



## DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS IN CAMPAIGN MANIFESTOS IN THE POST-COLD WAR<sup>1</sup>

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**Abstract:** In the beginning of the 1990's, democrats and republicans were struggling to define their new worldview and to differentiate its view from that of the other party. Having as the starting point the assumption that foreign policy is designed as a space for parties' competition, this article has as its main goal to measure the ideological positions of the American parties on foreign policy issues in the presidential elections contested in the post-Cold War. The results show that the Democratic Party had more liberal positions on foreign policy than the Republican Party in all the six elections. Furthermore, it was found that the parties employed centripetal and centrifugal positioning strategies, each in three elections. In order to overcome the limitations of the standard method of the Manifesto Project to position parties ideologically on foreign policy, we present ways to improve it through the creation and reinterpretation of existing categories in its analytical framework.

**Keywords:** United States; Democrats; Republicans; Foreign Policy; Post-Cold War.

### 1. Introduction

Thinking about the United States foreign policy agenda through its political parties presupposes recognizing that these actors are not empty recipients concerned solely with the search for and maintenance of power<sup>2</sup>. In this sense, like Aldrich (2011), we

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<sup>2</sup> Downs (1999) understands that politicians never seek power as a means of executing specific public policies, since their sole purpose is to reap the rewards of holding public office. In his view, ideologies would only be a means for politicians to come to power. Epstein (2000), on the other hand, considers that the Democratic and Republican parties are almost never considered as policymakers and, in fact, have often been criticized for not having policies, except ad hoc. This criticism, for the author, has been an integral part of a broad attack against the American parties, \*Master and Doctorate in Political Science by UFSCar. Bachelor in Social Sciences from Unesp / Araraquara. He is active in the area of Political Science, with emphasis on Foreign Policy Analysis, in the following subjects: United States Foreign Policy, United States-Latin America Relations, Political Parties and Elections ([flavio.contrera@gmail.com](mailto:flavio.contrera@gmail.com)).

understand that politicians have preferences and values and fight for political issues, and obtaining positions is only one of their many objectives. That is, when elected, politicians propose alternatives, shape the agenda, approve or reject legislation, and implement what they sanction, making the process of policy formulation and execution strongly partisan. Moreover, to think of the American foreign policy agenda in these terms presupposes overcoming the perception that political disputes are limited to domestic politics. Indeed, for a long time there was a consensus on foreign policy, which was characterized by the political support of the majority of Republicans and Democrats who led Congress to unity in foreign issues (CRABB, 1957). From the point of view of relations between the Executive and the Legislative, also gave support to the explanation of bipartisan consensus in foreign policy the thesis of the two presidents (WILDAVSKY, 1969), which posited the existence of a prevailing president in the conduct of foreign policy as opposed to another one, strongly constrained by a powerful Congress in domestic politics. Added to these explanations, it was argued that the low interest of the electorate by external themes also contributed to the predominance of bipartisan consensus (HOLSTI, 1992), since the consequent disregard of the legislators for these issues facilitated consensus.

However, bipartisan consensus on foreign policy issues began to collapse as a result of the Vietnam War, whose negative repercussions led to a turning point in party stances. This moment is also pointed out in the literature as a symbol for strengthening the channels of direct participation of Congress in the conduct of its foreign policy (MEERNIK, 1993; LINDSAY, 1994). The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s culminated in the end of the Cold War and the rise of the United States to the status of sole superpower, posing new challenges to its foreign policy. In the absence of a threat considered vital, the United States found great difficulties in formulating its foreign policy agenda and in promoting its national interests (HUNTINGTON, 1997; NYE, 1999; RICE, 2000). This is because, in the post-Cold War period, new issues such as ethnic conflicts, environmental degradation, terrorism and transnational crime have gained prominence in their agenda for international issues.

Indeed, the post-bipolar context is marked by a long period of transition in the system characterized by both the change and the continuity in the conduct of US foreign policy. In terms of continuity, Pecequillo (2003) highlights the maintenance of the basic political, economic, and security structures created by the United States in post-1945 that would

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understood as non-programmatic and disorganized.

have provided a relatively stable scope for system administration and relationship among nations. On the other hand, in the field of change, the author points to the triggering, deepening and acceleration of some trends, such as interdependence and globalization, and more specifically, the reordering of the relative positions of States. However, in spite of its position as the only remaining superpower, the United States in the early 1990s questioned the new course of its foreign policy, revealing numerous questions about its real will and ability to continue leading the system. For the author, it seemed evident that the most notable aspect of this transition period was the lack of clarity of the Americans in relation to their international goals. As Ornstein (1992) points out, this lack of definition in foreign policy also affected political parties, which in the first presidential elections after the end of the Cold War were fighting to define a new worldview and to differentiate their position from the other party's position.

