



## MINISTERIAL RECRUITMENT IN BRAZIL: COMPARING FHC AND LULA'S ADMINISTRATIONS

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**Abstract:** The article explores the party origins and the nature of the professional careers of State ministers in Brazil during Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's presidential administrations. The goal was to compare the different political strategies employed by both former presidents when recruiting their collaborators and creating their respective cabinets. The explanatory variables are: career time and number of offices before assuming the ministerial office, occupational sector of origin, and the party affiliation. The results, based on the different profiles of the occupants across all ministries appointed between 1995 and 2010, showed scarce differences in the recruitment patterns for top-tier positions when comparing both presidential administrations. The most disparate data refers to the longer careers of Cardoso's ministers and the greater cabinet partisanship during Lula's administration, with a significant presence of the Worker's Party (PT).

**Keywords:** Ministerial Recruitment; State Ministers; Cabinet Partisanship; Fernando Henrique Cardoso Administration; Lula Administration.

### 1. Introduction

This paper explores some empirical findings to understand the different criteria adopted by president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) and president Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) to form their respective ministry cabinets, comparing how they distributed the political actors through the various ministries. Since two rival parties – PSDB (Portuguese acronym for Brazilian Social Democracy Party) and PT (Portuguese acronym for Workers Party) led these two administrations – with distinct political priorities, we expected that there would also be some difference in the profile of the respective government teams.

We analyzed some professional and party characteristics related to the careers of more than two hundred ministers nominated between 1995 and 2010. The explanatory variables taken in the study were: I) sex; II) the holder's age at the swearing; (III) main

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occupation; IV) career time prior to entry; V) number of positions during the political career; VI) type of ministry according to its scope (economic, political, social and military matters); VII) sector of professional origin of the minister; and VIII) type of party affiliation of the minister (if the minister belongs to the party of the president, to the allied base or to no specific party). We categorized the last six variables in order to favor the results of the statistical tests.

The basic assumption of this study is that there are divergences in ministerial recruitment patterns when FHC (1995-1998, 1999-2002) and Lula (2003-2006, 2007-2010) governments are compared, as well as some political nuances in the preferences of these presidents in relation to the nominations over four presidential mandates.

It is known that different ministerial appointment strategies impact not only the efficiency and quality of public decisions, but also the political configuration of governments. In Brazilian presidential system, ministers develop a dual function: to ensure that the formulation and implementation of public policies are in accordance with the directives of the President of the Republic and the program of his party; and guarantee, through political transactions, the partisan support so that these projects have support and chances of approval by the National Congress.

The selection of ministers and the office formation, especially in Brazil, play a central role in the political strategy and good governance of the President of the Republic. Ideally, one should seek a balance between congressional support - with an adequate distribution of ministries for coalition parties that support the government - and government efficiency, through the allocation of ministers according to their expertise.

We test the hypothesis that different types of ministries, depending on the type of policy theme they oversee, require different criteria for recruitment by the president. Thus, we expect that both the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) and the Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) terms:

**Hypothesis 1:** that ministers with a high degree of previous political experience occupy, mostly, the ministries with more political than managerial functions, either in elective positions or on first-level appointment positions.

**Hypothesis 2:** that more technical than partisan personnel, with a previous professional trajectory mainly in positions of public bureaucracy and / or in the market, occupy, mostly, ministries with economic functions.

Alongside these assumptions, we also imagine that, due to the electoral strength of the Workers' Party, the size of its seats in the National Congress during the Lula years and, in addition, the alternation implied by the Workers' Party's victory as a defiant party in the 2002 elections for presidency of the Republic:

**Hypothesis 3:** The Lula government was marked by the greater presence of politicians and party leaders in the ministerial cabinet, while in the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso was found more professionals recruited in the public sector bureaucracies and in the private market, without direct link with the president's party.

The article is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the discussion about types of previous careers of ministers, among those present in the national and international literature, highlighting authors who have explored the weight of this variable and its influence on the profiles of governments. In the section 3, we detail the methodology of our study, as well as the criteria used to categorize the variables used in our analyses; in the section 4, we present the results of the statistical tests, always based on a comparative approach between the two governments, with description and analysis of the empirical findings. In the conclusions, we made a balance of the results of this research, comparing them with the hypotheses previously formulated.

## **2 Ministers of State: professional career and political itinerary**

The nomination of state ministers with different political, professional and social attributes largely expresses not only the profile of their advisors, but the priorities and the space of maneuver of the president of the Republic in front of his own party coalition. It is precisely because of these choices that the head of government may have greater or less predictability about the way his ministry operates.

