institution. This appears in quadrant 2, which corresponds to high electoral competitiveness and low decision-making power.

The most widely accepted hypothesis in the literature is that the most experienced parliamentarians have no incentive to remain in the legislature (SAMUELS, 2000; SANTOS, 2003). Santos (2003), for example, believes that parliamentarians usually use the Legislative Branch as a springboard for more attractive positions. Based on the hypothesis that the more professional the federal deputy is the greater the chance to choose progressive ambition, we hope

that the most committed and experienced deputies, whether in the party or in the Chamber of Deputies, assume a progressive ambition.

3 Methodology

This section describes the methodological procedures adopted. The objective is to allow the replication of the results (KING, 1995; JANZ, 2015). The data that compose the bank were obtained in the electoral data repository of the Supreme Electoral Court - TSE and in the biography of the deputies, which can be consulted on the website of the Chamber of Deputies.

The population that served as the basis for the calculation corresponds to the totally 513 parliamentarians of the 54th Legislature of the Chamber of Deputies. The assumed confidence level is 95% and sample error of 7%. Therefore, it was necessary to compose a sample with 142 cases to measure the results. The sample was composed by the method of Random Systematic Sampling⁶, with the objective of being representative and not producing bias.

Table 2 describes the structure of opportunities and political ambition of the federal deputies:

Chart 2 – Structure of opportunities and political ambition of the federal deputies

Structure of opportunities	Type of ambition of the federal deputies	Description of ambition
Councilman, State depute	Regressive	Occurs when the parliamentarian is run for a position in the state or municipal legislature
Senator, Mayor, Governor, and President of the Republic	Progressive	It occurs whenever the deputy applies for positions with access to better benefits (salaries, funds, larger teams)
Federal depute	Static	Occurs when the parliamentarian is running for re-election
No Office	Retired	Occurs when the parliamentarian does not apply for any elective position until the end of the term.

Source: Own development.

The ambitions that matter to test the hypothesis of this work are progressive and static. The purpose is to compare the groups of parliamentarians. For this, the sample was divided in two, each part corresponding to parliamentarians with a type of ambition. The aim is to give equal opportunities for the manifestation of the characteristics of the different groups of deputies. If the sample were composed proportionally to the type of ambition assumed, the group corresponding to parliamentarians with static ambition would be approximately 3.4 times larger than the group that assumed progressive ambition. Therefore, the possibility of occurring cases of more

⁶ Random Systematic Sampling is obtained by dividing the total population (N) by the total elements of the sample (m). ($N/m = X$). The result obtained X corresponds to the selection interval between the sample elements. A value is drawn between 0 and X, which will result in the initial count number. Therefore, the count from the number drawn, sum the range of selection X, the result corresponds to the second element Sample. This step should be performed successively until you have completed the number of cases required to compose the sample (BARBETTA, 2014)

experienced parliamentarians, whether in the party or in the Chamber, for example, would be greater.

The table below describes the composition of the dependent variable.

Chart 3 – Composition of the dependent variable.

Nomenclature	description	Values	Measurement
Type of ambition	Progressive Ambition	Progressive gets value 0.	Dichotomous.
	Static ambition.	Static gets value 1.	

Source: Own development

According to Leoni, Pereira and Rennó (2003), being in prominent positions in the Chamber increases the likelihood of running for re-election. This would happen because these positions increase the rewards of those who occupy these posts. Moreover, according to Mancuso et al. (2013), success in static ambition is linked to partisan loyalty. In this article, looking for new variables that are capable of measuring professionalization, we choose to measure it through the number of mandates exercised in the Chamber of Deputies, the experience in occupying prominent positions in the House, time of experience in the party, experience in important positions in the party, as well as verifying whether the parliamentarian has changed party after being elected to the House. The aim is to verify if these variables influence, actually, the choice of the parliamentarians' career. Table 4 describes the composition of the dependent variables.

Chart 4 – Composition of independent variables.