When they fight for elections, parties are faced with centripetal and centrifugal forces. The former concern the majority of public opinion, which is moderate in its positions and that massive membership is necessary for a party to win the election. According to Downs (1999), in a bipartisan system, parties would move toward these voters, making their positions ambiguous and moderate. The second concerns the party's militants, who hold ideological positions. According to Aldrich (2011), their role is to try to embarrass the party leaders and their ambitious candidates, as well as try to turn the party into the government by appealing to the electorate. Because they are politically driven, militants in the party provide a compensatory weight in relation to the centrist electorate. To the extent that incumbents must continually seek re-election, they must also reveal political positions in government that reflect those along the lines of their party's cleavage. The result is that politicians seeking to elect themselves face two competing pressures: the centripetal, which comes from seeking votes among the most moderate voters and the centrifuge, emanating from party militants and constraining candidates to defend political positions.

In the face of changes in the external environment caused by the end of the Cold War, which allowed the parties redefine their visions of foreign policy and to make that one party competition space that Democrats and Republicans so are positioning themselves in relation to foreign policy issues in Post-Cold War? To answer this question, we define as the primary objective of this study to measure the ideological positions of the US parties on foreign policy issues in each of the six disputed presidential elections in the post-Cold War. The results demonstrate that the Democratic Party presented more liberal

foreign policy positions than the Republican Party in all the elections held in the period. In addition, it was found that the parties used centripetal and centrifugal positioning strategies, each in three elections. In order to overcome the limitations of the standard approach of Manifesto Project to position ideologically parties in an exclusive left-right scale of foreign policy, we present ways to improve it from the creation and reinterpretation in, the context of foreign policy, already existing in its analytical situation.

This article is structured in five sections. After the introduction, we present in the second section the standard method of Manifesto Project, which is used to measure the position of political parties on the left-right scale. In the third section, we apply that method to measure the position of the parties specifically US foreign policy in the elections held between 1992 and 2012. In the fourth section, we discuss the limitations of this methodological approach and they suggest ways to overcome. Finally, in the fifth section, we synthesize the conclusions of the study and signal the possibilities of future research agendas.

## **2. The default method of ManifestoProject**

The Downsian interpretation of party competition has revived diverse reactions in the academic community and to this day continues to influence the development of many studies. This influence is also present in the initial motivations that culminated in the creation of Manifesto Research Group (MRG) in 1979, now better known as Manifesto Project. They were interested in discovering, in particular: (I) which political issues divided the postwar parties; and (II) whether they were divergent or convergent in political and ideological terms, the political scientists grouped around the Project Manifesto were able to empirically test the Downs hypothesis that, in bipartisan systems, parties converged their proposals into the position of the median voter. It is about the formation of this research group and its analytical method that we are now considering.

Andrea Volkens and Hans-Dieter Klingemann are two of the main researchers in the Manifesto Project. Together with Judith Bara, Ian Budge and Michael McDonald systematized the theoretical and methodological scope of their research group's analytical diagram in *Mapping Policy Preferences* (2006). ManifestoProject method allows researchers make three types of studies: a) comparing changes in political positions or emphases over time within specific parties; b) comparison of differences of political positions or emphases in all parties; and c) comparison of differences between the

countries studied. The basic data supporting such comparisons are the proportions of electoral programs dedicated to each category set out in the analytical situation of ManifestoProject.

Once the country (ies) that compose their analyzes are chosen, researchers interested in using the standard method of Manifesto Project should make a temporal cut and identify manifestos of the parties they wish to research. Then, the selected manifests submit a codification process, which consists of identifying quasi-sentences and classifying them into only one of the 56 that integrate the method of analysis of ManifestoProject. These 56 categories are divided into seven major domains, which can be understood as great theme policy areas. Table 1 summarizes each of these domains and their corresponding categories.

**Table 1** - Domains and categories of the standard method of Manifesto Project

Field	Category
1 - Foreign relations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Special external relations: Positive</li> <li>- Special external relations: Negative</li> <li>- Anti-Imperialism: Anticolonialism</li> <li>- Military Strengthening: Positive</li> <li>- Military Strengthening: Negative</li> <li>- Peace: Positive</li> <li>- Internationalism: Positive</li> <li>- European Integration: Positive</li> <li>- Internationalism: Negative</li> <li>- European Integration: Negative</li> </ul>
2 - Freedom and democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Freedom and human rights: Positive</li> <li>- Democracy: Positive</li> <li>- Constitutionalism: Positive</li> <li>- Constitutionalism: Negative</li> </ul>
3 - Political system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Decentralization: Positive</li> <li>- Centralization: Positive</li> <li>- Administrative and governmental effectiveness: Positive</li> <li>- Political corruption: Negative</li> <li>- Political Authority: Positive</li> </ul>