In the field of Political Science, research on the selection process and on the political and social trajectories of ministers has had some space, although they do not have a tradition as extensive as that of studies that focus on parliamentary elites. The important thing is that the available projects deal with the theme in a variety of institutional contexts, from European parliamentary system (MERSHON 1996, ROSE

1971, TERUEL, 2005, ATKINS et al., 2013), to Latin American presidential system (CARRERAS, 2013; D'ARAUJO, 2009; DÁVILA et al., 2013; ESCOBAR-LEMMON; TAYLOR-ROBINSON, 2005; INÁCIO, 2013; CAMERLO, 2013) to the French and Portuguese semi presidential system (DOGAN, 1979; FRANÇOIS; GROSSMAN, 2012; PINTO; TAVARES DE ALMEIDA, 2014; BEHR; MICHON, 2013)

In short, the premise of such research is that experience gained in the leadership of political parties, in a parliamentary committee, or in senior positions in the public sector bureaucracy has a significant impact on the style, expertise, and personal preferences of State. Thus, naming a ministry should take into account the previous paths these agents followed and the nature of the stages of their careers. This basically means that a minister who has spent most of his professional life in a party does not necessarily have the same profile, the same opinions and the same preferences as his colleagues directly from senior levels of administration or Congress (DOGAN, 1979). The same assumption holds true for those recruited in the market.

Studies have sought to draw a profile of the ministerial elite in their respective countries based on standard variables such as age, sex, family heritage, school education, professional trajectories, ideological orientation of the party, previous experience in legislative positions, and occupation in positions of high scale at State or in private companies. Their results are not surprising. There is a "minister-type" that prevails in almost every cabinet. Although they may be different, Dogan warns of the continuing importance of political legacies that categorize actors to occupy a ministerial post. The elements of political recruitment in France, for example, varied greatly over time (DOGAN, 1979). He comes to this conclusion after conducting a longitudinal analysis of the last three republics (1870-1940, 1946-1958, 1958-1978), totaling more than one thousand ministers of state evaluated in 108 years. What the research on the French semi presidential regime's offices has observed is the occupation of ministries by individuals increasingly accustomed to the logic of the political field. Authors have noticed the presence of new professional types, with a decrease in the number of technocrats, experts and non-partisan ministers and the consequent increase of policy frameworks composed by people with training and careers fulfilled in representative entities, either in elective positions or in party bureaucracy political and even social movements (FRANÇOIS; GROSSMAN, 2012). Behr and Michon (2013) emphasized how this "politicization of offices" movement gained strength in 2002, led mainly by leftist governments.

However, this is not the rule for any European country. Pinto and Almeida showed how the pattern of recruitment of Portuguese ministers has been increasingly approaching the public sector, even relegating to a secondary role the politicians in the cabinet. According to the authors, this fact would not be exclusive to Portugal:

[...] the linkages between ministerial and parliamentary careers have been weakening in several countries during recent decades. Simultaneously, the number of expert and non-partisan ministers has increased, although in an uneven way. Someone simply and eloquently put it, there is a tendency towards the formation of 'party governments with fewer partisans' (PINTO; TAVARES DE ALMEIDA, 2014, p.1).

The countries referred to in this survey are mostly semi presidential systems. In parliamentary system, the preponderance of the Legislative Branch over the Executive makes the ministerial nomination directly the responsibility of the parties with representation in Parliament. The result is the much larger proportion of individuals in the offices with extensive political career. In this sense, the British case would be the most expressive, especially when compared with the other parliamentary countries (ROSE, 1971). In the United Kingdom, when the period from Attlee (1945-1951) to Cameron (2010-2016) is considered, the average age of ministers and their parliamentary experience, despite the emergence of new leaderships, have not diminished (ATKINS et al., 2013).

In Latin American presidential countries, even with a system of government opposed to parliamentary system, presidents seem to open more and more space to career politicians. In Chile and Argentina, parliamentarians and partisan leaders have increasingly occupied more ministries and posts in the federal bureaucracy, or at least have maintained a strong presence in the cabinet, despite a historic presence of technocrats in the Executive Branch of these countries (CAMERLO, 2013; DÁVILA *et al.*, 2013).