Nomenclature	description	Values	Measurement
Success in Election.	Success and failure of applications.	Failure receives value 0, Success gets value 1.	Categorical
Parliamentary condition.	<i>Incumbent</i> or challenging.	Challenger gets value 0, Incumbent receives value 1.	Categorical
Political experience.	Executive Elective.	Do not receive value 0, Yes it gets value 1.	Categorical
Featured in the Chamber.	Has held senior positions ⁷ in the chamber	Do not receive value 0, Yes it gets value 1.	Categorical
Seniority in the Chamber.	Number of seats in the Chamber.	Receives the number of parliamentary mandates.	Discreet
Party antiquity.	Number of years of party affiliation.	Receive the number of years of party affiliation.	Discreet
Party experience.	Position in the executive of the party.	Do not receive value 0, Yes it gets value 1.	Categorical
Changed sides.	Changed party after elected.	Do not receive value 0, Yes it gets value 1.	Categorical

Source: Own development.

Methodologically, the work makes use of descriptive and inferential statistics techniques. We used chi-square association test, a method applied to test the significance of association

⁷ We hold the following positions as the most prominent positions: President of the Chamber, Leader of the Party leader, President of the Legislative Committee, 1st Secretary of the Chamber, 1st Vice-President of the Chamber, 2nd Vice-President of the Chamber, 2nd Secretary.


between two variables, and also to compare two or more samples, when the results of the response variable are arranged in categories (BARBETTA, 2014). We compare the averages through bar graphs of errors. Finally, to test the main hypothesis of the work, we estimate a logistic regression model, chosen to be adequate to analyze cases where the dependent variable is dichotomous and the independent variables can be of any type: dichotomous, ordinal, discrete or continuous (HAIR et al., 2009).

4 Results

Initially, before composing the sample, it was necessary to analyze the political ambition of the parliamentarians of the 54th Legislature. We find that there are parliamentarians who have been classified into two types of ambition during the mandate. This is possible because, in the middle of the House's four-year term, the congressman can apply for the position of Mayor or Alderman. It is more common for parliamentarians to choose to apply for the position of Mayor, but not everyone is successful in the candidacy, and may return to his term in the House. At the end of the term, they can run for office again and have access to four positions: State Representative (regressive ambition), Federal Deputy (static ambition), Senator, Governor and President of the Republic (progressive ambition).

Figure 1 shows the type of ambition chosen by the federal deputies of the 54th Legislature.

Graph 1 – Choice of political career of federal deputies of the 54th Legislature



Source: Own development.


Most parliamentarians (62.18%) fulfill their mandate and stand for re-election. The second largest number, 16.37%, is relative to the parliamentarians who retired from the electoral contest. Parliamentarians with progressive ambitions represent 11.89% of the cases. The

parliamentarians with regressive ambition, in turn, were 1.75% of the cases. Among parliamentarians who have applied for positions representing two distinct ambitions, we have a rate of 6.82% of parliamentarians who have applied for progressive and static ambition, and 0.97% applying for progressive and regressive ambition.

4.2 Success and Failure in the dispute for the Chamber of Deputies

After classifying the type of ambition of the parliamentarians, we sampled the 142 cases. In our sample, the success rate in applications is higher among the lawmakers applying for re-election compared to parliamentarians who have sought more advantageous positions. Consequently, the rate of failure was higher in the group of parliamentarians who had a progressive ambition. We elaborated the Graph 2 to illustrate the success rate and failure in the candidacies of the parliamentarians of the sample.

Graph 2 – Success and failure in the applications of the Members of the sample.



Source: Own development.

Table 1 lists the candidates that have achieved success and failure in the sample with the type of ambition assumed by the parliamentarians. 63.40% of the re-candidates were successful in the race, while only 22.50% of the candidates who opted for progressive ambition succeeded. Most of the applications, regardless of the type of ambition, have failed - this percentage is 57%. The results point to a statistical correlation between these variables.

Table 1 – Ambition of the parliamentarians x Success and failure in the candidacies.