<p>4 – Economy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Free initiative: Positive</li> <li>- Incentives: Positive</li> <li>- Market regulation: Positive</li> <li>- Economic Planning: Positive</li> <li>- Corporatism: Positivo</li> <li>- Protectionism: Positive</li> <li>- Protectionism: Negative</li> <li>- Economic Objectives</li> <li>- Keynesian Management of Demand: Positive</li> <li>- Productivity: Positive</li> <li>- Technology and Infrastructure: Positive</li> <li>- Controlled economy: Positive</li> <li>- Nationalization: Positive</li> <li>- Economic Orthodoxy: Positive</li> <li>- Marxist analyzes: Positive</li> <li>- Growth control: Positive</li> </ul>
<p>5 - Well-being and quality of life</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Environmental protection: Positive</li> <li>- Culture: Positive</li> <li>- Social Justice: Positive</li> <li>- Expansion of well-being state: Positive</li> <li>- Limitation of well-beingstate: Positive</li> <li>- Expansion of education: Positive</li> <li>- Limitation of education: Positive</li> </ul>
<p>6 - Principles of society</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- National way of life: Positive</li> <li>- National way of life: Negative</li> <li>- Traditional Morality: Positive</li> <li>- Traditional Morality: Negative</li> <li>- Law and Order: Positive</li> <li>- Social harmony: Positive</li> <li>- Multiculturalism: Positive</li> <li>- Multiculturalism: Negative</li> </ul>
<p>7 - Social Groups</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Working Classes: Positive</li> <li>- Working Classes: Negative</li> <li>- Agriculture, farmers: Positive</li> <li>- Professional and middle class groups: Positive</li> <li>- Minority groups underprivileged: Positive</li> <li>- Non-economic demographic groups: Positive</li> </ul>

Source: KLINGEMANN *et al.* (2006).

Codification, however, is not such a simple process and sometimes involves overcoming some obstacles. For example, when none of the categories in the table applies to a given quasi-sentence, it should be treated as non-codifiable (000). In cases where the non-coded quasi-sentences have a specific bias of the country studied, subcategories can be created, which must be included within the 56 categories of the standard model. Another problem that may arise is the quasi-sentence contains arguments that allow it to be classified in more than one category. In this case, the coder must decide what is the most important concern of the argument and classify the quasi-sentence in only one category. When still some sentences seem obscure, the researcher must take into account the context in which they are inserted and also the following sentences, because in them the previous argument can be better explained.

After the classification of each of the quasi-sentences in any of the fifty-six categories, it is verified which were the most frequent. Since the metric of partisan programs varies considerably, the percentages that each category represents in relation to the total number of sentences in a program are calculated. The percentages of each category, such as "environmental protection" or "government effectiveness", can be interpreted as the importance of this issue for the respective party. At this point in the analysis it is already possible for the researcher interested in the electoral competition to see which issues are prioritized by each of the parties in dispute. However, the standard method of ManifestoProject goes beyond this aspect, enabling the researcher to position the party on a left-right scale.

The construction of this scale involves only twenty-six of the fifty-six categories of ManifestoProject. Thirteen categories are considered on the left (103, 105, 106, 107, 202, 403, 404, 406, 412, 413, 504, 506, 701), and thirteen other categories are considered right (104, 201, 203, 305, 401, 402, 407, 414, 505, 601, 603, 605, 606). The scale ranges from -100 to +100, these points being considered as the left and right extremes, respectively. To calculate the position of the parties in the scale, it is necessary to subtract the sum of the left percentages from the sum of the right percentages.

No detailed explanation is given as to why the twenty-six categories cited above were chosen from fifty-six totals. On the fact that they belong to the left or right domain a justification is rehearsed: the authors argue that the categories of the left find a theoretical basis in Marxist writings, which emphasize state intervention in economics and social well-being, together with Leninist idea that the internationalization of capitalism through the colonial expansion of imperialist powers would lead to conflict and war - that is why


peace is understood as a category of the left.

In relation to the construction of the called of the right categories, the authors admit to having difficulty defining a specific theoretical source. In spite of this, they affirm that the chain between security, free trade and traditional morality began to be discussed from the writings and theoretical discourses of Burke (1790). They also point out that investigations prior to Manifesto Project in party documents attest to the association of these themes as belonging to their respective left or right spectra (Klinginger et al., 2006).

Graph 1 shows the position of the parties on this scale in the elections held between 1992 and 2012. As we can see, the positions of the parties are not very extreme, having been more polarized in 2000 and 2012. These two elections were the only ones, that one of the parties, the Democrat, was left. In all other elections both parties have positioned themselves to the right. Thus, considering all political domains on the left-right scale, we can affirm that the positioning strategy most used by the parties was the centripetal in the elections conducted after the end of the Cold War.



**Graph 1** - Position of the US parties in the left-right scale of the Manifesto Project in the presidential elections held between 1992 and 2012.



Source: Prepared by the author, based on data from Manifesto Project.

In the next section we look at the emphasis on external relations compared to the other domains of ManifestoProject, as well as the emphasis each party gave to the foreign affairs categories in the post-Cold War presidential elections.