Ideally, we would have the following profile of the cabinets according to the adopted system of government:

**Table 1** – Type of dominant installation of cabinet ministerial by system of government

<b>Government systems</b>	<b>Ministerial cabinet</b>
Semi-presidential system	Experts and non-partisans
Parliamentary system	Professional politicians
Presidential system	Experts and nonpartisan / professional politicians

Source: Prepared by the authors.

In Brazil, D'Araújo did a radiography of the Executive after redemocratization and showed that “ministros são pessoas experientes na vida política com forte enraizamento em atividades parlamentares e executivas em todos os níveis de governo<sup>1</sup> (D'ARAÚJO, 2009, p. 25). This is indicative of the existence of political and administrative expertise as a basic condition for nominations to the ministry. Although they are nomination posts and not elective positions, ministries can also be a space for political professionalization, such as legislative houses (COSTA, CODATO, 2013).

In the case of Brazil, that derives from the importance of the party criterion in ministerial recruitment. In multiparty presidential system, the party of the President of the Republic can hardly be the majority party in the National Congress, forcing the head of government to make alliances with other legends to get political support and approve its draft bills, legislative amendments and provisional measures. To ensure this support, the president needs attract the other parties that are not his/her to the government by allocating them to ministries or subordinate bureaucracies. This bargain between high-ranking political positions and parliamentary support in the two houses of the Brazilian National Congress has a significant impact on the composition of the ministries (ABRANCHES, 1988) and reveals the strategies pursued by the President of the Republic to form the government coalition (AMORIM NETO, 2006; AMORIM NETO, 2007).

Inácio has convincingly demonstrated how political trajectories marked by positions in party bureaucracies, and not in others organizations, increase the chances of an individual being chosen to participate in the ministry. This probability increases in Brazil according to the size of the party bench. The greater the space occupied by the legend in the House of Representatives, the greater the chance that the party will appoint

<sup>1</sup> “Ministers are experienced people in political life with a strong rooting in parliamentary and executive activities at all levels of government” (D'ARAÚJO, 2009, p. 25).

a high-ranking member of the association to compose a ministry in the Executive (INÁCIO, 2013).

In this article, we calculate the proportion of professional politicians in the composition of the different ministries of Lula and FHC compared to those who came from other sectors (public bureaucracies, private market, armed forces). We also analyze the proportion of occupation by different types of agents from their respective functions (social issues, economic matters, political articulation, etc.). We hope to find not only patterns of recruitment, but also patterns of designation or "packaging" - that is, the position occupied - by political actors between 1995 and 2010.

### **3 Data, methodology and categorizations**

We take into account, for collection and analysis of data, all ministries - including those of an extraordinary nature - from the two FHC administrations (1995-1998, 1999-2002) and the two administrations Lula (2003-2006, 2007-2010), in addition to the secretariats and autarchies with ministerial status, as is the case of the Central Bank of Brazil<sup>2</sup>.

In all, one counted 33 ministries and direct advisory secretaries. To better operationalize the information, we divide these agencies into four categories, based on their government attributions. The division takes into account some categories already used in the literature on the subject, besides the explicit functions in the laws of creation and/or transformation of these agencies.

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<sup>2</sup> The Law no. 11.036, dated December 22, 2004, amended provisions of Laws Nos. 10,683 of May 28, 2003 and 9,650 of May 27, 1998. The position of President of the Central Bank of Brazil was transformed into a post of Minister of State (Article 2). To keep the comparison with the FHC period, we also consider the presidents of the Central Bank with mandates from 1995 to 2002 as ministers.

