



LEGISLATIVE PRODUCTION, CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE AND ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM A CASE STUDY

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Abstract: What factors explain the electoral performance? This article analyzes the impact of legislative production, campaign expenditures, and partisan membership on the number of votes received by Recife city councilors in the 2016 municipal elections. There are two hypotheses: 1) the larger the legislative output the greater the number of votes wishes and 2) the higher the campaign expenditure, the greater the number of votes. The research design examines an original database based on secondary information collected from the Recife Chamber website and the site of the Regional Electoral Tribunal of Pernambuco. The results indicate that, when considering all cases ($n = 37$), the regression model presents an adjustment of 0.456. However, after excluding an outlier, we have a $r^2 = 0.081$, which means that the variables do not satisfactorily explain the electoral performance. In substantive terms, the results indicate that the electoral performance of the councilmen is not affected by the formal legislative production nor by the campaign or party spending.

Keywords: Legislative production. Campaign spending. Election results.

1 Introduction.

In the specialized literature the study on the Legislative has been a great object of knowledge (AMES, 2003; FIGUEIREDO; LIMONGI, 1999; FREITAS, 2008; LIMONGI; FIGUEIREDO, 2005). More specifically, the analysis of the relationship between legislative output, campaign spending and electoral performance is carried out over time by researchers.

The present article seeks to make a specific analysis, that is, a case study. The case study is a widely used method in Social Sciences (STEINER, 2011). This methodological tool serves to understand empirically the motives of a phenomenon or how they occur (YIN, 2009).

Understanding which variables affect electoral performance has always been a challenge for Political Science and Electoral Law. The complexity is mainly due to the diversity of political scenarios, mainly in Brazil.

The city of Recife is no different. The municipal elections in 2016 stand out for having a

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high turnover rate and for having two women among the top three candidates.

The renewal in the municipal elections of Recife in 2016 was 43.59% of the House seats. Among the mayors in Pernambuco, only 26% were able to re-elect. What factors explain municipal electoral performance? This article analyzes the impact of legislative production, campaign expenditures, and partisan membership on the number of votes received by city councilmen in Recife in the 2016 municipal elections. Two hypotheses were tested 1) the larger the legislative output the greater the number of votes and 2) the higher the campaign expenditure, the greater the number of votes.

Methodologically, the research design examines an original database based on secondary information collected from the site of the Recife Chamber and from the website of the Regional Electoral Tribunal of Pernambuco (TRE - PE).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the first part establishes the theoretical assumptions; the second part presents the methodology used in the present work, explaining the variables of the model, as well as the statistical tools; the third part summarizes the main results; Finally, the last part presents the conclusions.

2 Theoretical assumptions.

Understanding what influences election performance is one of the most difficult tasks for today's science. Initially, we have to consider the complexity of the phenomenon, since there are several variables that interfere in the amount of votes that a candidate receives in an election. However, science always advances one step at a time. Based on this premise and the existing literature, this research design establishes the study of the influence of legislative production and campaign spending on electoral performance.

According to Mayhew (1974), parliamentarians are always guided by the need to obtain votes in the next election, that is, all parliamentary relations are motivated by re-election. Consequently, the actions of parliamentarians tend to be segmented in the places where they have the highest voting or destined to their voters (CAIN, 1987).

When it comes to electoral spending, there is a tendency that Brazilian parliamentarians spend a lot on electoral campaigns, which leads us to the hypothesis that campaign spending impacts the number of votes of a candidate. In the elections in analysis, the councilmen spent R \$ 3,005,176.13. Unfortunately, the figures reported to the Electoral Court, in general, tend to be smaller than the actual expenditure, which should be analyzed with caution. However, this is the only official information on campaign expenditures and, therefore, was used in this work.

Regarding parliamentary activity, literature points to a phenomenon called pork barrel (SILVA, 2011):

The term pork barrel is commonly used in Political Science to classify a policy whose economic benefits or services are concentrated in a geographically circumscribed area, but the costs are spread throughout the territory. They are policies that aim to please a certain constituency, that is, these policies aim to reward voters who voted for a particular politician.