### 3. Foreign policy in the post-Cold War presidential elections

In elections, parties can position themselves on the international scene through their campaign platforms and the opinions voiced by the candidates during the presidential debates. Far from being decisive for voter choice, the foreign policy issue, on the other hand, can not be considered irrelevant. According to Ornstein (1992), although foreign policy issues are rarely the focus of presidential elections, they are hardly likely to be absent. In times of conflict with external actors, international politics often gains a great deal of space in US presidential debates and manifestoes.

Between 1992 and 2012 six presidential elections took place. Year of the first election after the end of the Cold War, 1992 marks also the first victory of the Democratic Party since 1976. Until 2012 were four victories of candidates Democrats (Clinton in 1992 and 1996 and Obama in 2008 and 2012) and two of Republican candidates (Bush in 2002 and

2006). In the two elections won by Clinton, independent candidate Ross Perot got strong popular votes, although he did not win seats for the polling station. In 2000, Democrat Al Gore won the popular vote, but lost at the polling station.

Although we can affirm that the theme of foreign policy was on the agenda of all the elections between 1992 and 2012 and that in some of them was more debated than other topics, there is a difficulty to measure empirically the importance of this issue for the parties at each event. There are a lot of possibilities for obtaining data in this sense, ranging from coverage of the press to the foreign policy agenda of the candidates, through the debates between them, interviews granted, and, of course, the program of government of each party. Given that the latter is published periodically in each election by both parties and that it is a view of them on the various themes that compose the US policy agenda, we have chosen to measure the importance of this issue through this basis of data. Campaign manifestoes represent a more faithful portrayal of party stances because in the electoral arena there are no institutional constraints capable of modifying them in their essence, as in the Executive and Legislative, where the composition of forces determining whether or not the party will have government influence decisively their positions. Add to this the fact that there is a specific methodology developed by ManifestoProject for the analysis of the content of partisan programs.

According to the data available on Manifesto Project portal, "external relations" was among the seven thematic areas of its platform classification of sentencing, which received more emphasis among Republicans in the 2000 and 2004 elections and among Democrats in the 2008 and 2012 elections. The same can not be said about the 1992 and 1996 elections, when the issue attracted medium attention among the parties' campaign proposals. The complete data for the period studied are shown in table 1.

These data together show that foreign policy is present on the presidential campaign agenda and has received more attention in a period marked by a significant threat to the security of the United States and its allies, namely after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

**Table 1** - Classification of sentences in thematic domains on US presidential campaign platforms in the period 1992-2012

Elections Domains	1992		1996		2000		2004		2008		2012	
	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R	D	R
External Relations	14,9	14	7,7	15,4	14,1	24,3	21,7	25,1	22,4	17,3	21,9	13,7
Freedom and Democracy	7,2	2,85	2,7	3,5	4,5	6,6	7,6	3,7	6,2	2,8	7,5	11,4
Political system	12,3	24,9	16,5	18,9	13,8	18,7	12	6,7	13,8	12,7	8,5	14
Economy	19,8	24,4	11,1	18,5	11,9	15	11,3	21,8	15,4	18,9	21,9	22,8
Well-being and quality of life	17,2	8	25,6	14,9	31,3	12	21,9	14,9	14,5	8,9	17,4	13,7
Principles of Society	20,3	18,1	25,9	19,7	13,9	17,5	16,8	21,8	16,1	21	11,8	15,9
Social Groups	7,9	7,4	10,2	8,7	10,1	5,5	8,4	5,8	11,3	17,9	10,7	8,2

Source: Manifesto Project Database. Available in: <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>

In order to evaluate precisely which foreign policy themes received the most attention from the parties during the studied period, we consulted in Manifesto Project database the frequency of appearance of each of the categories that compose the domain "external relations". These are: Special Foreign Relations (positive), Special Negative Relations (negative), Anti-imperialism, Armed Forces (positive), Armed Forces (negative), Peace, Internationalism (positive), European Union / negative), Union / European Community (negative). The description of each of them follows in Table 2:

**Table 2** - Categories of the External Relations domain of the standard method of Manifesto Project

Code	Category	Description
101	Foreign relations (positive)	Mentions favorable to countries with which the country has special diplomatic relations; need for cooperation and / or assistance to this country.
102	Special Overseas Relations (Negative)	Negative mentions to countries with which the country maintains special diplomatic relations.
103	Anti-imperialism	Negative references to the exercise of strong influence (political, military or commercial) over other states; negative references to control over other countries as if they were part of an empire; favorable to decolonization; favorable references to greater self-government and independence for colonies; negative references to the imperial behavior of the country itself or others. Self-determination, nonintervention, world power

		balance, non-alignment.
104	Armed Forces (positive)	Need to maintain or increase military expenditures; modernization of the Armed Forces and improvement of military force; rearmament and self-defense; need to honor military treaty obligations; need to ensure adequate human resources in the Armed Forces. Territory defense and integrity. Favoring of military.
105	Armed Forces (Negative)	Mentions favorable to the reduction of military expenditures; disarmament; evils of war; promises to reduce recruitment or internal powers.
106	Peace	Peace as a general goal; declarations of belief in peace and peaceful means of resolving crises; interest in the country's negotiation with hostile countries.