**Table 2 - Ministries categorized by type and number of cases considered, governments FHC and Lula<sup>3</sup>**

<b>Economic Ministries</b>	<b>Military Ministries</b>	<b>Political Ministries</b>	<b>Social Ministries</b>
1. Central Bank (7)	1. Military House (1)	1. General Union Law (8)	1. Ministry of Culture (5)
2. Ministry of Agriculture (1)	2. Institutional Security Office (3)	2. Civil House (8)	2. Ministry of Education (6)
3. Ministry of Science and Technology (7)	3. Ministry of Aeronautics (3)	3. General Controllershship of the Union (3)	3. Ministry of Social Security (13)
4. Ministry of finance (5)	4. Ministry of the Navy (3)	4. Ministry of Administration and State Reform (2)	4. Ministry of Health (9)
5. Ministry of Industry (9)	5. Ministry of the Army (3)	5. Ministry of Justice (13)	5. Ministry of Cities (3)
6. Ministry of National Integration (9)	6. Ministry of Defense (7)	6. Ministry of Foreign Relations (5)	6. Ministry of Development
7. Ministry of Fishing (2)		7. Extraordinary Ministry of Institutional Reforms (1)	7. Ministry of Social Development (5)
8. Ministry of Communication (9)		8. Extraordinary Ministry of Political Issues (1)	8. Ministry of Sports (7)
9. Ministry of Mines and Energy (1)		9. Secretariat for Strategic Issues	9. Ministry of Labor (1)
10. Ministry of Environment (7)		10. Secretariat of Social Communication (3)	10. Secretariat for Human Rights (4)
11. Ministry of Planning (1)		11. Secretariat for Institutional Relations (7)	11. Special Secretariat for Policies for the Promotion of Racial Equality (4)
12. Ministry of Tourism (3)		12. General Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic (5)	12. Special Secretariat for Women's Policies (3)
13. Ministry of Transport (12)			
14. National Secretariat of Ports (1)			

Source: Observatory of social and political elites in Brazil (<http://observatory-elites.org/>) UFPR

The data collected for this article refer to the 182 individuals who held the positions of Minister of State between 1995 and 2010 in Brazil. Thus, the unit of observation is the ministers of the governments of FHC and Lula. However, our unit of analysis is ministerial mandates.

<sup>3</sup> Although not listed below, we considered the ministries and secretaries that disappeared with mergers between ministries or with the constant change of names. The criterion adopted by us in this article was to standardize the denomination of ministries based on their attributions and normative laws.



This means that if, for example, a minister has held the same ministry over two presidential terms (this is the case of Pedro Malan, Minister of Finance of the terms of government FHC I and FHC II), he will be duplicated in our database and will be counted twice. Likewise, those individuals who headed more than one ministry were included, even during the same presidential term (this is the case of Minister Bresser-Pereira, who occupied the Ministry of Administration and State Reform and Science and Technology during the first mandate of FHC). As a result, our unit of analysis is the mandates, not the individuals, and the results of the statistical tests refer to a total of 256 cases (117 for the FHC governments and 139 for the Lula governments).

On the basis of the classification of their previous careers, that is, before entering the function of minister, we ordered these 256 individuals into five categories. They indicate the predominant sector in which they built their professional trajectory. We consider as: I) **public sector**: the directors of public companies, public employees, college professors, heads of the cabinet, legislative advisors; II) **private sector**: managers and directors of private companies, entrepreneurs, consultants; III) **political sector**: occupants of elected or nominated first level positions (federal, state, municipal); IV) **military sector**: career in the Armed Forces, exclusively; V) **party sector**: individuals with trajectory characterized by the occupation in positions of the high dome of the political parties.

As can be expected, the individuals studied do not fully fit into just one of these categories. The research showed that the ministers of state are individuals with a hybrid career, with transit through different professional areas - something already verified by Loureiro and Abrucio (1999). According to Pinto and Tavares de Almeida,

[...] there is a larger number of ministers, a hybrid type, who combines political skills developed in parties and legislatures with expert knowledge gained through academic training and experience in parliamentary and governmental committees (PINTO; TAVARES DE ALMEIDA, 2014, p.2 ).

However, this simplified classification according to the predominant sector where the ministers passed before assuming the post, allows to make some comparisons regarding the professional type that would be being prioritized by the president in exercise and to estimate, *a posteriori*, his strategies of nomination. From there we try to identify the social spaces where the chief executive sought the members of his office.

The data of the ministers were collected in the institutional site of the Brazilian Historical-Biographical Dictionary (DHBB), produced and edited by the Center for

Research and Documentation of Contemporary History of Brazil of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation, on the site of the Library of the Presidency of the Republic and in news' portals and other websites. Descriptive statistics were produced from the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software.

#### **4 Social and professional aspects of ministerial offices in Brazil**

Ministers in Brazil during the FHC and Lula governments were mostly men (99% and 88.5%, respectively) and almost all white, with average age of 54 years (FHC) and 55 years (Lula), some years older than the standard found in France or England (Francois and Groosman, 2012). The youngest member of our database was 30 years old when he took office (Daniel Barcelos Vargas, interim minister of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs in the second Lula government for almost four months). The oldest, 80 years old (Waldir Pires, Defense Minister also in the second Lula government). No less than 94% had a degree in the government of Fernando Henrique against 92% in the Lula government. If all the ministers are considered, regardless of the government, the most common professions are in the following order: lawyer (18.8%), economist (14.8%), politician (14.1%), professor (5.9%)<sup>4</sup>. More than half of them (56.3%) were born in the Southeast of the country, followed by Northeast (21.5%) and the South (13.7%).