		Type of Ambition.				Total	
		Static		Progressive			
Success in Applications	No	26	36,60%	55	77,50%	81	57,00%
	Yes	45	63,40%	16	22,50%	61	43,00%
Total		71	100,00%	71	100,00%	142	100,00%

Source: Own development. Value of the chi-square test: 24,170, with a minimum expected count of 30.50, a statistical significance of 0.000 and a contingency coefficient of 0.381.

4.3 Analysis of the professionalization of parliamentarians.

From this point on, we show the results of the correlation analysis of the variables that make up the professionalization of the parliamentarians. For this, we will use the chi-square test. Two important characteristics to draw the professional profile of the deputies are the exercise of position in the party and the elective experience in the Executive.

Table 2 shows the correlation.

Table 2: Position in the executive of the party x Elective in the Executive

		Executive Elective				Total	
		No		Yes			
Position in the executive of the party.	No	23	24,00%	73	76,00%	96	100,00%
	yes	3	6,50%	43	93,50%	46	100,00%
Total		26	18,30%	116	81,70%	142	100,00%

Source: Own development. Value of the chi-square test: 6,321, with a minimum expected count of 8.42, a statistical significance of 0.012, and a contingency coefficient of 0.206.

According to the results, only 18.30% of the deputies are inexperienced, that is, they did not hold elective positions outside the Chamber. However, 67.61% (of the sample, 96 parliamentarians) of the deputies have never held positions in the party to which they are affiliated. The cross-checking reveals that 76% of MPs who did not hold positions in the executive committee of their political party have experience in another arena, while 93.50% of the parliamentarians who have held some office in their party have elective experience. The chi-square test reveals a statistical dependence between the two variables. In addition, it is important to note that only 43 (30.28% of the sample) deputies meet the two characteristics at the same time, that is, they are part of the most professional group under this aspect. The following table complements the scenario made so far and points out the result of the cross between the parliamentary's political experience and his condition.

Table 3: Elective office on the Executive x Status of the parliamentary.

		Parliamentary Status.				Total	
		Challenger		Incumbent			
Executive Elective.	No	25	96,20%	1 ⁸	3,80%	26	100,00%
	yes	49	42,20%	67	57,80%	116	100,00%
Total		74	52,10%	68	47,90%	142	100,00%

Source: Own development. Value of the chi-square test: 24,738, with a minimum expected count of 12.45, a statistical significance of 0.000 and a contingency coefficient of 0.385.

The individual analysis of each variable has already been made, so the highlight here is for the cross between them. Precisely, among parliamentarians who do not have elective experience, 96.20% are challenging and 3.80% are incumbents. The chi-square test points to statistical dependence among the variables. It seems that the experience of parliamentarians influences the entry of politicians into the House. In any case, 67 (47.18%) deputies who make up the sample are both experienced and incumbents simultaneously.

From here, the analysis of the categorical variables highlights the exercise of position in the Chamber of Deputies. First, we analyze the relationship between the commitment to the party and the exercise of office. Table 4 shows the cross between these variables.

Table 4: Position in the Party Executive x Positions in the House

		senior positions held in the Chamber.				Total	
		No		Yes			
Position in the executive of the party.	No	66	68,80%	30	31,30%	96	100,00%
	Yes	24	52,20%	22	47,80%	46	100,00%
Total		90	63,40%	52	36,60%	142	100,00%

Source: Own development. Value of the chi-square test: 3,682, with a minimum expected count of 16.85, a statistical significance of 0.055, and a contingency coefficient of 0.159.

According to Table 4, only 36.6% of the sampled parliamentarians were in key position in the Chamber. Of these, only 15.49% exercised some position in their current party. The chi-square test points to statistical independence between variables, so everything indicates that the exercise of a position in the party is not associated with the exercise of a prominent position in the Chamber. In general, only a fraction of 15.49% of the Members' sample can be considered more professionalized, that is, they held positions at both places.