Code	Category	Description
107	Internationalism (positive)	Need for international cooperation, assistance to developing countries, global resource planning and international courts; support for any international goal or world status; support to the UN; use of multilateral forums for negotiation with hostile states.
108	European Union / Community (positive)	Statements favorable to the Union / European Community in general. It may include: the desirability of the country to become or remain a member, an opportunity to expand the Union / European Community, an opportunity to increase the powers of the Union / European Community, and the opportunity to extend the powers of the European Parliament.
109	Internationalism (negative)	Mentions favorable to national independence and sovereignty as opposed to internationalism. It includes references to the defense of national interests in front of other countries and organizations; includes use of unilateralism and military intervention.
110	Union / European Community (negative)	Negative references to Union / European Community. It may include: opposition to specific European policies favored by European authorities; opposition to the net

		contribution of the country to the EU budget.
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Source: Manifesto Project Database. Available in: <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>

Analysis of the Democratic and Republican presidential campaign manifests published in the six contested elections after the end of the Cold War reveal similar priorities. For most of the period studied, both parties issued more positions related to the defense of internationalism. In this regard, the Democrats on five of the six opportunities emphasized this subject more than the Republicans. Positive positions on the Armed Forces were prioritized once by each party: Republicans in 2000 and Democrats in 2004. Four times Republicans argued for more positions of this nature than Democrats. Regarding negative positions on the Armed Forces, the relationship is reversed, that is, four times the Democrats have put more emphasis on this issue than the Republicans. On five occasions the Republicans emphasized more than the Democrats the theme "Special Foreign Relations: Negative". The same trend is seen in the positive version of this category, this time with the Republicans approaching the issue more than the Democrats on four occasions, in one of them the subject was the most discussed among all in the party manifesto. On the subject of "peace", each party emphasized the subject more than the opponent on three occasions. Finally, the categories "anti-imperialism" and "Union / European Community", both positive and negative, had low frequencies of appearance in the manifestos of both parties and did not elicit relevant conclusions. Tables 2 and 3 bring the frequency of all categories of the domain "outer relations".

**Table 2** - Frequency of the categories of the domain "external relations" in the manifestos of the Republican Party in the elections held between 1992 and 2012

Category	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Special Foreign relations (positive)	22,4	0	22,17	36,61	8,62	3,23
Special Foreign relations (negative)	1,56	0	17,35	10,07	1,15	1,38
Anti-imperialism	0	0	0	0	0,57	0
Armed Forces (positive)	16,67	35,32	30,36	22,65	29,89	62,21
Armed Forces (Negative)	9,9	0	4,58	1,37	1,15	3,23
Peace	8,85	0,5	4,58	11,44	5,17	5,07
Internationalism (positive)	38,02	56,22	14,94	16,25	35,06	15,21
European Union / Community (positive)	0	0	0,72	0	1,15	0
Internationalism (negative)	2,08	7,96	5,06	1,6	16,67	9,22

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Union / European Community (negative)    0,52    0    0,24    0    0,57    0,46

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Source: Manifesto Project Database. Available in: <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>

**Table 3** - Frequency of the categories of the domain "external relations" in the manifestos of the Democratic Party in the elections carried out between 1992 and 2012


Category	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Special Foreign relations (positive)	10,34	7,25	16,87	19,37	10,57	2,77
Special Foreign relations (Negative)	0	0	6,25	2,09	0	0,69
Anti-imperialism	0	2,9	0	0	0	1,73
Armed Forces (positive)	22,41	7,25	21,25	28,8	28,46	33,22
Armed Forces (Negative)	3,45	21,74	11,88	16,23	0	11,76
Peace	6,9	7,25	15	8,9	7,32	3,11
Internationalism (positive)	56,9	52,17	28,75	23,56	49,59	46,71
European Union / Community (positive)	0	0	0	0,52	2,03	0
Internationalism (negative)	0	1,45	0	0,52	2,03	0
Union / European Community (negative)	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Source: Manifesto Project Database. Available in: <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>

In addition to verifying the emphasis given by the parties in each category of the "foreign relations" domain, we applied the criterion of party positioning in the left-right scale to verify how the parties positioned themselves ideologically in foreign policy. We reviewed at this point that only five categories of the domain "external relations" are part of the left-right scale. In this case, the frequency of the categories "Armed Forces (positive)" was subtracted the sum from the frequency of the category "anti-imperialism", "Armed Forces (negative)", "peace" and "internationalism (positive)". The result of this analysis can be visualized in Graph 2.