In all, there were 18 female ministerial mandates, against 92.8% male-dominated mandates. Of these women, only two served under the PSDB; all others occupied the cabinet during the PT governments. These data are not surprising, because many studies show the masculinized character of the political field. However, figures on the offices in France show that, although there is still some inequality between men and women, this difference is much more significant in Brazil. The proportion of women in French ministries reaches 25% (BEHR, MICHON, 2013). In Latin America, in 2003, the average proportion was 18%, and in Colombia half the cabinet was female (ESCOBAR-LEMMON; TAYLOR-ROBINSON, 2005).

Although the declared occupation is largely restricted to those listed previously, the professional trajectory of the individuals before they are appointed varies greatly from case to case, never being restricted to just one occupation. In fact, the research shows that the ministers in Brazil are people with a multifaceted career, who, throughout their

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<sup>4</sup> There are, however, some notable differences. While in the governments of FHC the proportion of military and doctors is of 9.4% and 1.7%, in Lula's governments these values are respectively 1.4% and 4.3% of the ministry. Economists, for example, are 24.8% in FHC's office and only 6.5% in Lula's cabinet.

professional life, occupy dozens of medium and high-level positions, passing through corporate environments, public companies, political positions of free nomination and elective positions in the Executive and Legislative, universities, political parties, unions and other representation agencies.

#### **4.1 Career profiles of ministers in different governments**


Due to the heterogeneity of the professional career of the ministers, we have counted the number of previous positions they occupied in order to have a dimension of the importance of this indicator of experience. For an average time of 31 years of career, the individuals studied went on average by 12 positions before serving as Lula or FHC ministers.

We divided the total number of ministers from the number of career positions into three categories, with cuts that distributed all individuals to approximately 33% for each category: I) 1 to 8 positions before entering the ministerial function ("short career"); (II) 9 to 13 positions ("average career"); III) above 14 positions ("long career").

When separating the data by presidential mandate (according to Graph 1, below), there is a gradual and steady decrease of ministers with a high number of previous positions occupied during these sixteen years. On the other hand, the number of individuals with a shorter career almost doubled in the second Lula administration (from 25% of the ministers in FHC I to 45.1% in Lula II).

The explanation for this phenomenon could be as follows: whereas in the terms FHC I and FHC II there was no break with the groups that had held political and bureaucratic positions in the Brazilian state in the last decade - due to the alliance with the PFL (Portuguese acronym for Liberal Front Party), heir to the PDS (Portuguese acronym for Social Democratic Party) and the Arena (Portuguese acronym for National Alliance for Change) -, what was seen in the Lula government was an assault of the ministries by individuals who, up to then, because they were always in the opposition, had never come to positions in the domains of state bureaucracy, or former federal command-in-government functions.

**Graph 1** - Ministers of State in Brazil according to the number of positions held before the beginning to assume the respective ministry (%)



N = 256; Number of cases: FHC I = 56; no information = 2; FHC II = 61; no information = 2; Lula I = 68; Lula II = 71  
**Source:** Observatory of social and political elites of Brazil (<http://observatory-elites.org/>), UFPR.


That said, we compared the group of the most experienced ministers (career above 14 positions) with the other two groups according to their presence in the different types of ministries.

Graph 2 shows the predominance of actors with a large professional experience in almost all types of ministries during the two FHC administrations, a much more significant percentage in social ministries (almost 52% of the ministers had gone through 14 or more positions before enter the function). Already during the two Lula administrations, the ministries that supervised social policies were delegated to ministers with a lower professional rank compared to other types of ministry (no less than 60% of the ministers in these types of ministries had careers between 1 and 8 positions) .

In absolute terms, with a high number of previous positions, we are talking about only six individuals who managed social ministries in the Lula government. During his administration, the most experienced ministers were not a majority in any of the ministries considered. An alternative reason for the number of ministers with short careers during the Lula administration would be the fact that he prioritized the recruitment of individuals in the political field, that is, that they had a professional trajectory predominantly in elective or first-level nominations, such as secretaries state and municipal, without a great career completed in the market or in the state bureaucracy. Political careers tend to have fewer positions, because the length of time in each position tends to be higher (four years is the standard time for executive and legislative mandates).