In Brazil, according to Shugart (1992), voters tend to prefer local public policies to national programs, which further encourages clientelism.

According to Silva (2011):

That is, a model of the configuration of the political system in which voters are not given a clear view of public policy types (national character) at the time of the elections, because legislators prefer policies with a parochial focus rather than a national one. The model presupposes a strong Executive, who would take charge of national policies, while the parliamentarians would take care of the interests of their clientele, proposing parochialist matters.

This parochialist behavior has been widely studied by researchers (AMES, 1995a, 1995b, 2003, FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1999, 2002, LAMOUNIER, 1992, LIMONGI and FIGUEIREDO, 2005, MAINWARING, 1991, 1999, PEREIRA and MUELLER, 2002, 2002) .

There are two ways of approaching the theme: distributivist and partisan (SILVA, 2014). In the distributivist approach, parliamentarians are driven by their own electoral interests (CAREY and SHUGART, 1995). In the party approach, the parties and the rules of the Legislative House orient the parliamentarian's performance (FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1999).

Another important aspect is the high decentralization of the Brazilian electoral system (SILVA, 2009; LAMOUNIER, 1989; MAINWARING, 1991), so that political parties have weak links with society and the political system. Thus, the political party does not enter into the analyzed model. But the analysis of the results shows that there is a tendency for the parliamentarians / candidates of the ruling base to be more likely to re-elect / elect.

3 Methodology used².

For the development of this work, we use the information available on the site of the Regional Electoral Tribunal of Pernambuco and the website of the Municipal Council of Recife.

Frame 1 – Methodological Overview.

Population	37 councilmen
year	2016
source	<i>TRE-PE and Recife City Hall websites.</i>
Period	2013-2016
Technique	Descriptive statistics and linear regression.
Variable	

²It is important to emphasize that the present study has a very precise epistemological cut, since it analyzed strictly the legislature of 2013-2016 and the election 2016 in Recife. Thus, there is no need to talk about generalization of results to other socio-political scenarios.

Dependent	Electoral performance
Variables independent	Legislative production Campaign cost.
Hypothesis null	There is no impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable.
Hypothesis alternative	The higher the legislative output. greater the electoral performance. The higher the campaign spending the greater the electoral performance.
Software	SPSS version 23

Source: Prepared by the author.

The dependent variable is the electoral performance (y) and the independent variables are the legislative output (x1) and the campaign expenditure (x2). The linear regression is calculated from the following equation:

$$y = \alpha + B_1 x_1 + B_2 x_2 + \varepsilon$$

Being B1 and B2, the values of the impact of the dependent variables on y.

The electoral performance corresponds to the number of votes obtained by the parliamentarian in the 2016 elections. These data were obtained from the website of the Regional Electoral Tribunal of Pernambuco.

Legislative production is the total number of bills and requirements produced by the councilor during the 2013-2016 term. This information was taken from the website of the City Hall of Recife.

The methodology used has two stages. Initially we performed a legal analysis of the Organic Law of Recife, the Internal Regulation of the Chamber of Recife and the Federal Constitution. In the second moment, a database was created with the dependent variable and the independent ones. Then, we applied linear regression to analyze the impact of the independent variables (campaign spending and legislative production) on the dependent variable (electoral performance).

The software used for the data processing was SPSS, version 23, inclusive, in the chapter destined to the analysis of the data the computational routines were detailed so that it is possible the replication of the present study.

The entire database is also available so that stakeholders can replicate the study and to ensure full transparency of the research.

4 Municipal Legislative Process and the action of the City Council.

In the national structure, the Municipality is indispensable to the Brazilian federal system, having full autonomy (MORAES, 2007, p.267).

The autonomy of the Municipality includes self-organization, self-regulation, self-

government and self-administration (MORAES, 2007, p.268).