**Graph 2 -** Position of US parties on the left-right scale of foreign policy in the presidential elections held between 1992 and 2012



Source: Elaborated by the author from data of Manifesto Project.

Unlike the full left-right scale of the standard method involving categories from all domains, the exclusive left-right scale of the "foreign relations" domain shows the parties positioned to the left in almost all elections. Exceptions once again to the 2000 and 2012 lawsuits, which had the Republican Party positioned to the right. In all elections the Democrats were positioned to the left of the Republican Party. Parties were less polarized

(distance of 4.74 percentage points) in 1992, in the first election after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and more polarized (distance of 68.79 percentage points) in the 2012 election. We can consider that the parties used a centripetal strategy in their foreign policy positions in the lawsuit of 1992, 2004 and 2008 elections and a centrifugal strategy in the 1996, 2000 and 2012 elections.

This distortion in relation to the full left-right scale occurs because most categories of the "foreign policy" domain are considered left. Of course, this is not the best criterion for verifying the position of parties in foreign policy. Thus, in the next section we discuss how to improve the method of ManifestoProject to analyze the emphases and ideological positions of the parties in foreign policy.

#### **4. Suggestions for positioning US parties in foreign policy through ManifestoProject**

The study by Dinas and Gemenis (2010) has shown that the standard method of ManifestoProject positions the Greek parties in the wrong way on the left-right scale. In the case of the Brazilian parties, Tarouco and Madeira (2013), verified that the positions attributed to them through this method, diverge widely from those usually defined by the specialists. In the opinion of the authors, this divergence is certainly due to the inadequacy and Brazilian specificities of some of the categories chosen to compose the scale.

Thus it is undeniable that the application of the Manifest Project method should be weighed and evaluated around the political context of the country to which it applies. To the extent that the analysis focuses on specific parties or only in a particular country, we believe that the application of the method with adaptations does not suffer methodological damage. However, we understand that this criterion should not be applied when the researcher is comparing parties from different countries, since comparisons require uniformity.

The first imprecision of the application of Manifesto Project to the study of American parties is conceptual. Unlike European countries, the cleavage of US policy is generally discussed in terms of the dispute between liberals and conservatives rather than between left and right. Left-right and liberal-conservative configurations are, according to Sartori (1991), spatial images, whose property is to order objects horizontally in a one-dimensional space. The origin of the spatial translation of political perceptions in a left-right plan goes back to the French Revolution, specifically to the disposition of the seats in the Assembly. Connotations of value, praise, and blame for these words have



undergone considerable variations since then, and in the whole have counterbalanced. According to the author, the right capitalized on the positive association with the legal meaning of the word (having a right, or being "right"), but suffered from the initial association to the king and to the subsequent Restoration. On the other hand, the left capitalized the location of the heart on the left and the initial association of the word with republican, constitutional politicians, but continued to be hampered by the inferiority of the use of the left hand in relation to the use of the right hand.


However, Bobbio (1995) observes that the attribution of positive or negative value judgments, which depending on the circumstances on the right or left, is an integral part of the political struggle itself, in which the spatial metaphor has completely lost its original meaning and represents only two non-axiologically connotated places. Thus, right and left represent a certain topology, which has nothing to do with political ontology, and can designate diverse contents according to times and situations. Despite this, there is a fundamental distinction between one and the other, which for the author refers to the different positive or negative judgment about the ideal of equality. Egalitarians, while not ignorant of the fact that men are as equal as they are unequal, especially appreciate and consider that which unites them is more important for good living together, while the unequal ones, starting from the same judgment, appreciate and consider more important for the good coexistence of diversity. The former understand that inequalities are social and, second, that they are natural.

Add to Bobbio's (1995) analysis the concept of freedom, which can be considered as an individual good. The ideal of freedom finds its fulfillment in the principles and rules that are at the basis of democratic governments. Already the radicality of projects of transformationis revolutionary or counterrevolutionary has in common the conviction that its realization depends on the establishment of authoritarian regimes. Thus, the liberty-authority dyad serves, in turn, to distinguish the moderate wing from the extremist wing on both the left and the right. However, the role of the concept of freedom in the distinction between left and right goes somewhat beyond what Bobbio has formulated. That the idea of freedom is present on both sides of the spectrum seems incontrovertible even to the author, but what we really want to emphasize is that left and right can be thought of as distinct ways of limiting liberties also within the democratic regime. While the left limits economic freedoms, through state intervention in the economy, when it finds that it is related to inequality, the right holds a restrictive discourse to the moral freedoms of individuals, because they believe that they can jeopardize tradition. By

limiting certain freedoms, each ideology reinforces its point of view around the idea of equality.