In addition, as already mentioned in Graph 1, the generation of leaders who started in the Lula administration has a less extensive career, even though the average age of the two groups of ministers, FHC and Lula, is the same (54.5 years). The function in the public sector implies intense turnover among various agencies, companies, councils, advisory positions, etc.

**Graph 2 - Ministers of State in Brazil by number of previous positions occupied according to the nature of the ministry by president (%)**



Number of cases: FHC: economic ministry = 48; military = 13; political = 29; social = 27

Number of cases: Lula: economic ministry = 53; military = 7; political = 31; social = 48

Source: Observatory of social and political elites of Brazil (<http://observatory-elites.org/>), UFPR.

The next tests compare the sectors of professional origin of which the ministers were recruited in the offices of FHC and Lula following the parameters reported in the previous section.

Table 1 summarizes data for the sectors in which ministers have completed most of their professional trajectories. These frequencies, organized by presidents (rather than mandates), give a more general view of their respective emphases on recruitment criteria.

The remarkable fact is the much smaller presence of the military in Lula's office than in that of his predecessor (11 against 2), but it has institutional and political reasons. A controversy with the Armed Forces marked the first FHC term: at the end of his first term, by instituting an administrative reform, Cardoso suppressed the military ministries. The once powerful ministries of the Army, Navy and Air Force, structures that were institutionally strengthened during the military dictatorship, were unified and replaced by the newly created Ministry of Defense, which was now commanded exclusively by

civilians. This resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of ministers with a military career in the governments thereafter (although the Heads of State of the Navy, Army and Air Force have maintained the formal status of state ministers even after the creation of the Ministry of Defense and its extensive power (ZAVERRUCHA, 2005).

Another relevant fact is the great difference between the numbers of ministers from the party sector in the administrations of Cardoso and Lula. While in the case of the PSDB the cabinet had only three, in the PT government this number reached 22 (Table 1).

**Table 1** - Ministers of the government of FHC and of Lula by sector of origin (N and%)

		<b>FHC</b>	<b>Lula</b>	<b>Total</b>
Military Sector	N	11	2	13
	%	9.4%	1.4%	5.1%
Party Sector	N	3	22	25
	%	2.6%	15.8%	9.8%
Political Sector	N	44	52	96
	%	37.6%	37.4%	37.5%
Private sector	N	14	9	23
	%	12.0%	6.5%	9.0%
Public sector	N	45	54	99
	%	38.5%	38.8%	38.7%
Total	N	117	139	256
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Source:** Observatory of social and political elites of Brazil (<http://observatory-elites.org/>) UFPR.


However, these 22 ministers were not evenly distributed in a balanced way among governing coalition parties. The PT (the President's party) indicated 18 of them, while the PMDB (Portuguese acronym Social Democracy Party), 2, and the PDT (Portuguese acronym for Democratic Workers' Party) and PSB (Portuguese acronym for Brazilian Socialist Party) indicated one each. We shall return to this point later.

Chart 3 orders this same information but distributes it through the four mandates of the two presidents. We can thus have a better view on the evolution of the date and specifically on the discrepancies between Lula I and Lula II.

The greatest differences can be observed in those ministers from the public sector in the Lula II government (directors of public companies, public servants, university professors, heads of the cabinet, legislative advisors). While in the first term of the PT, the proportion of public employees, civil servants and executives decreased in

relation to the “FHC” administration (from 41% to 29%), in Lula's second term they were almost half of ministerial mandates. As a result, the assumption made above about the public bureaucracy sector being less numerous in PT governments proved to be wrong. The proportion between the FHC and Lula governments is very similar between individuals from both the public sector and the political sector (Graph 3).

**Graph 3** - Ministers of State in Brazil by sector of origin and by government (%)



Number of cases: FHC I: military sector: 8, partisan: 1, political: 20, private: 7, public: 20; FHC II: military sector: 3, partisan: 2, political: 24, private: 7, public: 25.

Number of cases: Lula I: military sector: 1, partisan: 15, political: 28, private: 4, public: 20; Lula II: military sector: 1, partisan: 7, political: 24, private: 5, public: 34.

Source: Observatory of social and political elites of Brazil (<http://observatory-elites.org/>) UFPR.

The private sector is of little relevance in both governments, but much smaller in Lula I (6%) and Lula II (7%) than in both FHC mandates (12% on average). The most substantial difference between Cardoso and Lula was due to the growth of ministers with a previous career in party bureaucracies.