The Federal Constitution of 1988 (BRAZIL, 1988) establishes the legislative competence of the Municipalities in its art. 30:

Art. 30. It is the responsibility of the Municipalities:

I - legislate on matters of local interest;

II - to supplement federal and state legislation as appropriate;

III - to institute and collect the taxes of their competence, as well as to apply their income, without prejudice to the obligation to render accounts and publish balance sheets within the periods fixed by law;

IV - create, organize and suppress districts, observing the state legislation;

V - to organize and provide, directly or under a concession or permit regime, public services of local interest, including collective transportation, which are essential;

VI - to maintain, with the technical and financial cooperation of the Union and of the State, programs for early childhood education and basic education; (Redaction given by Constitutional Amendment No. 53, of 2006)

VII - provide, with the technical and financial cooperation of the Union and the State, health care services for the population;

VIII - promote, where appropriate, adequate land-use planning through planning and control of land use, urban land use and urbanization;

IX - to promote the protection of the local cultural and historical patrimony, observing the legislation and the federal and state fiscalization action.

Faced with the constitutional role, we highlight the legislative production, which can be directly observed and quantified, as well as being the main activity of the Legislative Branch.

In addition to legislative competence, the Legislative Branch must also supervise the Municipality, according to art. 31, of the Federal Constitution (BRAZIL, 1988):

Article 31. The supervision of the Municipality shall be exercised by the Municipal Legislative Branch, through external control, and by the internal control systems of the Municipal Executive Branch, in the form of the law.

Paragraph 1 - The external control of the City Council shall be exercised with the assistance of the Courts of Accounts of the States or of the Municipality or of the Councils or Courts of Accounts of the Municipalities, where it exists.

Paragraph 2. The prior opinion, issued by the competent body on the accounts that the Mayor must annually render, will only cease to prevail by a decision of two-thirds of the members of the City Council.

Paragraph 3. The accounts of the Municipalities shall remain, for sixty days, annually, at the disposal of any taxpayer, for examination and appreciation, which may question their legitimacy, in accordance with the law.

Paragraph 4. It is forbidden to create Courts, Councils or organs of Municipal Accounts.

However, it is extremely difficult to identify and oversee the activity of the councilmen, mainly because the inspection can occur in several ways.

From the constitutional analysis, it is clear the limited legislative competence of the councilmen, whose bills also can not create expenses for the Public Administration, except within its own budget.

The Organic Law of Recife, replies the constitutional provision, regarding the legislative competence, Art. 6.

Already the art. 23, of the Organic Law, brings the exclusive competence of the City Council, which is divided into legislative and administrative competencies.

One of the quantitative variables used in this work is the legislative production, for that, we use art. 24, of the Organic Law (RECIFE, 1990), which brings normative possibilities:

Article 24 - The legislative process includes the preparation of:

I - amendments to the Organic Law;

II - complementary laws; (plus Amendment No. 21/07)

III - ordinary laws;

IV - legislative decrees;

V - resolutions.

However, we find that the councilmen have low productivity in the face of art. 24, which can be attributed to reduced legislative competence.

There is also a legislative tool that is widely used by councilmen: the application. This instrument is provided for in the Internal Rules of the Chamber, Chapter IV, arts. 351 to 356 (RECIFE, 1994).

Application is the instrument by which the councilor sends institutional requests, approved by the House Plenary, to government agencies, so that certain measures are adopted to address political, social, economic, public services, etc. problems.

Applications may be sent to mayors, secretaries and other public authorities. It can also surpass the municipal sphere. They are usually used to meet the demands of the population, for example, public lighting, garbage collection, asphalt recovery, etc.

Quantitatively the application is more used than the bills and is what reaches the population more quickly and directly, which brings us to the concept of vertical accountability.

The term accountability does not yet have a precise translation for our language, but in general terms it is a form of control / accountability (ODONNELL, 1998).

Vertical accountability can occur in elections, when citizens punish bad politicians by not voting or reward for good performance. This phenomenon only occurs in democratic countries, that is, countries in which citizens freely participate in the elections (ODONNELL, 1998).

5 Data analysis.

The database used in the present study was based on the information obtained on the website of the Recife Municipal Council (legislative production) and the Regional Electoral Tribunal of Pernambuco (number of votes and the profile of city council members).

Our initial population is of 47 city concilmen, including here the substitutes who assumed the mandate even temporarily, in the period from 2013 to 2016.