Next, we analyze the correlation between the deputies who have political experience outside the Chamber and have held a prominent position in the House. Table 5 presents the results.

⁸ In our sample, the only case of incumbent parliamentarian who does not have elective experience in the Executive is the deputy Raimundo Sabino Castelo Branco Maues of the PTB of Amazonas. However, mid-term he applied for the position of Mayor.

Table 5: Elective office in the Executive Office x Key Positions in the Chamber.

		He held senior positions in the Chamber.				Total	
		No		Yes			
Executive Elective.	No	21	80,80%	5	19,20%	26	100,00%
	Yes	69	59,50%	47	40,50%	116	100,00%
Total		90	63,40%	52	36,60%	142	100,00%


Source: Own development. Value of the chi-square test: 4,146, with a minimum expected count of 9.52, a statistical significance of 0.042, and a contingency coefficient of 0.168.

Table 5 shows that 14.79% of the parliamentarians did not hold elective positions and also did not hold prominent positions. The dependence test indicates the statistical dependence between the variables. It seems that the elective experience is associated with the position of the Chamber, however, only 36.62% of parliamentarians present both characteristics at the same time.

With a 95% confidence interval, the Graph 3 shows the average seniority in the Chamber for those deputies who have or have not held high positions.


The highest average expressed in Chart 3 is relative to the group of deputies who have held a prominent position in the Chamber. In this case, it is possible to identify more clearly a group of more professional MPs, since they have a greater number of mandates in the Chamber and also hold prominent positions. The average number of mandates for the group that held the 54th Legislature sample is approximately 3 terms, while those who have not held office have an average of less than two elective experience legislatures in the House.

Graph 3 – Bar of errors: Antiquity in the Chamber x Highlight in the Chamber.



Source: Own elaboration.

Graph 4 – Bar of errors: Party antiquity x Highlight in the Chamber.




Source: Own elaboration.

Chart 4 represents the average number of years of party membership for the deputies who have or have not held a prominent position in the Chamber. In it, we can observe that the highest average belongs to the group of deputies who held a prominent position in the Chamber. The average for this group revolves around 14 years of partisan membership; for the other group, the average is around 10 years of party membership. Therefore, the group that has a relatively higher number of professional deputies is composed of politicians who have held prominent positions. However, it is possible to identify that there is in this group a cluster of deputies with less than 12 years of party membership, this figure is below the maximum number of years of membership corresponding to the group that did not hold office.


The relation between the group of deputies who have or have not held positions in the executive committee of the party with the number of mandates they exercise in the Chamber is expressed in Graph 5. It is possible to observe that the average between the two groups is very close, i.e., the group of deputies who held office in the party executive and the group that did not exercise do not have differences when comparing the number of mandates exercised by them.

Gráfico 5 – Bar of errors:
Seniority x House experience.



Source: Own elaboration.

Graph 6 – Bar of errors: Party antiquity x Experience in the party



Source: Own elaboration.

Graph 6 correlates the number of years of party membership of the federal deputies of the sample with the groups of parliamentarians who have or have not held positions in the party executive. It is possible to visualize in it that the group of parliamentarians who held office in the party executive has an average of approximately 16 years of party membership, which is higher than the group of those who did not hold important positions in their parties, with a mean of approximately 8.5 years membership.

4.5 Logistic Regression Model

Using logistic regression, we did a discriminant analysis of two groups: the group of deputies that assumed static ambition and the one that assumed progressive ambition. With this technique, the model predicts the type of ambition according to the information contained in the independent variables and points out the degree of correctness of the model.

Table 11: Leaderboard *

	Observed		Expected				
			Type of Ambition.				Correct Percentage
			Static		Progressive		
Stage 1	Type of Ambition.	Static	37	52,11%	34	47,89%	52,1%
		Progressive	27	38,03%	44	61,97%	62,0%
	Global percentage						57,0%

Source: Own elaboration. * with cutoff value of 0.500.