Graph 3 shows that the proportion of the party sector in the Lula I government was more than twelve times higher (22.1%) than in FHC I (1.8%). The data illustrate the priority of the PT and its allies in regrouping party chiefs for ministerial posts, while the PSDB gave preference to bureaucrats, university professors, officials and politicians in their recruitment strategy.

The next step of the investigation is to know in what kind of ministry individuals from different sectors were accommodated in the governments of the PSDB and the PT. Table 2 crosses the nature of the ministries (economic, military, political and social ministries) and the sectors of professional origin of ministers of state (military, partisan, political, private and public).

**Table 2** - Sector of professional origin of the ministers by nature of ministry by governments (N and%)

		Economic Ministry	Military Ministry	Political Ministry	Social Ministry	Total	
<b>FHC</b>	Military Sector	N	11			11	
		%	100.0%			100.0%	
	Party Sector	N	3			3	
		%	100.0%			100.0%	
	Political Sector	N	19	1	10	14	44
		%	43.2%	2.3%	22.7%	31.8%	100.0%
	Private Sector	N	9		4	1	14
		%	64.3%		28.6%	7.1%	100.0%
	Public Sector	N	17	1	15	12	45
		%	37.8%	2.2%	33.3%	26.7%	100.0%
	<b>Total</b>	N	48	13	29	27	117
		%	41.0%	11.1%	24.8%	23.1%	100.0%
<b>Lula</b>	Military Sector	N	2			2	
		%	100.0%			100.0%	
	Party Sector	N	8		4	10	22
		%	36.4%		18.2%	45.5%	100.0%
	Political Sector	N	22	3	10	17	52
		%	42.3%	5.8%	19.2%	32.7%	100.0%
	Private Sector	N	5	1	3		9
		%	55.6%	11.1%	33.3%		100.0%
	Public Sector	N	18	1	14	21	54
		%	33.3%	1.9%	25.9%	38.9%	100.0%
	<b>Total</b>	N	53	7	31	48	139
		%	38.1%	5.0%	22.3%	34.5%	100.0%

N = 256; Number of cases: FHC = 117; Lula = 139

Source: Observatory of social and political elites of Brazil (<http://observatory-elites.org/>) UFPR.

The greater presence of party leaders in the PT governments compared to the PSDB governments is confirmed (22 against 3). Lula distributed these leaderships in all kinds of ministries, but with an emphasis on social ministries (10), with the exception of military ministries. They are also in the ministries of the economic area. In absolute terms, there were many more party leaders in the Lula da Silva administration (8 against 3). However, all three who served in the PSDB government are in economic ministries (Transport and Communications).

Economic ministries (*latu sensu*) are no longer "politicized" in PT governments over PSDB governments. There is practically the same percentage of politicians in both (43%). However, if we add the values of the political sector and party sector, the management of FHC would be ahead (22 or 46.8% against 30 or 40.5% of Lula). In both



governments, political ministries were largely occupied by individuals from the public sector rather than from the political sector, as might be expected.

Strictly speaking, the difference in recruitment for the professional sector in political ministries is similar between the two governments. The strategy of the presidents analyzed in the choice of cabinet ministers is relatively similar, with Lula also choosing to nominate politicians with more party-related careers, while Cardoso practically ignored this criterion in most of his cabinet. As shown in Chart 3 and Table 1, the proportion and *N* of politicians in the FHC (44) and Lula (52) governments is similar. The significant difference is due to the greater presence of the party sector during the PT governments.


#### **4.2 Ministers of State and Party Strategies of Brazilian Presidents**

The last test concerns the partisan origin of the ministers. We seek to measure the proportion of ministers affiliated to the government party, as well as those linked to allied base parties in each administration over time. This proportion, seen diachronically, can give a better dimension to the party strategies adopted by the two presidents in the nomination of their collaborators.

The purpose of this test is to compare the group that was most active in each of the presidential mandates: whether the party from the parties allied with the government or the party of the president. By way of comparison, we also included in the test ministers without partisan membership.

Chart 4 indicates how these groups can vary with each government, and especially the important change that occurs between FHC II and Lula I.

**Graph 4 – Most active groups in presidential mandates (%)**



N = 256

Number of cases: FHC I = 56; FHC II = 61; Lula I = 68; Lula II = 71

Source: Observatory of social and political elites of Brazil (<http://observatory-elites.org/>) UFPR.