Regarding the comparison of the liberal-conservative<sup>3</sup> dimension with the left-right, Sartori (1991) states that they differ fundamentally because the latter can not be totally purified of cognitive-informative content, whereas the former consists of empty behaviors that can be occupied and reoccupied, in principle, at will. An example of this is that although there is a semantic impediment to the association of liberal with Stalinist policies, such an impediment does not exist for the left. Indeed, it does not fit in the liberal-conservative dimension the extremisms of left and right. Thus liberals and conservatives can be seen as moderate wings of left and right, respectively, whose positions are circumscribed to democratic principles. In effect, it is a smaller dimension (liberal-conservative) within a larger dimension (left-right) in the same space of competition.

**Figure 1** - Characterization of the one-dimensional ideological space



Source: Elaborated by the author from the literature discussed.

From the point of view of the study of the personalities of the defenders of each ideology, there is an analytical approach to the two cleavages. For Confrancesco (1975), "the right-wing man is the one who, above all, is concerned with safeguarding tradition, the leftist man, on the contrary, is the one who wants above all else to free his fellow man from the chain they imposed by the privileges of race, caste, class, etc. " In turn, conservatives prefer things that are familiar, stable, and predictable, while liberals are more open to experience and more inclined to seek change, both personally and politically (GRAHAM; HAIDT; NOSEK, 2009).

From this discussion, we can understand that the distinction between left and right or liberal and conservative can be made through different conceptions of equality, freedom and conduct in the face of change, which order positions on issues involving the size and

<sup>3</sup> On the liberal-conservative scale, economic liberalism is considered a conservative theme, while state intervention in the economy is considered a liberal theme. Therefore, defending economic liberalism means the opposite of defending "liberal" policies on this scale.

role of government, social well-being, minority rights, traditional values, among others, that help us think about how the parties stand. The left-right scale of ManifestoProject was constructed to encompass both economic issues (different conceptions of equality) and non-economic ones (different conceptions of freedom). However, when we focus only on the domain "external relations" we perceive that the categories disposed there belong mainly to the second cleavage. Perhaps the only categories that have any relation with the economic theme are those related to European Integration.

In this sense, the position of US parties in foreign policy can be better measured by adding categories that focus on economic issues, since this theme is of extreme importance for any country, and in particular, the United States. Proof of this is that issues such as economic growth and rising US exports, as well as growth of free-market economies and international economic openness are frequent themes in national security strategies, strategic plans and in the US campaign manifests themselves.

As we know, there are already categories belonging to the Economy domain in the standard method of ManifestoProject. Thus, instead of simply creating new economic categories within the domain of "foreign relations," it would be productive to make an effort to interpret existing economic categories in the light of foreign policy. Created to assess the positioning of European parties, the negative and positive categories of European integration do not make much sense when applied to other scenarios. Thus, we suggest that to the study of the US case the positive and negative categories of European integration be replaced by the categories "bilateral or regional (positive) economic integration" and "bilateral or regional (negative) economic integration". It is important to remember that NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) entered into force during the 1990s, and much was discussed in the United States about the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas. Therefore, the inclusion of these categories is justifiable.

The categories referring to the positive and negative views of protectionism, which exist in the "economics" domain, certainly can also be thought from the perspective of foreign policy, since they meet US demands for the increase of free market economies and international economic openness. However, we should point out that although domestic politics support different views on protectionism, we strongly suspect that this is a consensual issue in foreign policy. Of course, only the negative view of protectionism would be sustained by the parties in foreign policy, since protectionist policies undermine the competition of American products abroad. As the economic growth and the increase

in the export goals constantly promoted in the US strategic documents, positive visions of protectionist policies abroad would be contradictory with these goals.

Even non-economic issues in Manifesto Project categories are amenable to reinterpretation. An example of this is the pair of categories regarding the country's special relations with other countries. These categories do not capture the use of strategies of cooperation and conflict with other countries. This dimension, if added, would be very useful, since it also allows for inferences about the positioning of parties on a liberal-conservative scale of foreign policy. According to Baum and Nau (2012), the literature offers increasingly strong evidence that the ideology of domestic politics influences people's attitudes toward specific foreign policy issues. From conceptions of combative internationalism (use of force, defeat opponents) and a cooperative internationalism (disarmament, support to the UN, foreign aid), which are linked to conservative and liberal ideologies respectively, the authors work with four visions of world relations: nationalist, realistic, conservative internationalist and liberal internationalist.

Nationalists support independence, unilateralism, a strong defense apparatus (including missiles), non-intervention abroad, and maintaining power. Realists, however, advocate active alliances, peace through the use of force, world order, stability, prudence (coexistence with tyranny), moral relativism, and preservation of balance. Internationalist conservatives, on their turn, have as their preference to reduce tyranny (not just coexist or cooperate with it), sow freedom (regime change), use force assertively, and anticipate threats militarily. Finally, internationalist liberals support strengthening the legitimacy of institutions (multilateralism), human rights, disarmament, the fight against poverty and disease to prevent the emergence of threats. Nationalists, conservative internationalists and part of the realists tend to think about the role of the United States in the world more in terms of security and power, while internationalist liberals and some realists favor multilateralism and diplomacy. While the first group could motivate the creation of the category "Relations with other countries (conflict)", the second group could motivate the creation of the category "Relations with other countries (cooperation)", linked to conservative and liberal ideas, respectively.