From Table 11, we verified that the accuracy was only 57%. For the case of static ambition, the model was correct in 37 of the 71 sample cases; for progressive ambition, the model was correct in 44 of the 71 cases. Therefore, the model is better to predict the parliamentarians who have assumed progressive ambition. In general, we can assume that the independent variables chosen were not adequate to differentiate the cases, which resulted in a model with no statistical significance.

Table 12 presents the variables included in the test stage and indicates which variables increase the probability of the parliamentarian assuming progressive ambition and which of them influence in a contrary way.

Table 12: Variables in the equation.

		B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
1st Stage	Parliamentary condition	-,488	,453	1,158	1	,282	,614
	Political experience	,665	,516	1,656	1	,198	1,944
	Party antiquity	-,004	,024	,030	1	,864	,996
	Party experience	,002	,416	,000	1	,997	1,002
	Changed party	-,192	,549	,123	1	,726	,825
	Seniority in the Chamber	,085	,140	,363	1	,547	1,088
	Prominent in the Chamber.	,447	,391	1,309	1	,253	1,564
	Constant	-1,023	1,132	,817	1	,366	,360

Source: Own elaboration.

Precisely, the variables that increase the probability of the deputy being more ambitious are: 1) Political experience, 2) Experience in the party, 3) Seniority in the House, 4) Prominent position in the Chamber. Those that act in the opposite direction are: 1) Condition of the parliamentarian, 2) Party antiquity, 3) Changed party. In general, we note that most of the variables that represent the parliamentarian's experience increase the likelihood that he will assume the progressive ambition. However, the effects are not statistically significant.


4.5.1 Model Considerations

This result asks for an explanation of the explanatory capacity of some variables individually. The idea is to show that the model reflects the similar behavior of some variables in the two groups of parliamentarians.

To begin with, the following graphs⁹ represent the relationship between the expected probability and the number of terms in the House (Chart 9) and the expected probability and number of years of party membership (Chart 10). The midpoint on each axis is marked by the dashed line. In both cases it is observed that the cases are widely dispersed. There is no distinction between groups when you compare the expected probability with the actual data of the variables. In Graph 9, only the value range ≥ 7 contains all cases above the line.


In addition, all x-axis values (number of mandates and number of years) presenting cases above and below the horizontal line can be considered of low discriminatory capacity between groups.

Graph 9 – SCATTERPLOT: Anticipated probability x Antiquity in the Chamber.



Source: Own elaboration.

Graph 10 – SCATTERPLOT: Expected probability x Party antiquity.




Source: Own elaboration.

⁹ To read the graphs, the best way is to follow the dotted lines. The cases are marked by their actual classification. Therefore, black dots below the horizontal dotted line (prob. <0.5) are model estimation errors. 0.5 is point of ie, all cases with values above this probability are classified as progressive) being the opposite true.

In the case of the variable party affiliation, practically all values of x present cases with probability above and below 0.5. It is important to note that there are cases of success (progressive ambition) above and below the mean of the independent variables (dotted vertical lines). Together, these results indicate that the two variables are incapable of distinguishing groups of parliamentarians.


Finally, we examined the discriminatory potential of two categorical variables. The charts below illustrate the.

Graph 11 – Expected probability x Highlight in the Chamber.



Source: Own elaboration.

Graph 12 – Expected Probability x Executive Elective.



Source: Own elaboration.

To understand this Graph, it is enough to observe if the behavior of the bars differs in each kind of ambition. If the variable has a high capacity to distinguish between ambitions, the behavior of the bars would be the inverse in each group. As can be seen in Figure 11, the non-exercise of the executive branch of the party is the focus in both types of ambition, although there is a larger contingent of deputies who have held positions in the progressive ambition group. In the case of the exercise of position in another arena, Graph 12, the problem is among the

parliamentarians who have experience, both in static and progressive ambition they are majority. Together, these results indicate that the model allocates experienced parliamentarians in both groups. This shows the inability of the variables to help the model to correctly distinguish the cases.

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