We can see how different the political movements of the two presidents were in relation to the partisan criterion of ministerial recruitment.

While the PSDB was ahead of the government, most of the ministers were not affiliated to any party (43.6% on average in the two periods versus 23% in the management of the PT). The PSDB, which was the party that was leading the government, had the least positions when compared to the nonpartisan group or the sum of all the allied parties, thus favoring the presence of related parties, especially PMDB (Portuguese acronym for Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) and PFL (Portuguese acronym for Liberal Front Party), with 13 mandates each one.

What happens after Lula as president in 2003 is the complete reversal of this situation, with the PT being represented in the cabinet, reaching almost half of the ministers during Lula's first term (46%), while the nonpartisan ministers passed the smallest number, reaching less than half of the proportion reached in the FHC's governments (19%). It confirms the membership of the ministerial offices of the Lula government, with emphasis on the PT's strong presence in the Executive Branch.

In spite of this great inversion of the party representation of the allies in the ministerial cabinet, research shows that the proportionality between the presence of the parties in the House of Representatives and in the ministries - coalescence rate - does not differ radically between the two governments (AMORIM NETO, 2007; INÁCIO; REZENDE, 2015). This frequently happens because the Lula administration nominated

for one or two political ministries affiliated with parties with few seats in the National Congress, which ultimately resulted in a consistent calculation between the proportion of ministries and the presence in the Legislature<sup>5</sup>. In spite of this, studies show that, comparatively, Brazil is the country with the lowest coalescence rate - similar proportion of party seats in the House of Representatives and ministries - among Latin American countries (AMORIM NETO, 2006). It would indicate, in a way, difficulties in accommodating, in a coherent way, the allied party base in Brazilian presidential system, causing constant political crises.

The similarity between the different governments and mandates was due to the presence of the allied base which, despite changes in relation to the president's party and nominated non-partisan, remained at an average of 33% of the ministries over the 16 years analyzed. The strategies did not change in relation to the allies, but in relation to the Presidents' own parties.

## 5 Conclusions

This work sought to detail the careers and profiles of the ministers nominated between 1995 and 2010 to identify the strategies behind the recruitment patterns of Brazilian Presidents in the PT and PSDB governments.

We have seen, when dealing with the numbers of positions held prior to the ministerial nomination, that the prior experience of the ministers is the most salient aspect during the FHC governments. The large number of positions, coupled with a hybrid career and intense turnover, seems to have been one of the essential elements for an individual to be assigned a ministerial chair during the PSDB's management.

The public sector, formed mostly by public executives and directors of state-owned companies, had a significant presence in all the mandates and types of ministries studied. Technocrats, specialists, professors and civil servants have, it seems, a consolidated place in Brazilian presidential coalition governments. Seeking to form a cabinet with legitimacy to the public opinion, the president often nominates individuals with expertise and administrative experience in the area.

The regrouping of some positions in the political field in elective or high ranking appointments, in political parties, in associations, and so on, is related to another

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<sup>5</sup> Partido Verde (PV), for example, acts with only 5 and 13 seats in the National Congress in the first and second terms of Lula, respectively, occupied only the Ministry of Culture - mandates of Gilberto Gil and Juca Ferreira.

dimension of ministerial recruitment. The political-partisan criterion of ministerial nomination was evident both in the Lula governments and in the FHC governments, especially in economic ministries, followed by social ministries. To a large extent, these findings refute our hypotheses.

Comparatively, we did not see substantial differences in the sector of professional origin between the Cardoso and Lula governments. In fact, the proportion of individuals in the public sector and the political sector in the offices of the two presidents was very similar, which goes against the idea that Fernando Henrique Cardoso would deploy fewer politicians to lead the ministries than Lula.

Moreover, we haven't found any evidence that the majority occupation of political ministries was done by individuals already in the political field, whether in parties, in elected positions, or in first-level appointed positions. In fact, the ministries of a political nature were occupied by those recruited in the public sector, since the occupation of the economic ministries was carried out by politicians, again contradicting our hypothesis.

The comparison made here between the governments of the PSDB and the PT showed few divergent strategies in the formation of the cabinet by the presidents. The most open difference talks about the type of party affiliation of the nominated ministers. Lula not only gave more space to party leaders in his office, but also prioritized those who were inscribed in his own party, resulting in an over representation of the PT. This calculation, however, was not incoherent, because PT was, at the beginning of its government, the acronym with the largest bench in the House of Representatives.

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