Another issue that divides Americans and could be included as part of the analysis of party positions in foreign policy is the issue of immigration. It involves economic and non-economic cleavages. From the economic point of view, the arguments of those who consider that immigrants are overloading American borders and their labor market (HUNTINGTON, 2005) and those who argue that immigration is beneficial to the

American economy, labor costs, which affects the cost of goods and services (TELLES, 2006). This dispute of ideas could be verified by creating two exclusionary categories "Immigration (positive)" and "Immigration (negative)", which would be arranged, in the liberal and conservative spectrum, respectively.

The non-economic cleavage linked to immigration is linked to the cultural assimilation of immigrants. In an article discussing the erosion of American national interests in the post-Cold War era, political scientist Samuel Huntington (1997) criticizes the Clinton administration for allegedly encouraging multiculturalism. For the author, in the early 1990s, immigrants were being constituted as groups that, although rooted in the United States, supported the interests of their homeland. This process would be accompanied by an increase in the cult of multiculturalism and diversity in the Clinton administration which, in the author's view, would contribute to the fragmentation of American national identity insofar as they replace individual rights for widely defined groups' rights in terms of race, ethnic origin, gender and sexual preference. Conservative, Huntington's argument is closer to the positions advocated by the Republican Party. To the extent that he criticizes Clinton for promoting a cult of multiculturalism, Huntington establishes a cleavage, which puts conservatives (Republicans) on one side and liberals (Democrats) on the other. The Manifest Project method presents multiculturalism among its categories. The categories "multiculturalism (positive)" and "multiculturalism (negative)" could thus also be interpreted in the context of foreign policy.

Covering positions on the Armed Forces, internationalism, economic integration, protectionism, the nature of external relations with other countries, immigration and multiculturalism, ManifestoProject method could be improved to position parties more accurately on an exclusive ideological scale of foreign policy . In any case, it should be emphasized that the application of the standard method for party positioning in foreign policy is not mistaken, since in all elections the position of the Democratic Party was considered more liberal than the position of the Republican Party, experts and public opinion position them.

## **5. Conclusions**

The analysis of Democrats and Republicans' positions on foreign policy issues from their campaign manifests issued for post-Cold War elections demonstrates that parties used centripetal positioning strategies in the 1992, 2004, and 2008 elections and centrifugal strategies in the 1996, 2000 and 2012 elections. It also reveals that the

Democratic party was more liberal than the Republican Party in all elections. This position was constructed from differences in emphasis on positive and negative manifestations of the Armed Forces and to the extent that Republicans emphasized more than the Democrats a negative view of internationalism. In addition, Republicans have less emphasis on defending positive internationalism and have placed more emphasis than their opponents on negative foreign relations with other countries.

On the other hand, we must consider that the analysis categories of Manifesto Project prove insufficient to capture all the ideological cleavages existing in American foreign policy. As we have seen, the categories of "peace", "anti-imperialism" and "Union / European Community" had a low frequency of appearance and were imprecise to explain differences between the parties in terms of ideological positions. As a method built to be able to compare positions of parties from different countries, Manifesto Project leaves out contextual specificities of each country in its categories of analysis. With this in view, we suggest that studies of the positions of US political parties in the foreign policy that use Manifesto Project method should correct some inaccuracies. The first is to recognize the party-space of competition as liberal-conservative rather than left-right. The second is to incorporate economic categories into the foreign policy domain, which can be done from the reinterpretation of existing categories. In this sense, the categories "bilateral or regional (positive) economic integration", "bilateral or regional economic integration (negative)", "protectionism (positive)" and "protectionism (negative)" would be created. We also suggest the reinterpretation of the pair of non-economic categories relating to US relations with other countries. Thus, the categories "relations with other countries (conflict)" and "relations with other countries (cooperation)" would be included in the table. Finally, categories that have an economic and non-economic interface like "immigration (positive)", "immigration (negative)", "multiculturalism (positive)" and "multiculturalism (negative)" would be added.

We believe that this cluster of categories, together with the categories referring to the Armed Forces and Internationalism, would give a more precise view of the position of the parties on the liberal-conservative scale. Future research may assess the viability of applying the improved Manifesto Project method to measure party positions more accurately in foreign policy. In sum, the analyzes presented here contribute to the debate that the conceptions that structure the ideological distinctions in domestic politics also help us to distinguish different foreign policy perspectives. That is, different conceptions of equality, distributive politics, and conduct in the face of change place liberals and

conservatives on opposing sides in issues such as free trade, immigration, and defense. In addition, this study launches new contributions to the debate around improving the method of Manifesto Project and its adaptation to local contexts.

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