Adding the legislative production of the concilmen of Recife we have the following detail, emphasizing that all the numbers are bills of law (broad sense):

Table 1 – Amount of legislative output ³.

Legislative Decree.	Ordinary Law.	Requirement.	Resolution.	Amendment to Organic Law.	Complementary law.
266 (0,59%)	1.776 (3,96%)	39.554 (88,40%)	3.124 (6,98%)	22 (0,04%)	1 (0,002%)

Source: Prepared by the author.

The disproportion between requirements and other items is clear. This indicates a weakening of legislative activity and high institutionalized assistance through the requirements. In a future qualitative research, it will be possible to map the degree of assistentialism in the requirements, that is, to verify the degree of sectorization of the requirements, considering the electoral stronghold of the councilor.

It is worth mentioning that in terms of art. 344, §3, of the Internal rules of the House the draft legislative decree is intended exclusively to grant the title of citizen of Recife and the award of merit medal José Mariano. That is, the theme is honors, which does not directly impact the life of Recife citizens, but even so, the legislative decree is the fourth most used instrument.

There is a perimeter limit per councilman, under the terms of art. 414, §9, of the Internal Regiment, which is two medals of merit José Mariano and two titles of citizen of Recife for each legislature.

With regard to the number of mandates, only 8 concilmen have more than 4 mandates and 19 concilmen are in the first term.

Among the three concilmen with the highest legislative output are those with between one and three mandates, contradicting the thesis that those with more mandates have greater legislative output.

In terms of the number of votes, we have that the 3 most voted concilmen are in the first term, which again contradicts the intuitive hypothesis that those with more mandates are better known and consequently receive more votes.


Regarding the gender declared by the candidates, we have the following proportion: n = 37, female = 6 (12.8%) and male = 31 (66%). This is highly disproportional and shows a repetition

³ Table with the number of each normative element produced in the City Hall of Recife.

of the federal standard (SENADO, 2016). The voters from Recife who attended the polls are men (45%) and women (55%).

In relation to race, we have a striking predominance of the white race, in the following distribution:

Graph 1 – Distribution by race ⁴.




Source: Prepared by the author.

Image: Yellow, white, brown, black.

As for the educational level, we have, on average, a high level of education among the parliamentarians (n = 37):

Graph 2 – Distribution of schooling of parliamentarians ⁵.



Source: Prepared by the author.

Image: Incomplete education, complete secondary education, complete higher education.


⁴ Pie chart showing the distribution of parliamentarians taking into account the race declared at the time of registration of the application with the TRE-PE.

⁵ Graph 2 - shows the distribution of the parliamentarians considering the level of education informed to the TRE-PE

Among the elect we have the following proportion: complete upper (75.68%), incomplete upper (5.41%) and complete high school (18.92%).

The party distribution is highly concentrated, with the PSB (which is the same party as the mayor elected) the party with the largest party:

Graph 3 – Distribution of parliamentarians by party.⁶



Source: Prepared by the author.

This work was developed using, in addition to descriptive statistics, linear regression.

Although the population initially was 47 cases, the regression used only 37 cases, since there are councilmen who, for example, assumed the position of state deputy or applied to the mayor or simply did not apply, among others.

The linear regression or to be more accurate ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is the statistical tool most used in political science (FIGUEIREDO FILHO, 2011).

The objective of linear regression is, in summary, to measure the impacts of the independent variables (X) on the dependent variable (Y), in order to estimate the degree of association (FIGUEIREDO FILHO, 2011).

Through regression we can answer the question: how much y will change if x change? (Dancey and Reid, 2013, pp. 384).

Legislative production corresponds to the sum of all the legislative elements discussed in the previous chapter, the number of votes is the total votes obtained in the 2016 election and the campaign expenditure is the totality of electoral expenses declared by the councilmen.

⁶ Graph 3 shows the number of parliamentarians per political party at the time of registration of the candidature with the TRE-PE.

Considering that some concilmen have more than one mandate, we have balanced the legislative production variable through the log function.

For the accomplishment of the statistical calculations and graphs, we used the computer program SPSS, available at the Federal University of Pernambuco.

Through the "analyze - regression - linear" commands, we have the "dependent variable = voting" and "independent variables = campaign expenditure and legislative production" and we arrive at the following results.

Initially, considering all cases, we have $r = 0.675$, that is, a mean correlation. We also have a $r^2 = 0.456$ and an adjusted $r^2 = 0.424$, which shows an explained variance of 42%.

Table 2 – result of linear regression with all cases ⁷.

Model	R	R ²	R ² square squared.	Default estimation error.
1	0,675	0,456	0,424	0,46512

Source: Prepared by the author.

Considering the increase of campaign spending in a unit, we have a standardized B value of 0.152, that is, each real spent on the campaign we have an increase of 0.152 votes.

In terms of legislative production, we have a standardized B of 0.614, which means that each unit of legislative production has the increase of 0.614 votes. The significance of this model is also high.

Table 3 – Continuation of the linear regression result ⁸.

Model	B	Default error.	Beta	t	Sig
Constant	7,077	0,350		20,213	0,000
Campaign cost.	1,713	0,000	0,152	1,143	0,261
Legislative Production.	0,266	0,057	0,614	4,631	0,000


Source: Prepared by the author.

However, when analyzing a scatter plot, we find an outlier, an off-the-shelf case, that affects too much the average:

⁷ Table 2 - result of linear regression with all cases.


⁸ Table 3 - result of the impacts of the independent variables (legislative production and campaign expenditure) on the dependent variable (voting).

Graph 4 – Comparative Dispersion Chart, Voting x Legislative Production ⁹.



source: Prepared by the author.

Gráfico 5 - Comparative Dispersion Chart, Voting x Campaign Spending ¹⁰.



source: Prepared by the author.

In the specific literature, outlier is a case that is very distant from the average of the other cases (FIGUEIREDO FILHO et al., 2014). A single case can greatly influence the correlation result, so it is necessary the analysis without the outlier and the verification of human error in the data collection.

When re-calculating the linear regression without the outlier, we obtain the following results:

The value of r becomes 0.296, which represents a weak correlation, the r² becomes 0.088 and the adjusted r² is 0.031, indicating a very low generalization.

Table 4 – result of linear regression without outlier ¹¹.

Model	R	R ²	R ² square squared.	Default estimation error.
1	0,296	0,088	0,031	0,32148

Source: Prepared by the author.

⁹ Graph 4 - comparative dispersion chart considering the presence of the outlier (red triangle). The correlation uses the variables Voting and Legislative Production.

¹⁰ Graph 5 - comparative dispersion chart considering the presence of the outlier (red triangle). The correlation uses the variables Voting and Campaign Spending.

¹¹ Table 4 - result of linear regression without outlier presence.

With a real increase in campaign spending, we now have an increase of 0.283 votes, while increasing legislative output by one unit increases by 0.045 votes. However, legislative production was shown to be of low significance (0.796)

Table 5 - Coefficients^a

Model	Non-standardized coefficients.		Standardized coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Erro Padrão	Beta		
1 (Constant)	8,732	,368		23,753	,000
Campaign. cost	1,702E-6	,000	,283	1,643	,110
Production_Legislative.	,015	,058	,045	,261	,796

a. Dependent Variable: Voting.

Source: Prepared by the author.

6 Conclusion

Analyzed the legal provisions and data on the website of the Municipality of Recife and the Regional Electoral Court of Pernambuco served as the epistemological basis for this study.

Methodologically we used descriptive statistics and linear regression for data treatment.

Thanks to the analysis of the dispersion graph, we identified a discontinuous, outlier case that significantly altered the value of the correlation. With the operator, $r = 0.675$. Without the item the value becomes $r = 0.296$.

Thus, considering the legislative output of Aldermen from 2013 to 2016 and the electoral performance in the elections in 2016, we found that there is no significant impact of the legislative process and the campaign spent on the electoral performance.

Finally, we emphasize that this study has a very precise epistemological cut, since strictly examined the 2013-2016 legislature and the election in 2016, in Recife. Thus, one should not talk about generalization of results to other socio-political scenarios.

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